War in Chechnya

Cryptic said:

Back to the topic, the Russians are doing very well in the Second Chechen War. At its current level, the insurgency will not force the Russians out. Following their defeat in Chechen War I, the Russsians applied several lessons.

- Russians wait and let "victorious" Chechen crime bosses, religous fanatics and Arab Jihaders alienate the same Chechens that they "liberated".
- Then, trained troops with functioning equipment systematicaly clear low elevation areas first before the advance into Grozny. Any pockets resistance are identified and destroyed by massive firepower
- Russians make good use of Chechen allies. Some Chechen leaders change sides. Unlike Iraq, Chechneya appears to have a functioning local government supported by local security forces.
- Fragmented and desperate Chechen / Arab resistance uses terrorst tactics. These tactics alienate both Christian and Moslem ethnicites.
- Several attempts by Chechen terrorists to expand the Jihad into Daghestan and Ingustia end in total failure.

Sure, increasing smaller groups of Chechens will attack Russian and local security forces for years. Others will commit terrorst attacks. But there are no anti Russian armed groups operating in Daghestan, Ingustia etc. Chechen rebels cant destroy local Chechen government let alone drive out Russian Army. Russians and their allies have won.

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I think Cryptic is right. It appears a watershed moment in the Chechen War has been passed. I would say that that moment was when the Chechens were attacking into Dagestan, Ingushetia and Ossetia in order to spread the conflict. That effort failed. At the same time, assasinations of major pro-Russian Chechnians was at an all-time high, exemplified by the killing of Akmad Kadryov . But Russia regained control. With Putin at the helm, it does not seem that Russia will be broken by casualties. Since then, both Shamil Besayev and Aslan Mashkadov have been killed, and the resistance is being brutally crushed mostly by local forces led by Akmad Kadyrov's son Ramnzan.

If Russia can continue to take casualties in Chechnya and is prepared for a fight that will continue for a while, victory seems certain.

During preparations for second Chechen war Russian analysis showed that besides politics these were mayor reasons for Russian failure in first Chechen war:

- Command structure and C&C system: Russian annalists believe that coordination problems whit ministry of interior units and MoI control over military units were main reasons for defeat…

- Mobilization system: units were short of personnel for about a third or even half of their authorized strength, to solve this army created “composite” units by merging units whit this problem. These units were often from different regions or even different services, they didn’t train together before deployment and they weren’t in no way ready for deployment…

- Training: soldiers weren’t trained for urban nor mountain warfare, they received only basic training. They lacked tactical training, and they didn’t know how to effectively use equipment they had…

- Weapons and equipment: generals have come to conclusion that while there were problems whit quality of weapons and lack of equipment (especially radios) real problem was that troops didn’t know how to use effectively equipment they had…

- Information warfare

To solve these problems Russians started mayor reforms (starting 1997).

- Command structure and C&C was greatly improved and it was under direct control of General Staff.; Operational–strategic commands were created and they primary function was C&C of all units in there area of responsibility including border guard units, ministry of interior units and civil defense units.

- Training was improved; troops received urban warfare and mountain warfare training. Conscripts deployed in Chechnya had min of 6 months in service, whit high percentage of volunteers.


Ground forces operational structure was improved significantly. “Composite” units were replaced by battalion/regimental size tactical groups and whit rapid reaction forces.
For example one battalion tactical group consisted from North fleet naval infantry battalion, Black fleet reconnaissance company, Caspian see 120mm 2S9 battery and North fleet engineering company (this structure was created on experience from Afghan war and peacekeeping operations in Kosovo and Tajikistan).

Every regiment and battalion had there responsibility area. To provide support in this area one artillery battery supported one company sized unit plus every battalion had air control officer to call in CAS strikes( Mi-8/24 and Su-24/25)...