There's been discussion here about procurement and production.
A reading of various articles and forums over time has suggested several things to me:
1. Russian shipbuilding was (2014-2021) seriously affected by at least two main factors:
a) corruption / inefficiency at the shipyards
b) loss of engines from Ukraine
Top-down efforts from government over a period of years has reduced the first problem. [One issue is that shipyards were not motivated to produce at the cost mandated by the Russian government, since export contracts were more lucrative. But there were many other issues as well.]
The shipyards are supposedly under better administration now than they were circa 2014.
The Ukraine engine problem is one that is severe when it is operative, but becomes less severe over time as replacements are procured. It was a really bad problem for several years, but they are working their way out of designs that required those Ukraine-sourced engines.
Basically, Ukraine caused Russian shipbuilding a lot of temporary pain, but once that is cleared, is no longer extant.
Like many other military programs, things started to 'click together' around 2020. Their submarines, for example, are on a more regular timetable now, you see introduction of new types, and so on.
Critics have pointed out that they only cleared the bad blood out of their war industries and gotten into a rhythm by 2021 or thereabouts, just when major tensions were starting. Obviously, it would have been better if the corruption + foreign dependance had been addressed much earlier.
2. With regard to the Lider class, it looks pretty outrageous and over-ambitious at first glance. However, Russia is already producing nuclear icebreakers. They have the hull and propulsion understanding pretty down-pat, and the electronics suite integration is probably being addressed among the frigates. From a logistics and production standpoint, you could argue that the Lider is more rational than other alternatives. They should be able to indigenously build and sustain the systems without too much blue-sky research. Could be completely sovereign. The nuclear icebreakers are still in the build queue, that might be the only real hold-up (they make money for Russia, so are a priority).
I think the period of short-term pain is largely ending for Russian shipbuilding. It won't have much impact on the current conflict.
3. In terms of very large ships, they seem to be following the philosophy of 'master, then innovate.' A lot of talent was lost after dismantling the Soviet Union. The Kirov-type ship they're working on mostly just sat there, even after the 'refit' started. Real work has been much more recent. Study of Admiral Nakhimov, and their carrier, will allow younger shipyard workers and naval engineers to learn about large ship construction. Once Nakhimov is refitted, which will take some time, new builds may commence.
4. In terms of land systems, Russia was allegedly in near war-time production of munitions for months before the present crisis. Some platforms like BTR-82A were in high-rate production, and many of those are present on the battlefield today.
Armata went into series production shortly before the present military operation. The latest T-90 variant is also in series production. None of this will impact the present phase of the conflict.
Russia is now [2021 and beyond] engaging in series production of modern land equipment. Bumerang could make an appearance in that regard, as well.
5. SU-57 is expensive and comes from a more high-tech production line than usual. There were few people trained in the new methods at the outset of production. It's not like pumping out SU-30. They have to expand trained personnel for both SU-57 and SU-75 projects, probably from the same small core.
SU-75 debut was successful, there is likely someone funding initial production. First flight may happen this year. May start deliveries in ~3 years. At that point, it can fill out the 'numbers' plane for 5th generation fighters.
So Russia is unlikely to need fighter jets from China, but may need other systems [e.g. drone technologies].
Since military exports are an important part of Russia's present and future economy, it is unlikely that they would want to drop any functional systems. I personally believe that there is much to be gained in co-operation with China on projects such as transport aircraft, space missions, maybe next-generation helicopters.
Russia will probably have its frigate situation sorted out, but they won't be building carriers anytime soon. I guess they could purchase a Chinese carrier and outfit it with Russian systems.
Capital-ship and land-force modernization started picking up pace in the past two years, but not in time to influence the opening of the Ukraine military operation.