Is he related to Arleigh Burke ??
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Your analysis is congruent with GAO, TWZ, Cdr Salamander, et al.
However, from an acquisition program perspective -- Cost, Schedule and Performance -- the Constellation is a failure for the first two with the third TBD several years from now.
Hughes and Tancredi assert Agree or not with their assertion the Constellation was intended to be the bigger fleet response to the PLAN. And now it's not, at least in a timeframe of significance.
In acquisition programs as well as our daily lives, success feeds more success and failure feeds more failure. For example, the concurrent multiple systems and equipments development and integration mandate a robust land-based facility from the very beginning of the program. But under Cost failure conditions this is often short-changed -- facility, materials and personnel -- which leaves integration and validation to post-shipboard installation, a proven method to drive up cost while pushing out the schedule.
Which leads to both government and industry program management and systems engineering personnel taking a risk-adverse approach to decision-making with a focus on careerism rather than delivered capabilities.
Aucoin identified the adverse operational effects
The demand is excessive because the USN has too few ships which the Constellation's failure exacerbates as existing ships age out.
Failure is failure.
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F-18 Super Hornet carrying a SM-6. I wonder if being airborne increases the range significantly? Also, that is one big missile for a jet! I wonder how many it can carry simultaneously?
EDIT: An even better picture
EDIT: An even better picture
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Another article defending the A-10... The A-10 saga is a good example of why popular media and politicians shouldn't be a part of procurement decisions. The problems with the concept has been listed by thousands of people and we have the battle record of Desert Storm.
Despite facing outdated and suppressed defenses (which the A-10 had contributed nothing for) the A-10 was limited to low-risk missions and needed F-16s to scout for it. The latter is important to mention because, for long, the ability to fly low and slow was touted as a big advantage for scouting. The Maverick missile scored most of the vehicle kills. The gun was found to be not safer than guided bombs for covering assaulting infantry. Its inability to carry guided bombs and lack of night-capable sensors severely limited the aircraft. (A-10C solved these problems but there is still no radar). The same lack of sensors and incapability to survive in low altitudes resulted in it causing more friendly fire incidents than fast jets.
So no. The gun is a non-factor. So are 11 hardpoints and the fleet's "culture" of CAS. The aircraft is outdated in every way possible. The culture and hardpoints don't matter if the aircraft can't survive or employ newer weapons.
Despite facing outdated and suppressed defenses (which the A-10 had contributed nothing for) the A-10 was limited to low-risk missions and needed F-16s to scout for it. The latter is important to mention because, for long, the ability to fly low and slow was touted as a big advantage for scouting. The Maverick missile scored most of the vehicle kills. The gun was found to be not safer than guided bombs for covering assaulting infantry. Its inability to carry guided bombs and lack of night-capable sensors severely limited the aircraft. (A-10C solved these problems but there is still no radar). The same lack of sensors and incapability to survive in low altitudes resulted in it causing more friendly fire incidents than fast jets.
So no. The gun is a non-factor. So are 11 hardpoints and the fleet's "culture" of CAS. The aircraft is outdated in every way possible. The culture and hardpoints don't matter if the aircraft can't survive or employ newer weapons.
Seems to miss the part about how satellites in LEO have an extremly high chance of being fried with an atmospheric nuclear detonation, which is what would happen in a nuclear war scenario, which would render Starlink unusable. And even if the satellites themselves aren't damaged, the radiation belt would just degrade the links to a point you might as well be using the old Iridium network
A few months ago we even had news of Russia developing exactly this kind of weapon, to disable swathes of satellites.
As far as I know, the gun was hype and the chances of it realistically destroying a tank newer than a T-62 were low and the chances of losing the aircraft attempting such were higher.
In fact, the A-10 is capable of carry:
These are photos taken from Tucson, AZ. An Air Force JDAM on an A-10.
There are two characteristics of the A-10 that favor it for carrying out CAS:
1 - prolonged waiting time
2 - the large number of weapons
In a high-intensity conflict situation, both characteristics can be harmful.
On the other hand, the USAF has a very competent doctrine center and trains CAS at Green Flag-West every year, in a contested environment or not.
The fact is that the A-10 will not do CAS against China like the A-10 did CAS against the Taliban. The A-10 was made for the CAS and anti-tank role against the Warsaw Pact, which at the time only had the ZSU-23-4 Shilka, whose cannon only reached 1 km while the A-10's 30 mm GAU-8 reached twice that distance. With the introduction of the SA-8, the cannon became useless and they resorted to the Maverick missile which could attack at around 4 km while the SA-8 had difficulty stopping the A-10 at a very low altitude.
With the evolution of the OSA, the A-10 introduced the Maverick D, which could lock on to a target at 8 km, but things were already complicated for the A-10 to do the CAS as intended in its doctrinal conception.
Today, even with the USAF establishing air superiority over the battlefield that still has some MANPADS saturation rate is unknown and that is why since the 90s, the A-10 has received weapons launched from above, such as the JDAM and up to SDB (100 km range).
The A-10's cannon is useless in high-intensity point-to-point conflicts. The A-10 in this case (if used) will be adopted when there is air superiority and will fly high launching JDAMs to stay out of the range of MANPADS.
Against insurgents, the cannon is undoubtedly interesting, as is the A-10's payload capacity, but not against China.
The problem is that they want to compare the F-35 with the A-10 because there are these two planes in the USAF, but what about the USN? In the USMC? In China? In Russia? Which aircraft will do CAS against the US?
The answer is clear: they will be high-performance stealth fighters like the F-35. Let's get used to the idea because there is no going back. The A-10 has already given everything it had and now it has to pass the baton to the F-35 and other complementary means, even though nostalgic supporters (including members of the USAF) insist on not liking the idea.
CAS against China, in a situation where the USAF has not been able to establish air superiority, will be best executed by a high-altitude stealth aircraft using guided weapons.
Even if the USAF has established air superiority over the battlefield, there is still a risk from MANPADS and therefore the aircraft that performs CAS will not be able to do so in the same way that the A-10 performs CAS at low altitude in a situation of intensity against insurgents or terrorists.
Without a doubt, the F-35 is not best suited for COIN missions, despite it being able to do so. There is no doubt that the A-10 is much better for COIN missions, including CAS in low-intensity conflicts. But it is a fact that despite the persistence of this type of scenario, the F-35 is intended for high intensity operations (including CAS) against a similar state, while an A-10 with its 30mm cannon becomes little more than useless in this modern threat environment.
It is very difficult to envisage the possibility of operating the full range of capabilities of an aircraft like the A-10 in a high-intensity environment due to dissemination or low-altitude air defense systems. They would certainly see much of their weapons capacity degraded and would be crushed, just as happened with the Su-25s in Ukraine.
It should not be a coincidence that in Ukraine almost no aircraft are observed carrying out close air support, while we see many aircraft “dropping” bombs or launching volleys of stupid rockets to hit the area, from low altitude flights.
In a contested environment, the use of smart weapons that require altitude and speed to be effective, such as guided bombs, will be the use of stealth aircraft. It is very difficult to see any other viable alternative in the medium term.