The War in the Ukraine
- Thread starter SampanViking
- Start date
That's a realistic demand tbh. Aside from occassional Ukrainian sabotage attempt within Russian territory, all things that matter seems to never got hit. It also show that Ukrainian industrial base has been essentially reduced to rubble from what was used to be 50% of Soviet Industry.
US might see this as a chance to revitalize industry tho. Would be expensive as they never really make anything of scale since WW II, have to invest and modernize with new machine tools etc. Might see interest in getting new still mill, relaxed environmental regulations etc.
US might see this as a chance to revitalize industry tho. Would be expensive as they never really make anything of scale since WW II, have to invest and modernize with new machine tools etc. Might see interest in getting new still mill, relaxed environmental regulations etc.
I frankly don't understand why, because given the 2022 and 2023 experience, that's a fairly fair assessment of yearly needs for active operations.
During a period of high-interest rates and a lack of skilled labour? It will be expensive, and a slow effort. It probably won't be in time to effect this war, unless it's managed to drag on for another few more years.
At least it seems the Russians managed to retain the adaptability and quick learning of lessons of their Soviet forefathers. Kind of amusing seeing how they went from barely paying attention to drones in general to trying to integrate them at every level
A few days ago pictures came out of Scranton's ammunition manufacturing plant, it looked really really really dated and as far as I remember, the building is in the Historic Registry so they can't modify it to add newer machinery as it is too big for the existing building.
Amuzing part here is that of all the fancy "drones of the future", which were often studied before the war, nothing is actually useful at the front.
At best, mine clearing Urans work in rear areas(and apparently do it worse than normal BMRs).
Moreover, companies and engineering groups producing those new battlefield drones aren't even the same, i.e. all the pre-war ground drone development was aimed at decision-makers who don't understand anything about modern autonomy, and as a result was completely wrong.
Kalahsnikov did have the right idea with the KUB, missed the mark on payload but at least they quickly remedied it with the Lancets but yeah, everything else was out there.
Still lacking on the MALE drone front, though, but this seems to have actually pushed the Orion out of the "symbolic production" realm
Still lacking on the MALE drone front, though, but this seems to have actually pushed the Orion out of the "symbolic production" realm
Key elements that shaped the counteroffensive and the initial outcome include:
● Ukrainian, U.S. and British military officers held eight major tabletop war games to build a campaign plan. But Washington miscalculated the extent to which Ukraine’s forces could be transformed into a Western-style fighting force in a short period — especially without giving Kyiv air power integral to modern militaries.
● U.S. and Ukrainian officials sharply disagreed at times over strategy, tactics and timing. The Pentagon wanted the assault to begin in mid-April to prevent Russia from continuing to strengthen its lines. The Ukrainians hesitated, insisting they weren’t ready without additional weapons and training.
● U.S. military officials were confident that a mechanized frontal attack on Russian lines was feasible with the troops and weapons that Ukraine had. The simulations concluded that Kyiv’s forces, in the best case, could reach the Sea of Azov and cut off Russian troops in the south in 60 to 90 days.
● The United States advocated a focused assault along that southern axis, but Ukraine’s leadership believed its forces had to attack at three distinct points along the 600-mile front, southward toward both Melitopol and Berdyansk on the Sea of Azov and east toward the embattled city of Bakhmut.
The U.S. intelligence community had a more downbeat view than the U.S. military, assessing that the offensive had only a 50-50 chance of success given the stout, multilayered defenses Russia had built up over the winter and spring.
● Many in Ukraine and the West underestimated Russia’s ability to rebound from battlefield disasters and exploit its perennial strengths: manpower, mines and a willingness to sacrifice lives on a scale that few other countries can countenance.
● As the expected launch of the offensive approached, Ukrainian military officials feared they would suffer catastrophic losses — while American officials believed the toll would ultimately be higher without a decisive assault.
Also expanding on this, how they got rid of their reluctance to develop guided munitions to now spam it all over the place
● Seventy percent of troops in one of the brigades leading the counteroffensive, and equipped with the newest Western weapons, entered battle with no combat experience.
● Ukraine’s setbacks on the battlefield led to rifts with the United States over how best to cut through deep Russian defenses.
● The commander of U.S. forces in Europe couldn’t get in touch with Ukraine’s top commander for weeks in the early part of the campaign amid tension over the American’s second-guessing of battlefield decisions.
● Each side blamed the other for mistakes or miscalculations. U.S. military officials concluded that Ukraine had fallen short in basic military tactics, including the use of ground reconnaissance to understand the density of minefields. Ukrainian officials said the Americans didn’t seem to comprehend how attack drones and other technology had transformed the battlefield.
● In all, Ukraine has retaken only about 200 square miles of territory, at a cost of thousands of dead and wounded and billions in Western military aid in 2023 alone.