WW II Historical Thread, Discussion, Pics, Videos

[chuck731]

First of all - it was Britain which put a real emphasis on radar usage starting in pre war years. Japanese started production of radars, probably after they became aware of it's wide usage in Royal Navy, in 1941. Ended works in the autumn of 1944. The key wasn't antennas but magnetrons which they started to produce too late. Magnetron - device which originally came from Japan itself... Talk about irony. But they put a lot of attention on radar equipement development and closed the gap pretty fast. But as the war ended radar fire control devices you could see aboard Yamato lagged a bit from what you could find aboard Iowa class battleships at the same time but the gap wasn't as wide as many think.

Well, it was. Yamato even in the end had three types of radar onboard and not one of them was a proper fire control radar. All were search or warning sets broadly comparable in performance to British warning sets from 1941 to 1942. The type 22 surface search radar set on Yamato, with its distinctive trumpet antenna can assist optical surface fire control as the British and Germans sets could also do in 1941. But it lacked adaquate range and directional resolution to be the sole fire control source for blind fire comparable to what the British could do in 1942. Yamato never acquired any sort of radar fire control for her AA artillery even in the 1945. AFAIK no form of radar fire control for shipboard AA weapons was ever deployed on any scale in the Japanese navy. This puts the Japanese naval radar development in 1945 behind the British and American radar development of 1942, or German development of late 1943. The Japanese also never developed anything to enable their ship-board fire control mechanical computer to easily receive input from Radar, which both British and Americans had done. So even if Japanese had produced suitable radar sets, their AA fire control system was not ready to efficiently utilize radar input. The Radar warning sets onboard Yamato were copied from German sets from 1943.

Basically by 1943, both British and American battleships would be able to engage an enemy battleship with surface gunfire in condition of zero visibility. Japan never acquired that ability during the war. Both British and American battleships would also be able to throw up effective medium AA barrages in zero visibility, again Japanese naval vessels never acquired that capability.

Japanese radar development also failed to be well organized or to promptly utilize all the appropriate resources available in Japan. Take for example the Yagi antenna. It was the first practical and efficient short wave transmitting and receiving antenna, and it was invented in Japan by professor Hidetsugu Yagi back in 1926. It was widely used in telecommunication in 1930s and in radars right from the beginning. (Chinese types 052C abd 052D sports prominent Yagi arrays abft the funnel as part of its anti-stealth radar, BTW) But the Japanese radar development teams appearently never heard of it at the beginning of 1942. They were puzzled by references to "Yagi antenna" in British technical documentation captured in Singapore, and commissioned a naval salvage effort on sunken British warships to find out just what a "Yagi antenna" was. Meanwhile professor Yagi was alive and well in Tokyo and his offers to assist in radar development being turned down.

 

[Rutim]

Well, it was. Yamato even in the end had three types of radar onboard and not one of them was a proper fire control radar. All were search or warning sets broadly comparable in performance to British warning sets from 1941 to 1942. The type 22 surface search radar set on Yamato, with its distinctive trumpet antenna can assist optical surface fire control as the British and Germans sets could also do in 1941. But it lacked adaquate range and directional resolution to be the sole fire control source for blind fire comparable to what the British could do in 1942. Yamato never acquired any sort of radar fire control for her AA artillery even in the 1945. AFAIK no form of radar fire control for shipboard AA weapons was ever deployed on any scale in the Japanese navy. This puts the Japanese naval radar development in 1945 behind the British and American radar development of 1942, or German development of late 1943.

The truth said that US Navy fire control equipement even radar assisted wasn't superior to Japanese without radars in the real battles USS New Jersey fired at Nowaki using radar some 30km assisted by aircraft but without result. That's probably WWII record. Japanese Type 22 radar could spot aircraft from 190 km and battleship from 36km. Enough for WWII realities. All of that in 3 years from the scratch. Type 22 Mod 4S was a full fledged fire control radar. Japanese even went to Germany to see what they had in 1941 but Germans didn't want to share any informations. Yamatao and Kongo reported that informations from the radar were more accurate than from optical devices after the Cape Engano (Yamato reported firing few radar assisted salvos in action) and there's need for operational tactics development. Damaged heavy crusier Myoko hit USS Bergall on 12th December 1944 using nothing else than radar fire control equipement. That's enough to say that they got full operational ability by the end of the war.

What was the extent of what Japanese got in the months before the end of war is unknown as they burned all of devices and manuals before US Navy and Army could get it in their hands.

Meanwhile professor Yagi was alive and well in Tokyo and his offers to assist in radar development being turned down.

Professor Yagi's team of researchers worked on radars since 1936. Of course they made a basic mistake blinded by the great prospects at first which they corrected in 1941 with magnetron. They worked with Navy, not Japanese Army. Sony was established by two men who met in the team which Yagi supervised. He held a grudge for himself that he was unable to create wireless long range weapons which resulted in sending many young men on suicidal missions. And he lived and worked in Osaka and Tokyo during the war.

 

[chuck731]

One single hit does not a workable system demonstrate. The British battleship Duke of York managed 13 hits at night, in bad weather and heavy seas. with snow squalls, at extreme range, with zero visibility to target, under combat conditions, at the end of 1943 during battle of North Cap. That is a convincing demonstration.

In ideal visibility, optical fire control in WWII has superior resolution in both range and bearing to radar. Ideal visibility seldom happens. That's why radar was better overall.

As to Iowa failing to kit a ship 30km away, so what? The longest ranged hit ever scored in any naval surface gunnery was 26km, I believe. And it took the British a hour of steady firing to score one hit on a battleship at that range. Is it a wonder that Iowa ought to have missed a much smaller ship 4 kms further away with just a few salvos?

Which Japanese ship scored hits at 26 kms, much less 30 kms away under combat conditions with optical control, with or without aerial spotting? Actually, come to think of it, I don't believe I recall any instance, even just suggested, of Japanese surface gunnery, optical or rada guided, hitting anything beyond 19 kms during WWII. I think US battleships hit Japanese battleships with radar directed fire at 22kms during the battle of Battle of Surigao Strait.

 

[Rutim]

One single hit does not a workable system demonstrate. The British battleship Duke of York managed 13 hits at night, in bad weather and heavy seas. with snow squalls, at extreme range, with zero visibility to target, under combat conditions, at the end of 1943 during battle of North Cap. That is a convincing demonstration.

It was a salvo of two shells. One hit and the other landed astern in the wake. Out of the blue. No illumination, pure radar aiming. This means nothing...

Which Japanese ship scored hits at 26 kms, much less 30 kms away under combat conditions with optical control, with or without aerial spotting? Actually, come to think of it

How many times they fired on such distance? Samar only? Japanese battleships (aside from Kongo class) weren't thrown into real action until the very end of the war. That's not the case.

As to Iowa failing to kit a ship 30km away, so what? The longest ranged hit ever scored in any naval surface gunnery was 26km, I believe. And it took the British a hour of steady firing to score one hit on a battleship at that range. Is it a wonder that Iowa ought to have missed a much smaller ship 4 kms further away with just a few salvos?

Airplanes reported that it framed Nowaki. Unfortunately you can't find that in Japanese sources. This means long range firing, may it be radar or optical assisted, was based on pure luck on ranges longer, let's say 22,000 meters.

I think US battleships hit Japanese battleships with radar directed fire at 22kms during the battle of Battle of Surigao Strait.

Mississippi, Maryland and Pennsylvania with Mark 3 radar couldn't open fire for a long time (Pennsylvania haven't fired a single shell in the battle). It was Mark 8 which which worked there. Japanese could match Mark 3 FCS in the open sea engagement in the last naval battles of the war.

 

[chuck731]

Mark 3 radar couldn't open fire for a long time (Pennsylvania haven't fired a single shell in the battle). It was Mark 8 which which worked there. Japanese could match Mark 3 FCS in the open sea engagement in the last naval battles of the war.

By not firing for a long time, or sometimes not firing at all? I think most people can match that.

 

[Jeff Head]

The truth said that US Navy fire control equipement ,even radar assisted wasn't superior to Japanese without radars in the real battles.

Oh no?

Well, this is just not so.

In the last Battlesip vs. Battleship gun duel in history, during the great Battle of Leyte Gulf, in the Battle at Suriago Strait in October 1944, the Mark 8 Fire Control on the US Navy West Virginia, California and Tennessee battleships, and the Mark 3 fire control on the Maryland, performed admirably, and the fire control, such as it was, that was fitted to the Imperial Japanese Navy vessels under Admiral Nishimura, the battleships Fuso and Yamashiro and the heavy cruiser Mogami perfomred and four destroyers pitifully. Actually, the Yamashiro was the only one that made it to the actual gunfight as the Fuso was disable and ultimately sunk by torpedoes before reaching the main battle, but en route her radar performed very badly just the same.

West Virginia's radar picked up Nishimura's force at a range of 42,000 yds (0r 38 kilometers) and achieved a firing solution at 30,000 yd (or 27 kilometers). West Virginia tracked them in the pitch black night and fired eight 16" shells of her main battery at a 22,800 yd (or 20.8 kilometers) and hit the Yamashiro with that first salvo. She went on to fire a total of 93 shells. California and Tennessee joined in, firing a total of 63 and 69 14" shells, respectively.

Gunfire from the American battle line at Suriago Strait, October 25, 1944
​

That battle was a complete defeat for the Imperial Japanese Navy.

Now admittedly, the Fuso and the Yamashiro did not have the best Japanese equipment. But your statement was that, "the truth was that the US Navy fire lcontrol equipment, even radar control, wasn't superior to Japanese in real battles," just was not so. Suriago Strait was a real battle. The US Navy equipment was superior.

I believe the fire control equipment on the Iowa Class battleships was far superior to the fire control on the Yamato battleships. It is true that the 18" guns on the Yamato vessles were heavier and outranged the Iowa Class 16" guns, but I believe the Iowa guns would have been more accurate and would have utlimately prevailed if the two had ever met. But they did not, and so it is an entirely moot point. None theless it is interesting to compare the two gun designs:

Iowa Class 16" gun:
Size: 16 in (406 mm) Mark 7
Date Of Design 1939
Date In Service 1943
Gun Weight 267,904 lb (121,519 kg) (including breech)
Gun Length oa 816 in (20.73 m) (breech face to muzzle)
Rate Of Fire 2 rounds per minute
Range 41,622 yards (38.06 km)

Yamato Class 18" Gun:
Size: 18.1 in (460 mm)
Date Of Design 1939
Date In Service 1941
Gun Weight 363,000 lb (121,519 kg) (including breech)
Gun Length oa 831.9 in (21.13m) (breech face to muzzle)
Rate Of Fire 1.5-2 rounds per minute
Range 44,500 yards (40.70 km)

In fact, I believe that the only time a Yamato battleship ever fired on another surface ship in combat was also during the great BAttle of Leyte Gulf during the Battle off Samar, when the Imperial Japanese Navy's Central Force under Admiral Kurita including the battleship Yamato herself, engaged the Escort carriers of Taffy 3 under US Admiral Clifton Sprague.

This is an amazing picture from that battle. In the foreground is the US escort carrier, Gambier Bay, CVE-73, hit and being strattled by direct gunfire. On the horizon, just to the right of the carrier, is a surface ship, some think may be either the Yamato herself, or a heavy cruiser, actually within visual range. An amazing picture. The Gamier Bay was sunk in this action.

USS Gambier Bay, CVE-73, hit and bracketed by gunfire, October 25, 1944
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[chuck731]

This is an amazing picture from that battle. In the foreground is the US escort carrier, Gambier Bay, CVE-73, hit and being strattled by direct gunfire. On the horizon, just to the right of the carrier, is a surface ship, some think may be either the Yamato herself, or a heavy cruiser, actually within visual range. An amazing picture. The Gamier Bay was sunk in this action.

USS Gambier Bay, CVE-73, hit and bracketed by gunfire, October 25, 1944
​

Seems doubtful. The conventional story of the battle seem to suggest the Yamato was actually running away from the US jeep carriers during much of the battle in an effort to outrun phantom torpedoes the Japanese thought American destroyers would have launched at them, but which in any case wouldn't have had the range to reach Yamato, and Yamato fired a few salvos from 29 kms, but didn't hit anything.

A few years ago a respected American naval historian indicated he was reexaming the role of Yamato in the battle, and suggested the conventional story was all wrong, Yamato got within 15 kms, and actually scored many hits with 18" and 6" guns. But the promised detail does not seem to have emerged yet.

 

[Jeff Head]

Seems doubtful. The conventional story of the battle seem to suggest the Yamato was actually running away in an effort to outrun phantom torpedoes American destroyers would launched at them...

A few years ago a respected American naval historian indicated he was reexaming the role of Yamato in the battle, and suggested the conventional story was all wrong, Yamato got within 15 kms, and actually scored many hits with 18" and 6" guns.

Well, all three Japanese battleships did engage the American escort carriers with their long guns. And at least one (the Kalinin Bay), and some believe a second, were hit by shells from one or more of the battleships. However, the Japanese were using armor piercing shells and they tended to go right through the thin plating of the escort carriers. Morison speaks of this in his history, though he does not indicate which vessels scored.

But the telling damage against the Gambier Bay was ultimately done by Kurita's four heavy cruisers, particularly the Chakuma. Which is why I said what I said about that picture. I am aware of both trains of thought. Some believe that Japanese vessel in the picture is one of those heavy cruisers, either Chakuma or Tone. Others believe it may actually be Yamato.

 

[Lezt]

Oh no?

Well, this is just not so.

In the last Battlesip vs. Battleship gun duel in history, during the great Battle of Leyte Gulf, in the Battle at Suriago Strait in October 1944, the Mark 8 Fire Control on the US Navy West Virginia, California and Tennessee battleships, and the Mark 3 fire control on the Maryland, performed admirably, and the fire control, such as it was, that was fitted to the Imperial Japanese Navy vessels under Admiral Nishimura, the battleships Fuso and Yamashiro and the heavy cruiser Mogami perfomred and four destroyers pitifully. Actually, the Yamashiro was the only one that made it to the actual gunfight as the Fuso was disable and ultimately sunk by torpedoes before reaching the main battle, but en route her radar performed very badly just the same.

West Virginia's radar picked up Nishimura's force at a range of 42,000 yds (0r 38 kilometers) and achieved a firing solution at 30,000 yd (or 27 kilometers). West Virginia tracked them in the pitch black night and fired eight 16" shells of her main battery at a 22,800 yd (or 20.8 kilometers) and hit the Yamashiro with that first salvo. She went on to fire a total of 93 shells. California and Tennessee joined in, firing a total of 63 and 69 14" shells, respectively.

Gunfire from the American battle line at Suriago Strait, October 25, 1944
​

That battle was a complete defeat for the Imperial Japanese Navy.

Now admittedly, the Fuso and the Yamashiro did not have the best Japanese equipment. But your statement was that, "the truth was that the US Navy fire lcontrol equipment, even radar control, wasn't superior to Japanese in real battles," just was not so. Suriago Strait was a real battle. The US Navy equipment was superior.

Jeff, you make it sound like the 7th fleet support force of 6 battleships, 4 heavy cruisers, 4 cruisers, 28 destroyers and 39 PT boats had a fair fight with Southern Forces: 2 battleships, 3 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser and 8 destroyers.

The fact that 6 american BB was firing on Yamashiro and Mogami as only these two got to the american lines; and that the high level of hits started to land only after the hull was ablaze (which really mean that optical gun laying was used) and that both ship were able to slip away from the american line.

It is also to be noted that it was only the West Virginia's radar that got the firing solution, Older BB like the Maryland, Mississippi, Tennessee, California and Pennsylvania, did not get a radar firing solution and had to rely on optical sighting. - All of whom are younger than the Yamshiro except maybe for the Penn.

US fire control radar is definitely better, but I think it is over hyped. you can see something doesn't mean that you can hit something. the US fleet that day fired 93+63+69+48 14" and 16" shells and hundreds of 8" and 6" ones; but hits are still hard to achieve, with about 10 hits.

 

[B.I.B.]

If any of you have not read this book, I recommend it. It deals with one of those 'alternate decision' type scenarios. I found it very fascinating and interesting reading.. also unnerving because Hitler 'could' have won the war or at least conquered most of Europe and held it.

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I think we could also ask ourselves what might have happened had Britain and France stood up to Hitler in the early days of Hitlers rise. A Second World War might have been avoided and would Japan have started a pacific conflict if the European powers had not been defeated.