WW II Historical Thread, Discussion, Pics, Videos

[chuck731]

The training of American pilots, and the sophistication of American carrier operation planning and doctrine, as well as the quality of American aircraft at the time of Pearl Harbor, until well past the time of Midway, was substantially below those of the Japanese.

It is true Japanese lacked radar and Japanese scout and reconnaisance doctrine were faulty, so it is possible for the Americans to get lucky and score some telling successes against Nagumo force. But I think on the balance, the odds are the American carriers would be wiped out in an one sided fashion should they have manage to get themselves noticed by the Japanese immediate after Pearl Harbor.

 

[Rutim]

It is true Japanese lacked radar and Japanese scout and reconnaisance doctrine were faulty, so it is possible for the Americans to get lucky and score some telling successes against Nagumo force.

I doubt if radars at the time would do any work or changed anything. The biggest advantage of radars aboard warships at the time were that they worked at night (and away from the shores). Airplane with radar which could 'scan' vast areas of oceans - that was a hit! Huff-duff and ASDIC gave the Allies an upper hand in the war thanks to Royal Navy's grasping early the capability of such armament. Completely changed the rules of the game up to the times when you can observe a single truck anywhere around the globe from space.

 

[chuck731]

I doubt if radars at the time would do any work or changed anything. The biggest advantage of radars aboard warships at the time were that they worked at night (and away from the shores). Airplane with radar which could 'scan' vast areas of oceans - that was a hit! Huff-duff and ASDIC gave the Allies an upper hand in the war thanks to Royal Navy's grasping early the capability of such armament. Completely changed the rules of the game up to the times when you can observe a single truck anywhere around the globe from space.

Even 1941 radar would be of substantial help in carrier to carrier battles. As shown by Midway, without radar to provide warning, it is possible for high flying dive bombers to come almost directly overhead and ready to begin attack dive before being detected. By that time it is far too late to vector in any combat air patrol, and the carrier had less than 2 minutes between first warning and bombs landing.

But radar with detection range of even just 30 miles against groups of incoming aircraft would provide almost 10 minutes of warning and substantially improve the ability of the combat air patrol to deal with incoming threat.

 

[kwaigonegin]

Jeff, thanks for summarizing this, hey, if I was a billionaire, I'd visit all five of them!

The good news is you don't need to be a billionaire to visit those sites. I've been to 4 of them and rest assured even in my dreams I'm not a billionaire let alone in real life.
I recommend USS Intrepid if you only get to pick one! Not only is it in NYC but the Space Shuttle Enterprise is there too.

 

[Jeff Head]

The good news is you don't need to be a billionaire to visit those sites. I've been to 4 of them and rest assured even in my dreams I'm not a billionaire let alone in real life.
I recommend USS Intrepid if you only get to pick one! Not only is it in NYC but the Space Shuttle Enterprise is there too.

Amen to every bit of that, kwaig.

The nice thing is, they have them on all three coasts, and one of them is fairly near most of the large metropilitan areas on those coasts. For examplle:

If you are on the East Coast in the North East, definitely see Intrepid in NYC. Or on the East Cast furhter South, the Yorktown is in Charleston.

If you are on the west coast, near LA in the southern California area, get down to San Diego and see the Midway. If in northern California around San Francisco, go to Alamedia and see the Hornet

If you're along the Gulf Coast, anywhere near Houston, go down to Corpus Chisti and see the Lexington.

The cost to get in is very reasonable and you can easily spend all day there. Anyone with very modest means who happens to be in those areas anyway would create memories to last a life time. Plus, there are a lot of really nice things to purchase to remember your visit by.

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[asif iqbal]

That was the battle where both sides made no mistakes. That's what it was. Perfect plans and execution. Both sides made excellent effort.

And don't pick up such examples as Marianas because such defeats happened to US Army as well. And Japanese Army and Navy were best and most experienced in the world at landing operations in the moment when the war between Japan and US started. I bet US Marines took much from it's tactics and utilised that in the war. Big guns from the sea and planes from aircraft carriers to dominate in the air were first used by Japanese.

There is no such thing as perfect plan, plans are made the best military's can change them in the midst of battle and come out on top

The military that wins is one who makes the least mistakes

 

[Jeff Head]

THE BATTLE OF SAVO ISLAND: (August 8-9, 1942)

I was reading my World War II history today and was again amazed at the Battle of Savo Island, or as some call it, the 1st Battle of Savo Island (the Japanese called it The First Battle of the Solomon Sea).

It occurred on August 8–9, 1942 and was the first major naval engagement of the Guadalcanal campaign, and the first of several naval battles in the straits later named Ironbottom Sound, that were fought during the very intensive and hard fought six to seven month long Guadalcanal campaign.

The US had just landed on Guadalcanal and other nearby islands to take the uncompleted Japanese airfield that was building there, and which would become, when completed, Henderson Field.

The US and Australia had a strong defensive force present of six heavy cruisers , two light cruisers, and fifteen destroyers. A US carrier group had assisted in the landings, but because of significant losses to its fighter wing in supporting those landings, it had withdrawn late on August 7th, which was unknown at the time to the Japanese.

US Admiral Turner commanded for the US forces, and Japanese Admrial Gunichi Mikawa commanded for the Japanese.

Upon learning of the US landings, Admiral Mikawa gatherd up as strong a force as he could at the time and sailed for Guadalcanal, coming "down the slot," on August 7th and arriving off Guadalcanal in the evening of August 8th. He had five heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and a single destroyer.

What were the results of this major surface action?

Only the worst surface action defeat ever suffered by the US Navy!

Four heavy cruisers were sunk, the HMAS Canberra, the the USS Astoria, the USS Vincennes, and the USS Quincy...two destroyers were also damaged and almost 1,100 American sailors were killed.

USS Quincy, illuminated by Japanese spotlights, burning and sinking
​

In return the Japanese navy suffered light damage to three heavy cruisers and 58 sailors killed. No Japanese vessels were sunk or badly damaged.

Chart of the line of battle as the Japanese line sailed around Savo Island and in turn took on two US forces
​

The amazing thing was, that after delivering such a tremendous defeat, because Mikawa thought an American carrier group was in the area and because he felt if he went ahead and made for the anchorage of US transport and supply ships off of Guadalcanal (which were the whole point of his attack), he would not be able to withdraw under darkness and would fall prey to US naval aircraft (which had left the area). So, Admiral Mikawa withdrew immediately after the battles and the opportunity to deliver a potentially fatal blow to the US operation on Guadalcanal was missed.

Had the Japanese destroyed those transports and supply vessels (which would leave late the next day after completing unloading, and many of which would make numerous future runs into Guadalcanal), they may have been able to defeat the Marines on Guadalcanal (which was a very long and hard fought battle in any case) and changed the whole course of the war in the South Pacific.

But it did not happen. On such happenstance do the pages of history turn.

 

[kwaigonegin]

If any of you have not read this book, I recommend it. It deals with one of those 'alternate decision' type scenarios. I found it very fascinating and interesting reading.. also unnerving because Hitler 'could' have won the war or at least conquered most of Europe and held it.

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[asif iqbal]

Japan missed the USN cargo ships landing but the USN did catch the Japanese cargo ships landing Japanese marines later in this campaign the Japanese however very very tactically withdrew all thier forces from Guadalcanal when they retreated from the campaign at the end

The term "Tokyo express" was also coined in this campaign, there was a saying at the time that although the day belong to the USN the night belonged to the Japanese bacause see they were masters at operating under the cover of darkness without any radar or communications, a technique they pioneered over many many years at sea from as early as 1931

Imperial Japanese Navy was actually a very very dedicated and professional militray branch

 

[chuck731]

The amazing thing was, that after delivering such a tremendous defeat, because Mikawa thought an American carrier group was in the area and because he felt if he went ahead and made for the anchorage of US transport and supply ships off of Guadalcanal (which were the whole point of his attack), he would not be able to withdraw under darkness and would fall prey to US naval aircraft (which had left the area). So, Admiral Mikawa withdrew immediately after the battles and the opportunity to deliver a potentially fatal blow to the US operation on Guadalcanal was missed.

Had the Japanese destroyed those transports and supply vessels (which would leave late the next day after completing unloading, and many of which would make numerous future runs into Guadalcanal), they may have been able to defeat the Marines on Guadalcanal (which was a very long and hard fought battle in any case) and changed the whole course of the war in the South Pacific.

But it did not happen. On such happenstance do the pages of history turn.

This is another instance of that IJN doctrine in action which favors accomplishment of narrowly defined mission and preservation of own force over exploiting opportunities that presents for the complete destruction of enemy forces.

There were at least 4 instances during the war when IJN forces found themselves with American forces before them on the run, and their own forces in position to significantly effect the course of the war for the better from the Japanese point of view, but chose to back down in face of relatively low probability of being overmatched by as yet unseen american forces potentially beyond the horizon instead of pressing their advantage in order to benefit from the greater possibility of collecting the fruit of their situation.

It appears while IJN forces was capable of suicidal determination, but only when specifically instructed to attack suicidally. Otherwise the default mode of operation was err on the side of self preservation and risk avoidance. Yamamoto was one of the few senior Japanese naval commanders who appeared to be empirical odds calculators who disdained suicidal operations for its own sake, but favored much greater risk taking in normal operations. His chief of staff Ugaki, on the other hand, was a fanatic and an main proponent of suicide attacks, and favored the spiritual and subjective over empirical calculation of odds and chances. Ugaki believed any material odds can be overcome if one is sufficiently suicidal in pursuit of one's goal, therefore failure is always one's own fault as it must result from lack of adequate zeal.