The War in the Ukraine

Gloire_bb said:

Y ventaja significa poder realizar operaciones.
Supremacía (no está definida estrictamente, si no recuerdo mal, pero como grado superior podemos continuar con la lógica) significa que el enemigo no puede disputar operaciones de manera significativa.

Este "astuto juego de palabras" significa que en la mayor parte de Ucrania los aviones ucranianos operan cuando quieren y como quieren. Incluso pueden utilizar Yak-52 como cazas y son lo suficientemente despreocupados como para hacer despegar aviones de combate para realizar pases de honor sobre los entierros.

La zona "disputada" (en la que los aviones ucranianos no tienen libertad para operar, pero que sí sobrevuelan aquí, mientras que los aviones rusos no ) es una zona que se encuentra a unos 100-150 km de la línea del frente, según el sector y los medios de que se trate. Cabe señalar que, si bien algunas intercepciones de aviones ucranianos se produjeron más allá de esta zona, los aviones de combate ucranianos merodean a esas distancias y, como mínimo, las consideran viables. Los aviones ucranianos también suelen estar preparados en aeródromos avanzados que se encuentran dentro de esta zona, pudiendo despegar y aterrizar libremente y sobrevivir a ello.
¿Importa que los aviones rusos no puedan sobrevolar esta zona? Por supuesto que sí, porque:
(1) Mientras que los aviones de ala fija ucranianos están vinculados a huecos explotables en las patrullas aéreas rusas para llevar a cabo sus operaciones ofensivas, los aviones de ala rotatoria no lo están: vuelan lo suficientemente bajo como para estar más o menos a salvo del ataque de misiles de radar de largo alcance. Estos realizan ataques de lanzamiento y (lo que es más importante) operaciones logísticas y de enlace de alta prioridad. El VKS podría haberlos abordado si hubiera podido estar más cerca, pero no puede.
(2)La interdicción a distancia es difícil para cualquiera, pero para los VKS sin cápsulas es imposible. La interdicción también resulta ser la tarea ofensiva más importante de la fuerza aérea en apoyo del ejército.

Muéstreme un solo sobrevuelo en profundidad en Ucrania por un avión de las Fuerzas Aerotransportadas después de marzo de 2022, señor maestro de definiciones.
Son más de dos años, seguro que podrás encontrar algo.

Contra Georgia, tenía exactamente superioridad (sobre toda Georgia).
Las operaciones aéreas fueron disputadas y sufrieron bajas (lo que afectó los resultados de las misiones), pero el VVS podía atacar objetivos en cualquier lugar.

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Tu deducción no hace más que confirmar la ayuda técnica que recibe Ucrania en materia de alerta temprana (no me imagino de quién), que quieren presentar como capacidades ucranianas. Con mucha desfachatez, por cierto.

Google translate: Your deduction only confirms the technical help that Ukraine receives in terms of early warning (I can't imagine from whom), which they want to present as Ukrainian capabilities. Very brazenly, by the way.

Please use English as this is an English-only forum.

LMUR hits PVD position of the AFU 155th Battalion. 15 Ukrainian specialists allegedly killed in this attack.


The moment a Grad firing was hit by a Lancet.


5 Su-27 destroyed on the ground by Iskander cluster munition strikes plus 2 Ukrainian Su-27 bonus allegedly shot in air to air engagement for 7 in a day. I would consider damaged Ukrainian Sukhois as write-offs given that obviously they can't be repaired by those who made them.


Valkyrie SPN unit sends FPV drones to Ukrainian drone operator sites. This unit operates in the Ugledar front.


Rare Ukrainian BMP-3 captured from the Russians gets taken out by FPV drone of the Sudoplatov.


Ukrainian ammo truck gets attacked by FPV drone from the Sudoplatov unit. This looks like a minibus or Bukhanka.


More work from the notorious Sudoplatov unit. A Marder and a Bradley hit by FPV drones.


Artillery fire or Krasnopol taking out another Ukrainian crossing over the Volchya River.


P-18 radar taken out presumably using an X-35U antiship missile like in previous. Usually this type of target is taken out by a Lancet or X-35. Taking out these radars and turning it into a gap opens the way for Russian UAVs to loiter in the region, which in turns leads to missile strikes, i.e. HIMARS, S-300, airfield, logistic hubs and train strikes, not to mention power plant strikes of recent are in this and close regions where P-18 radars have been covering. This in the Dnipropetrovsk region.


The 98th VDV has raised it's flag and the Russian flag on the southwest sector of the Kanal microdistrict high rise. Much of the microdistrict is now in Russian hands.


FAB-3000s are now being used regularly especially on the Kharkhiv front.


Krasnopol strikes on PVDs and radio communication centers.


Ukrainian forces hide in the forests, making it difficult for both visual and radar sighting or even with satellite ISAR. So the Russians drop FAB, TOS, cluster, aircraft NARS and Grad MLRS on them.


Ukrainian observation unit gets hit by FPV drone in Kherson.


Ukrainian vehicle ran over a mine dropped by a drone, them gets attacked by an FPV drone.


Another significant crossing or embankment used by Ukrainian logistics gets taken out by an X-38ML missile.


Iskander-K with cluster munitions strikes on a Ukrainian temporary airfield used as a stop over by Ukrainian helicopters. Here an Mi-24 and various equipment is taken out. 115km away from the border.


Abrams near Sokol, taken out by MSTA-S with Krasnopol.


Ukrainian drone operators base in Kherson gets hit with an air strike.


Russian forces breaking out at Makeevka.


Russian Strela-10s does it work against Ukrainian drones and UAVs. Unlike Ukrainian Strela-10s which are encountering issues with aged, expired, and poorly stored missiles acquired from the arms market, Russian Strela-10s are armed with the lastest Verba MANPADS missiles.


Accurate arty hit in a Bradley.


M777 taken out the usual way with a Lancet. The howitzer was spotted firing by drone.


Ukrainian observation post on top of a high rise gets taken out.

gelgoog said:

Russia can strike deep into Ukraine with cruise missiles and the Geran-2. Why would they risk losing aircraft by going in there?

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（1）Geran-2 is blind. It can strike coordinates, but it can't strike any targets of opportunity, including mobile ones. At least not the ones that operate in Russian service, Iran has suitable versions for themselves. You can only target pre-determined fixed locations with time lag of many hours(cruise speed of piston-engined drone is in 1xx km/h range).
（2）Geran-2 isn't actually that cheap, despite its reputation. Basically, even flanker sorties with reasonably priced(say, laser or umpk) guided PGMs would've been cheaper as means to deliver explosives to their destinations - with far higher quality.
（3）Penetration rate of Geran-2 isn't stellar. They're good as long as you view them as decoys with success chance, but when you rely on them to strike something - they're seriously underperforming.

Yes, geran to strike some targets without air superiority. No, they can't even hope to collapse or seriously affect Ukrainian war potential.

gelgoog said:

Why would they risk losing aircraft by going in there?

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While you save aircraft, for every day you save, soldiers on the ground pay with their lives. Moreover, over half a million working men are slowly getting increasingly torn away from the rest of society, because replacing them means another mobilization, and we know how popular mobilizations are.
Half a million people torn away from society, with permanent losses in 5 digits(count their full input into the economy for the rest of their lives & compensations to their families, which Russia actually pays) - it isn't exactly that cheap anymore, isn't it?

gelgoog said:

Even large bombers like the Tu-160 were primarily designed as cruise missile carriers.

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Because they're deterrent/nuclear carriers first, yes. They were designed to strike targets that anyone can find simply on the map.
In a long-term conventional strategic campaign, it simply means that:
(1)every 500kg bomb, delivered by them, costs over a million USD.
(2)Russia can produce at best a few such "bombs" a day(compared to normal bombs, which can be produced in 4 digits a day).
(3)again, existing cruise missiles won't be able to search for targets of opportunity, though for strategic bombers it's probably more OK.

gelgoog said:

Russia is not just considering the fight against Ukraine but against NATO as well. A considerable loss in their air force's aircraft could tempt the US and its allies to directly attack Russia.

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This one is true. But it simply means that Russia can't sustainably operate its aircraft over Ukraine and had to cease it. So it stopped contesting air superiority over most of Ukraine, and, by default, Ukraine got it back.
Result is this long war, which otherwise could've long since been finished by VKS alone. Could have.

Just wondering, has anyone analyzed the performance of the Russian 2S7s during the conflict? While being only a quarter of the weight of a FAB 500, it's still twice the weight of a 152mm shell, and it ought to be less risky to deliver against frontline targets than a bomb. Wouldn't they function as basically a "poor man's" FAB?

Tootensky said:

Just wondering, has anyone analyzed the performance of the Russian 2S7s during the conflict? While being only a quarter of the weight of a FAB 500, it's still twice the weight of a 152mm shell, and it ought to be less risky to deliver against frontline targets than a bomb. Wouldn't they function as basically a "poor man's" FAB?

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Both 2s7 and 2s4 are considered to be extremely important.
Former(together with 2s5) as an available CB reply to 155/52 NATO. In particular, 2S7 are the only Russian arty with cluster shells.
On the other hand, they aren't especially accurate and they don't have guided shells - because their original main role was tactical nuclear, accuracy wasn't their design problem.
Urgently need modern ammo(laser, satellite, self-targeting).

2S4s, on the other hand, are extremely accurate and deadly (with experienced crew and digital FC - hits on 1st shot are a norm, not luck) - but suffer significant CB losses.
Urgently need a heavily armored platform.

Would this imply that we might again see development of larger calibers with heavier rounds again in the future? Or just Russia running the remainder of "old stock"? Thinking back to WW II, Soviet Union had a dozen calibers from 76 to railway guns, and while I'm sure it must have been a logistical nightmare, the idea of consolidating everything in 155mm (NATO/Ukraine) seems to have cut down a lot on versatility...

The reason the larger conventional artillery calibers are no longer available is due to the introduction of large caliber rocket artillery.

Shouldn't the economy swing things back in favour of tube artillery in a high intensity conflict though? At the end of the day, a heavy artillery shell is still bound to be a lot cheaper than a large caliber rocket?

Gloire_bb said:

Former(together with 2s5) as an available CB reply to 155/52 NATO.

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I think the new coalition solves that problem, and I've seen somewhere that it started production (I don't know if it's deployed in Ukraine or not) So that issue should slowly disappear with time.

Gloire_bb said:

On the other hand, they aren't especially accurate and they don't have guided shells - because their original main role was tactical nuclear, accuracy wasn't their design problem.
Urgently need modern ammo(laser, satellite, self-targeting).

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Didn't @Tam mention that they had guided shells? I think it was called Smelchak. Or was that the one for 2s4?

Virtup said:

I think the new coalition solves that problem, and I've seen somewhere that it started production (I don't know if it's deployed in Ukraine or not) So that issue should slowly disappear with time.

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Partially yes, but frankly speaking I personally see it as a downgrade.
2s7 throws basically HIMARS warheads, but with much easier logistics than HIMARS.
Not applying guided shells to this caliber, and instead wasting a decade of development, squeezing every bit of performance out of 6" IMHO is a criminal military "fashion".

Virtup said:

Didn't @Tam mention that they had guided shells? I think it was called Smelchak. Or was that the one for 2s4?

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yes, it's a 2S4 one.