The War in the Ukraine

FriedButter said:

Hard to believe Russia is suffering anywhere near the casualties that Ukraine and the West keep claiming. How does one have a 6 to 1 manpower advantage while only mobilizing once since the start? Either Ukraine has only a few hundred thousand left or Russia has several million in Ukraine.

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About artillery:

More than a dozen Ukrainian soldiers on the front noted a marked decrease in artillery fire from their side in recent weeks, including the U.S.-made multiple rocket launching system known as HIMARS.

“HIMARS — I barely hear them at all anymore. They’re almost nonexistent,” said Sgt. Maj. Dmytro, a 33-year-old drone operator and company leader. “If we had more munitions, it could compensate for the lack of people.”

Given the shortage of artillery, drones now account for 80 percent or more of enemy losses along much of the front, commanders said.
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The lack of artillery compromises that effort. With no signs of the Russian offensive easing, Ukraine is racing to fortify defensive lines across the front. Tree lines are being cut down to limit places the Russians can hide. Tank traps are being dug deep into the ground. New trenches branch off from roadsides in all directions. And fertile fields are lined by concrete dragon’s teeth and seeded with mines.

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Sinnavuuty said:

In Ukrainian Telegram channels, I see these reasons for complaints over and over again:

1 - personnel problems

2 - lack of quality fortifications

3 - poor strategy

4 - poor leadership

These are the main reasons why, despite a shocking lack of infantry, the AFU has not yet broken.

One thing I have been analyzing for some time is the organizational structure of the AFU, which is completely deficient. Just to give you an idea, a Ukrainian brigade commander must have about seven bosses to whom he reports directly, this is an unprecedented mess that many analysts simply ignore, but in Ukrainian channels you can see this chronic problem affecting the defense strategy, there are several cases of Ukrainians retreating from their positions because of it.

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interesting point, i have heard before that there was complaint from the brigades that they would get broken up and sent to separate fronts. I had assumed that the idea may be that high command does not trust brigade commander/staff enough to give them autonomy. in terms of brigade having to answer to multiple chains, it is not uncommon in war or any large organization for that matter, but i wonder how bad is it for Ukrainian forces? who do these commanders have to report to?

drowingfish said:

interesting point, i have heard before that there was complaint from the brigades that they would get broken up and sent to separate fronts. I had assumed that the idea may be that high command does not trust brigade commander/staff enough to give them autonomy. in terms of brigade having to answer to multiple chains, it is not uncommon in war or any large organization for that matter, but i wonder how bad is it for Ukrainian forces? who do these commanders have to report to?

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Instead of the Corps structure and the former Districts, Operational Commands (OC) were created - South, North, East, West. In 2016, the Reserve Corps was created, which remained the only Corps in the structure of the Armed Forces until last year. In 2014, the ATO headquarters was added, followed by the JFO. Already in 2016, the structure was broken again, as the Donetsk OTG [Operational-Tactical Group] appeared. In 2022, the OSGs [Operational-Strategic Groups] "Tavria" and "Khortytsia" were added to this structure. And several more OTGs appeared - Kharkiv, Odesa, Sumy, Lyman, Soledar, etc. Last year, the 9th and 10th Corps were created, as well as the 30th Marine Corps.

But OTGs/OSGs continue to exist in this mess, as do OCs. And this continues to generate ineffective management. After all, when you have a brigade commander - corps commander - OC commander - Ground Forces commander - commander-in-chief in a vertical command structure, decisions are made relatively quickly and efficiently. But when the OTG and OSG exist vertically next to the OC, and are even more important than the latter, this creates inefficiency. Because it is problematic to go through 2 more command channels in the hierarchy structure.

Some Ukrainian analysts call for the elimination of OTGs and OSGs in the future. This could only happen when the process of forming Corps is completed, and the OC command is reinforced by OTG/OSG commanders, forming fully functional OC HQs, where decisions are made quickly. At the same time, the strengthening of the OC staff should be from among officers who have proven themselves in combat and enjoy great respect among the military.

In short: a brigade commander may be required to report to both the OTG, OSG, OC and the Corps, which has created a real mess in Ukrainian C2.

In the current structure, OTGs are a Corps without having organic units attached to them. The problem is that OTGs have the responsibilities of a Corps, without having any units under them organically (i.e. permanently) and without consistency in terms of units under their command.

In any case, the Russian organization is much better organized and structured.

The Russian organization at the lower level is based on separate brigades and divisions (and no longer on BTGs as at the beginning of the invasion), with some of the former gradually being reformed into divisions as part of the reforms announced in 2023. They are subordinate to their respective CAA, which has jurisdiction in a specific sector (they are, in fact, Corps-sized formations). The top level is the Group of Forces (GoF), which acts like an Army Group (although it is the equivalent of a Field Army) and is the deployment of the Military Districts (MD) on the front. There is a lot of correspondence, coherence and unity between them - usually a GoF will include most of the units and formations of a MD, although it will often have units belonging to the same MD in other GoFs, as well as units under it that actually belong to other MDs. GoFs are usually led by the commander of the corresponding MD. At the central level, there is the Command of the Joint Group of Forces in the area “SMO” (chaired by Gerasimov). The distinction is clearly observable here.

Do you understand the mess?

gelgoog said:

Ukraine had nothing to do with the sabotage. They simply lack the capability.
The pipes are at a depth of over 80 meters.
They are still trying to pin it on Ukraine. Pathetic.

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80m is within technical scuba diving depth using hypoxic trimix. I myself have got to 65m with normoxic trimix so I don't see why Ukraine would not have this capability. Not saying that means they did it, though.

Index said:

China will sooner just let Putin empty out 10 kt of conventional weapons from our own stockpiles over Kiev than use a single 5 kt nuke. So because of that, nukes will never fly in the entirety of the conflict.

After making such a claim, and NATO giving him the perfect excuse to do it, Putin can just show his shopping list and more items will be shipped.

Remember how non existent Iskander/long range targeting on time sensitive targets was during 1st year? That's radically changed in the last 6 months. Not only ammo, new weapons, drones can be cashed out by Russia but also intelligence/info.

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Russia has launched a lot of recon satellites since the conflict started. And more GLONASS satellites to improve accuracy of their whole satnav system. They also seem to be doubling their capability to manufacture solid rockets. A huge expansion in industrial facilities is happening right now.

12 Storm Shadow missiles struck at the historical palace of the Baryatinsky Princes of the Kursk region. They didn't strike at the palace however, but at the surrounding areas which they claim is being used as a communication and command center. Which might be doubtful as Ukraine had already struck the same place in October 11 and damaged the administration building.


Wolf Hunt tactics. Russian assault forces clearing residential areas in the Kurakhovo direction as the ring closes.


The Russian 5th Brigade raises it's flag in the center of Kurakhovo.


Lancet hits Abrams tank in Nikoslke. Tank appears damaged and immobilized, crew survived and left it.


Ukrainian troops took shelter at a house to establish a firing position but is hit by an FPV drone soon after.


The 114th Brigade raises it's flag on Novoilinka.


Molinya-2 winged FPV drone at work.


Drone drop on a Ukrainian field ammo depot in the Krasnoliman direction.


Ukrainian tank in Kurakhovo taken out by Krasnopol by the 238th.


Lancet hits a Bradley in the Kursk region.


A Krasnopol strikes at target in the first, then an FPV closes in on a Bradley only to see a Molinya FPV drone hit it first. Then the FPV drone hits it.


A Ukrainian APC gets hit by an FPV drone.

gelgoog said:

Russia has launched a lot of recon satellites since the conflict started. And more GLONASS satellites to improve accuracy of their whole satnav system. They also seem to be doubling their capability to manufacture solid rockets. A huge expansion in industrial facilities is happening right now.

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The question that I have is whether Russia has the labor force for this. Unemployment is rock bottom right now, which means production can only increase through increased productivity and capitalization. Otherwise inflation will rise.

This is going to get fun if it is true though seems extremely impractical though practicality wouldn't be the point of it, either.


More on the claim