The War in the Ukraine

“Fact is if the Republicans take over the House in 2022 US support to Ukraine will come to a halt,” tweeted Ruben Gallego, a House Democrat. Republican leaders, he predicted, would not be able to stop Trumpists like Marjorie Taylor Greene and Matt Gaetz “from dictating our Ukraine policy”. Mr Gaetz shot back: “Ruben is correct.”

Mr Trump still holds much of his party in thrall. He denounced the last aid package for Ukraine, saying: “The Democrats are sending another $40bn to Ukraine, yet America’s parents are struggling to even feed their children.” His base could be energised if, in the coming weeks, he announces his intention to run for president again in 2024. Meanwhile, unexpected trouble has come from Victoria Spartz, a Ukrainian-born Republican in the House who had once urged Mr Biden to act more decisively in Ukraine, but has recently taken to accusing some of Mr Zelensky’s aides of corruption.

Perhaps the biggest consideration is the third factor: progress on the battlefield. If the Biden administration can show that Ukraine is gaining ground, rather than being bogged down in another “forever war”, support for the country will be easier to rally. But a protracted conflict looks all too likely. Ukraine has had success of late in using , a guided-missile launcher, to strike at command posts and ammunition dumps behind Russia’s front lines. But Ukrainian forces are still heavily outgunned and on the defensive, if not still retreating.

Mr Biden’s aim in the war is unclear. His administration has stopped talking about helping Ukraine to “win”, and instead speaks of preventing it from being defeated. It is delivering himars in small packages of four launchers at a time. (It claims it needs time to train Ukrainian forces.) But Mr Biden’s main concern is to avoid a direct conflict between nato and a nuclear-armed Russia. America has demanded assurances that the 84km-range gmlrs munitions provided with himars will not be fired at Russian territory; it has so far refused to provide the atacms munition which has a range of about 300km.

To some the war is unwinnable. They say the Biden administration should make haste to find a diplomatic deal. But for Ukraine’s supporters, whether Democratic or Republican, the answer is for Mr Biden to hurry up and win: give Ukraine more military help, do it faster and accept more risk. Mr Edelman has this warning for the Biden team: “If they think stalemate is the answer, or even if they are not intentionally playing for a stalemate, they’re going to lose on the battlefield, and they’re going to lose the battle for public opinion at home.”

One thing I don't understand is, why aren't the Ukrainians using their NATO weapons to attack Russian mainland? The whole point of war is to do what your enemy doesn't want to do. They now have the capability to do so thanks to the NATO longer range GMLRS. Ukrainians consider Donetsk to be their own country, it seems retarded to be shelling what you consider your own territory.

If they do, one of two things happen. Either Russia retaliates by attacking a NATO base in Poland which leads to article 5 being triggered, congratulations Ukraine actually has a chance of winning the war.

Or Russia does nothing which is a win as it'll make Russia look weak. It'll hurt Russian domestic opinion much more than anything done so far.

I know Americans have made the Ukrainians pinky promise not to use them against Russia, but it's easier to get forgiveness than permission. Even if the government gets pissed, just make a few more fake rape/dead baby videos to get the public back on board.

Seems to be a much better plan than the current one which is to create memes on the internet while sending as many Ukrainians as possible into continuous artillery bombardment.

gadgetcool5 said:

Yeah, the Russians are screwed because their troops will be stuck on the wrong side of the Dneiper unable to be reinforced while being chewed up by a massive Ukrainian counter-offensive in the Kherson region. The Ukrainians are steadily striking the area- destroying the bridge, the anti-aircraft radar, shooting down planes. Degrading Russian capabilities.

If I were Russia, I would have to annex the area pretty quickly so that an attack on the region is seen as an attack on the Russian Federation itself.

Click to expand...

Why do they need to do that? According to you, shouldn't the Ukrainians be at Moscow already?

Fedupwithlies said:

Why do they need to do that? According to you, shouldn't the Ukrainians be at Moscow already?

Click to expand...

So if they suffer a humiliating and sweeping loss in Kherson they can still claim it in a "territorial dispute" and offer to drop the claim later on in exchange for other concessions.

Also, the Russian Federation itself being attacked would allow reserves to be deployed there, and would help justify a partial or general mobilization if that option was wanted. There are already many in the region who have been given Russian passports, so they are officially Russian citizens already.

I like to think that there are still people visiting this thread who want a more constructive take on the conflict and are dissatisfied with the condition of this thread even if they happen to agree with the political bias. I acknowledge that I might be wrong about that. Certainly the discussion in portions of SDF degenerated to levels that I can not tolerate and participate in with good faith. But that's something I won't know unless I test the waters.

Air campaign during the Russian invasion of Ukraine - general characteristics

This is the timeline of combined losses for Ukrainian and Russia air forces since 24 February to 19 July. I used Wikipedia article on aircraft losses because I do have my doubts about Oryx in this instance. For example the recently added photo of a destroyed Su-35 from "29 March to 2 April" looks remarkably similar to the confirmed Su-35 downed on 3 April. Having spent some time analyzing the materials I'd say that Oryx is still mostly right and whatever duplicates are included account for the missing approximately 25% of losses that are confirmed by other reports and sources. On the other hand Ukrainian losses past March are completely not believable.

Quality might not be best but I had to downsize it so that SDF engine wouldn't make it completely unreadable.

Black numbers are downed aircraft. Purple numbers are aircraft destroyed on the ground. Red numbers are heavily damaged aircraft that returned to base.



I included the timeline counting days of operations which will help to establish periods of combat and consolidation. Remember that military equipment is designed to work in extreme conditions and has a limited life in combat conditions. For example when we consider the standard 8000 hours airframe life it is calculated per peacetime use. Once you add combat loads and reduce maintenance due to man-hours shortage the life of the airframe drops significantly below that number and requires additional repairs and maintenance afterward. This means that during wartime air force works in bursts. The first 2 weeks is the intended "high intensity" operations which are then followed by "regular" loads for the following 2 weeks. Then when should follow is an operational pause with low-intensity operations to maintain position but at the same time recover and consolidate your assets. Sometimes that is replaced by additional 2-4 weeks of fighting at "regular" loads which ten require longer recovery.

• High intensity phase involves contesting of airspace as well as ground strikes - it's when air supremacy/superiority is achieved and the target is primarily air force and air defense assets and command and control facilities along with key infrastructural targets to disrupt ground forces movements.
• Regular phase is focused on ground strike missions to degrade enemy ground force and strategic potential.
• Low intensity phase has reduced ground strikes and minimum air superiority missions.

Now compare it with Desert Storm which lasted only 5 weeks:



In terms of levels of activity reports indicate that Russian Air Force level of sorties never exceeded and average of 250-300 sorties per day in peak periods - that included air defense missions conducted over Russian territory. I haven't found out if those numbers included helicopter sorties.

This is a table of missions by category from USAF's Air Power Survey:

• AI - air interdiction
• BAI - battlefield air interdiction
• CAS - close air support
• DCA - defensive counter-air (shooting down aircraft)
• CAP - combat air patrol
• OCA - offensive counter-air (strikes against airfields)
• SEAD - suppression of enemy air defenses
• ESC - escort
• ESM - electronic support measures
• EW - electronic warfare (and recon)
• FUEL - refueling

If you compare the phases with the timeline of both operation you see similarities which are the direct consequence of logistical and mechanical constraints. The scale of air war in Desert Storm was significantly greater than in Ukraine (close to an order of magnitude) but the general characteristics are preserved.

From what I can tell Russian invasion of Ukraine followed the extended plan - 2 weeks "high intensity" + 6 (rather than 2) weeks "regular" but it seems that it was slightly stretched over time so it lasted up to mid-April because of gaps in the preceding 2+6 weeks, probably due to weather. Then with the change of plan aka "second phase" of the invasion the low intensity phase began. However it involved regular strikes in the Donbas region for a period of 2-3 weeks in the end of April/early May. Low intensity phase lasted for close to two months which probably can be explained by preparations for resuming higher intensity when the counter-offensive begins. This is probably why we've seen an increase in activity in recent days. What we need to remember is that the machines are worn out from the intended use in the first high intensity/regular phase so they won't resume initial level of combat activity. It will be "high intensity" in character more than pure numbers matching the opening two weeks. That's something that can be noticed in statistics of all aerial campaigns throughout the history of combat aviation from WW2 onward. Every war is two wars: one against the opponent, another against physics.

Judging from well documented past precedent and whatever scarce data I could gather on current state of RuAF I think it has about 2-3 weeks of fighting in it, perhaps 4 weeks if they push it. Afterward it should collapse into a state of material "exhaustion" that will prevent it from operating above "low intensity" for several months - provided that recovery of fighting capability is conducted on terms of wartime mobilization. This prognosis of course assumes that Russia retains strategic reserve and doesn't wear it out in Ukraine. But Russia would have to be late-Third Reich insane/incompetent to do anything else and so far I think they kept the reserve intact. This is why Su-35S are rarely seen in action over Ukraine.

Air campaign during the Russian invasion of Ukraine - Russian Air Force

I found no indication that the technical quality of Russian aircraft is affecting the performance of RuAF in the conflict. That doesn't mean that claims about their capability are warranted - they are definitely not, and this war offers some proof that I won't get into now - but it means that they should perform significantly better than they have. Their lackluster performance is due to RuAF personnel incompetence which can only explained by complete institutional collapse of the RuAF compared to the Soviet predecessor.

Being Polish I know the actual level of performance of Soviet /Warsaw Pact air forces and while there were important differences in doctrine which led to each side having their advantage both NATO and WP retained a similarly purpose-driven level of competence. That competence included not only pilots but also ground crews and institutional framework. It existed despite the many problems plaguing WP military culture. RuAF can best be described as "SovietAF LARPers" and let's leave it at that.

The material issues like lack of sufficient number of PGMs that are often brought up by western analysts should not play a part , especially if you consider that Russia is waging it's "Desert Storm" over Ukraine in a very literal sense of the word. Therefore methods of Desert Storm - which involved mass use of unguided munitions - should prevail and bring comparable results. They haven't because Russia lacked the cultural/institutional component which made US aviation effective.

As for using Desert Storm as literal comparison - confusion might arise from conflating the daring raids resembling the invasion of Iraq in 2003 from the first phase of Russian invasion. But in my opinion the correct view to understand this conflict is to see it as Desert Storm against more competent Iraqi ground defenses with the first half (the dynamic part) of Iraqi Freedom overlaid on top of it.

Russia attempted these two very different operations simultaneously, but with absolutely insufficient numbers in air power. That alone is an interesting problem indicating that they paid too much attention to the "shock and awe" approach of Iraqi Freedom and not enough to the grinding material consequences of combined Iran-Iraq war, Desert Storm and Northern/Southern Watch (no fly zone) which makes it a period of 20 years of intense warfare. In other words they thought the effects of 2003 invasion were due to the merits of the forces and tactics used therein rather than due to the consequences of long-term exhaustion of Iraq as a state. Definitely the 8 years of limited warfare that Ukraine waged since 2014 can't be compared to what Iraq went through and I fail to see how they could be conflated.

Another major error seems to be the assumption that US forces in 1991 were numerous because Iraqi forces were numerous and completely ignores the basic mathematics of target, sortie and payload numbers. This in particular is a display of unbelievable incompetence which assumed no backup plan for when the initial psychological shock of the first 1-2 days fails to achieve a political effect and Ukraine consolidates its defenses. This is a level of incompetence that suggests a mental dysfunction at work at the highest levels of Russian political and military authorities. Because this is the only explanation of blatant rejection of the lessons of the many failures of American military in the last 20 years.

The war also revealed some very fundamental limitations arising from the structure of Russian military - namely the role and size of Military Districts. This is a particularly interesting question as it brings attention to Chinese military reform which established Theater Commands - there are important lessons to be drawn from Russian errors. Russia has very limited air force that is not just spread geographically but also isolated due to lack of sufficient infrastructure and support services (aerial refueling).

For example Russia's primary tactical bomber force (Su-24M and Su-34) is physically split between Western, Southern, Central and Eastern districts and any institutional inertia (not to mention corruption) makes it difficult to re-integrate assets while preserving the structure. The USAF has Air Combat Command with centralized assets leaving theater commands with multi-role planes. This meant that Russian tactical bombers couldn't be used in overwhelming numbers because institutional structure kept control and supply separate. Moreover there was no indication that the command of the invasion was handled by an unified command structure. Instead it very much seemed that all the commands pitched in with notional oversight from politically-nominated commanders at the top level. There is no evidence that air forces of western and southern districts coordinated together. That split the ~60 Su-34 at their disposal while separation of districts prevented the most efficient use of all ~120 Su-34s. Similarly Tu-22M3s were not used to the best of their capacity which in comparison to how B-52s were used in Desert Storm (low-altitude bombing runs) suggests that the crews are not trained sufficiently as Long Range Aviation does participate in the operation. These two types alone would mean 150 bombers capable of delivering massed strikes at targets compared to the 40 at best that were used in the initial phase.

There are also consequences in training and use resulting from assets being handed over to formations. For example Naval Aviation has some limited number of warplanes to augment limited AAW of the navy (much like PLANAF did in the past) but that disrupts Air Force planning. If integration is so important then why the Air Force has all the helicopters? The coordination between Ground Force and even VDV and the helos leaves much to be desired, especially compared to American standards, and the only reason is politically motivated shift of helicopters to RuAF.

In terms of tactical shortcomings I see three main ones:

1. Lack of aerial refueling capacity. Russia has only approx. 18 Il-78 tankers but all of them in the Long Range Aviation. This meant that both district commands had no tankers of their own which could be used to practice and develop missions. This also means that no tankers are available to assist in ongoing operations. During Desert Storm most of CAP/DCA was performed by a total of 72 F-15C loitering at high altitudes for 4 to 8 hours with support of large tanker fleet. USN F-14s provided assistance over the Gulf but they were only an auxiliary force. Optimizing mission duration ad profile s significantly reduced the wear of the aircraft and crews (F-15s lost only about 10% of initial readiness at the end of the war) and allowed USAF to maintain continuous air supremacy over the region. Russian Su-35s should be able to do the same but they face two fundamental constraints - lack of spare fuel tanks and lack of tankers supporting the CAP. Lack of fuel means that they can't engage in more aggressive tactics and have to remain in safe Russian airspace which opens Ukrainian airspace to operations by UAF. Lack of fuel means that tactical bombers runs carry reduced payload which combined with fragmentation of assets means multiple low-payload runs that stress the aircraft as save for high-g maneuvering landing and takeoff are the most problematic elements of a mission for life of the plane. Lack of fuel means that enemy forces can "wait out" RuAF knowing very well the time limit on station.

2. Lack of dedicated SEAD capability. Considering that Ukraine is not NATO and follows a Soviet model it was stunningly incompetent for RuAF to never develop even a single unit to training SEAD for which they would have all the resources. That resulted in UA air defenses being operational throughout the entirety of the conflict. At no point during the invasion was there a region where RuAF would succeed in suppressing UA air defenses even temporarily. Destroyed lauchers, radars or batteries do not equal suppression of air defenses as SEAD can (in theory) be achieved with no destroyed enemy SAMs.

3. Lack of coordination between assets. While we have evidence that Ka-52/Mi-28 and Su-25 often do work in tandem (as they should) I haven't seen instances of Flankers and Fullbacks coordinating air-to-air and air-to-ground strikes. Fullbacks don't coordinate among themselves either - Su-34s don't fly in pairs where one aircraft with EW pods performs ECM while the other (or more) hunts for targets.

Note that I did not include lack of situational awareness as a major issue because it is mostly limited by the lack of aerial refueling. While Russia has insufficient number of AEW planes it has sufficient A-50s for operation in Ukraine as long as they can stay in the air - which they can't because of lack of refueling and potential threat of a single S-300 (missed by non-existent SEAD) shooting it down.

MarKoz81 said:

I like to think that there are still people visiting this thread who want a more constructive take on the conflict and are dissatisfied with the condition of this thread even if they happen to agree with the political bias. I acknowledge that I might be wrong about that. Certainly the discussion in portions of SDF degenerated to levels that I can not tolerate and participate in with good faith. But that's something I won't know unless I test the waters.

Air campaign during the Russian invasion of Ukraine - general characteristics

This is the timeline of combined losses for Ukrainian and Russia air forces since 24 February to 19 July. I used Wikipedia article on aircraft losses because I do have my doubts about Oryx in this instance. For example the recently added photo of a destroyed Su-35 from "29 March to 2 April" looks remarkably similar to the confirmed Su-35 downed on 3 April. Having spent some time analyzing the materials I'd say that Oryx is still mostly right and whatever duplicates are included account for the missing approximately 25% of losses that are confirmed by other reports and sources. On the other hand Ukrainian losses past March are completely not believable.

Quality might not be best but I had to downsize it so that SDF engine wouldn't make it completely unreadable.

Black numbers are downed aircraft. Purple numbers are aircraft destroyed on the ground. Red numbers are heavily damaged aircraft that returned to base.

View attachment 93583

I included the timeline counting days of operations which will help to establish periods of combat and consolidation. Remember that military equipment is designed to work in extreme conditions and has a limited life in combat conditions. For example when we consider the standard 8000 hours airframe life it is calculated per peacetime use. Once you add combat loads and reduce maintenance due to man-hours shortage the life of the airframe drops significantly below that number and requires additional repairs and maintenance afterward. This means that during wartime air force works in bursts. The first 2 weeks is the intended "high intensity" operations which are then followed by "regular" loads for the following 2 weeks. Then when should follow is an operational pause with low-intensity operations to maintain position but at the same time recover and consolidate your assets. Sometimes that is replaced by additional 2-4 weeks of fighting at "regular" loads which ten require longer recovery.

• High intensity phase involves contesting of airspace as well as ground strikes - it's when air supremacy/superiority is achieved and the target is primarily air force and air defense assets and command and control facilities along with key infrastructural targets to disrupt ground forces movements.
• Regular phase is focused on ground strike missions to degrade enemy ground force and strategic potential.
• Low intensity phase has reduced ground strikes and minimum air superiority missions.

Now compare it with Desert Storm which lasted only 5 weeks:

View attachment 93587

In terms of levels of activity reports indicate that Russian Air Force level of sorties never exceeded and average of 250-300 sorties per day in peak periods - that included air defense missions conducted over Russian territory. I haven't found out if those numbers included helicopter sorties.

This is a table of missions by category from USAF's Air Power Survey:

• AI - air interdiction
• BAI - battlefield air interdiction
• CAS - close air support
• DCA - defensive counter-air (shooting down aircraft)
• CAP - combat air patrol
• OCA - offensive counter-air (strikes against airfields)
• SEAD - suppression of enemy air defenses
• ESC - escort
• ESM - electronic support measures
• EW - electronic warfare (and recon)
• FUEL - refueling

View attachment 93589

If you compare the phases with the timeline of both operation you see similarities which are the direct consequence of logistical and mechanical constraints. The scale of air war in Desert Storm was significantly greater than in Ukraine (close to an order of magnitude) but the general characteristics are preserved.

From what I can tell Russian invasion of Ukraine followed the extended plan - 2 weeks "high intensity" + 6 (rather than 2) weeks "regular" but it seems that it was slightly stretched over time so it lasted up to mid-April because of gaps in the preceding 2+6 weeks, probably due to weather. Then with the change of plan aka "second phase" of the invasion the low intensity phase began. However it involved regular strikes in the Donbas region for a period of 2-3 weeks in the end of April/early May. Low intensity phase lasted for close to two months which probably can be explained by preparations for resuming higher intensity when the counter-offensive begins. This is probably why we've seen an increase in activity in recent days. What we need to remember is that the machines are worn out from the intended use in the first high intensity/regular phase so they won't resume initial level of combat activity. It will be "high intensity" in character more than pure numbers matching the opening two weeks. That's something that can be noticed in statistics of all aerial campaigns throughout the history of combat aviation from WW2 onward. Every war is two wars: one against the opponent, another against physics.

Judging from well documented past precedent and whatever scarce data I could gather on current state of RuAF I think it has about 2-3 weeks of fighting in it, perhaps 4 weeks if they push it. Afterward it should collapse into a state of material "exhaustion" that will prevent it from operating above "low intensity" for several months - provided that recovery of fighting capability is conducted on terms of wartime mobilization. This prognosis of course assumes that Russia retains strategic reserve and doesn't wear it out in Ukraine. But Russia would have to be late-Third Reich insane/incompetent to do anything else and so far I think they kept the reserve intact. This is why Su-35S are rarely seen in action over Ukraine.

Click to expand...

Makes sense, Ukraine is very close to Russia and pretty flat. A ground campaign would be probably be cheaper and easier to sustain than an air campaign. Drones, missiles and artillery could do the work better than expensive to use jet fighters.

MarKoz81 said:

Air campaign during the Russian invasion of Ukraine - Russian Air Force

I found no indication that the technical quality of Russian aircraft is affecting the performance of RuAF in the conflict. That doesn't mean that claims about their capability are warranted - they are definitely not, and this war offers some proof that I won't get into now - but it means that they should perform significantly better than they have. Their lackluster performance is due to RuAF personnel incompetence which can only explained by complete institutional collapse of the RuAF compared to the Soviet predecessor.

Being Polish I know the actual level of performance of Soviet /Warsaw Pact air forces and while there were important differences in doctrine which led to each side having their advantage both NATO and WP retained a similarly purpose-driven level of competence. That competence included not only pilots but also ground crews and institutional framework. It existed despite the many problems plaguing WP military culture. RuAF can best be described as "SovietAF LARPers" and let's leave it at that.

The material issues like lack of sufficient number of PGMs that are often brought up by western analysts should not play a part , especially if you consider that Russia is waging it's "Desert Storm" over Ukraine in a very literal sense of the word. Therefore methods of Desert Storm - which involved mass use of unguided munitions - should prevail and bring comparable results. They haven't because Russia lacked the cultural/institutional component which made US aviation effective.

As for using Desert Storm as literal comparison - confusion might arise from conflating the daring raids resembling the invasion of Iraq in 2003 from the first phase of Russian invasion. But in my opinion the correct view to understand this conflict is to see it as Desert Storm against more competent Iraqi ground defenses with the first half (the dynamic part) of Iraqi Freedom overlaid on top of it.

Russia attempted these two very different operations simultaneously, but with absolutely insufficient numbers in air power. That alone is an interesting problem indicating that they paid too much attention to the "shock and awe" approach of Iraqi Freedom and not enough to the grinding material consequences of combined Iran-Iraq war, Desert Storm and Northern/Southern Watch (no fly zone) which makes it a period of 20 years of intense warfare. In other words they thought the effects of 2003 invasion were due to the merits of the forces and tactics used therein rather than due to the consequences of long-term exhaustion of Iraq as a state. Definitely the 8 years of limited warfare that Ukraine waged since 2014 can't be compared to what Iraq went through and I fail to see how they could be conflated.

Another major error seems to be the assumption that US forces in 1991 were numerous because Iraqi forces were numerous and completely ignores the basic mathematics of target, sortie and payload numbers. This in particular is a display of unbelievable incompetence which assumed no backup plan for when the initial psychological shock of the first 1-2 days fails to achieve a political effect and Ukraine consolidates its defenses. This is a level of incompetence that suggests a mental dysfunction at work at the highest levels of Russian political and military authorities. Because this is the only explanation of blatant rejection of the lessons of the many failures of American military in the last 20 years.

The war also revealed some very fundamental limitations arising from the structure of Russian military - namely the role and size of Military Districts. This is a particularly interesting question as it brings attention to Chinese military reform which established Theater Commands - there are important lessons to be drawn from Russian errors. Russia has very limited air force that is not just spread geographically but also isolated due to lack of sufficient infrastructure and support services (aerial refueling).

For example Russia's primary tactical bomber force (Su-24M and Su-34) is physically split between Western, Southern, Central and Eastern districts and any institutional inertia (not to mention corruption) makes it difficult to re-integrate assets while preserving the structure. The USAF has Air Combat Command with centralized assets leaving theater commands with multi-role planes. This meant that Russian tactical bombers couldn't be used in overwhelming numbers because institutional structure kept control and supply separate. Moreover there was no indication that the command of the invasion was handled by an unified command structure. Instead it very much seemed that all the commands pitched in with notional oversight from politically-nominated commanders at the top level. There is no evidence that air forces of western and southern districts coordinated together. That split the ~60 Su-34 at their disposal while separation of districts prevented the most efficient use of all ~120 Su-34s. Similarly Tu-22M3s were not used to the best of their capacity which in comparison to how B-52s were used in Desert Storm (low-altitude bombing runs) suggests that the crews are not trained sufficiently as Long Range Aviation does participate in the operation. These two types alone would mean 150 bombers capable of delivering massed strikes at targets compared to the 40 at best that were used in the initial phase.

There are also consequences in training and use resulting from assets being handed over to formations. For example Naval Aviation has some limited number of warplanes to augment limited AAW of the navy (much like PLANAF did in the past) but that disrupts Air Force planning. If integration is so important then why the Air Force has all the helicopters? The coordination between Ground Force and even VDV and the helos leaves much to be desired, especially compared to American standards, and the only reason is politically motivated shift of helicopters to RuAF.

In terms of tactical shortcomings I see three main ones:

1. Lack of aerial refueling capacity. Russia has only approx. 18 Il-78 tankers but all of them in the Long Range Aviation. This meant that both district commands had no tankers of their own which could be used to practice and develop missions. This also means that no tankers are available to assist in ongoing operations. During Desert Storm most of CAP/DCA was performed by a total of 72 F-15C loitering at high altitudes for 4 to 8 hours with support of large tanker fleet. USN F-14s provided assistance over the Gulf but they were only an auxiliary force. Optimizing mission duration ad profile s significantly reduced the wear of the aircraft and crews (F-15s lost only about 10% of initial readiness at the end of the war) and allowed USAF to maintain continuous air supremacy over the region. Russian Su-35s should be able to do the same but they face two fundamental constraints - lack of spare fuel tanks and lack of tankers supporting the CAP. Lack of fuel means that they can't engage in more aggressive tactics and have to remain in safe Russian airspace which opens Ukrainian airspace to operations by UAF. Lack of fuel means that tactical bombers runs carry reduced payload which combined with fragmentation of assets means multiple low-payload runs that stress the aircraft as save for high-g maneuvering landing and takeoff are the most problematic elements of a mission for life of the plane. Lack of fuel means that enemy forces can "wait out" RuAF knowing very well the time limit on station.

2. Lack of dedicated SEAD capability. Considering that Ukraine is not NATO and follows a Soviet model it was stunningly incompetent for RuAF to never develop even a single unit to training SEAD for which they would have all the resources. That resulted in UA air defenses being operational throughout the entirety of the conflict. At no point during the invasion was there a region where RuAF would succeed in suppressing UA air defenses even temporarily. Destroyed lauchers, radars or batteries do not equal suppression of air defenses as SEAD can (in theory) be achieved with no destroyed enemy SAMs.

3. Lack of coordination between assets. While we have evidence that Ka-52/Mi-28 and Su-25 often do work in tandem (as they should) I haven't seen instances of Flankers and Fullbacks coordinating air-to-air and air-to-ground strikes. Fullbacks don't coordinate among themselves either - Su-34s don't fly in pairs where one aircraft with EW pods performs ECM while the other (or more) hunts for targets.

Note that I did not include lack of situational awareness as a major issue because it is mostly limited by the lack of aerial refueling. While Russia has insufficient number of AEW planes it has sufficient A-50s for operation in Ukraine as long as they can stay in the air - which they can't because of lack of refueling and potential threat of a single S-300 (missed by non-existent SEAD) shooting it down.

Click to expand...

Thanks for this great and detailed write up! Really brings a level of analysis and quality that has been sorely missing from this thread.

MarKoz81 said:

AEW planes it has sufficient A-50s for operation in Ukraine as long as they can stay in the air - which they can't because of lack of refueling and potential threat of a single S-300 (missed by non-existent SEAD) shooting it down.

Click to expand...

Well how long they should stay on air i wonder and what is the endurance of the A-50's unrefuelled, particularly if they are flying from Crimea ? and why Russians cant set a picket where 2 or 1 AEW is on air while others standby at base ?

As for S-300's. Do you expect A-50's to get inside the Ukrainian Airspace ? This is kinda hard to believe TBH as their radar coverage are deep enough that they can fly from inside Belarus. This is beyond the range of any S-300 Ukrainian have. Unless you were expecting cruise missile detection which then yes. But at that point same question can be asked for Western AEW.. can they detect Russian cruise missiles pounding the Ukraine from within the Polish or other NATO country border.

As for coordination.. how you can verify this via open source ? Like are there radio communications open ? like some we heard back in yt via Motolko channel ?

Air campaign during the Russian invasion of Ukraine - Ukrainian Air Force

Almost everything that UAF "won" in this war is due to Russia giving it up or losing it on its own because UAF had no meaningful capability on its own. It's an air war of Russia with itself. There are however some notable elements that underscore the difference between the two formations and their ability/inabilty to adapt.

In the opening phase of the invasion UAF was protected by partial dispersal of units and shifting of assets to airfields in south-west of the country. This was aided by extensive use of cannibalized airframes as decoys and by the failure of Russian missile strikes. Specifically Russians chose to completely ignore the proper tactic of missile strikes which is the massed use of munitions. Following the example of US attack at the airbase in Syria each UAF airbase should be targeted by a minimum 30-40 cruise and ballistic missiles (to account for losses to air defenses) and those attacks should be immediately followed up by large-scale air raids. That however would absorb majority of Russian bomber force just for the first wave of strikes. Instead Russia chose to continue with pointless "warning shots" throughout the whole invasion which resulted only in waste of munitions and had no major impact on UAF's ability to wage war.

UAF was made ineffective primarily by their outdated munitions as Flankers and Fulcrums can use only SARH missiles which means they have to stay in contact with the target making it not viable against ARH-carrying Su-30s and 35s. They could however successfully counter Russian bombers which - together with RuAF failure to neutralize UAF planes - was the main reason why there were no deep RuAF raids into Ukrainian territory. There were no RuAF airstrikes within the combat radius of UAF airplanes based in SW Ukraine.

Interestingly RuAF did not attack communication infrastructure - especially bridges across Dniepr - which indicates that they were hoping to capture them in the first phase, and for some reason refused to restrain Ukrainian logistics even as the second phase progressed slower than intended. That I put on Russian command's ineptitude as well as RuAF incompetence (to perform such mission) as there is little that UAF could do to prevent it otherwise - especially if RuAF agreed to take losses.

What is interesting is the speed with which UAF changed tactics compared to RuAF.

While the initial fighting stuck to traditional Soviet doctrine with heavy emphasis on individual pilots over time Ukrainians because of US advisors began to fly formation and mix assets on regular basis. There are indications that UAF tested a combined formation of Su-27, Su-24, Su-25 and MiG-29 with each plane utilizing its limited potential to the best of its ability. While Ukraine has only SARH missiles which is a serious limitation Su-27s are technically capable of matching Su-27s of Russia's southern district which would mostly use SARH missiles as well. Russia has only 12 Su-30s in Crimea which means that it has to move assets from other bases (problematic) or use Su-34 re-based closer to the front as air superiority aircraft. MiG-29s carry only 2 R-27 and have poor radar with range of about 60km but they are sufficient for downing Russian bombers attacking targets in Kherson region especially if it's still protected by remaining S-300 (the recent strikes by Russian S-300s are an attempt to test and disclose the defenses).

UAF is capable of attacking Russian positions with Su-24 and Su-25s while MiG-29s shoot down Russian bombers and Su-27 attack the fighters and that is exactly what I've seen them attempting in the recent days although Su-27s are being tied to defending Kiyv. Ukraine has a handful of aircraft remaining - about 6 Su-24M, no fewer than 12 Su-27s, no fewer than 12 Su-25s and no fewer than 12 MiG-29s - including donations of MiG-29 and Su-25 from former WP countries in NATO. It is not enough to contest the entire airspace but it is enough to punch a hole in Russian air power in Kherson. All that prevents that from happening is uncertainty if losses would be replaced in time and potential threat to north of the country. However if RuAF is unable to return to activity comparable to the first or second phase UAF might choose to leave themselves vulnerable to gain a temporary advantage in the south.

In the meantime UAF performs strikes against targets signalling their presence and forcing RuAF to respond. UAF strike against Snake Island was very different from the type of airstrikes that it performed early in the war. Similarly more recent raids in the Kherson region. Much more careful, measured in their aims and very different from the risky raids on Mariupol or Belogorod. This is indicated by the marked drop in losses. The only type of aircraft that continues to take high losses is the CAS Su-25. All other aircraft stay put and execute missions that are low-risk/high-reward. Importantly this is less about the competence of idividual pilots' as the commanders' and planners'. It signals adaptation that is missing entirely in RuAF due to institutional failure. In the case of UAF it simply might be that the institution no longer exists and thus doesn't constrain what remains.

The most important factor impacting UAF is its immediate future which happens also to be the one issue attracting most attention apart from HIMARS which is being reported on in increasingly comical manner.

(On HIMARS - it's simple: Ua had low stocks of long range rocket artillery and it used them up early in the war to push back Ru advances in north-east. Now it's getting back into the game of long range fires while Russia grew accustomed to Ua not having any for the last 4 months or so)

While there is sufficient news about "Ukrainian pilots training on F-16 and F-15" and declarations from DC about transfer of such assets in the future they ignore one crucial element which will play a role even if nobody speaks about it openly.

In my view this is used as a cover for mercenary pilots flying the aircraft while UAF airmen will be involved to legitimize it. I'd like to emphasize that it doesn't preclude UAF receiving western fighters in the future, but enables a strategic play before that long-term solution becomes viable.

The previous cover of "Foreign Legion" aimed to introduce mercenaries and useful idiot mercenaries as cover for SF operators and technical advisors and it proved to be a success. It was followed by donations of western weapons and HIMARS rocket artillery. Because doing the same in the aerial domain will have a much greater impact and will be more escalatory it had to be delayed until these two were done. There's no viable option to train UAF pilots on F-16s and F-15s to fight effectively on their own.

The reason why I think that is that Poland has practical experience of moving from Soviet aircraft to F-16s and there's no way that a MiG-29 or Su-24 pilot can learn within 6 to 8 weeks to operate an F-16 for ground attack roles at sufficient level to survive because of the fundamental conceptual difference between the two planes. It's not just the switches and gauges - it's very way in which the aircraft flies and how it affects what you can do or not. For UAF pilots the technological jump in control and situational awareness will be easy, it is the instincts of flying that will be hard to counter. If Ukraine used Su-22s then paradoxically it would be easier because they were light, single-seat strike "fighter"-bombers.

The F-15C will be easier but it will still mean a 1:1 ratio of losses against Su-35s at minimum due to novelty. Considering that RuAF already took losses it probably would reduce RuAF ground strikes significantly which is the most important thing for any offensive operation - protecting supply lines and maneuver. Even if F-15s are shot down over Ukrainian airspace it will be a positive tradeoff if Russian bombers are shot down in turn and it doesn't have to come to that since ARH missiles that F-15s can use to great effect will simply neutralize the efficiency of ground strike missions. However if veteran USAF (or IDF) pilots are hired by the "Ukrainian Legion" (as I would expect any reasonable war planner to do at this point) then it's going to be bad times for RuAF because the F-15C with AN/APG-63(v)3 is better than Su-35 in WVR. It has a better radar, it has a datalink communicating it with NATO assets outside of Ukraine and unlike the Flanker it can carry three spare tanks giving it an energy advantage.

Finally let's not forget something even more important: once F-16s and F-15s are "officially in service of the Ukrainian Air Force" the line of distinction between a UAF and non-UAF aircraft firing AIM-120s from within Ukrainian airspace is no longer clear. Most importantly Russia will not be able to meaningfully recognize and communicate the difference and because of the current escalation of their own rhetoric their claims will be rejected.

That means that F-35s and F-22s staying out of range of detection of Russian systems to avoid engagement and lobbing additional missiles - shifting the numbers to UAF's favor - becomes a viable option without a similar viable counter on Russia's part. Because of that Russia should strive to achieve some kind of resolution on the ground - or be prepared to cede the gains in the south west of Dnieper where UAF can operate with greatest effectiveness - before American planes arrive in Ukraine. In this conflict Russian Air Force demonstrated sufficiently that they are completely unprepared for what may follow once that happens.

However whether this prediction comes to pass or only remains a threat can only be answered by faits accompli because it is a purely political decision and DC might choose to avoid escalation for its own purposes.

I hope you found this helpful.