The War in the Ukraine

Tam

Brigadier
Registered Member
Drone attacks intensify.

Leopard 2A6 gets hit by a Lancet drone. This is going to happen sooner or later.

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Lancet hits Ukrainian MLRS.

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Another Gvozdika gets attacked by Lancet.

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More Ukrainian tractors under attack by Ka-52.

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Russian FPV drones attack Leos at Orekhiv. Jamming is detected.

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M777 destroyed this time by Krasnapol.

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MarKoz81

Junior Member
Registered Member
There's intelligence value in capturing complete working NATO comms equipment for a teardown analysis of their hardwired capabilities.

No sensitive systems on any of the vehicles that are used in frontline combat.

This is war is interesting in the aspect of technology because of its asymmetry. Russia uses and loses its most modern and sensitive systems which when captured are immediately traded with NATO. Ukraine however uses outdated systems and aid from NATO is stripped of anything sensitive so even if they're captured nothing or very little of critical value is lost. This is particularly true in the realm of communications. Those stripdowns are one of the main reasons why transfer of equipment takes long time - if transferred systems are new they have to be replaced by something older.

The downgrading of communications doesn't matter a lot because Ukraine wouldn't be able to properly utilise those solutions. Personnel training and skill gap are the biggest challenge for AFU and those make any effective use of advanced communications problematic. Training has been cut to the bone to produce numbers so while there are visible differences in tactics especially for formations trained by NATO there's still a huge skill gap remaining that needs to be filled for those soldiers to be put on equal footing with properly trained NATO formations as far as technology use goes. A typical well trained or "rapid reaction" NATO unit has a minimum of two to four years experience and is staffed by even more experienced officers and NCOs. In Ukraine experienced officers are too reliant on life-long habit of ex-Soviet doctrine, NCOs are experienced in the reality of ATO 2014-2022 and defensive campaign of 2022 and enlisted are mobilized personnel after (too) short training.

Also as far as C2/C3 equipment goes Ukraine likely still doesn't have sufficient numbers to properly equip its entire army to the same standard that US Army had in Iraq in 2003, or probably even in 1991. Military grade C2/C3 is not something that can be mass produced as commercial solutions and they are an order of magnitude (or two) more expensive. You can't put a commercial telecom manufacturer to work on that and Ukrainian military is currently at ~700k people total with ~300-400k in all land formations. It makes no sense to transfer most modern communications with tanks - which all have to be accounted for in terms of cost - and leave battalion and company commanders with insecure systems.

Ukraine fights this war on the cheap even when sometimes it gets superficially flashy items like HIMARS or PzH2000 or Leopard 2A6 and that's because no matter how much money it has it's not enough for the sheer scale of warfare taking place there.

It will be funny if the Armata ends up with a copy of the Leopard's engine

It would be really funny because Russia is incapable of replicating German combustion engine technology in mass production. So it would have to be a joke.

As with many other Soviet/Russian systems the problem doesn't like in the capacity of engineers to design a high-quality product but with the capacity of the industrial process to bring the design to completion. Manufacturing in Russia is of very poor quality and what makes Leopard's engine special is the quality of development, materials and manufacture. There are very few areas in Russian defense and heavy industry where quality is retained but they tend to be focused on strategic branches like rocketry, nuclear power etc. Aviation has higher priority than heavy vehicles and road transport is not prioritised in Russia.

Russian industry is simply not sufficiently developed to replicate something like MB873 within limits of affordability even though it's technically an old design. There's plenty of evidence for that in naval propulsion.

Also Germany is an automotive powerhouse with decades of tradition. Per Wiki vehicle production in 2021 in Germany was at 3,3m vehicles while German companies (in 2017, per Wiki) made 17m vehicles. In comparison Russia in 2021 only made 1,5m vehicles and in 2022 it was little over 600k due to sanctions and war. Russia's heavy vehicle industry runs on inefficient and outdated but cheap designs which are affordable due to price of energy in Russia. Civilian industry always forms the foundation for human capital in defense industry.

If you spend your life training to be a long distance runner you can't become a sprinter overnight.

Besides I don't think engine is the most valuable part of the tank. Arguably transmission is the hardest part because that's something even Korea had problems with in K2/Altay. And arguably Russian copy of Leo's transmission would benefit more from aerospace propulsion like helicopters. T-90s with Leo's transmission would be better than T-14 with Leo's engine.

Leopard 2's performance has been consistently underwhelming everytime it has been used in combat. It's an overhyped weapon, plain and simple.[cut b/c 10k limit]

Tanks don't fight duels. When a tank fights a tank it's only a few steps away from a SNAFU of submarine fighting another submarine (I already made a few posts explaining why this is a bad idea and where it came from). Tanks do that because unlike submarines there are many tanks on a typical battlefield so statistically it is going to happen with some regularity. But ideally you don't want a tank to fight another tank. An IFV with ATGM is better because while a tank can survive an ATGM an IFV can't survive a tank round. Similarly infantry. Tank vs tank is something that World of Tanks popularised and that game (and others like it) is for idiots who think spending money on pay-to-win and screaming into the headset is better than psychotherapy.

In contemporary combined arms warfare tanks are breakthrough spearheads. They are supposed to raid the rear once a gap in the frontline is created and the gap is created with combined arms assault in a short span of time. Then tanks enter the gap and push forward disorganising the rear and forcing the enemy to abandon defensive positions or risk being cut off. That's what tanks are really for. Everything else is a bonus.

So technically speaking what you've seen on that clip is tanks being used in roles which are secondary to their purpose. It was armed recon where tanks supported the infantry in the Bradleys. They just got stuck on a minefield before they reached their objective and got smacked by arty.

That happens all the time in this war. How do you think Russia lost 2000+ tanks and 3600 ifv/apcs but is still in the fight?

Mines + arty = 70% +20% all vehicle losses for both sides. You get hit, you ditch the junk and run to fight another day. It only looks "stupid" if you're an armchair warrior watching UAV clips online. Most of those "experts" wouldn't know which way to run if they were hit like that. But hey they have high rank on CoD and ARMA is stupid.

This is also why the POV video is fine. The next group of Bradleys came to take the infantry and crews but were partly- or unsuccessful. Despite what armchair warriors online claim that's not bad from a unit with very limited training. It was bad luck. Once you get stuck on a minefield it's arty time and personnel is priority. So losing a few more Bradleys to rescue personnel is precisely what NATO instructors would teach them. Per Oryx they've lost 15 M2s. That's only 15 M2s. They still have 84 left There's never more than a battalion (30) in action at any time, and usually it's 1-2 companies (10-20). If you have personnel you can rotate them on the same vehicles and keep fighting. Ukrainians get tired faster than NATO vehicles break down.

Bradleys are really necessary only to achieve breakthrough in difficult and heavily defended terrain. Afterward even US Army doctrine suggests wheeled vehicles in greater number and dispersion. If AFU reaches Tokmak they may as well lose all 99 M2s in the process and it's a win.

Also Leopards were only used twice in combat. By Turkey in 2016 (and possibly later) when they were horribly misused as fire support vehicles by untrained crews without proper infantry support. They were also L2A4s which are 1985-1992 upgrade of 1979 L2A0 design which does play a role because L2A4 was not a "frontal charge" MBT. It was "retreat, maintain distance and fire" MBT because it was as fast in reverse than Soviet tanks going forward.

This is the second time Leopards are being used and this time it's against a peer opponent with defense in depth and without air support. I'm surprised it's only been three so far. After a week of fighting I expected more. If clips of more destroyed vehicles don't come up next week that means that Ukrainian offensive is doing better than expected.

For comparison - on day 13 of invasion Oryx counted Russian losses at ~140 mbt and ~300 ifv/apc and that was when Russia was gaining ground.

This is the same thing, except against a more consolidated front. If by next Saturday Ukraine loses 140mbt and 300 ifv/apc and consistently moves forward then offensive is working because unlike Ukraine in march 2022 Russia in the south has only symbolic depth and nowhere to go.

As counter-intuitive as it may be drowning Russian forces in Ukrainian blood is a viable solution if enemy depth is~100km and the only other way is straight into the sea. And if the southern front breaks the war is effectively over no matter the casualties. The rest will be politics and formalities.

I suggest holding judgment for a week or two. It took Russia five weeks of fighting before it lost SMO/1st phase.
 
D

Deleted member 24525

Guest
This is the second time Leopards are being used and this time it's against a peer opponent with defense in depth and without air support. I'm surprised it's only been three so far. After a week of fighting I expected more. If clips of more destroyed vehicles don't come up next week that means that Ukrainian offensive is doing better than expected.
This could also be because Ukraine's sustainment system is not capable of supporting a very high number of tanks in offensive operations, so they are doing it more piecemeal. We don't know yet but there are many explanations here beyond Ukraine having a near-supernatural ability to avoid armor losses when on the offensive with no air support.
 

BoraTas

Captain
Registered Member
Was this posted before anywhere?

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I've seen this a few times on my Twitter from a couple different sources. Some pro-Russian, some relatively neutral. I also stumbled on this article. However, I cannot find the original source of where Renikov said it. Would appreciate if someone could confirm that this is something the Ukrainian Minister of Defense said.
If the current Ukrainian offensive fails, Ukrainian morale advantage will disappear. Also, Western aid would decrease. So Ukraine will adjust its tactics and keep pressing. It has no other choices other than a peace treaty, which is practically the same as ceding currently occupied territories to Russia.
 

Phead128

Captain
Staff member
Moderator - World Affairs
if Ukraine's counteroffensive fails, any chance the West will stop sending weapons, forcing Ukraine to negotiate with Russia?

I remember a year ago, it was winter cold + oil/gas embargo will force West to end support to Ukraine.

Then it was Infrastructure attacks to force Ukraine to negotiate with Russia.

Then shift towards Ukraine depopulation and economic doom/debt to end Western support.

The goalpost is shifted an unsuccessful counteroffensive will end Western support to Ukraine.

It's time to recognize no effort short of regime change will end Western support for Ukraine... These open-ended predictions about ending Western support is too uncertain and risky to inform any war strategy and planning.
 
D

Deleted member 24525

Guest
I remember a year ago, it was winter cold + oil/gas embargo will force West to end support to Ukraine.

Then it was Infrastructure attacks to force Ukraine to negotiate with Russia.

Then shift towards Ukraine depopulation and economic doom/debt to end Western support.

The goalpost is shifted an unsuccessful counteroffensive will end Western support to Ukraine.

It's time to recognize no effort short of regime change will end Western support for Ukraine.
The west will probably never stop with stuff like air defense but it's possible the political will for offensive oriented stuff like tanks might waver if they can't get substantial gains from this offensive.
 

dingyibvs

Junior Member
I remember a year ago, it was winter cold + oil/gas embargo will force West to end support to Ukraine.

Then it was Infrastructure attacks to force Ukraine to negotiate with Russia.

Then shift towards Ukraine depopulation and economic doom/debt to end Western support.

The goalpost is shifted an unsuccessful counteroffensive will end Western support to Ukraine.

It's time to recognize no effort short of regime change will end Western support for Ukraine. These open-ended predictions is not a real war strategy.

We're just 16 months into the conflict, let's not speak with any finality yet. All of what you mentioned could contribute to an end of Western support for Ukraine, who knows what'll be the straw that breaks the camel's back. Maybe a failed counterattack would be another stack of straws, or maybe it'll make the West double down and send more aid. Who knows, it depends on so many variables, much of it on the internal politics within Western polities.
 

plawolf

Lieutenant General
There have been a lot of footage coming from this offensive, some of the longer clips are very illuminating. Below is a particular interesting exhibit.

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There are a lot of perplexing things going on at first glance, but in moving past the default ‘it’s because their training is trash’ nonsense, one can get some potentially interesting insight when trying to understand why those perplexing choices were made.

The most obvious question mark is why the Ukrainians are just literally sitting out in the open as the Russians walk artillery onto their positions. The most obvious possibilities are that:

-they are waiting for friendly preparatory artillery/suicide drone swarm attacks to soften up the Russian positions before they make their attack and the friendly strikes are massively delayed, so they are stuck in an impossible position. Advance and you risk attacking a full strength enemy dug in position, worse, if your timing is bad, your own artillery might start landing just as you advance into the kill zone. Retreat and you will probably get shot for cowardice and disobedience. Also, while shells are landing all around them, it’s random and sporadic, so the unit probably doesn’t think it’s being actively engaged yet, so can afford to wait to find out more information before committing to a course of acrikn
-Russian EW might be playing hell with Ukrainian comms and the unit commander might be desperately trying to get clarification from HQ on the status of the promised friendly fire support and whether they should advance or retreat by can’t get through.

Next, the drone has IFVs, tanks and massed exposed infantry out in the open, but it goes and wastes time following a stretcher party and seem more interested in calling in strikes on them than the full squads sitting behind the IFVs.

My guess is that this is an example of how the Russians are allocating targets to different units. The drone making the footage most likely is from a small mortar or light artillery unit. They are not targeting the enemy armour and infantry because they don’t have the firepower or volume of fire to do worthwhile damage. The enemy are sitting tight because they are confused, but also because they think they are relatively safe for now. If shells start landing too close, they will move irrespective of orders and consequences and that may move them out of range of a big battery that can do some real serious damage.

The nature of the Russian shelling also suggests to me that they are being incredibly disciplined in fire and movement to avoid Ukrainian counter battery fire. They are shooting a barrage, and moving even before the shells land. The DJIs monitor and gives them a lot of critical information on corrections, but the second volley still isn’t going to be pinpoint since the battery likely has already relocated to a new location, so it needs to do a lot of recalculating. This is probably not a set in stone SOP, and will probably depend on target and mission priority. If it’s a big enemy column and/or friendly units are at imminent risk of being overrun, artillery might stay longer and fire more volleys and risk eating counter battery fire, but for a handful of IFVs and tanks sitting in a field doing not a lot, they are probably happy to just take pot shots and hope for a lucky hit instead of risking their valuable artillery and crews.

The Ukrainian artillery would be doing the same thing, and artillery duals are the meat and potatoes of this war, so crews from both sides will be extremely good, or they will be dead very quickly.

Counter battery combat seems to involve sending in drones first, rather than blind fire at the location enemy shells originated from. That is probably the result of a lot of painful and expensive lessons learnt the hard way. And may explain the lack of Ukrainian counter battery fires - Russian EW is just not allowing the Ukrainian DJIs to get through to give them enough confidence to do counter battery attacks. That is also likely compounded by all the lancet strikes on Ukrainian artillery of late. They Ukrainians know to open fire is to take a big risk of drawing the attention of a lancet.
 

BoraTas

Captain
Registered Member
I remember a year ago, it was winter cold + oil/gas embargo will force West to end support to Ukraine.

Then it was Infrastructure attacks to force Ukraine to negotiate with Russia.

Then shift towards Ukraine depopulation and economic doom/debt to end Western support.

The goalpost is shifted an unsuccessful counteroffensive will end Western support to Ukraine.

It's time to recognize no effort short of regime change will end Western support for Ukraine... These open-ended predictions about ending Western support is too uncertain and risky to inform any war strategy and planning.
The support to Ukraine is just a good idea for Western govts. It weakens Russia considerably at a relatively low cost and no loss of Western lives. If the first part becomes less true and the Ukrainian War becomes less of a topic for domestic politics, the cost part would become more prominent. Russia’s apparent unsuccess is why the support escalated this much in the first place. At the start, the West was calling for peace and even the US itself was keeping the aid limited to MANPADSes and ATGMs. After Ukraine stopped the Russian advance and destroyed high numbers of Russian heavy equipment, the aid escalated. Trucks, tube artillery, ex-WP equipment, rocket artillery, air-to-ground guided munitions, modern Western AFVs, area air defenses and recently cruise missiles. The last few categories were unthinkable at the start. Russia's position just makes it high ROI to donate these. Western equipment getting destroyed with little to show for would change this.
 

Phead128

Captain
Staff member
Moderator - World Affairs
We're just 16 months into the conflict, let's not speak with any finality yet. All of what you mentioned could contribute to an end of Western support for Ukraine, who knows what'll be the straw that breaks the camel's back. Maybe a failed counterattack would be another stack of straws, or maybe it'll make the West double down and send more aid. Who knows, it depends on so many variables, much of it on the internal politics within Western polities.

Indeed, it's complex and multifaceted situation. But remember, Western support for Ukraine is tied more to strategic objectives than the situation on the ground. Short of a drastic shift, such as a regime change, a consistent geopolitical stance is likely to prevail over individual setbacks or challenges. In other words, so long as West believes it's geopolitical interests is served by supporting Ukraine, it will continue so, short of catastrophic regime change or conquest.
 
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