Seems Ugledar might finally fall without much fanfare
The Russian military is capable of incredible incompetence, but the mistake Western sources routinely make is they attempt to extrapolate the worst of the Russian army to the entire force as a whole. Whenever I hear stories like this I put it in the back of my mind as something potentially possible, but highly unlikely. If it gets corroborated later, great. If not, then I guess it was fake news as usual.How can someone like you, having watched the total incompetence of the Russian military over the last 30 months, believe that they're NOT capable of something as staggeringly stupid as using highly trained specialists as line infantry?
People actually involved in the SMO will have much better pay and better chances for career improvement in the military. So it would be hardly surprising if some of the personnel chose to volunteer for these kinds of units. Like that guy supposedly did.
Isolated episodes of incredible "incompetence" becomes normal whenever you try and coordinate so many people. Especially ones that haven't been in a war before. On the other hand, you also see lapses of incredible "competence" or rather "initiative" on a local level.The Russian military is capable of incredible incompetence, but the mistake Western sources routinely make is they attempt to extrapolate the worst of the Russian army to the entire force as a whole. Whenever I hear stories like this I put it in the back of my mind as something potentially possible, but highly unlikely. If it gets corroborated later, great. If not, then I guess it was fake news as usual.
I am very skeptical when I hear about things like this. This reminds of me of when ChrisO wiki claimed that Russia was sending astronauts and RosComos workers as line infantry to Ukraine on the basis of a single ad circulated in RosCosmos Telegram...
On a recent sweltering afternoon, the screens of the Ukrainian National Guard’s 15th Brigade command centre lit up with alarming footage from the eastern front: the radar was showing a dozen highly-destructive Russian glide bombs barrelling towards Ukrainian positions.
Another screen displayed hacked feeds from Russian suicide drones zeroing in on Ukrainian tanks. And a third, coming from a Ukrainian reconnaissance drone, was tracking enemy motorcycles and dune buggies headed towards Kyiv’s forces.
Some commanders and many soldiers see this as the cost of the Kursk offensive and a poor trade-off.
“Kursk was a good idea, it exposed Russia as being weaker than many people believed,” said a commander of a Ukrainian ground forces unit. “But we are paying the price of it with [more of our own land].”
Russia’s main strategy has remained the same since the start of its in 2022: overpowering Ukrainian forces with sheer might and resource advantages, Phoenix and commanders from four other Ukrainian brigades told the Financial Times this month. They all complained their soldiers were sometimes outnumbered at a ratio of 1:8 and that for every shell fired, Russians were firing 10 or more.