Miragedriver
Brigadier
Part 2
What will the future conflict?
It is very difficult to predict future conflicts in an era characterized by complexity. Therefore, military analysts have focused on certain aspects of future war, the nature of potential adversaries and characteristics of the operational environment. Existing research indicates that future conflicts will be hybrid and asymmetric, with actors as diverse as regular forces, tribal militias, paramilitaries, insurgents, terrorists, warlords and criminal groups, to mention a few.
Questions about the future operational environment are somewhat clearer. According to David Kilcullen, four global trends are key in this regard. First, population dynamics, highlighting the increasing population especially in developing countries. Second, the phenomenon of urbanization becomes more important when most of the population growth occurs in cities, often without sufficient infrastructure, basic services and resources for the population. Third, connectivity. The ability of people to communicate instantly assumed an undoubted advantages, but also existing networks can be (and are) abused to commit illegal activities. Finally, Kilcullen argues that the fourth key global trend is the littoralisation. Most of the world's population lives in cities located on the coast or within one hundred kilometers of the sea. Analyzing these global trends from the point of view of future conflicts, Kilcullen argues that urban combat shoreline continue to acquire increasing relevance.
Strategic thinking and concepts
Strategic analysts forecast these trends when it comes to predict what kind of operations will take place and what are the necessary capabilities will be considered.
Military procurement plans are usually performed with a range of approximately fifteen years. Logically, budgetary constraints can alter. And besides, the bureaucratic procedures can slow them down causing some of the acquisitions do not conform to the changes in the strategic environment. Therefore a very important role (though not receiving the increased funding) is the strategic long-term forecast. In this case, analysts try to predict what the environment in which military forces conduct their operations in fifty years. Obviously, this type of analysis is in many respects more difficult given the complexity of the current conflict dynamics. Just we do not know what kind of militias will operate for example in a decade in the area which today controls the Daesh. However, predictions using data and trends on natural, social and technological dynamics can provide useful clues.
An example of such initiatives is undoubtedly the urbanization project developed by NATO, in addition to focusing on urban combat programs (including aspects from doctrine to training) in the US, UK, Israel and other countries especially in Western Europe. The strategic analysis also often outsourced; for example, the RAND Corporation has its own section analysis of military action in cities. Nevertheless, the strategic analysis related to urban combat represents only a tiny fraction when compared with the amount of tactics and technology initiatives currently being undertaken in this area.
Tactics and technology
In contrary to budgetary constraints affecting the European armies direction, other countries are increasing their military potential. Among those investments combat in population is receiving particular attention. Urban combat has characteristics and constraints due to the nature of cities. Innovations in the ability to command and control, using the latest advances in communications technology, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance go beyond the scope of this analysis. The objectives include the design of more efficient monitoring systems, including improved drones using sensors, and nano-technologies to improve awareness of the situation (situational awareness) in the dense urban terrain.
As for the weapons, the current development is focused on improving the accuracy, effect, firepower and mobility: key issues in urban combat. Attention has been paid to equipping soldiers for armor (body armor) lighter but with greater protection capacity. Furthermore, night vision devices and media try to improve efficiency and reduce physical and mental exhaustion which is typical of urban combat. Finally, modifications to the military vehicles are intended to make them smaller, efficient and mobile, able to maneuver in narrow streets, avoid physical obstacles and face are the enemy, protecting all operators situation.
Problems of complexity
Critics say there is a fundamental problem in the mainly tactical and technocratic approach that has dominated the current practice of combat in cities. The core problem is that the doctrine of urban combat still see the city simply as a part of the operating field and therefore favors the tactic of "clear and hold". As a Canadian military expert pointed at a congress of the Dutch army in the Hague, 'we are very good at cleaning but we are failing to sustain'.
This type of doctrine and practice useful when trying to capture a building or block of buildings, but reaches its limits when the objective is to stabilize and protect a larger urban area. The cities, especially large ones, have a complex network of natural elements, infrastructure, and social frameworks with their constant interactions (many intangibles). In other words, the city is a complex system. Systems of this type are extremely (or impossible) to control in the classic military sense. Consequently, it is very difficult to exercise total control over a large city in the medium to long term, simply because no military force today has adequate human and technical resources to do so.
l result of employing the tactics of urban control is often to "freeze" a part of the city in question. At its extreme, this form of combat has been labeled "urbicide" (an analogy to "homicide", although in this case the victim is the city as a whole). Critics such as Stephen Graham have used this term, referring especially to the military-urban Israeli policy regarding the Palestinians. Freeze a city or its parts through military force can only lead to long-term strategic success.
Considering the morphology of future conflicts, defined by battles in a dense urban terrain, coping with difficult to distinguish from the local population actors, it seems appropriate to start thinking about developing new strategies. Before working in an environment like this, you need to understand the physical and social networks that define the city. The enemy knows, uses and abuses of these networks, but are the same that hold the city as such. Therefore, the aim should be to maximize the accuracy and discrimination during the confrontation, and do everything possible to minimize the disruption of everyday interactions (information, energy, materials and people trafficking, etc.). The latter form the basis of urban resilience inherent in the cities and essential to its operation and the long-term safety.
Katarína Svitková is a researcher of the Research Group in International Security (GESI) and Master in International Security and Strategic Studies from the University of Granada
Link:
Back to bottling my Grenache
What will the future conflict?
It is very difficult to predict future conflicts in an era characterized by complexity. Therefore, military analysts have focused on certain aspects of future war, the nature of potential adversaries and characteristics of the operational environment. Existing research indicates that future conflicts will be hybrid and asymmetric, with actors as diverse as regular forces, tribal militias, paramilitaries, insurgents, terrorists, warlords and criminal groups, to mention a few.
Questions about the future operational environment are somewhat clearer. According to David Kilcullen, four global trends are key in this regard. First, population dynamics, highlighting the increasing population especially in developing countries. Second, the phenomenon of urbanization becomes more important when most of the population growth occurs in cities, often without sufficient infrastructure, basic services and resources for the population. Third, connectivity. The ability of people to communicate instantly assumed an undoubted advantages, but also existing networks can be (and are) abused to commit illegal activities. Finally, Kilcullen argues that the fourth key global trend is the littoralisation. Most of the world's population lives in cities located on the coast or within one hundred kilometers of the sea. Analyzing these global trends from the point of view of future conflicts, Kilcullen argues that urban combat shoreline continue to acquire increasing relevance.
Strategic thinking and concepts
Strategic analysts forecast these trends when it comes to predict what kind of operations will take place and what are the necessary capabilities will be considered.
Military procurement plans are usually performed with a range of approximately fifteen years. Logically, budgetary constraints can alter. And besides, the bureaucratic procedures can slow them down causing some of the acquisitions do not conform to the changes in the strategic environment. Therefore a very important role (though not receiving the increased funding) is the strategic long-term forecast. In this case, analysts try to predict what the environment in which military forces conduct their operations in fifty years. Obviously, this type of analysis is in many respects more difficult given the complexity of the current conflict dynamics. Just we do not know what kind of militias will operate for example in a decade in the area which today controls the Daesh. However, predictions using data and trends on natural, social and technological dynamics can provide useful clues.
An example of such initiatives is undoubtedly the urbanization project developed by NATO, in addition to focusing on urban combat programs (including aspects from doctrine to training) in the US, UK, Israel and other countries especially in Western Europe. The strategic analysis also often outsourced; for example, the RAND Corporation has its own section analysis of military action in cities. Nevertheless, the strategic analysis related to urban combat represents only a tiny fraction when compared with the amount of tactics and technology initiatives currently being undertaken in this area.
Tactics and technology
In contrary to budgetary constraints affecting the European armies direction, other countries are increasing their military potential. Among those investments combat in population is receiving particular attention. Urban combat has characteristics and constraints due to the nature of cities. Innovations in the ability to command and control, using the latest advances in communications technology, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance go beyond the scope of this analysis. The objectives include the design of more efficient monitoring systems, including improved drones using sensors, and nano-technologies to improve awareness of the situation (situational awareness) in the dense urban terrain.
As for the weapons, the current development is focused on improving the accuracy, effect, firepower and mobility: key issues in urban combat. Attention has been paid to equipping soldiers for armor (body armor) lighter but with greater protection capacity. Furthermore, night vision devices and media try to improve efficiency and reduce physical and mental exhaustion which is typical of urban combat. Finally, modifications to the military vehicles are intended to make them smaller, efficient and mobile, able to maneuver in narrow streets, avoid physical obstacles and face are the enemy, protecting all operators situation.
Problems of complexity
Critics say there is a fundamental problem in the mainly tactical and technocratic approach that has dominated the current practice of combat in cities. The core problem is that the doctrine of urban combat still see the city simply as a part of the operating field and therefore favors the tactic of "clear and hold". As a Canadian military expert pointed at a congress of the Dutch army in the Hague, 'we are very good at cleaning but we are failing to sustain'.
This type of doctrine and practice useful when trying to capture a building or block of buildings, but reaches its limits when the objective is to stabilize and protect a larger urban area. The cities, especially large ones, have a complex network of natural elements, infrastructure, and social frameworks with their constant interactions (many intangibles). In other words, the city is a complex system. Systems of this type are extremely (or impossible) to control in the classic military sense. Consequently, it is very difficult to exercise total control over a large city in the medium to long term, simply because no military force today has adequate human and technical resources to do so.
l result of employing the tactics of urban control is often to "freeze" a part of the city in question. At its extreme, this form of combat has been labeled "urbicide" (an analogy to "homicide", although in this case the victim is the city as a whole). Critics such as Stephen Graham have used this term, referring especially to the military-urban Israeli policy regarding the Palestinians. Freeze a city or its parts through military force can only lead to long-term strategic success.
Considering the morphology of future conflicts, defined by battles in a dense urban terrain, coping with difficult to distinguish from the local population actors, it seems appropriate to start thinking about developing new strategies. Before working in an environment like this, you need to understand the physical and social networks that define the city. The enemy knows, uses and abuses of these networks, but are the same that hold the city as such. Therefore, the aim should be to maximize the accuracy and discrimination during the confrontation, and do everything possible to minimize the disruption of everyday interactions (information, energy, materials and people trafficking, etc.). The latter form the basis of urban resilience inherent in the cities and essential to its operation and the long-term safety.
Katarína Svitková is a researcher of the Research Group in International Security (GESI) and Master in International Security and Strategic Studies from the University of Granada
Link:
Back to bottling my Grenache
