Don't put these ships at risk in the first place... what is the use of them anyway in that war. They are juicy PR targets ready to be picked.
The War in the Ukraine
- Thread starter SampanViking
- Start date
Quite informative podcast/space for those interested in Russian losses around Avdiivka
Pretty sure that was in the War on the Rocks episode rather than the Russian Contingency one.
But anyway, Ryan Evans basically vouched his credibility on the rumours. He basically stated that Zelensky did in fact plan to fire Zaluzhny and was only foiled because someone leaked it.
There were only two such Project 1239 ships made. Are you confusing this with something else? This is a Yeltsin era project and there is little chance of more ships being built.
Also, your chart shows the Admiral Makarov as being hit by Ukraine. Yet there is zero evidence of this having happened. Ukraine attacked it, but it was undamaged and none of the drones hit.
There was one irrecoverable loss of a Ropucha class ship when it was hit with a Tochka missile while in port and it sank.
Another of the Ropucha class ships they did damage has already been repaired and put back into service.
Another Ropucha that Ukraine damaged was announced to be currently under repairs. The Russians said they will remove the upper structure, and replace it with the upper structure of another inactive Ropucha class they captured from Ukraine when they annexed Crimea. They also said they will repair the submarine hit in dry dock and the corvette hit in port. But we will see. I kind of doubt it since the damage looked quite extensive.
It is normal for a navy to have a third of its ships out of service at any one time doing maintenance. So 25% of the Russian Black Sea Fleet non-combat capable isn't that high of a percentage. The rule of thumb is one ship at sea, one ship in port, and another doing maintenance. The reason for this number being this low in the first place (25% and not 33%) is likely because of a large chunk of the fleet like the submarines being relatively new.
The loss of amphibious ships is hard to replace since those ships used to be built in Poland and there is no project to replace them yet. One was sank for sure, one was damaged and later repaired, and another was damaged and is being repaired. There is the Ivan Gren class of ships, and the LHDs, but those aren't exactly the same class of ship since they are much larger.
The loss of the Moskva was a major blow but the ship was basically obsolete. It has about the same number of surface attack VLS cells as an Admiral Gorshkov class frigate, and while it carries more SAMs, those either use a revolver launcher, or a dual arm launching system, so it can't handle saturation attacks properly. They lost the Mosvka, but they put the Admiral Golovko into service which is about as capable if not more despite having like a third of the displacement.
As for the other ships, Russia can basically replace them with more modern ships at least as fast if not faster than the Ukrainians can damage them.
I think the naval drones thus far have proven to be more of a nuisance than a real threat. They only seem to be effective against really small ships. The large ships all seem to have been damaged with cruise missiles. In theory the drones could be quite dangerous, basically a cheap torpedo, but in practice they are slow and very visible. In nearly all instances we see that Russia manages to detect the drones and fire at them with deck side machine guns.
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True. I think I must have confusing, but I won't review it.
This type of attack requires extremely advanced planning and for very few military forces. Without NATO it would be impossible. It was not the first nor will it be the last attack
Therefore, it is recommended to study the role of ISR and C4I systems in modern warfare. Because they are differentiators in the effectiveness of any attack or military operation. It is a high-intensity conflict, Ukraine has an entire constellation of ISR and C4I systems provided by NATO and underwater naval drones are a technological tool that is difficult to detect.
This is the fifth vessel actually sunk (the others were damaged to varying degrees and repaired or are under repair) and inherent to an effective asymmetric method of area denial and tactical defeat - not strategic, as a means of raising morale and denying access .
In the Red Sea the Houthis, with far fewer resources, are having similar success. Therefore, it is too complex a reality to reduce our analysis to a specific defeat. Note that this attack had a combined preparatory activity of ISR (RQ-4B drones) and AWACS G-550 platform with Israeli ELTA radar that detects aerial targets up to 450 km and tracks up to a thousand potential targets.
The use of swarms of drones and decoys serves to saturate the air defense layers and favor the free and unintercepted trajectory of LACMs such as SCALP and Storm Shadow.
Such an attack was to be far more devastating than the sinking of a corvette that Russia commissions more than a dozen annually.
The level of interception of cruise missiles and suppression by drone ECMs must be highly considered, as it was greater than 90%.
Now a reflection: what military force on the planet would have this SAM and ECM capability in the face of an attack so coordinated and structured by the largest military alliance on the planet, with an indicator of suppression/interception of more than 90% of attack vectors? I'm not minimizing the Ukrainian victory, I say that the Russian Navy seriously failed to establish more efficient countermeasures at the beginning of the conflict, but we need to give a broader interpretation.
It is a very complex and multifaceted war in systems, tactics, operational means, levels of gradation and escalation. In addition to involving the most advanced military resources on the planet in various scopes.
And in the learning curve, the Russians have stood out notably. Few forces have the capacity to contain the even greater effects of such a sophisticated attack and establish neutralization resources and countermeasures in a relatively quick time. Let's wait and see if they will create effective defense solutions against underwater kamikaze drones.
Not to mention that denying Ukraine the sea is already an impossible task given the conditions of the Black Sea Fleet which has amphibious assets and landing units for operations to capture Odessa through this means of action. It is a littoral defense fleet above all else.
Therefore, it is recommended to study the role of ISR and C4I systems in modern warfare. Because they are differentiators in the effectiveness of any attack or military operation. It is a high-intensity conflict, Ukraine has an entire constellation of ISR and C4I systems provided by NATO and underwater naval drones are a technological tool that is difficult to detect.
This is the fifth vessel actually sunk (the others were damaged to varying degrees and repaired or are under repair) and inherent to an effective asymmetric method of area denial and tactical defeat - not strategic, as a means of raising morale and denying access .
In the Red Sea the Houthis, with far fewer resources, are having similar success. Therefore, it is too complex a reality to reduce our analysis to a specific defeat. Note that this attack had a combined preparatory activity of ISR (RQ-4B drones) and AWACS G-550 platform with Israeli ELTA radar that detects aerial targets up to 450 km and tracks up to a thousand potential targets.
The use of swarms of drones and decoys serves to saturate the air defense layers and favor the free and unintercepted trajectory of LACMs such as SCALP and Storm Shadow.
Such an attack was to be far more devastating than the sinking of a corvette that Russia commissions more than a dozen annually.
The level of interception of cruise missiles and suppression by drone ECMs must be highly considered, as it was greater than 90%.
Now a reflection: what military force on the planet would have this SAM and ECM capability in the face of an attack so coordinated and structured by the largest military alliance on the planet, with an indicator of suppression/interception of more than 90% of attack vectors? I'm not minimizing the Ukrainian victory, I say that the Russian Navy seriously failed to establish more efficient countermeasures at the beginning of the conflict, but we need to give a broader interpretation.
It is a very complex and multifaceted war in systems, tactics, operational means, levels of gradation and escalation. In addition to involving the most advanced military resources on the planet in various scopes.
And in the learning curve, the Russians have stood out notably. Few forces have the capacity to contain the even greater effects of such a sophisticated attack and establish neutralization resources and countermeasures in a relatively quick time. Let's wait and see if they will create effective defense solutions against underwater kamikaze drones.
Not to mention that denying Ukraine the sea is already an impossible task given the conditions of the Black Sea Fleet which has amphibious assets and landing units for operations to capture Odessa through this means of action. It is a littoral defense fleet above all else.
Actually the SCALP and Storm Shadow were not designed to hit ships in the first place. They basically hit a target given its coordinates.
As far as I know they cannot track moving targets. So these are basically only good for hitting stationary ships. Either in dry dock, or in port. This severely limits their usefulness.
There are dedicated anti-ship missiles like the Exocet or Harpoon. But most of these have less range than the Redut air defense system. So you would put an aircraft at risk of being shot down against any modern mid or large Russian surface combatant.
The US could supply Ukraine with the LRASM. But then they would risk their supposed trump card against the Chinese Navy being captured by the Russians and its information being passed over to China. It would also require them operating either the Super Hornet or the F-35 in Ukraine. Which could still happen, they might do like the Soviets did in the Korean War and operate with their own pilots from bases in Ukraine.
As is NATO forces already had to use the MALD, the SCALP, and the Storm Shadow. They have had their radar signatures classified and added to Russia's air defense database. Fairly intact samples have been captured. Current air defense systems still lack radar coverage to reliably operate against such targets. The range of detection is just too short. But I suspect improvements in radar with latest Tor variants will close the gap. Once the modernized Tor enters service with the new radar and missiles I suspect any advantage these systems still have will go down the drain.
Actually there isn't a replacement for the Tarantul class yet. The Russians have been replacing the Nanuchka, which is a larger ship, with the Karakurt. I am not sure if they will bother making a replacement for the Tarantul or just build more larger corvettes.
I think the loss of control over Snake Island was an issue. It would have allowed the Russians to control the shipping traffic between Ukraine and NATO. Right now the best the Russians can do is either mine that area, which can be done with submarines, or attack passing ships at long ranges with surface ships or closer with submarines. But by losing the Moskva the Russians basically lost their air defense umbrella so they had to leave the island. The Russians now lack a ship with enough air defense not just to protect itself but to guard whole areas in the Black Sea.
You shouldn't underestimate the difficulty of conducting amphibious assaults. There is a reason why Russia didn't even try going in the first place and just used the amphibious fleet as deterrence to try to pin down Ukrainian troops in Odessa.
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Ukraine didn't need Australia's F-18 fighters, thinks they're trash. Ends negotiation, according to Australian Financial Review. Relationship has become tense after this.
Russians introduce new kinds of 122mm and 152mm fragmentation ammunition with greater explosive power and improved aerodynamic shaping.
Cool footage. Two Su-25 seen flying flow then spraying NARS at Ukrainian positions in Avdiivka.
Ukrainian military installations continue to get hit daily by FABs in Kherson.
2S1 Gvozdika of the AFU gets destroyed in Kupyansk area.
2S1 Gvozdika taken out by Lancet in Gorlovka.
Rail station in DNR under Ukrainian hands gets hit with two Iskander or Tornado-S. There might be a train there that arrived with reinforcements and supplies.
Ukrainian T-72M1 gets hit by a Lancet in Kherson. This one is a total loss.
Orlans have autonomous trackers inside the drones. If the Ukrainians retrieve the remnants of the drones, these would have tracked the retrievers back to their home base. Then the Russians would come knocking down your doors.
Despite the grills, a Lancet managed to put this Krab out of commission. Damage went through the thin roof.
Ukrainian landing boat near Tyaginka gets hit by artillery fire.
Brief summary in Dniepr operations includes two KUB attacks, one against a TPQ-37, and another at a car. This indicates the return of the KUB drone to the front after absence and added improvements.
Russians introduce new kinds of 122mm and 152mm fragmentation ammunition with greater explosive power and improved aerodynamic shaping.
Cool footage. Two Su-25 seen flying flow then spraying NARS at Ukrainian positions in Avdiivka.
Ukrainian military installations continue to get hit daily by FABs in Kherson.
2S1 Gvozdika of the AFU gets destroyed in Kupyansk area.
2S1 Gvozdika taken out by Lancet in Gorlovka.
Rail station in DNR under Ukrainian hands gets hit with two Iskander or Tornado-S. There might be a train there that arrived with reinforcements and supplies.
Ukrainian T-72M1 gets hit by a Lancet in Kherson. This one is a total loss.
Orlans have autonomous trackers inside the drones. If the Ukrainians retrieve the remnants of the drones, these would have tracked the retrievers back to their home base. Then the Russians would come knocking down your doors.
Despite the grills, a Lancet managed to put this Krab out of commission. Damage went through the thin roof.
Ukrainian landing boat near Tyaginka gets hit by artillery fire.
Brief summary in Dniepr operations includes two KUB attacks, one against a TPQ-37, and another at a car. This indicates the return of the KUB drone to the front after absence and added improvements.
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Russia claims to have found fragments of Patriot missiles near the Il-76 crash site.
It appears their air defenses didn't work anyway. That bluff couldn't have lasted much longer than it did.