Mr. Koffman visited Kherson frontlines too when it was still Russian-occupied. He said he did not believe Russia would leave Kherson without being forcibly evicted by force (i.e., Russia won't give up without a fight). He ended up very wrong...
On the contrary. He was very right. That's exactly what happened. But you can't tell because fog of war obscures the picture on the ground and the media narrative is overflowing with either psy-ops or sensationalism influencing your emotional state. You can't
think with emotions only
feel and feeling is not understanding. But even if you focused on the data from the front you still wouldn't read it because you don't know how.
For that you need to know Russian
doctrine.
Doctrine is the way that a military perceives and shapes the battlefield. It's a language of war for a particular culture. When two cultures come to war it is an argument conducted in their respective languages of war. If you don't know the language then you can't read the content which is the situation on the battlefield. And when fog of war and propaganda obscures the text and you only get scattered bits - a word here, a letter there - you can't even attempt to reconstruct the text so that someone can translate it for you. But if you know the language you can guess the content and fill the blanks with high likelihood of being correct. Otherwise it's random signs without context. Doctrine is context.
Koffman is an expert on Russian
doctrine. Not equipment or history but
doctrine. His expertise is in how Russian view the battle and how they will behave in it. And he is a public figure, a professional employed by a federal research institute with numerous publications in the field of Russian doctrine.
Koffman knows what he's talking about but he has a public post so he has to be careful with his words. And that confuses you because you're used to online commentary that pretends to know everything. That's the difference between experts and grifters. Real experts are careful not to mislead at the expense of not saying all they suspect because the role of an expert is to allow you to
rely on their opinion. Grifters just want your money/clicks.
Let me explain how knowing doctrine plays into the situation in Kherson.
Russian doctrine is very rigid. It is a very top-down structure of narrow objectives and "
what is permitted is permitted" as opposed to broad objectives and mission command approach of "
what is not forbidden is permitted" in America doctrine. This creates a very inflexible and inefficient system for warfighting but it is also a very stable and safe system for maintaining peace in Russia. Russian military has never been fully under control under civilian authority for any long period of time. Russian military is too large for Russian society and political system to be fully subsumed even when it is under civilian control. Compare the numbers in America, China, India etc. So internal stability is prioritized over external flexibility. This is why in Russian military the commanders are so afraid of taking up initiative. The system doesn't recognize or reward initiative. It punishes it. If you take up initiative and fail it is
your fault. So to protect themselves commanders employ "what is expressly permitted is permitted" an even narrower interpretation of the command doctrine. That's great if you want to prevent mutinies. Not great if you want to surprise your enemy.
This is why Russians kept assaulting Vuhledar repeatedly with the same failed tactic. This is why Charnobayevka happened multiple times. That's because their orders were specific and only what the order said could be used to protect the commander. It doesn't matter that the equipment is lost and soldiers are killed. The commander executed the order to the letter in the safest possible manner and because Russian doctrine doesn't emphasize initiative he can't be disciplined for lack of it. And that goes up the chain of command all the way to Putin. This is how Russian military operates and how it largely always operated. They don't know any other way. And even if they are forced to show initiative they will never do anything that isn't in the manual because to do it is extremely risky. Especially if you're the only one breaking the rules and everyone else refuses to break rules to aid you. That's even worse than doing it by the book.
Because of that if you know Russian operational and tactical doctrine you can guess what is happening on the ground with very good accuracy even from fragmentary data because you know how Russia sees the problem and the solutions. Also you can apply numbers but
10k limit won't let me give examples and it's already a long post. I measured front lengths and arty ranges and force density. It checks out.
Here's what we know - quickly.
24 Feb - 18 Mar: push and retreat
18 Mar - 28 Apr: consolidation
In May the frontlines stabilized on 28/4 lines. The question was whether Ukraine would find necessary strength to push on. Because Russia outranged and outnumbered Ukraine with fires the proportion of 2,5:1 or higher would have to be met and AFU wasn't there yet. The front was stable because Russia had insufficient numbers to secure the entire length per doctrine but fires advantage meant that Ukraine wouldn't get in range.
In June/July HIMARS began operations and that put the only three crossing on Dnipro under fire - Antonovsky and railway bridge in Kherson and Nova Kakhovka dam. From that moment Ukraine was able to slowly reduce Russian front using numerical advantage however the numbers weren't there yet particularly with artillery. HIMARS gave AFU advantage in precision and range but not numbers in division fires. Brigade fires were still too weak and too few. Also it turned out that equipment for reserve units wasn't available in sufficient numbers so 5th Tank Brigade in Odessa couldn't be put into action until tanks came from Poland.
Table from 18 Jul
L to R: unit, tank, mech, inf and arty bat., mbt, ifv and arty qty.
B - b-de, P- rgt, Z - mech, Panc - tank, Zmot - motor inf., BPM - marines, B/PPD - VDV
In July/August Russia began to reinforce the front with additional units incl. 3 Corps. Probably to deter any early AFU push.
Russia also began to move all VDV units - except 31st Bde near Bakhmut IIRC - to Kherson in an unprecedented
breach with doctrine. I didn't understand why but this war was so confusing that I assumed it's another improvisation. It turned out that VDV was used as a screening force to allow exhausted and depleted Ground Force units to reorganize and withdraw. No mobilization yet so
VDV had full complement and army didn't.
Russia began withdrawing from Kherson in August but did so very slowly and in small increments so as not to trigger AFU push.
In September the "counter-offensive" in Kherson was very limited and AFU HQ issued a blackout on troop movements. I think it wasn't to hide concentration but lack of it. All the reinforcements went to Kharkiv. Which means that Russia must have withdrawn a significant portion of heavy forces before then because otherwise it would make sense to entrap them in Kherson where retreat was easily disrupted by HIMARS. Not so in Kharkiv.
From Sept - analysis of potential movements. Yellow is crossings. Also Oskil can be easily bridged while Dnipro can't. Note that it largely matches except 10a,11a, 11b, 10/11b and 10/11c vectors because 1st Tank Army was relocated to that area.
Also data on Russian arty and airstrikes in Kherson confirmed that there weren't sufficient forces massing. Only the crossings near Davidovy Brod were targeted more intensely and briefly.
In September/October I got reliable info about temporary truces in Kherson that were kept secret that allowed Russia to evacuate and spare lives on both sides in what was inevitable at that point. Ukraine would wait before following up to "check for ambushes and traps" but it was to cover up the deal. The fighting was very limited and essentially Ukraine moved forward after Russia vacated an area.
This is situation lasted from 4 Oct - a month!
When the clip of Surovikin receiving an order to conduct a withdrawal from Shoigu was aired on 9 Nov the entire operation was already done. Lives were spared.
Kharkiv push might have been deliberately allowed to draw away forces from Kherson. With sufficient numbers AFU could destroy all of Russian forces on west bank but wouldn't be able to cross Dnipro. Because regaining territory is political priority for Ukraine and the Kharkiv-Izyum direction was going nowhere due to terrain, insufficient force and efficient AFU defense Russia likely decided to withdraw, consolidate front behind Oskil river and trade ground for forces in Kherson. In the end the "huge" losses during the Kharkiv counter-offensive weren't nearly as large as they could be if west bank was retaken by force. Oryx counted ~100 mbt, ~ 200 ifv/apc by 17/9 but many could have been damaged earlier and
troops retreated. In Kherson the losses would be at least 3x larger and troops would not retreat. The damage to Kherson and AFU losses would have been very high and so a trade was preferable.
It was an implicit deal. How you communicate intention is described in historical literature. Matches doctrinal solutions. It checks out to me.
Koffman was right - Russia was "forcibly evicted". But as they went they retreated skillfully minimizing losses. These two are different things.
