A sober analysis of UAF's offensive. This war appears to be heading for stalemate.
Good article. It really does show the Western POV of this war, a lot of which I disagree with. Some of these observations are honestly downright chauvinistic.
> All while having to cope with a still deeply entrenched bureaucracy, infighting and a continued reliance on “Soviet-style thinking.” Then there are the Russians, who are “putting up stiff resistance.”
There is a reason for why Soviet doctrine is the way it is. Soviets weren't stupid or outdated. They were in fact, forward looking and many of the concepts they pioneered in the late 80s are being used successfully by Russia today.
The issue IMO isn't, as many Western pundits like to say, the legacy of Soviet style training. I know that this is what many pundits say (Konrad-Muzyka, Michael Kofman, Rob Lee, etc) because that's what they hear from the front. That's what many Ukrainian NCOs complain about, as well as the "next-generation" of Ukrainian leaders. It's a very popular thing to lambast "Soviet-Style" thinking. Even if it's not necessarily the truth.
In fact,
if you ask me, Soviet style training is
what Ukraine should be using en masse. Ukraine has very limited resources in terms of time and equipment. What they do have is manpower. Lots of it. In order to adequately man the front, and conduct mass maneuver, you need to organize these men into large formation, train them quickly, and have effective C2.
Ukraine doesn't have 2 years to train 300,000 men in NATO style training. They constantly need reinforcements to man trenches, reconstitute damaged units, and apply pressure on Russian lines.
This sort of approach is probably not very popular with the professional part of the Ukrainian army, which is experienced, prides itself on efficiency, tactical prowess, and high level of readiness. To them, the idea of "Soviet style human-wave insert-meme-here" approach is likely downright offensive. But they likely cannot understand the
bigger picture. Low-level commanders and officers, likely want to extrapolate company and battalion level success on a larger scale. But that's likely, very hard to do during wartime, probably impossible.
This clash of personalities is likely paralyzing Ukraine's combat effectiveness. The "NATO" part of the Ukrainian army needs to stop complaining, and try to work better with their "Soviet" part, which is likely in charge.
By and large this is an infantryman’s fight (squad, platoon and company level) supported by artillery along most of the frontline. This has several implications.
I really, really disagree with this. This is not an infantryman's fight. Quite the contrary, this is a fight where combined arms and artillery are raining supreme.
Infantry does have to take ground, but the measurement of success in
"inches" represents a strategic misunderstanding and failure on the part of Western think tanks.
Infantry has to seize ground yes, but you should not be advancing little bits at the time. In the absence of airpower (something that ails both sides, Russia does not have free reign of the skies either), artillery and enablers like mine-clearers reign supreme. What this "counter-offensive" demonstrates, is the refusal of Ukraine to commit serious firepower to this offensive. In order for infantry and armor to properly advance, defenders have to be suppressed, logistics have to be disrupted, the skies have to become sufficiently dangerous.
This means you need lots of ISR, artillery, long-range fires, and attritable SHORAD. Properly prepared, this offensive should have the capability to penetrate deeply into Russian lines. At which point Russians would either have to take risks by contesting this firepower with their own, and trying to outlast Ukraine's initial offensive, or simply retreat even further behind more secured lines.
The lackluster nature of Ukraine's counter-offensive is simply a reflection of their lackluster preparation. There were early hints of a long-range strike campaign by the Ukrainians. But it seems that Ukraine simply
does not have the necessary munitions to prosecute such a campaign.
This is why missiles like ATACMS are necessary. It's not about wonder weapons. It's about giving Ukraine a large enough variety, and quantity of strike options, in the absence of airpower. Without these tools, it is unlikely that Ukraine can make any serious headway into well-defended Russian lines.
