The War in the Ukraine

typexx

Junior Member
Registered Member
The Russian Air Force began to use new high-precision glide bombs.
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In Donetsk, an unexploded Fab-500 aerial bomb was found on one of the streets of the kuibyshevsky district, which fell due to a technical malfunction from a Russian bomber. However, the most interesting thing is that a control and correction module was detected 500 meters from the detection, which makes the layout of precision-guided ammunition from an ordinary unguided aerial bomb. Most likely, the mass fell out of the grenade during the fall and hit the ground. The wings are also clearly visible in the product photos.
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the remains of an unknown product , which, by all external indications, turned out to be the Grom (UK RBV) rocket-propelled grenade weapon system developed by KTRV, namely precision-guided ammunition

 

Anlsvrthng

Captain
Registered Member
Another failed JDAMski

Probably the use of the glider causes it to hit the ground at an angle where the fuze isn't triggered

If the quality is terribly bad then they have one failure from three launches.


To collect photos of the failures could be very unlikelly, say 1:100.


Means they allready used hundreds of bombs if it is the worst possibly quality.


IF it is professionaly made theused up ammunition would be in the thousands range.
 

HighGround

Senior Member
Registered Member
What else do you expect in war? Everyone is going to be biased one way or another.

Unlike most analysts, Mike has been several times on the battlefield lines in Ukraine. Just 10 days go he visited Bakhmut to witness first hand the intensity and complexity of the urban combat taking place there at considerable risk to himself.

Michael Kofman is a quality analyst. That said, it's best to treat his work as the "least biased" out of Western think tanks. But him and Rob Lee are still biased. Most recently, Rob Lee reiterated that Ukraine had favorable casualty ratios in Bakhmut. I don't care if he was shooting a rifle on the front line himself, he has no way of knowing that information. The only people with useful and detailed Russian casualty numbers are Russian commanders just like the only people with useful and detail Ukrainian casualty numbers are Ukrainian commanders...

Little slip ups like that are fine IMO. And I still consider Kofman to be a fairly reliable source, but we need to understand that the only real thing we are seeing are opinions and anecdotal evidence. Therefore, all of our assumptions must be underline by a degree of uncertainty.

The employment of Kinzhal in the most recent missile barrage is notable, and it'll be interesting to see if it's largely a one time thing.
 

drowingfish

Junior Member
Registered Member
crazy development on the front today. i think something broke in the ukrainian defense that allowed the wagners to advance so far towards slovyansk. at the same time i also think the russians went a little too far, unless they were actively looking for a defensible position, they will likely be losing a lot of ground in the event of an ukrianian counterattack.

the other two points of interests are avdeevka and keremina, seems like very intense fighting going on their on par with bakhmut.
 

Cult Icon

Junior Member
Registered Member
crazy development on the front today. i think something broke in the ukrainian defense that allowed the wagners to advance so far towards slovyansk. at the same time i also think the russians went a little too far, unless they were actively looking for a defensible position, they will likely be losing a lot of ground in the event of an ukrianian counterattack.

the other two points of interests are avdeevka and keremina, seems like very intense fighting going on their on par with bakhmut.

If they have operational reserves in second echelon (like Ukrainian army is claiming- VDV and mechanized elements) then these supporting forces could reinforce them as they culminate. Eventually though the advance has to stop and the Russian forces have to dig in for the defense. I think it ultimately depends if their command does not overreach with their current forces.
 

MarKoz81

Junior Member
Registered Member
It's not specifically in reply to this comment but more of a general remark using this as a starting point:

Michael Kofman is a quality analyst. That said, it's best to treat his work as the "least biased" out of Western think tanks. But him and Rob Lee are still biased. Most recently, Rob Lee reiterated that Ukraine had favorable casualty ratios in Bakhmut. I don't care if he was shooting a rifle on the front line himself, he has no way of knowing that information. The only people with useful and detailed Russian casualty numbers are Russian commanders just like the only people with useful and detail Ukrainian casualty numbers are Ukrainian commanders...

Little slip ups like that are fine IMO. And I still consider Kofman to be a fairly reliable source, but we need to understand that the only real thing we are seeing are opinions and anecdotal evidence. Therefore, all of our assumptions must be underline by a degree of uncertainty.

There's something that we refer to as "tactical tables" and by we I mean former Warsaw Pact militaries, which includes both Poland, as well as both Russia and Ukraine. Tactical tables is war described in arbitrary numbers that are developed from meticulous study of past conflict and exercises and translated from real data into "tactical parameters". They don't make much sense outside of the entire framework and sometimes are slightly wrong, but they are based on what works which means they're based on what allowed a fighting unit to achieve its objective with a given success and casualty rate.

Military science is very much about hundreds and hundreds of "rules of thumb" for everything.

Those rules of thumb described by tactical parameters are somewhat similar to how you would set up rules in a tactical game - tabletop or computer - except they are much more unwieldy and complicated. There are some games that utilize past tactical tables but they're not popular because they're not much fun. And that's because military intelligence is not fun at all. It's tedious, boring and confusing collection and interpretation of rather meaningless data to produce something that can be put against those tables with a "degree of probability".

The degrees of probabilty work something like this: of probability of data assessment or confidence of 0% to 49% is below 5% of tactical probability or what will happen according to tactical tables, 50% is 5% and 95% is 100%. You never have probability or confidence higher than 95% and never lower than 50% because if you have lower than 50% then it's a coin toss. IIRC my edition of tactical tables had standard confidence at 85% which is not extremely high but high enough.

What those tables had were parameters like "defensive position strenght" - not reinforced say... 1,0 to 1,5, lightly reinforced 1,5 to 2,5 etc up to heavily reinforced at 4,5 to 6. For example, I can't remember precise data and don't want to look for the materials right now.

Then you have your fire density and your fire mission - a specific amount of ordnance of specific category in a given unit of time (that depends on how many guns or lauchers are performing the fire mission) hitting a given area (defined by grids) with a given CEP.

Those then match their defensive strength like light infantry, mechanized infantry in vehicles, tanks etc and defensive position strength like trenches, bunkers, buildings etc.

Those will give you result categories - you need such and such parameters of fire mission against such and such target for your target to be unaffected, suppressed, suppressed and damaged, neutralized and destroyed.

And those categories of result have a numerical value as well - 5-10% loss of complement (TOE - table of organization and equipment in NATO) 15 to 25% loss, 25 to 40% loss, 40 to 60% loss, 75% loss and above. Those are then matched against TOE or strength of identified target and you get the results.

Against target X in position Y we fired Z and the result must be Q. Yes/No. Await confirming reports and send to MI to verify.

That's how it's done.

Everything about how war is conducted is informed by huge numbers of manuals filled with such tables. Those tables are then run against real data from the battlefield - recon and UAV images, satellite images, field reports, elint data etc - by military intelligence people who give projections, assessments etc of what happened and what can come out of it.

Such and such forces in the area, such and such units identified, such and such strenght, such and such readiness etc etc. And based on that "actionable intel" staff officers update tactical maps and develop suggestions and/or commanders give orders. This largely depends on the staff/command culture. Not sure what Ukraine does but I assume it's closer to Russian/Soviet style which is staff prepares situation and commanders make the call. In other armies staff officers are tasked with providing suggestions and commaders have the final voice. Which is also why Russians are not as aggressive because it's up to one man to decide everything.

All of that has confidence between 50 and 95% and usually 80 to 85% because that's the most practical value.

This is what "military science" is all about. And that is how Rob Lee who IIRC is a former Marine informs his assessment of casualty ratios based on his knowledge of USMC "rules of thumb" and what Ukrainian military tells him about how they perceive the situation based on their AFU "rules of thumb".

These parameters and calculations are enough to assess that when for example low bound (50% prob) of casualty ratio is 1:2 and high bound (95% prob) is 1:6 the mean is 1:4 which is favourable. If recent reports indicate a falling trend then it's becoming unfavourable.

And when you have a situation like in Bakhmut where the same tactical scenario is repeated time and time and time again and you have plenty of data to run your analysis you get a pretty good "rule of thumb" idea of what is going on.

This is also why I always pay attention to people who use military assessment because those types of assessments can be compared to the framework of that person's or their source's "rule of thumb". So even if they don't give numbers like OSINT crowd their data is actually more meaningful because it tells me what the tactical assessment is going to be for each side of the battle. OSINT data is for getting clicks and donations, not for making tactical decisions. Tactical decisions need actionable intel and tactical parameters and OSINT is not that. Don't confuse the two. The world of the military and the world of the military enthusiast couldn't be more different. Those who know what I'm talking about know what I'm talking about.

Also don't take all those numbers as gospel. It's been many years since I read the manuals and since then I've read quite a lot of other countries' stuff so I just explained the process using figures that seemed plausible but I might have mixed things up. My point was only to explain who is credible and why and to what extent.

For example Chuck Exseal is useless because he's former spec ops. Spec ops is barely military and they don't do tactics above squad level. Those who do don't end up like Chuck Exseal but find employment with good salary in corporate security.

Also.. learn to take a hint. Many of you here really just like to listen to your own voices and grow your information bubbles but I come here because it's a good, accessible place for info on PLA that is not absurdly biased and which doesn't require me to pay huge amounts of money, learn Mandarin (still getting to it...maybe later this year) or get a clearance and a boring job. But then I come to this thread and oh my god. Sometimes it's good to listen for a while even if you don't like what's being said or who is saying it. After all there's no better teacher than the enemy (and I wouldn't really consider myself an enemy to the more reasonable people here even if we disagree - those unreasonable not so much, but that's only because you're unreasonable and not for other reason). Sometimes you're right, sometimes you're wrong but it's always important to be wise. So guys, do yourself a favour and take hints when they're given. I've seen what this forum is capable of but still... come on. Are we here to grow angrier, louder or smarter? I know what I want. But do you?

Hope that helped. Take care.
 
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Tam

Brigadier
Registered Member
crazy development on the front today. i think something broke in the ukrainian defense that allowed the wagners to advance so far towards slovyansk. at the same time i also think the russians went a little too far, unless they were actively looking for a defensible position, they will likely be losing a lot of ground in the event of an ukrianian counterattack.

the other two points of interests are avdeevka and keremina, seems like very intense fighting going on their on par with bakhmut.


You need to check for the high ground. Check with a topography map to see what high ground is being captured.

You need to check for Russian artillery and mortar ranges, as well as indirect tank fire and ATGM line of sight from the captured high grounds. It can be that the Russians are positioning themselves against a counterattack. Does the high ground and artillery ranges cover the reserve areas where the Ukrainians are supposed to be gathering? Are they covering the potential lines of attack?

Check the weather. If its muddy, all the vehicles will do is get stuck in the mud and get mashed by artillery. They have to attack when you have at least three days of sunlight to dry the mud and not be interrupted by a rain in the fourth day, or be forced to wait for the late spring and summer season and have to worry about that it will be the Russians pouring through instead.
 

HighGround

Senior Member
Registered Member
There's something that we refer to as "tactical tables" and by we I mean former Warsaw Pact militaries, which includes both Poland, as well as both Russia and Ukraine. Tactical tables is war described in arbitrary numbers that are developed from meticulous study of past conflict and exercises and translated from real data into "tactical parameters". They don't make much sense outside of the entire framework and sometimes are slightly wrong, but they are based on what works which means they're based on what allowed a fighting unit to achieve its objective with a given success and casualty rate.

Military science is very much about hundreds and hundreds of "rules of thumb" for everything.

I'm aware. One of my primary sources of information on the Russian military used to be a Russian battalion commander who had a rank of major. He was a good friend of mine though I haven't heard from him for a couple of years, my assumption being as good as anyone's for why he's gone.

That said, there is a reason why a lot of tables and calculations are changed over time. New weapons, new methods, new wars. But more importantly, incomplete sampling (which is going to be a fact on the battlefield) and unreliable reporting. And what is even meat by "casualties"? How about the language barrier? We will never know how much manpower Russia can recover from casualties, what their actual CFR rate is, so on and so forth.

So sure, we can play around with statistics all we want, but as any data in any conflict shows, casualty rates can differ significantly between near identical companies based on a number of immutable factors. Data science is a rather complicated affair, and whatever inferences we can draw are going to need good, verifiable data. As Kofman's own podcast recently indicated, there is a difference in army culture and officer quality within Ukraine's own armed forces. So who did Rob Lee talk to? Local battalion commanders? A colonel in charge of this particular theatre? An NCO? How reliable is the reporting chain?

I find it puzzling that Rob Lee, someone who reiterates the foolishness of inferring concrete lessons or outcomes from this conflict, would be so authoritative on casualty ratios given, what is likely, a very incomplete and unreliable data set. I'm sure he has good reason for it, or perhaps he was impressed by the Ukrainians he spoke to, that he relied on their reported data far more than he should have.

Also.. learn to take a hint. Many of you here really just like to listen to your own voices and grow your information bubbles but I come here because it's a good, accessible place for info on PLA that is not absurdly biased and which doesn't require me to pay huge amounts of money, learn Mandarin (still getting to it...maybe later this year) or get a clearance and a boring job. But then I come to this thread and oh my god. Sometimes it's good to listen for a while even if you don't like what's being said or who is saying it. After all there's no better teacher than the enemy (and I wouldn't really consider myself an enemy to the more reasonable people here even if we disagree - those unreasonable not so much, but that's only because you're unreasonable and not for other reason). Sometimes you're right, sometimes you're wrong but it's always important to be wise. So guys, do yourself a favour and take hints when they're given. I've seen what this forum is capable of but still... come on. Are we here to grow angrier, louder or smarter? I know what I want. But do you?

Hope that helped. Take care.

I don't mind someone being didactical in their approach. In fact, that's why I appreciate your posts. From a glance of a non-professional, your work here has the appearance of actual expertise behind it. At the same time, I do not consider it to be fact, and actual military professionals, like Mick Ryan, have had some of the worst takes on this war I've ever seen.

I guess what I'm saying is, as much as I like to listen, I think sometimes "professionals" get a little too confident in their assertions. Hobbyists like myself make a lot of mistakes and tend to talk a little too much, but I'm fairly certain that if I talked to Rob Lee about Wagner before his recent trip, and after, I would find a significant difference in his assessments regardless of how confident he was. A little humility and caution never hurt anyone.
 

Yellow Submarine

New Member
Registered Member
You need to check for the high ground. Check with a topography map to see what high ground is being captured.

You need to check for Russian artillery and mortar ranges, as well as indirect tank fire and ATGM line of sight from the captured high grounds. It can be that the Russians are positioning themselves against a counterattack. Does the high ground and artillery ranges cover the reserve areas where the Ukrainians are supposed to be gathering? Are they covering the potential lines of attack?

Check the weather. If its muddy, all the vehicles will do is get stuck in the mud and get mashed by artillery. They have to attack when you have at least three days of sunlight to dry the mud and not be interrupted by a rain in the fourth day, or be forced to wait for the late spring and summer season and have to worry about that it will be the Russians pouring through instead.
As I understand it, the Rasputitsa came a few weeks early this year and the year before. Historically, it has generally arrived in mid March, but from the reports I have seen, the last couple of years its been arriving in late February or the beginning of March.

The reason why this is important is not just because it rains a lot during that period. The ice and snow are thawing and the ground gets really, really waterlogged. The soils in that part of the world tend to be thick and rich, with lots of clay and silt, so they absorb and hold water extremely well. What's more, until the subsoil, which is usually 10-12 feet down, thaws, that water has nowhere to drain. Typically, it takes 3 to 4 weeks after the Rasputitsa starts for that to happen. Until the soil has had time to drain and dry out, its going to be really difficult to move off-road, especially for vehicles.

So any large scale attacks will probably have to wait until late March at the earliest. That is when the big Russian spring offensive will likely kick off. The proposed Ukrainian counterattack towards Melitopol and Crimea faces the same constraint, plus having to deal what will almost certainly be a huge Russian assault along multiple axes. It's possible the Russians might even wait until the expected Ukrainian offensive launches and gets underway in hopes of trapping their maneuver forces in a Stalingrad style cauldron and then lowering the boom, which has been a favorite tactic of Russian strategists for a long time. Current Russian operations are aimed at grinding down Ukrainian forces and gaining useful jumping off points for future operations through attrition based trench warfare tactics. It will be extremely interesting to see how things play out this spring.
 

Tam

Brigadier
Registered Member
Another failed JDAMski

Probably the use of the glider causes it to hit the ground at an angle where the fuze isn't triggered


Would be cool to find out where exactly these landed, but my bet this is around the Avdiivka area, where hqs, barracks and depot's are being targeted by an intensive air campaign, and where we are seeing a pincer movement northeast of the city.
 
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