Does calling your Russian-speaking citizen "subhumans" and deeming them second-class citizens factors into that equation?
Everybody calls everybody dehumanizing names. "Khokols" "Orcs" "Ukrop" etc. It is par for the course, and hardly relevant in my opinion.
Military target? A bridge? So is the nuclear power plant a military target as well in your view?
It is a primary GLOC, and a meaningful vector to generate and employ VKS and RuGF combat power. There is active large scale kinetic action ongoing in a sector that directly coordinates, sustains, regenerates, and employs the currently involved + surge forces and fires from Crimea. Thus, the ability for Russian forces to enter Crimea via that bridge is of direct, significant, and material military importance.
I am not the individual you are replying to, but yes. It is a very clear military target. This is akin to asking "People? A bunch of living, breathing people? A military target?" when discussing the military necessity of shooting at dismounted infantry in defense of a position.
If that though were the case, it cannot survive a day against NATO.
This is correct. Patchwork is urging me to respond to some of the Russian Armed Forces apologia present in the thread, so I feel it relevant to respond to this with some of his paraphrased inputs as well.
Russia, while a notable military power, and absolutely no slouch if its forces are employed competently (prior to the losses it has sustained, at least), is simply not capable of inflicting a conventional military defeat upon even NATO's European member states. Prior to the war, the most significant threat profiles were:
1 - A conventional, high intensity maneuver campaign against the Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia; during which, Russia would nominally have been capable of closing the Suwalki Gap, forcing capitulation of one or more Baltic states in a matter of 1-2 weeks (depending on various factors), and denying immediate intervention by NATO's relatively slim NRF (NATO's Rapid Response Force, ~30-40k coalition personnel).
2 - A highly geopolitical-military fused campaign of gray zone warfare, localized kinetic offensives, and nuclear blackmail against Ukraine, east of the Dnieper/Dnipro River. Within this threat profile, Russian use of false flag provocations, geopolitical maneuver, energy-diplomacy, and the fomenting of local unrest across Europe and Russian-aligned minor nations could have been used to generate a viable justification for a large military campaign against Ukraine's Donetsk and Luhansk regions, moderate European (and potentially American) backlash, and grant time to generate the 300-450k strong land component necessary to decisively and rapidly defeat AFU combat power in the Donbas (over the course of 2-4 months). Employing massed indirect fires against UKR strongpoints, extensive maneuver from the Crimea-Zaporozhia-Pavlohrad/Mariupol direction, and Kharkiv-Lozova direction to deny AFU reinforcement and replenishment, and coordinated use of their limited precision strike regime (via Tu-22, Tu-95, Tu-160) to strike the most critical C2 and enabling infrastructure, with the aim of degrading Ukranian C3 in the Donbas. If NATO/US support beings to materialize in spite of the shaping aforementioned geopolitical/gray-zone shaping activities, an agile and pre-planned use of nuclear blackmail and escalation-ladder-climbing could well have neutered any Western attempts to affect the outcome.
In both of these scenarios, which (according to Patch) were the only two that the US IC regarded as meaningfully concerning, Russia was considered unlikely to prosecute their objectives without extensive loss of life, armored fighting vehicles, fixed and rotary wing airframes. The RuGF's offensive potential was believed to culminate either shortly after, or just as their aims were realized, and would find themselves in the following dispositions post-offensive:
1 - Effectively impotent against NATO airpower application and counter-offensive actions once NATO's joint force fully mobilizes and commits to liberating the Baltics kinetically (i.e. Russian suicide)
2 - Extremely vulnerable to massed Ukrainian raids and logistics interdiction, poorly positioned to conduct high-intensity, large scale combat operations, and without the ability to meaningfully project power beyond their forward phase line's FLOC.
Once more, Russian military force (when employed competently) could still have achieved meaningful results on the battlefield, even with their litany of flaws. However, they were never even
close to challenging NATO, and when their flaws are compounded by utter failures in planning, coordination, personnel training, joint integration, and overall strategic/operational "direction," they're not even an existential threat to Ukraine.