Here's my reading of the events.
OBJECTIVES:
1. strategic level
1.1. test of invasion of Russian territory
1.2. test of false flag operations in Crimea
1.3. test of intervention in Belarus
2. operational level
2.1. test efficiency of Russian decision process
2.2. shaping operations for Ukrainian offensive
3. tactical level
3.1. test simulation of uprising as a tactic
3.2. test maneuver as foundation of tactics
Your evaluation is based on the assumption that the Russians are stupid.
This is the asumption of the Capitol, this shaped the whole Capitol controlled actions in political and NATO sphere in the past year.
OF course, the Russians could be stupid, but the current actions won't different if we expect them to be incompetent, or to expect them to hide the reaction timings and control structures.
At the end of the day the Russians well aware of the need of the Capitol/CIA to see the internal working of the information and logistical structures .
If the NATO command doesn't know the Russian reaction times and general reaction for an invasion then the plans will be bad and innacurate, that makes easier to defeat it.
Say they mobilised a bigger force immedietly, neutralised the intrusion on the spot - it would be a tactical success, but a strategical defeat.
From that point of time the NATO command in Brussel know well that if they send one ukrainans to the border then it will tie up say ten russian.
And the Capitol is not short of ukrainans, they haven't got enought equipment , and trained soldiers, but there are countless untrained/minimally trained personal that can be driven to the border in passanger cars with same cold war relic german guns.