We severely underestimated China, and the only way we can catch up is we travel back in time 20 years ago to make the investments we needed to.
The two main limiting factors are personnel cost and the limitations on funding imposed by other branches which also increased in number recently - Space Force will be the biggest funding problem in coming years as it is a nascent force in a nascent domain.
Without radical restructuring of the budget to benefit the navy or an overall increase in funding (the other branches will require equal share) the US naval power is already above its natural sustainable ceiling. Most people forget what level of funding was provided in the past and where it went
year and budget in
constant 2021USD billion (SIPRI), and total personnel, active conscription in grey:
If you consider conscription and wars (Korea 51-53, Vietnam 61-75 with major escalation from 63, GWoT) it becomes clearer why the US was able to fund naval expasions like in the 50s/60s and why crisis in the 70s forced fleet reduction and hi-lo mix, how Reagan era increase fits into it and the rest. Also note that the growing budget likely reflects also the personnel cost because retirement obligations accrue over time. Add higher cost of more complex equipment and overall higher cost of procurement and it explains why today's $800bn buys less than 1960s $500bn in constant 2021 dollars.
This is Battle Force Inventory 1945 to 2020:
With that being said:
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War in Ukraine diverted my attention for the last year so I missed the publication of the next 30-year shipbuilding plan in April. It's interesting because it has updated numbers compared to the plan from December of 2020 and these two can be treated as "outgoing Trump admin" and "outgoing Biden admin" proposals.
In tables below I indicated general election years to better illustrate key periods for decisionmaking. Considering that the current budget is flatlining at around ~$900bn I think PB2024 or "2024 low" is a realistic estimate. There is a third mid-level proposal "PB2024 Alternative 2" but I ignored it because it doesn't introduce any meaningful change compared to lower and upper bounds. Also the main difference between the plans lies in support vessels, not the combatants.
deliveries - by shipbuilding plans: 2020 vs 2024 low vs 2024 high
SSN production flatlines at average 2 per year. SSC never crosses 2 per year. LSC drops to 2 per year past 2036. That indicates no room for expansion and production atrophy but that was long time in the making. The last 20 years or so was pretending that outsized fleet was economically viable similar to what Russia has been doing at the time.
Battle Force Inventory - by shipbuilding plans: 2020 vs 2024 low vs 2024 high
If we compare 2028 and 2036 as key milestones then 2020 plan overshot significantly. The expansion of SSN production failed at current funding and investment levels and is likely to struggle in the future considering how Columbia, Virginia and refits are going. By 2048 USN seems to be left with just 60 SSNs maximum. On the surface it's only 85 LSC in 2024 vs 92 LSC in 2020 and more importantly only 24 SSC vs 36 SSC. That keeps the total surface combatant fleet at 109 vessels instead of 128 with ongoing emphasis on expensive DDGs which will drain funding for manpower. Note how amphibious ships are kept below the previous expanded level with LAW (Light Amphibious Warship) and the number falls further past 2036 to 21 ships in 2048. Considering that the ESG (Expeditionary Strike Group) requires currently three ships (1x LHD + 2x LPD) to carry a battalion-sized expeditionary unit it indicates that there are fewer ESGs planned. The new USMC doctrine Force Design 2030 doesn't allow reduction in footprint for expeditionary forces sufficient for only two vessels (1x LHD + 1x LPD). This likely indicates reduced involvement in some areas of the world but I won't speculate where those may be.
In comparison PLAN around 2028 is going to reach approximately ~55 LSC and ~100 SSC (of which ~45 FFGs). Capital ships (carriers and large amphibious ships) and logistical support need to catch up - but those match doctrine and strategy (and not USDoD tables or ChinaStronk trolls) so these numbers may be very different. That leaves submarines to match the projected 50-60 SSNs over that period.
This puts significant pressure on US allies to fill the gap in terms of numbers and capability and that's not happening for Australia, Japan is largely stagnated in terms of navy size and Korea is modernizing but not expanding significantly. Which only leaves India - which also struggles to expand its navy - but India operates on a different ocean.
The strategic layout is just being set through production capacity and that fundamentally determines what conflicts will and will not be fought, save for a random black swan event.
