Equation
Lieutenant General
I wish the article would describe what kind of "inappropriate behavior" that got him dismissed.
US Military News, Reports, Data, etc.
- Thread starter tphuang
- Start date
I wish the article would describe what kind of "inappropriate behavior" that got him dismissed.
navyreco
Senior Member
As I said elswhere:
'The hell is that old rusty shell?
A San Antonio class or JHSV would have been way more modern (with everything "modern" implies: Faster, Stealthier, in a word more 21st century!) while having both a large flight deck and large accomodations.
Xav , you know good and well that's just surface corrosion (easily treated)..typical of many days at sea.
The Ponce will work.. the USN will need a complete rebuild of that ancient boiler fired propulsion system.
The USN is not going to base a San Antonio class in Bahrain.
The Ponce will work.. the USN will need a complete rebuild of that ancient boiler fired propulsion system.
The USN is not going to base a San Antonio class in Bahrain.
TerraN_EmpirE
Tyrant King
there is only one sea shadow, she was built as a one off prototype used in trials. in terms of mission use too be honest she was lacking for the seals sure you can deploy ribs and sneak up on ships with out setting off the radar until Kissing close but she lacks helicopter capabilities and self defense arms. but the Navy has looked into the possibility's of using stealth ships for the seals like the M80 Stiletto
Then again, Sea Shadow or Stiletto are more of an asset to be used for the actual raid itself. I think it's not a good platform for the forward staging base role. Their just too small to support all the services needed when you stay in an area for weeks or month. But having such a ship attached to an MLP or AFSB would be much appreciated, I guess. Along with a few helos and UAVs.
TerraN_EmpirE
Tyrant King
true. it's like a mid stage go form a large ship too one of these too a rib for a extended range op.
Going to the large surface combatants now:
A GAO study is out that looked at the Navy's decision to restart AB construction rather than building more Zumwalts. And the findings are rather critical about that decision from just over two years ago.
The decision was mainly built on a hull & radar study wich is still classified. The big make or brake point in the study was the ability of the two designs to incorporate the new Air and Missile Defense Radar and perform BMD along with general AAW with a modernized AEGIS software. The navy concluded Flight III Burkes could serve that role better then the Zumwalts made for littoral combat. And for years there's been these allegations that Zumwalts are not really made for proper AAW and could only hanlde SM-2 / SM-3 with major upgrades to the PVLS. Although I have lost track on what's true and what isn't here.
GAO now sais the ABs may still require a major software upgrade, the ships are more or less already at the end of their growth potential and future upgrades have hardly any space left to fit in during the 40year service life of these new ships. And in the end, they may not be that much cheaper than a DDG-1000.
By Michael Fabey
The U.S. Navy should do a “thorough analyses of alternatives (AOA) for its future surface combatant program,” the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommended in a report released Jan. 24.
GAO also found the Navy analysis used to restart the service’s DDG-51 Arleigh Burke destroyer line and scuttle Navy plans for a larger, more modern DDG-1000 Zumwalt class fleet fails to justify the service’s decision.
Further, GAO’s report — “Arleigh Burke Destroyers, Additional Analysis and Oversight Required to Support the Navy’s Future Surface Combatant Plans” — questions the affordability of the Navy’s future destroyer and radar system programs.
The report echoes the concerns, analysis and recommendations provided in a recent exclusive series published in December by the Aviation Week Intelligence Network (AWIN).
As AWIN notes in its “Come About” series, the Navy based its DDG-51 restart decision on a still-classified hull-radar study that — according to those involved in the study or who had read it — was narrowly focused and skewed toward the restart decision.
Those concerns resound in GAO’s report. “The Navy relied on its 2009 Radar/Hull Study as the basis to select DDG-51 over DDG-1000 to carry the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) as its preferred future surface combatant — a decision that may result in a procurement of up to 43 destroyers and cost up to $80 billion over the next several decades,” GAO notes.
But, GAO contends, “The Radar/Hull Study may not provide a sufficient analytical basis for a decision of this magnitude.”
GAO cites several concerns with the Radar/Hull Study. It focuses on the capability of the radars it evaluated, but does not fully evaluate the capabilities of different shipboard combat systems and ship options under consideration.
The study does not include a thorough trade-off analysis that would compare the relative costs and benefits of different solutions under consideration or provide robust insight into all cost alternatives, auditors say.
The study also assumes a significantly reduced threat environment from other Navy analyses, which allowed radar performance to seem more effective than it may actually be against more sophisticated threats, according to the report.
GAO also cites other concerns with the restart program. “The Navy’s planned production schedules of the restart DDG-51 ships are comparable with past performance and officials told us that hull and mechanical systems changes are modest,” the report says. “But these ships will cost more than previous DDG-51s. A major upgrade to the ship’s combat system software also brings several challenges that could affect the restart ships, due in part to a key component of this upgrade that has already faced delays.”
Also, GAO says, “The Navy faces significant technical risks with its new Flight III DDG-51 ships, and the current level of oversight may not be sufficient given these risks. The Navy is pursuing a reasonable risk mitigation approach to AMDR development, but it will be technically challenging.”
According to Navy analysis, GAO says, selecting the DDG-51 hullform to carry AMDR requires significant redesign and reduces the ability of these ships to accommodate future systems. This decision also limits the radar size to one that will be at best marginally effective and incapable of meeting the Navy’s desired capabilities. The Navy may have underestimated the cost of Flight III.
A GAO study is out that looked at the Navy's decision to restart AB construction rather than building more Zumwalts. And the findings are rather critical about that decision from just over two years ago.
The decision was mainly built on a hull & radar study wich is still classified. The big make or brake point in the study was the ability of the two designs to incorporate the new Air and Missile Defense Radar and perform BMD along with general AAW with a modernized AEGIS software. The navy concluded Flight III Burkes could serve that role better then the Zumwalts made for littoral combat. And for years there's been these allegations that Zumwalts are not really made for proper AAW and could only hanlde SM-2 / SM-3 with major upgrades to the PVLS. Although I have lost track on what's true and what isn't here.
GAO now sais the ABs may still require a major software upgrade, the ships are more or less already at the end of their growth potential and future upgrades have hardly any space left to fit in during the 40year service life of these new ships. And in the end, they may not be that much cheaper than a DDG-1000.
By Michael Fabey
The U.S. Navy should do a “thorough analyses of alternatives (AOA) for its future surface combatant program,” the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommended in a report released Jan. 24.
GAO also found the Navy analysis used to restart the service’s DDG-51 Arleigh Burke destroyer line and scuttle Navy plans for a larger, more modern DDG-1000 Zumwalt class fleet fails to justify the service’s decision.
Further, GAO’s report — “Arleigh Burke Destroyers, Additional Analysis and Oversight Required to Support the Navy’s Future Surface Combatant Plans” — questions the affordability of the Navy’s future destroyer and radar system programs.
The report echoes the concerns, analysis and recommendations provided in a recent exclusive series published in December by the Aviation Week Intelligence Network (AWIN).
As AWIN notes in its “Come About” series, the Navy based its DDG-51 restart decision on a still-classified hull-radar study that — according to those involved in the study or who had read it — was narrowly focused and skewed toward the restart decision.
Those concerns resound in GAO’s report. “The Navy relied on its 2009 Radar/Hull Study as the basis to select DDG-51 over DDG-1000 to carry the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) as its preferred future surface combatant — a decision that may result in a procurement of up to 43 destroyers and cost up to $80 billion over the next several decades,” GAO notes.
But, GAO contends, “The Radar/Hull Study may not provide a sufficient analytical basis for a decision of this magnitude.”
GAO cites several concerns with the Radar/Hull Study. It focuses on the capability of the radars it evaluated, but does not fully evaluate the capabilities of different shipboard combat systems and ship options under consideration.
The study does not include a thorough trade-off analysis that would compare the relative costs and benefits of different solutions under consideration or provide robust insight into all cost alternatives, auditors say.
The study also assumes a significantly reduced threat environment from other Navy analyses, which allowed radar performance to seem more effective than it may actually be against more sophisticated threats, according to the report.
GAO also cites other concerns with the restart program. “The Navy’s planned production schedules of the restart DDG-51 ships are comparable with past performance and officials told us that hull and mechanical systems changes are modest,” the report says. “But these ships will cost more than previous DDG-51s. A major upgrade to the ship’s combat system software also brings several challenges that could affect the restart ships, due in part to a key component of this upgrade that has already faced delays.”
Also, GAO says, “The Navy faces significant technical risks with its new Flight III DDG-51 ships, and the current level of oversight may not be sufficient given these risks. The Navy is pursuing a reasonable risk mitigation approach to AMDR development, but it will be technically challenging.”
According to Navy analysis, GAO says, selecting the DDG-51 hullform to carry AMDR requires significant redesign and reduces the ability of these ships to accommodate future systems. This decision also limits the radar size to one that will be at best marginally effective and incapable of meeting the Navy’s desired capabilities. The Navy may have underestimated the cost of Flight III.
navyreco
Senior Member
For sure Gerry
I just wanted to underline that this ship is not so new/advanced (commissioned 1971) while special forces nowadays are all about technology:
In the late 90ies, early 2000s special forces were not relying so much on technology but were seen more as "rustic" and perfect for rough conitions...
I use the word Rustic for lack of better word... my vocabulary is rusty at times... I hope you'll get what I am trying to say
While with the GWOT, Special Forces worldwide (or at least in the western world) are again relying very much on tehcnology: they have their own PDA, own satelitte link, own UAVs, laptops during operations/missions.
They even get their own factory spec "Special Forces" variant of vehicles while "back in the day" they were often using "normal issued" gear that they were modifying on their own (when they could).
Another example:
Since WWII and France had 5 navy commando units:
And in 2008... to "support" the units above during GWOT (and to the surprise of many) an extra unit was created:
Commando Kieffer: Specialized in technology: UAV control, EW, CBRN, anti-IED etc
Anyways, I was just surprised that SEALS would "only" get a 40 y.o ship while "we" (as in "informed public") were used to see Special Forces getting cool/advanced/dedicated/"SF Spec" etc... gear (remember again that "stealth helicopter" from the Bin Laden raid).
Anyways, as a Friend on a french board put it: To fight pirates off the Horn of Africa and launch assaults USS Ponce will do just fine... plus in those times of weak economy you can't really justify a single class dedicated ship...
Equation
Lieutenant General
Those pesky pirates from the horn of Africa are sill at it, plus they're spreading further out into the Seychelles Island and beyond. The international forces of 30 different navies (with the US as the lead) are busier than ever. It's time for a different kind of approach to control this SLoC threat. Either deal with them peacefully or forcefully, something has to be done quickly. I hope the African Union can find a way to make Somalia central government more effective and reliable to combat these pirates. Somalia is very poor with high unemployment rate with little hope and prospects for any young Somalians to do with their time and skills.