Do you know if this fellow has any written articles that might be perused? Am curious about these 'viable' plans. Haven't seen one yet from the Americans.
No one ever became Under Secretary of Defense for Policy by being
completely candid about their views, preferences and expectations. This is especially true when it comes to unpalatable, if not outright bitter truths about America's sole pacing threat: a nation state that many Americans despise for its supposedly communist regime, despite widespread inability to so much as even define said form of governance.
As you can imagine, there is no singular document attributable to Elbridge Colby laying out the entirety of his containment strategy against China in a way that is
detailed,
candid,
current and
publicly accessible, at least to the best of my knowledge.
The
closest thing to what you're looking for would be his 2021 book: "
."
This text contains a fairly comprehensive and detailed framework, if not instructions for containing the rise of China. However, this book is fundamentally
defense and broadly
hard power centric. As such, lacking in coverage of certain facets of Sino-American competition and conflict, and applicable approaches for those domains.
Moreover, this book was written prior to the events of October 7, 2023 when "shit hit the fan" in Israel and then across the region; the start of the full scale Russo-Ukrainian War on February 24, 2022; and the Biden administration's intensified and multipronged efforts to
strangle China's semiconductor industry. So in a certain context it's more theoretical than current, but it does communicate the essence of Mr. Colby's vision and framework — specifically what he terms an "
anti-hegemonic coalition," rather
ironically assembled under American hegemony — for denying the emergence of a Chinese alternative.
On top of that, the 2025 National Defense Strategy, which is
currently being drafted under his purview, should provide a more current picture of Mr. Colby's and the broader administration's (likely idealized, but TBA) approach toward China, even in its unclassified or summarized rendition.
Moving forward, if you have the appetite for digesting a broader set of Mr. Colby's
,
and
current policymaking, you should be able to achieve a reasonable degree of clarity on just what the sitting USDP is aiming for.
That is
absolutely not to say the
political will will be there and the
requisite leadership will magically, if ever manifest for Mr. Colby to meaningfully pursue his agenda against China, absent a truly extraordinary black swan event or series of black swan events.
If so, I would recommend reviewing some of the
as they considered his nomination for USDP. Though do keep in mind that such nominees, however senior and pedigreed, still have to be cautious with their words before legislators — to get confirmed and to maintain a healthy working relationship with those who hold the power of the purse over their parent agencies — even if Mr. Colby is
arguably more blunt than most SES level officials serving in similarly politicized capacities.
Happy to check my notes if you want additional relevant materials to churn through, but best to start with the aforementioned linked texts and videos.
As far as ongoing policymaking intended for contesting the rise of Pax Sinica goes, you may wish to consider the following in terms of Mr. Colby's
lines of effort:
(1)
Dumping all non-pacing threats (e.g. Russia, Iran, North Korea, Venezuela, etc.) on allies or in totality. This is why
obsessing over the exaggerated Iranian threat, as well as both
and
eager to continue the proxy war against Russia via Ukraine are less than fond of Elbridge Colby.
Not to say I agree with the sitting USDP on his policy preferences, but senior officials who are this
unpopular are usually more principled than ambitious, which makes them
arguably decent human beings vis-a-vis their typical peers.
(2)
Reprioritizing finite American resources toward peer competition in general, and
around Chinese containment in particular. This would include deprioritizing CT and COIN capabilities; the potential, if not probable
; and reinvigorating American nuclear deterrence, inevitably at immense expense, among other things.
Guy is even
, and sees it as a mechanism for reducing South Korean dependency on its American security guarantees, so Washington can concentrate finite resources against Beijing! TBF, it's an aggressive, if not provocative and dangerous proposal, but it's arguably better reasoned and more logical than what the US has been doing for the last decade or two.
(3)
Impressing US allies like Japan and Australia, and should the opportunity arise even neutral regional players,
into an overt "anti-hegemonic coalition" against China, which translate into persuading, if not strong-arming technically sovereign countries into
and
targeting China.
Interestingly, in his 2021 book, not only did Mr. Colby envision every country from Vietnam and South Korea to Malaysia and India joining his notional "anti-hegemonic coalition," but he even believed it would be plausible to pull Russia to the anti-China side of the ledger!
However, he appears to have since tampered his wild dreams of an alliance with Russia, and has even openly rejected notions of an "Asian NATO." Guess Bridge must have realized that Trumpian tariff wars, and assembling an "anti-hegemonic coalition" don't mix.
In addition, the sitting USDP is
reportedly not actively courting NATO countries to confront China, at the current juncture, even though some NATO member states have conducted naval deployments to the Pacific in recent years to metaphorically
shake their fists at Beijing, and/or feigned willingness to confront the Celestial Empire. Mr. Colby is likely wise to not count on the Europeans: he knows that if they're reluctant to send troops to somewhere as close to home as Ukraine, they're not going to want to commit forces on the other side of the world against China.
(4) Convincing, if not outright
forcing the current DPP-led regime in Taipei to significantly and quantifiably increase its commitment to the military defense of Taiwan, should they expect US intervention in the event of hostilities against the PLA.
To this end,
from the current level of <3% of GDP.
To be totally fair and candid, and let's not mince words here: Elbridge Colby should know with complete clarity that the Trump administration will fail to assemble the grand anti-China coalition he has proposed. The current administration is too disliked, if not despised by allies and adversaries alike to cultivate the complex alignments and unpalatable commitments needed to even reasonably experiment with Mr. Colby's approach.
However, what is viable(-ish) if we're to be generous about Mr. Colby's approach is that it is founded upon clarity — in particular in its recognition of both the limits of American power and the might of extant and emerging Chinese capabilities — whereas the current US approach is one of make belief: the DoD pretend to make progress in deterring China, while Congress pretend to parameterize and resource the DoD for deterring China.
Even though the Trump administration will be unable to realize Mr. Colby's vision, his approach imbue clarity in the broader USG that gives Washington a chance, however slim, to maintain its hegemony, or more likely, a semblance thereof.
At a minimum, clarity will discourage Washington from entering a conflict it can't win, and preserve finite capabilities for another day or a lesser adversary. OTOH, continuing the status quo is a guaranteed dead end for Pax Americana.
