Yuan Class AIP & Kilo Submarine Thread

[kwaigonegin]

With modern space based maritime surveillance there is no place to hide anymore. It is unlike WWII era where the vast ocean afford concealment.
You need to read the official economic & security commission report on this .Once it is detected the defense only have 30 second to respond Not enough time

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The YJ-18’s wide deployment and long range would increase China’s ability to launch standoff* multi-axis, multi-missile attacks against U.S. Navy surface ships. Such attacks are formidable challenges for shipboard defenses, and the YJ-18’s supersonic sprint capabilities will further increase the likelihood some missiles would penetrate a U.S. ship’s missile defenses. The YJ-18 is one of a variety of antiship missiles that provide China a multilayered antiaccess/area denial capability in its near seas† and beyond (see Figure 2). In a 2014 volume on China’s cruise missiles, China military experts Dennis Gormley, Andrew Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan assessed, “It appears that China’s increasing ASCM inventory has increasing potential to saturate U.S. Navy defenses.

True. I believe that China now possesses enough sophisticated cruise missiles to totally saturate any USN defenses.
There is really no defense against 100 hypersonic bogeys coming from multiple vectors or even from a single vector for that matter. There will be losses for sure no doubt about it.
The only 'defense' is a preemptive first strike.

 

[Gloire_bb]

The YJ-18’s wide deployment and long range would increase China’s ability to launch standoff* multi-axis, multi-missile attacks against U.S. Navy surface ships.

With this i agree. I disagree with it being made main mode of operation. Where are neither visual signs of this, nor it is viable. Too many variables in process.

There is really no defense against 100 hypersonic bogeys coming from multiple vectors or even from a single vector for that matter.

Let hypersonic ASCMs appear at least.

For supersonic ASCMs soviet estimations(back in 80s - not against current aegis hordes!) of necessary salvoes to reliably put out of action carrier task forces were rather high.

 

[tphuang]

yep, the soviet estimation for the amount of losses their bombers would have to endure to penetrate and take out one USN carrier was really high. I can't remember the exact number. And China does not have anywhere near the firepower as Soviet did back in the 80s when we factor in how much USN technology has moved forward.

The greatest weapon China could have with diesel submarine is a really capable heavy torpedo. Far more important to continue the work in improving the acoustic signature of the submarine fleet rather than obsessing about supersonic missiles.

 

[Iron Man]

True. I believe that China now possesses enough sophisticated cruise missiles to totally saturate any USN defenses.
There is really no defense against 100 hypersonic bogeys coming from multiple vectors or even from a single vector for that matter. There will be losses for sure no doubt about it.
The only 'defense' is a preemptive first strike.

No country is capable of sending "100 hypersonic bogeys" against an enemy force.

Incidentally, my personal estimation of the number of "bogeys" needed to saturate and destroy a USN CSG is on the order of several hundred ASCMs, or essentially what it would take to empty the VLS magazines of the Burke and Tico escorts and then some, accounting for soft kills measures such as decoys, chaff and ECM and of course the number of missiles it would take to sink or mission kill the targets themselves. I think a combined force of PLAN, PLANAF, PLAAF and PLASAF assets could achieve this against one or possibly two USN CSGs, but the USN is sure to send 4, 5 or even 6 CSGs if they send any at all, depending on how fast they could muster the carriers from around the world. China's goal in such an instance would be to force the capitulation of the Taiwanese leadership and/or populace before the carriers could gather in force.

 

[Lezt]

No country is capable of sending "100 hypersonic bogeys" against an enemy force.

actually, technically, all of the great nuclear power can. there is nothing stopping the US to deploy 300 ICBMs against Moscow lets say and they are hypersonic bogey.

Now can they do that to a battle group?

Incidentally, my personal estimation of the number of "bogeys" needed to saturate and destroy a USN CSG is on the order of several hundred ASCMs, or essentially what it would take to empty the VLS magazines of the Burke and Tico escorts and then some, accounting for soft kills measures such as decoys, chaff and ECM and of course the number of missiles it would take to sink or mission kill the targets themselves. I think a combined force of PLAN, PLANAF, PLAAF and PLASAF assets could achieve this against one or possibly two USN CSGs, but the USN is sure to send 4, 5 or even 6 CSGs if they send any at all, depending on how fast they could muster the carriers from around the world. China's goal in such an instance would be to force the capitulation of the Taiwanese leadership and/or populace before the carriers could gather in force.

How did you come up with that estimation, are you assuming that the intercept system have a 100% hit rate? what about the missile bogey's decoys? what about the sensor disruptions when multiple bogeys are intercepted and detonated?

I am skeptical of all missile intercept systems, against one or two missiles, it should work. but against a barrage of missiles, even, unguided rockets. How is the system supposed to know which missile is guided and which one is not? The intercept system will have to engage all incoming bogeys just in case. this makes the cost to intercept ratio being very unfavorable.

Anywhere within naval aircraft strike range within China, china can saturate those targets with cheap mass produced missiles. Heck a scud C gave a 600 km range. Heck even the siklworms HY4 had a 500 km range - and there are tens of thousands of these missiles floating around.

This is not the ideal case of stratification attack too, the ideal case is, ~50 ballistic missile missiles arriving together with ~50 hypersonic cruise missile just before ~100s supersonic and subsonic cruise missile and ~30 homing tropedo (air and sub launched) hits.

 

[kwaigonegin]

No country is capable of sending "100 hypersonic bogeys" against an enemy force.

Incidentally, my personal estimation of the number of "bogeys" needed to saturate and destroy a USN CSG is on the order of several hundred ASCMs, or essentially what it would take to empty the VLS magazines of the Burke and Tico escorts and then some, accounting for soft kills measures such as decoys, chaff and ECM and of course the number of missiles it would take to sink or mission kill the targets themselves. I think a combined force of PLAN, PLANAF, PLAAF and PLASAF assets could achieve this against one or possibly two USN CSGs, but the USN is sure to send 4, 5 or even 6 CSGs if they send any at all, depending on how fast they could muster the carriers from around the world. China's goal in such an instance would be to force the capitulation of the Taiwanese leadership and/or populace before the carriers could gather in force.

I'm not talking about operational realism or any strategic 'goals' but rather a hypothetical event based on current technologies available to PLAN. A salvo of 100 modern generation cruise missiles be it from air, land and/or sea directed as a specified grouping of ships like a CSG will most certainly destroy it or at least guarantee a mission kill.

Aegis is good, great even but even it can be defeated by such a barrage.

 

[Iron Man]

I'm not talking about operational realism or any strategic 'goals' but rather a hypothetical event based on current technologies available to PLAN. A salvo of 100 modern generation cruise missiles be it from air, land and/or sea directed as a specified grouping of ships like a CSG will most certainly destroy it or at least guarantee a mission kill.

Aegis is good, great even but even it can be defeated by such a barrage.

You severely underestimate the capabilities of the Aegis system.

 

[Iron Man]

actually, technically, all of the great nuclear power can. there is nothing stopping the US to deploy 300 ICBMs against Moscow lets say and they are hypersonic bogey.

Now can they do that to a battle group?

You're making an irrelevant semantic argument here. There is no power, nuclear or otherwise that can send 100 hypersonic bogeys against a USN CSG. Yes, China could technically (and stupidly) send a rain of ICBMs down on a USN CSG, but this is obviously not what kwaigonegin was talking about, and you know it.

How did you come up with that estimation, are you assuming that the intercept system have a 100% hit rate? what about the missile bogey's decoys? what about the sensor disruptions when multiple bogeys are intercepted and detonated?

I am skeptical of all missile intercept systems, against one or two missiles, it should work. but against a barrage of missiles, even, unguided rockets. How is the system supposed to know which missile is guided and which one is not? The intercept system will have to engage all incoming bogeys just in case. this makes the cost to intercept ratio being very unfavorable.

Anywhere within naval aircraft strike range within China, china can saturate those targets with cheap mass produced missiles. Heck a scud C gave a 600 km range. Heck even the siklworms HY4 had a 500 km range - and there are tens of thousands of these missiles floating around.

This is not the ideal case of stratification attack too, the ideal case is, ~50 ballistic missile missiles arriving together with ~50 hypersonic cruise missile just before ~100s supersonic and subsonic cruise missile and ~30 homing tropedo (air and sub launched) hits.

That's right, Aegis will have to engage every incoming guided missile. Telling whether or not an inbound object is guided or not is so easy a developmentally delayed person could do it. The CSG will be actively maneuvering, so if the object is flying straight and not compensating for the CSG's maneuvers, it's unguided and can be ignored.

You don't have to have a 100% hit rate. You can even account for misfires and inflight losses and guidance failures and entire VLS module failures and whatever else you want to account for, expressed as a certain percentage of outbound missiles. I'm sure the USN includes all of these variables in its combat simulations based on its past experiences and theoretical estimates. Then you set the scenario. Most importantly, is a Hawkeye overhead yes or no? How many quadrants are missiles coming in from? How many missiles are coming within range of SM-6, SM-2, ESSM, and RAM at what times? What speeds are these missiles? Aegis takes all of these into account and during an engagement will automatically sort out how and when to respond to each radar contact, using CEC to launch the most appropriate air defense missile from the most appropriate escort at the most appropriate target, or else to deploy countermeasures and electronic warfare, all without human intervention. IIRC even the E-2C can already process over TWO THOUSAND contacts simultaneously. The E-2D is probably beating that number by a good margin. I see no reason why surface combatants with larger computers like the Burke and Tico cannot perform similarly. If you can detect the incoming missiles far enough away, and if there is a Hawkeye above the CSG then you will, then you can engage threats starting at the maximum ranges of your air defense missiles: 350-400km with the SM-6, 150-200km with the SM-2MR, 50-70km with the ESSM, 5-10km with the RAM, CIWS, soft kill measures, and ECM. Even if the ASCMs are designed to all up end at your location at the same time at the end of their flight, they certainly start out far apart, and can be engaged at a more leisurely pace with the OTH targeting provided by the Hawkeye. In this scenario the limiting factor is neither the sensor range nor the processing power but rather the number of missiles you have in your VLS magazines as well as how effective your CIWS, soft kill measures, and ECM are. As I said, it will take several hundred. That or a few well-placed torpedoes.

 

[SinoSoldier]

I would expect the "saturation threshold" to increase even further given the Mk. 41's ability to quadpack ESSM missiles. Each incoming threat would be dealt with in a layered manner, initially by the SM-6 at its maximum engagement range, followed by the SM-2MR Block II/IIIB, then the ESSM, and finally the Phalanx and RIM-116 Sea-RAM. All the while the incoming missiles would be under constant ECM bombardment.

The AEGIS system was designed specifically to deal with saturation attacks from Soviet cruisers, and when you factor in forward-deployed early-warning assets like AWACS, radar, aircraft, etc., the situation becomes manyfold as complex as before.

 

[plawolf]

It feels like things are getting way off topic and fast descending to the level of a pride driven pissing contest for some.

Something to consider is that any system is only as good as its weakest link.

For the USN, the weak link isn't Aegis or MK42s, but rather radar illuminators their Burkes and Ticos are dependent on.

Such illuminators have a hard capped simultaneous engagement limit even with time sharing and other modern developments and improvements.

You can pump SAMs out as fast as you like, but if your illuminators can only illuminate X bogies, you are only going to be able to engage those X bogies even if you have 10 times as many missiles in your VLS tubes ready to go.

A little history refresh may also be in order here, since some of you seem to be taking historical estimates and tactics out of context.

Multidirectional satiation attack was an late 70s early 80s tactic designed to defeat the technological limitations of that era's tech and tactics. Specially, it was intended to saturate a carrier's CAP in the absence of adequate friendly fighter escort for the bombers, rather than ship based missile defence (only a handful of missiles could have overwhelmed them back then).

Basically, the core reason for the high loss estimates and multi-directional attack was because the Soviet could not provide adequate fighter escort for its bombers until the Flanker came online in numbers (after 1985), and missile ranges were short, forcing the bombers to come into range of fleet air defences and CAP fighters before they could launch.

It was expected that if a CAP got to a bomber formation, that entire formation was toast, and it was expected that USN interceptors (F14s with Phoenix) would be able to get to a bomber flight after detection but before the bombers coiuld launch missiles.

So the 'solution' was to send up many bomber formations, coming from very different directions, so the enemy fleet's CAP and alert 5 fighters won't be able to get to all of them before they were in range to launch. Given the SAM limitations of that time, if even one bomber wing got within range, their missiles would kill the entire carrier battle group. That was the whole rational for Aegis and VLS, to close that final gap.

With Aegis and VLS in play, but relaying on SARH and illuminators (which are being replaced by ARH missiles, but slowly, so the backbone of the USN fleet air defence will remain SARH for years at least); the Tomcat having been scrapped in favour of the slow F18 and slower F35; and vastly increased range and/or speed of AShMs, the best bet to saturate USN fleet defences is a focused, uni-directional massive missile wave that puts all the pressure on single escorts or even single illuminators rather than spreading the same number of missiles so the entire enemy fleet could all engage at maximum effectiveness at the same time.