Launching such a weapon over Ukraine would be lethal to Kyiv’s information warfare systems
The writer is a US Army Special Forces veteran who served in Iraq and Afghanistan and a former deputy assistant secretary of defence
So far, Russia’s threats of escalation against Ukraine have been largely interpreted as a veiled reference to the use of traditional nuclear weapons. But there is another tool which Vladimir Putin may be considering: a tactical electromagnetic pulse, or EMP, strike. These weapons — designed to create a powerful pulse of energy which short-circuits electrical equipment such as computers, generators, satellites, radios, radar receivers and even traffic lights — could disable Ukraine’s military and civilian infrastructure at a stroke and leave the country without light, heat, communications or transport.
A tactical nuclear weapon used to create an explosion would most likely be ineffective against the mobile, dispersed combination of guerrilla and conventional warfare that Ukrainians are deploying to reclaim their territory. But the use of a nuclear weapon for electromagnetic warfare is a different matter. The signature of this type of attack would not be a fireball and mushroom cloud but a weird electric blue medusa orb pulsing directly overhead, followed by silence. At that altitude, the sound will not carry.
A relatively small nuclear EMP, easily deployed at high altitude by Russia’s hypersonic Zircon cruise missiles, might not destroy any buildings or kill anybody. But it could permanently disable electrical circuits over thousands of square miles of Ukrainian territory. Virtually all the defence equipment deployed by Nato allies to Ukraine — such as radios, GPS navigation, and aerial drones — are dependent on electronics, if not for operations, then for deployment, maintenance and integration. The lingering electromagnetic effects of a strike could destroy 90 per cent of the satellites over the afflicted zone within three months. However, it is likely that Russian information operations on the ground would also be affected.
The US and its allies are by no means oblivious to the dangers of an EMP, and most military equipment has a degree of inbuilt defence against this eventuality. But a strike would create a new battlespace that negates the superiority of our information systems. We have not war-gamed this properly.
In Kherson, for instance, a tactical EMP could disable the systems that operate the region’s dams, clog highways and bridges with miles of disabled vehicles and leave the civilian population struggling for food and heat. In the aftermath of a successful EMP strike, Ukraine would have to pause fighting to restock its ruined arsenal. Putin could meanwhile rebuild and resupply his forces and seize the newly depopulated areas during a spring offensive.
What is perhaps most concerning is that Russia and Nato have such different approaches to these weapons. Under Russian military doctrine, EMP strikes are a branch of information, cyber and electronic warfare rather than nuclear warfare. This lowers the bar and may render EMPs even more tempting to Putin’s beleaguered generals.
So, what next? First, we must warn Russia that an EMP strike against Ukraine — even if it is localised — would cross the nuclear threshold and trigger a collective defence response from Nato. The unpredictable effects of spillover on the earth’s atmosphere, the environment, satellites and downwind populations should suffice as a rationale for invoking Article Five (the alliance’s collective defence clause).
Second, we should help the Ukrainian military prepare. An EMP strike is survivable. We should support them in conducting live EMP drills with the participation of the civilian authorities. The Ukrainian people need to be educated about how to mitigate and overcome such an attack, including by stocking up on analogue radios, flashlights and batteries. Preparation, fortitude, ingenuity and self-reliance are already qualities with which Ukrainians have distinguished themselves in this war.
Finally, we must rethink our objectives. If Putin is indeed contemplating the use of a tactical EMP, then what is at stake is not just Ukraine’s liberty but the very future of warfare. If we yield to the Kremlin’s nuclear blackmail, there is a risk that other countries will follow its lead: China and North Korea already have EMP capabilities. The situation in Ukraine offers a keyhole glimpse to a potentially more dangerous and uncertain future. We cannot afford to lose this fight.
