The War in the Ukraine

TK3600 said:

It is clear Russia cannot sustain high tempo operation forever, but they don't have to. If Ukraine + western aid run low on equipments, Russian loss will go down, and vice versa. So the question then becomes who is running low first? The war is a race between NATO and Russian war economy. Russia is betting on reduced attrition on vehicle once western aid dwindles.

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The main problem with this is that it's attritional simply to hold ground. The mass proliferation of UAVs have made keeping armored assets near the front extremely expensive. It can no longer go back to the 2014 static front stage where losses were manageable for both sides, even with the current snail's pace of movement, I have seen from here and Ukranian footage of dozens of troops getting mauled daily by UAV dropped munition, there are almost always daily videos of armored vehicle losses.

I believe going into 2024 Ukraine will at least have enough of a lifeline that Russia won't be able to collapse the defense and push for surrender and that makes the war very expensive.

tankphobia said:

The main problem with this is that it's attritional simply to hold ground. The mass proliferation of UAVs have made keeping armored assets near the front extremely expensive. It can no longer go back to the 2014 static front stage where losses were manageable for both sides, even with the current snail's pace of movement, I have seen from here and Ukranian footage of dozens of troops getting mauled daily by UAV dropped munition, there are almost always daily videos of armored vehicle losses.

I believe going into 2024 Ukraine will at least have enough of a lifeline that Russia won't be able to collapse the defense and push for surrender and that makes the war very expensive.

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True, Ukraine will not collapse yet in 2024. Also true there is an inherent cost to keep the line going. Those two points don't contradict reduced Russian attrition once aid dwindles. My point is Russia can afford holding the line once Ukraine is weakened, but they cannot afford sustained high tempo of first 3 month. Once the aid run out, Russians will slowly push Ukraine over the course of several years, if Ukrainians actually fight to the end. Hold on at 2024? Sure. 2025? 26? Unlikely. I expect by 2024 Ukraine will slowly get pushed out of key positions, but not yet collapse. By 2025 Russia should control most of Donbass, and the war will devolve from high intensity today to more like Hezbollah vs Israel style of conflict. I think Russian economy can manage that level conflict. Until then there are still some stockpile left over to continue grinding.

tankphobia said:

The main problem with this is that it's attritional simply to hold ground. The mass proliferation of UAVs have made keeping armored assets near the front extremely expensive. It can no longer go back to the 2014 static front stage where losses were manageable for both sides, even with the current snail's pace of movement, I have seen from here and Ukranian footage of dozens of troops getting mauled daily by UAV dropped munition, there are almost always daily videos of armored vehicle losses.

I believe going into 2024 Ukraine will at least have enough of a lifeline that Russia won't be able to collapse the defense and push for surrender and that makes the war very expensive.

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If there's a turning point or sudden collapse of a frontline, the opposing side need to jump in the occasion and flood the area. We have seen that with the Ukraine offensive in Kharkiv. It was costly but the collapse of the line made a quick gain to a large area.

We are seeing gains on the front but for now not a collapse in any way. UAV proliferation make combined warfare costly. Not using it give way to only marginal gains even if a part of the line is in full retreat, you cannot access rapidly to an area on foot. If we see very cold weather, snow and wind, it could open the way for armored vehicules to be more survivable. Small UAV will be hard to use. A bit of snow in the lens and your going everywhere. It will depend on who have the most armor ready near the front.

tankphobia said:

The mass proliferation of UAVs have made keeping armored assets near the front extremely expensive.

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Their relative value to infantry life just decreased that much (due to both the overabundance of AFVs in this particular part of the world, steady growth of hand-held AT capability, and overall value of soldier). Everywhere else - sure, but not here (at least for Russia; Ukraine struggled to field fully mechanized units since the first spring). Any stronger units in attritional warfare ultimately are here for replacing some loss of human capital with material capital.

While AFV attrition draws attention, it's the question of capability of a country to maintain equilibrium; Russia appears quite capable of doing that medium-term (sustaining a much larger active force than Ukraine/West, longer).

The problem ultimately is human cost of maintaining lower - and still unsustainable! - equilibriums in AFVs (artillery, airforce, even general economy) for Ukraine.

As for the estimation of UVZ being capable of producing just 10 vehicles per year - well, that's a rather optimistic view. Hopefully, Polish policy won't be based on this curious estimation.

Putin in an interview claimed 617,000 Russian troops in Ukraine (including 244,000 reservists) recently.

This is after Zelensky recently claimed 600,000 Ukrainian troops.

The Russian claim is significantly higher than the 440,000-400,000 claimed earlier from open sources.

sheogorath said:

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Odd that it lists the Leopard 2A5. I suppose it's a typo and means 2A4? The only 2A5s received by Ukraine are the 10 Swedish Strv 122s.

The Leopard 1A5 is not surprisingly performing terribly. Guess the reactivation effort of these ancient and long-stored vehicles hasn't been very deep.

MarKoz81 said:

The article cites no figures for production of tanks, apart from one vague mention of "previous data" which "suggests" annual production. It only cites figures for deliveries to the armed forces which includes active vehicles repaired in factories and returned to service and vehicles reactivated from reserve stock.

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So how many whole new tanks is NATO producing? That's right. Zero. They only refurbish tanks. If NATO wants new tanks they would have to buy them from South Korea or maybe Japan. And good luck restarting production of the M1. The engine hasn't been produced for decades at this point. There was a program to make a new gas turbine engine for it, but I think it went nowhere.
Germany in theory can build new tanks but they have difficulty even producing the requisite upgrade kits for existing tanks in sufficient amounts. So Poland ended up buying South Korean tanks.

MarKoz81 said:

The estimated number of T-62M available in reserve for reactivation is ~850 tanks.
Similarly the number of T-80s and T-72s in reserve, estimated as available for reactivation within 6-12 months, depending on availability of necessary parts and production capacity, is 1500 to 3000.

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You are severely underestimating the amount of tanks the Russians have in reserve. For example you don't even take into consideration they could try to reactivate the T-64 tanks that they have in reserve.

Ukrainian recruiters raid fitness centers and bar clubs.


Burning French VAB APC near Marinka.


FABs hitting Ukrainian positions in the right side of the Dniepr at Noroberislav.


Ukrainian police arrest smuggling ring that brings out potential recruits across the border.


Loaded Ukrainian boat transferring Marines gets hit by a bomb from a quadcopter and sinks soon after.


Terracone previously captured by the AFU in Gorlovka, now recovered by the Russians.


Ukraine sends 9 long range drones into Russia for a morale boost raid, none appears to reach their target.


A grey scene over Bakhmut or Artemovosk. Restoration won't be done until the Russians take Chasiv Yar.


Grenade drops and explodes close to this Ukrainian commando boat. The boat reaches the left bank of the Dniepr but not the occupants.


Marder, Stryker and mortar among identified in this FPV drone compilation.


Mortar fire from the 6th Brigade strikes Ukrainian fortifications near Bakhmut.


Burning M113 near Ivanovka.


Confrontation between Polish police and Ukrainian truck drivers.


Ukraine sends missiles to Mariupol, hits concrete plant.

Bradley taking out Russian BMP what kind of BMP it doesn't say

Gloire_bb said:

As for the estimation of UVZ being capable of producing just 10 vehicles per year - well, that's a rather optimistic view. Hopefully, Polish policy won't be based on this curious estimation.

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I mean, pretty sure we have seen more than 10 T-90M and T-80BVM delivered this year alone