What did China know and when did China know it?
A popular Western belief is that China's almost as culpable as Russia in invading Ukraine.
Some Americans have even argued that China's more culpable than Russia because China allegedly ordered the invasion.
"Did China Know Russia Would Invade Ukraine?
Abstract: Russia’s war with Ukraine has put China in an uncomfortable position. It now faces three irreconcilable choices:
Support Russia at the risk of contradicting core principles of its foreign policy and angering the West, abandon its alliance
and support the West, or do nothing and tarnish its image as a responsible great power. Chinese foreign policy is risk-averse.
At the same time, China has economic interests in Ukraine. Chinese scholars were announcing that a war would not happen,
officials openly rejected US intelligence reports, and the embassy was complacent in evacuation planning.
All considered China was likely caught by surprise when Russia invaded.
Bottom-line-up-front: The Russian invasion of Ukraine seems to have caught Beijing off-guard. This may have been due to
a “mirror image” bias, in which Beijing based its assessments of Russian behavior on Chinese military philosophy."
"While the optics may not favor claims that Beijing was indeed left in the dark, a more thoughtful assessment of the facts
on the ground appears to paint a different picture."
"If China did indeed fail to predict the crisis, it raises questions as to how exactly Beijing managed to make such a mammoth
strategic miscalculation. According to Yan Sun, it was the result of a “mirror image bias”: that “Chinese assessment of Russian
intentions was based on China's own military philosophy”. Chinese military strategists like Sun Tzu contend that “to win
100 battles is not the acme of skill, to win a war without fighting is the acme of skill”.
As Yan Sun elaborates, ancient Chinese strategic thinking dictates that “the best military operations ranked are: undermining the
enemy's plans, then diplomacy, then defeating the enemy on the battlefield (上兵伐谋，其次伐交，其次伐兵，其下攻城)”.
A full-scale war is always the least desirable last option. According to this interpretation, China viewed the Russian encirclement
of Ukraine as somewhat of a
fait accompli, believing that the next step would be to bargain from a position of strength.
Russia already seemed to have the upper hand, making Beijing believe that war was unnecessary.
If this interpretation holds, it reinforces the idea that nations view the world through unique culturally inherited mental
frameworks that they subsequently project (unconsciously) onto others with vastly different histories and cultures.
When it comes to China and the Ukraine crisis, the case underscores the perils of succumbing to such biases."
