The War in the Ukraine

anzha said:

Let me second this.

Most personal connections (and family) are Russian speakers 1st and foremost. They are from the Donbas. They are overwhelmingly anti-Russian right now. The people captured might have been territory defense units: local, Russian speaking and anti-Russian.

It shouldn't be hard to fathom that language doesn't always match nationality or identity. Canadians are by and large English speakers, but they are not Americans, British or Australian. If the US invaded Canada, even though they are (mostly) friendly now, you can bet Canadians become rabidly anti-American and still speak English.

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In Kherson, more than 115,000 people evacuated to the Russian side when Kherson was abandoned. About 70,000 was left. Even then, a number continued to trickle to the other side. Also many evacuations to the Russian side at Limansky and Kupyansk during their retreat.

obj 705A said:

Don't know if this was shared here before:-


Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu stated that the Russian Air Force destroyed more than 20,000 Ukrainian military facilities, and made 140,000 sorties as part of Russia's special military operation in Ukraine.

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140000 sorties in ~400 days is ~350 sorties per day. It is not too good, not too bad.

Atomicfrog said:

A lot left Ukraine to live in Russia for not being killed by their own Ukrainian government ultranationalist fascist bunch from 2014 onward...

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I remember following the Ukraine war early on reading a telegram post about how Russia managed to capture Izyum more easily than expected because they had sympathizers inside. I've also read about how Odessa still has pro-Russian sentiment but I'm not sure how true this is still given what you've said. Overall, does this mean that Russia's gonna have an impossible task in forcing a neutral/non-hostile Ukraine on their border?

MarKoz81 said:

To make things worse the events of 2014 were not as clear as those in 2022. When Russia began the annexation of Crimea - even though it was impossible for such operation to take place without preparations in advance, and there were preparations done during Zapad 2013 for example - in the public eye it came as consequence to the overthrow of Yanukovych which was illegal. That illegality was recognized by people in Ukraine as was the role of the nationalists in the crisis. So when Ukrainians saw things spiralling out of control their natural instinct was not to perceive it as deliberate Russian invasion of Ukraine like in 2022 but rather as an uncontrolled escalation stemming from an internal crisis.

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These kinds of subtleties vanish in the face of an act as provocative as a foreign power annexing territory a country considers its own. If Ukrainians considered Crimea theirs in 2014, there would be no handwringing about the supposed illegality of overthrowing Yanukovych. It would be seen as a grotesque Russian violation of Ukrainian sovereignty no matter the circumstances that brought it about.

I find it much more likely that the Ukrainian government in 2014 recognized that it was in no shape to fight Russia and could not count on Western support. Do you have any data that indicates Ukrainians felt as you describe in 2014?

MarKoz81 said:

The problems in 2014 weren't only caused by lack of training or working equipment. A military is a social structure and the institutional knowledge that defines the military capabilities is contained within the social network. Military is all about how people work together, not what they can do on their own. So when that network breaks down the institutional knowledge disappears and you have to re-create it, often from scratch.

Ukrainian military was also based on the Soviet model, which meant that it lacked professional NCOs. NCO's are responsible for small tactics and managing discipline. If an army doesn't have professional NCOs it has two very serious consequences. First is almost complete lack of institutional knowledge retention below junior officer level. Second is emergence of "dedovshchina" because that natural leadership role is not taken by a separate and established hierarchy. No army with professional NCOs has that problem and every army without professional NCOs has it. "Dedovshchina" has a crippling effect on soldier morale and also typically causes officers to withdraw from interaction with their underlings because they have to do the NCOs job as well as the officer's. This is why those armies perform so poorly in combat. Their cohesion and morale is minimal on top of having no institutional knowledge bellow officer level.

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Very interesting and insightful. Do you think this culture has fundamentally changed over the past eight years? Is the AFU now a professional military (by NATO standards) with a competent NCO staff that can maintain discipline and give it a decisive edge over the Russian military? Is it still the antiquated Soviet institution it was in 2014? Or is it somewhere in between, and if so, where between these extremes would you put it?

I'd like to ask you what you think the reasons for Ukraine's relative success have been. If you were to break it down into factors, how much weight would you give to:
1. Direct NATO support through providing arms, ammunition, and intelligence.
2. Reforms and battlefield experience gained through fighting pro-Russian separatists from 2014-2022.
3. Ideological indoctrination and radicalization of the population in general and the military specifically since 2014.
4. Indirect NATO assistance through training over 2014-2022.
5. Russian underestimation of Ukraine and general incompetence.
Feel free to suggest any relevant factors I've missed.

MarKoz81 said:

Shortly before the war - you can look up those posts - I even suspect American foul play because from my calculations Russia had no way to succeed in a full-scale invasion save some unbelievably lucky break. And that was assuming full complement. Early on I was less surprised with Russia's failure as with the decision to proceed in the first place. It was illogical.

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Indeed. Here it is:
Specifically:

While there is qualitative advantage on the Russian side both in terms of technology and experience Ukraine has sufficient strength to inflict high casualties against an invading forces. In particular Ukraine has 7 brigades of tube artillery and 4 brigades of rocket artillery compared to Russia's minimum available 6 brigades of artillery (tube and rocket) giving them at least parity. Artillery on brigade level is also comparable meaning that the necessary firepower exists as long as ammunition is provided. Stocks of ammunition for artillery are the crucial factor.

This does not look like Russia preparing an attack. It looks like Russia preparing for any eventuality and proactively restricting the movements for Washington. They stand to lose too much from a full-scale conflict even if it turns out in their favor. Any casualties and losses of equipment will be problematic as the units deployed are the primary fighting strength of Russian armed forces.

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Impressively accurate. How do you see the war shaping up over the spring?

Is time on Ukraine's side or on Russia's side?

I keep hearing from various commentators that Russia's plan is to exhaust the west and ukraine. That thinking follows the slow pace Russia has taken in pursuing this war. But I also keep hearing that as more time goes on, Western industrial complex will ramp up production of weapons and Ukraine will also train more troops, thus Russia will be defeated.

So, if time is not on Russia's side in terms of production, then Russia is simply fighting a doomed battle until the west and Ukraine produces enough troops and weapons to defeat it.

What about Russian industrial complex. On paper they should also have a formidable defense industrial complex from the soviet days. Are they ramping up production of Tanks, planes, artillery pieces and so on to be able sustain and even expand their force numbers?

Production rate of equipment for the Russian ground forces was increased. A lot of factories are now working three shifts. Dedicated tank upgrade and repair facilities were put back into service.

The situation in aviation factories is likely different. Since most aviation losses were helicopters or Su-25s. If there is a focus on increasing production rate it is there. There were losses of Su-34s, maybe a dozen, but they are less than a year's worth of production in peacetime. You can count Su-35 losses on a single hand. I think the main focus of the Russian aviation sector, believe it or not, is production of civilian transport aircraft to replace the ones they cannot buy anymore because of sanctions.

The helicopter side of the industry was supposed to be doing the Ka-52M and Mi-28NM upgrade programs. The aviation side was supposed to be doing the Su-34NVO. These will all have significant improvements in terms of survivability. The new helicopters are supposed to have better sensors, longer reach guided missiles, and support for remote control of drones and loitering munitions. The Su-34NVO is supposed to include the capability to add pods with improved sensors, improved ECM, and MAWS. MAWS would make the Su-34 more survivable against MANPADS similarly to the Su-35.

gelgoog said:

he Su-34NVO is supposed to include the capability to add pods with improved sensors

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This capability should be standard for all Su-30 families. But so far Russia didnt buy the T-220 targeting pod and for some reason only wants to field 101-KS pod for Su-57. I would love to see changes in the policy.

Su-34NVO is supposed to be able to replace Su-24MR and MP variants with the pods.

"The key new feature introduced in the Su-34NVO is compatibility with interchangeable UKR pods slung under the Su-34’s underbelly, between the engines. The system is collectively known as the Baseline Reconnaissance Complex-3 (BKR-3). While the three pods mount different types of sensors, they share a common databus and all can transmit their findings via a wide-band datalink in real-time to friendly aircraft and command centers.

The UKR-OE variant pairs an M433 Raduga-VM infrared scanner with an Antrakt camera system. The UKRT radio-technical model uses an M410 electromagnetic sensor (miniaturized from the M400 used on the Tu-214R surveillance plane) designed to snoop on and geolocate the radar signals of other country’s military systems.

Finally, the UK-RL pod embeds an M402 Pika-M side-looking radar which can scan for air, maritime, and ground objects at ranges of 180, 60, and 30 miles respectively, has high-enough resolution classify tracks by type, and which is also touted as improving the Su-34’s all-weather capability by ‘seeing’ objects in low-visibility conditions.

As for the EW upgrade, technical details are more scarce, but supposedly a new, more powerful variant of Khibiny will allow the Su-34M to provide escort jamming, ie. protection for other nearby aircraft, rather than serving purely for self-defense. It’s possible the EW may also refer to fleet-wide integration of an L700 or SAP-14 Tarantul escort jamming pod, ..., or a special Khibiny pod designed to foil the more powerful radars used on AWACs early-warning aircraft."

gelgoog said:

Production rate of equipment for the Russian ground forces was increased. A lot of factories are now working three shifts. Dedicated tank upgrade and repair facilities were put back into service.

The situation in aviation factories is likely different. Since most aviation losses were helicopters or Su-25s. If there is a focus on increasing production rate it is there. There were losses of Su-34s, maybe a dozen, but they are less than a year's worth of production in peacetime. You can count Su-35 losses on a single hand. I think the main focus of the Russian aviation sector, believe it or not, is production of civilian transport aircraft to replace the ones they cannot buy anymore because of sanctions.

The helicopter side of the industry was supposed to be doing the Ka-52M and Mi-28NM upgrade programs. The aviation side was supposed to be doing the Su-34NVO. These will all have significant improvements in terms of survivability. The new helicopters are supposed to have better sensors, longer reach guided missiles, and support for remote control of drones and loitering munitions. The Su-34NVO is supposed to include the capability to add pods with improved sensors, improved ECM, and MAWS. MAWS would make the Su-34 more survivable against MANPADS similarly to the Su-35.

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Instead of just working existing factories by 3 shifts, are they also opening new factories or re-opening old soviet factories? Cause Soviets had the ability to produce 5000+ tanks per year. Right now Russia probably can produce a few hundred per year. That will not be enough if Western production ramps up.

The exact statements of Putin and Medvedev (who is the 'Speer' of the war effort):

President Vladimir Putin, who, in an interview with Russian television on March 25, said: “[Western] arsonists plan to send 420-440 tanks to Ukraine. During this time, we will produce new ones and modernize over 1,600 existing ones. The total number of Russian tanks will exceed three times the number of tanks in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Even more than three times.”

“Our enemies believed that our industry would choke, that is, we would spend everything—these were their endless conversations. “We ran out of shells, ran out of tanks, ran out of rockets,” etc.

We will make 1,500 tanks alone this year,” Dmitry Medvedev said in an interview with Russian news agencies and users of the social network VK.

“The military-industrial complex has become hot, it works actively, most enterprises (I’m talking about this firsthand, but because I drive around them) work in three shifts, they work, as they say, from wheels - they directly give everything to the troops, produce the most modern Russian types of weapons, and even in a situation where they are really trying to deprive us of components, cut off oxygen in certain areas,” Medvedev said.

Other recent statements by Putin:

Ukraine uses up to 5 thousand shells per day, and the United States produces only 14-15 thousand per month.
The Russian arms industry will produce three times as much ammunition as the West can supply to Ukraine.