By the way any source on number of Su-34 that's UMPK compatible?
Analysis:
We know that their growth rate is slow, and still is below 50% of the available fleet (source: fighterbomber).
It implies that only newly-produced planes, and planes that went through repair facilities are compatible, it is not a field upgrade.
This gives us a high estimation of 4x aircraft ever capable of doing UMPK(as of yet), minus aircraft known to be shot down through 2023; probable numbers are lower still. So, realistically this was done by something like 35...25 planes(high/modest estimate).
Given that flankers aren't exactly readiness stars (much less flankers after 2 years of war and thousands of fresh hours of Lo flights under fire) - my gut feeling is that Russia, to maintain the current bombing tempo for the February, could lose just a couple of operational planes at most -
including incidents and battle damage. Yet the bombing tempo didn't decrease on Feb. 27-29.
If we take Ukrainian claims at a face value, this would mean not just a big shift in Ru- approaches to air warfare (perhaps explainable, elections/maximum effort), but remaining UMPK-bombers flying 4-6 sorties, per plane daily, for week(s). This just isn't happening, not with this aircraft type (not even talking about crews).
This, of course, isn't everything - other Su-34s still fly just as much (UMPK isn't the only PGM available, just by far the most numerous one; a significant percentage of flights are reconnaissance flights and escort jamming), but they aren't anywhere as exposed to intercept, nor they represent much of tonnage.
Perhaps telling is that
known Russian losses are Su-35s, i.e. escorts and the most individually survivable AD suppressors - both early on in Avd. campaign.
Finally, we have multiple instances of recent footage of large AD systems being DEADed (by medium/high-level precision ground fires).
It's important on two aspects:
(1)Air SEAD doesn't have integral control, i.e. its effect on top of what is known(suppression, maybe hits). HARMs are being launched towards the threat(or even blindly, just to dissuade AA operators). Noo footage will come from them.
(2)Visible Russian DEAD is done through ground fires/drone strike control(probably cued by SIGINT).
Everything goes to a single most probable conclusion: AD network is simply suppressed and can't yet recover. Its results are at best very highly inflated, realistically - they're around zero.