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[Lezt]

This is another instance of that IJN doctrine in action which favors accomplishment of narrowly defined mission and preservation of own force over exploiting opportunities that presents for the complete destruction of enemy forces.

There were at least 4 instances during the war when IJN forces found themselves with American forces before them on the run, and their own forces in position to significantly effect the course of the war for the better from the Japanese point of view, but chose to back down in face of relatively low probability of being overmatched by as yet unseen american forces potentially beyond the horizon instead of pressing their advantage in order to benefit from the greater possibility of collecting the fruit of their situation.

It appears while IJN forces was capable of suicidal determination, but only when specifically instructed to attack suicidally. Otherwise the default mode of operation was err on the side of self preservation and risk avoidance. Yamamoto was one of the few senior Japanese naval commanders who appeared to be empirical odds calculators who disdained suicidal operations for its own sake, but favored much greater risk taking in normal operations. His chief of staff Ugaki, on the other hand, was a fanatic and an main proponent of suicide attacks, and favored the spiritual and subjective over empirical calculation of odds and chances. Ugaki believed any material odds can be overcome if one is sufficiently suicidal in pursuit of one's goal, therefore failure is always one's own fault as it must result from lack of adequate zeal.

I don't think it is as much of a doctrinal issue, but more of an unwillingness to take risks. I believe it is a side effect of; being educated so thoroughly of America's numerical superiority that Japanese commanders were unwilling to take risks - as they needed to preserve strength for the final Mahanism clash. Men they can lose and replace, but material - especially ships and planes - they cannot.

But of course, in war or any competition, if you stop taking risk, then you cannot win; especially in a poker game and not a chess game.

 

[Jeff Head]

This is another instance of that IJN doctrine in action which favors accomplishment of narrowly defined mission and preservation of own force over exploiting opportunities that presents for the complete destruction of enemy forces.

There were at least 4 instances when IJN forces found themselves with American forces before them on the run, and their own forces in position to significantly effect the course of the war for the better from the Japanese point of view, but chose to back down in face of relatively low probability of being overmatched by as yet unseen american forces potentially beyond the horizon.

Yes indeed.

Another such example, which I also plan to detail here in a similar fashion in a few days, is certainly the Battle off Samar involving US Admrial Sprague's Task Unit 77.4.3 ('Taffy 3') escort carrier group against Japanese Admrial Kurita's very powerful central surface force during the larger Battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944.

 

[Lezt]

Yes indeed.

Another such example, which I also plan to detail here in a similar fashion in a few days, is certainly the Battle off Samar involving US Admrial Sprague's Task Unit 77.4.3 ('Taffy 3') escort carrier group against Japanese Admrial Kurita's very powerful central surface force during the larger Battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944.

Jeff, would be nice to start of with Pearl Harbor with Nugumo's third wave and maybe away with the naval infantries.

 

[chuck731]

Yes indeed.

Another such example, which I also plan to detail here in a similar fashion in a few days, is certainly the Battle off Samar involving US Admrial Sprague's Task Unit 77.4.3 ('Taffy 3') escort carrier group against Japanese Admrial Kurita's very powerful central surface force during the larger Battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944.

Post war, Kurita implied he delibrately broke off combat because he thought the war was irretreivably lost and honor having been satisfied, it was pointless to put his men at more risk.

 

[chuck731]

Yes indeed.

Another such example, which I also plan to detail here in a similar fashion in a few days, is certainly the Battle off Samar involving US Admrial Sprague's Task Unit 77.4.3 ('Taffy 3') escort carrier group against Japanese Admrial Kurita's very powerful central surface force during the larger Battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944.

Post war, Kurita kept mum about his reason for breaking off for a long time, and eventually implied he delibrately broke off combat because he thought the war was irretreivably lost and the honor of his force having been satisfied, it was pointless to put his men at more risk.

If that was indeed the case and not merely an excuse for an tactical opportunity not grasped, then he was exceptionally enlightened for a war time Japanese officer.

 

[shen]

This is another instance of that IJN doctrine in action which favors accomplishment of narrowly defined mission and preservation of own force over exploiting opportunities that presents for the complete destruction of enemy forces.

There were at least 4 instances during the war when IJN forces found themselves with American forces before them on the run, and their own forces in position to significantly effect the course of the war for the better from the Japanese point of view, but chose to back down in face of relatively low probability of being overmatched by as yet unseen american forces potentially beyond the horizon instead of pressing their advantage in order to benefit from the greater possibility of collecting the fruit of their situation.

It appears while IJN forces was capable of suicidal determination, but only when specifically instructed to attack suicidally. Otherwise the default mode of operation was err on the side of self preservation and risk avoidance. Yamamoto was one of the few senior Japanese naval commanders who appeared to be empirical odds calculators who disdained suicidal operations for its own sake, but favored much greater risk taking in normal operations. His chief of staff Ugaki, on the other hand, was a fanatic and an main proponent of suicide attacks, and favored the spiritual and subjective over empirical calculation of odds and chances. Ugaki believed any material odds can be overcome if one is sufficiently suicidal in pursuit of one's goal, therefore failure is always one's own fault as it must result from lack of adequate zeal.

you exhibit classic signs of orientalist thinking. we are rational, they are spiritual; we are individualists, they are collectivists; we value life, they are suicidal. none of the characteristics you attribute to the "other" are based in reality. they are just the opposites of characteristics you attribute to yourself.

The behaviors of imperial Japanese military during WWII were unquestionable condemnable. However, the Allies were also guilty of racism that contributed to the hellish conducts of war in the Pacific.

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Lezt offers a perfectly reasonable explanation for the cautious behavior of IJN commanders, without resorting to racial stereotypes couched in more acceptable cultural terms. racial/cultural stereotypes are by definition irrational, lead to miscalculation, hatred, and contributed to the tragedies of WWII. by perpetuating these stereotypes, you are repeating history.

 

[Lezt]

i think that it is also a fault of japanese signal and intelligence: they never knew where american assets were.

generally they were short of patrol aircraft and picket ships/subs. therefore it is not hard to imagine that they would disengage their forces quickly and head for shelter after engaging. as by engaging means thst the USN knows the location of those Japanese assets; and thrrefore can bring her massive strike asset to bear.

how many times did us fleet carriers get away when damaged n turning incircles or slowing... when the subsequent wave of japanese strike aircraft were sent to intercept on a ploted course instead of msintaining a lolitering fighter cover to pinpoint the cvbg?

it doesent help that destroyers are held back to screen the main fleet instead of using them to prob the seas.

similarly; why were the radar warning receivers so finiky? they should be able to triangilate the americsn ships using radar as the radar signal is stronger as it doesnt need to bounce back to yhe american ships... yet japanese radar warning sets have similar detection range as radars n in many case not work at all.

so i would believe that japanese admirals must be seeing phantom us fleets everywhere.

 

[chuck731]

you exhibit classic signs of orientalist thinking. we are rational, they are spiritual; we are individualists, they are collectivists; we value life, they are suicidal. none of the characteristics you attribute to the "other" are based in reality. they are just the opposites of characteristics you attribute to yourself.

The behaviors of imperial Japanese military during WWII were unquestionable condemnable. However, the Allies were also guilty of racism that contributed to the hellish conducts of war in the Pacific.

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Lezt offers a perfectly reasonable explanation for the cautious behavior of IJN commanders, without resorting to racial stereotypes couched in more acceptable cultural terms. racial/cultural stereotypes are by definition irrational, lead to miscalculation, hatred, and contributed to the tragedies of WWII. by perpetuating these stereotypes, you are repeating history.

The comments about Japanese naval risk avoidance has nothing to do with race. It has to do with particular operational doctrines. Each nation and each armed force has them. Most have flaws that would be revealed when put to the test in war. But not all are equally flawed, and not all nation recognize and address the shortcomings with the same efficiency and alacrity.

 

[chuck731]

i think that it is also a fault of japanese signal and intelligence: they never knew where american assets were.

generally they were short of patrol aircraft and picket ships/subs. therefore it is not hard to imagine that they would disengage their forces quickly and head for shelter after engaging. as by engaging means thst the USN knows the location of those Japanese assets; and thrrefore can bring her massive strike asset to bear.

how many times did us fleet carriers get away when damaged n turning incircles or slowing... when the subsequent wave of japanese strike aircraft were sent to intercept on a ploted course instead of msintaining a lolitering fighter cover to pinpoint the cvbg?

it doesent help that destroyers are held back to screen the main fleet instead of using them to prob the seas.

similarly; why were the radar warning receivers so finiky? they should be able to triangilate the americsn ships using radar as the radar signal is stronger as it doesnt need to bounce back to yhe american ships... yet japanese radar warning sets have similar detection range as radars n in many case not work at all.

so i would believe that japanese admirals must be seeing phantom us fleets everywhere.

American penetration of Japanese naval codes certainly allow the Americans to far better anticipate what Japanese strengths are available where at least at a theater level. I don't believe the Japanese achieved anything like reciprocal penetration of American ciphers.

With a few exceptions, Japanese electronics industry fell far behind those of Britain, the US, and even Germany in most aspects of radar and counter radar development. What they have was late in being organized to efficiently focus it efforts. They also seem to have never disseminated good radar operating practice to their local commanders to the same degree as, say german Navy. So Japanese submarines continue to light up their radars while running on the surface well into 1945, making it easy for US submarines and ASW forces to find them.

 

[Rutim]

With a few exceptions, Japanese electronics industry fell far behind those of Britain, the US, and even Germany in most aspects of radar and counter radar development. What they have was late in being organized to efficiently focus it efforts. They also seem to have never disseminated good radar operating practice to their local commanders to the same degree as, say german Navy. So Japanese submarines continue to light up their radars while running on the surface well into 1945, making it easy for US submarines and ASW forces to find them.

First of all - it was Britain which put a real emphasis on radar usage starting in pre war years. Japanese started production of radars, probably after they became aware of it's wide usage in Royal Navy, in 1941. Ended works in the autumn of 1944. The key wasn't antennas but magnetrons which they started to produce too late. Magnetron - device which originally came from Japan itself... Talk about irony. But they put a lot of attention on radar equipement development and closed the gap pretty fast. But as the war ended radar fire control devices you could see aboard Yamato lagged a bit from what you could find aboard Iowa class battleships at the same time but the gap wasn't as wide as many think.