They go to the DPR, LPR and possibly the BARS voluntary special forces. All irregulars. Both DPR and LPR has been using T-62 and trophy T-64 as far back as last year.
The War in the Ukraine
- Thread starter SampanViking
- Start date
They go to the DPR, LPR and possibly the BARS voluntary special forces. All irregulars. Both DPR and LPR has been using T-62 and trophy T-64 as far back as last year.
With all these losses, using only shovels, Wagner encircled Bakhmut that have over 30 000 Ukrainians defender at some time. That article is in line with all the other west jokes about Wagner lately so we can stick them together. Former prisonners are probably a lot more prone to die than veteran anyway like the conscripts on the Ukrainian side.
They certainly lost troops and as mercenaries they recruit willing peoples. Wali the Canadian sniper was recruiting broken down PTSD soldiers in my wife units to go in Ukraine. These guys were leaving the canadian army for medical reasons. He had recruited to go in Syria before too...
Aren’t you contradicting yourself? You say the Ukrainians have no reason to hold Bakhmut other than that the battle gives them a favourable casualty ratio. You put the threshold of favourable at 1:3.5, concluding that the casualty ratio must be at least 1:3.5. Yet you also say that Bakhmut has value – that the Russians need it to establish their preferred front line, one with a more integrated railway system. Doesn’t that also mean the continued denial of Bakhmut to the Russians has value to the Ukrainians? Presumably, upon gaining their preferred front line, and potentially switching to pure defense, the casualty ratio will improve for the Russians. Thus, will it not still be logical for the Ukrainians to delay this for as long as possible by clinging on to the citical pieces, regardless of what the casualty ratio is while doing so, as long as they judge that what comes next will be worse?
You assume that the Ukrainians are choosing to hold or cede territory based entirely on achieving casualty ratios sustainable for the long term, without being constrained by any short term considerations. I can think of a short term constraint: Ukraine lives and dies by the continuous flow of foreign aid. Ukraine’s sponsor countries are run by politicians who all face highly competetive elections. Spiting Russia can be fun and all – as long as it doesn’t cost any votes. They will certainly demand that Zelensky does everything to help convince their voters that aid to Ukraine is not a huge waste of money for a lost cause. Thus propaganda becomes a very important consideration. And losing towns is terrible from a propaganda perspective.
Previously, after the Ukrainians regained territory in Kharkiv and Kherson, people could extrapolate those reconquests and think Ukraine needed moderate amounts of aid for just another year. Now, losing Bakhmut is kinda ruining the Crimea-by-Christmas illusion, and to restore it, the Ukrainians would have to pull off one hell of an offensive. It’s becoming easy to think that Ukraine has become a black hole that could consume a trillion dollars or more over the coming years. The Kiel Institute counts a nominal $157 billion worth of announced aid to Ukraine between 2022-01-24 and 2023-01-15 (though far from all of it had been disbursed yet). Ukraine might require an even faster rate of aid in the future, since its own materiel stockpile that Ukraine started with is depleting, Ukraine’s domestic tax base is likely only facing a downhill trajectory going forward, and domestic production of any serious armaments isn’t very feasible when Russia is likely to bomb the facilities.
Public support in the US for aid to Ukraine is waning. Among Republicans, it might be approaching the point of becoming an issue that could potentially be leveraged by primary election challengers.
Zelensky in late 2022, made a photographed visit to Bakhmut. Then he took an Ukrainian flag signed there by soldiers to the US capitol and held an English-language speech to American legislators while behind him the house speaker and vice president held up the Ukrainian flag. That alone is a bad sign, that such publicity stunts are considered needed to shore up American voter support. However, also noteworthy is how much he focused on Bakhmut in his speech.
Which may easily be interpreted by many listeners as meaning that the outcome of the entire war is more or less being decided in Bakhmut, or at least that there will be no quick victory without it. Why has Zelensky been hyping Bakhmut so much? I don’t know. It could be that Ukraine’s sponsors have privately told Zelensky that if Ukraine loses another major town then that would seriously jeopardize the continuation of foreign aid, so perhaps Zelensky figured he might as well gamble everything on Bakhmut. Or perhaps he just overestimated the defenses.
Transcript source:
This poll shows that in Germany public support for aid to Ukraine is beginning to wane.
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Holding on to territory for political reasons even when it doesn’t make military sense is hardly unprecedented I think. Is not Paulus’ 6th army at Stalingrad a famous example? Considering how the Ukrainians stay in Bakhmut even when the semi-encirclement is very tight, and every remaining supply line is seemingly in rather easily attainable line-of-sight for Russian spotting drones and in range of everything down to and including infantry mortars, if trying to cling on to Bakhmut for as long as physically possible wasn’t a paramount goal, then wouldn’t the Ukrainans have abandoned it already?
Ukraine’s dependence on foreign aid also means that a scenario where the Russians secure and fortify their ideal front line and then resort to a purely defensive stance could become a nightmare scenario. Ukraine can’t just let the conflict freeze. The above mentioned Kiel Institute counted $79B of financial aid commitments to Ukraine. Ukraine’s backers are unlikely to want to keep handing out such magnitudes of money to prop up a failing state, and keep making the effort to justify such expenditures to their voters, unless they see some returns on their investments. They will demand that Ukraine inflicts a certain minimum amount of damage to the Russians per unit of time. If the Russians are holed up in their bunkers and refuse to come out other than when circumstances are highly opportune, it might be that the only way to inflict the required amount of damage is with a large-scale assault on Russia’s ideal, fortified defensive lines. Supposing the Russians also maintain their lead in armored vehicles, artillery and munitions, that could put the Ukrainians in a very bad position, where they are forced by political circumstances to continuously make large-scale trades at very poor casualty ratios.
Still, regardless of what the casualty ratio is, I think it is safe to assume that Bakhmut is the area that is the most casualty intense for the Russians, or at least that Russian command estimated would be the most casualty intense. Hence why they assigned the job to Wagner, with their more flexible recruitment standards and personnel policies. Also, I don’t think the Russian leadership is too concerned about losing convicts, who would have been freed after their six months were up anyway and probably not contribute much positive to Russian society thereafter, so they may consider a more accelerated and aggressive advance at the cost of higher casualties to be worthwhile in this case.
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That's because Russian ground forces still use the vehicles largely in line with Soviet doctrine and the names of the vehicles are military designations describing tactical role:
- BMP is boyevaya mashina pyekhoty lit. fighting invantry vehicle
- BMD is boyevaya mashina desanta lit. as above except "desant" is Russian for air or amphibious assault troops.
- BTR is bronirovaniy transporter lit. armored transporter
- MT-LB is mnogotseloviy tyagach - lekkiy bronirovaniy lit. multirole tractor - light armored
In Russian nomenclature "motor rifle" does not mean "mechanized". Motor rifle is a traditional formation name much like US Army has "infantry" divisions which are ABCTs and "cavalry" units some of which are ABCTs and some SBCTs.
"Motor rifle" is a general purpose formation with three battalions of infantry, a battalion of tanks and an artillery battalion with two squadrons of howitzers (2x 18) and one of rocket artillery (1x 12). Of those three infantry battalions two are are BMPs or MT-LBs and one is BTRs - depending on location and army and whether they're more likely to be used offensively or defensively.
"Tank" units are dedicated armored formations and have three (rarely two) tank battalions and one infantry battalion - always with BMPs i.e. "mechanized". They also typically have weaker artillery compared to motor rifle units - 2S3s instead of 2S19s and no Grads.
BTR has weaker armour compared to BMP, especially from the front and it doesn't handle terrain as well despite relatively low weight. It's a primitive vehicle. It also has completely impractical layout with drivers at the front and hatches for dismounts on both sides of the hull - which means that it's not a good idea to get it anywhere close to enemy fire. Unlike the BMP you can't turn it with strongest armour and smallest cross-section toward enemy fire while infantry dismounts safely in the back. At best you turn it sideways which exposes the entire troop compartment which is lightly armoured.
BTR-82A entered service in the 2010s as an interim measure before introduction of Bumerang which was a proper wheeled IFV. The idea was to have some wheeled unit with better firepower compared to 14,5mm which is the standard BTR-80 armament. The main issue was gaining range because armour is too thin and the vehicle simply can't close the distance in the same way that a 20-25t APC can. So the 30mm autocannon is incidental and BTR-equipped battalions are rear/screening units not traditional assault infantry so whenever you see them in action that's an exception from their main tactical role.
Russian and Soviet nomenclature uses the designation "P" in the name which stands for "plavyushchiy" (lit. swimming) for vehicles with proper amphibious capability. PTS is the "plavyushchiy transporter stredniy" or medium amphibious transporter. PT-76 is "plavyushchiy tank" or amphibious tank etc. It therefore would be better to describe vehicles like BTR, BMP or MT-LB as "floating" while restricting "amphibious" to vehicles with "P". In essence you can cross water obstacles by "fording" (tanks) by "floating" (BMP, MT-LB, 2S1) or by "swimming" (PTS, PT-76, BRDM, BTR).
By the way if you look at the height of MT-LB's hull you'll see that it doesn't really sit so low in the water - it's just very flat, long and low. In water it handles as well as other "floating" vehicles which means you don't put it in water if there are waves. But fundamentally it's not a proper amphibious vehicle. It was only meant to cross smaller rivers while advancing in Germany and to be able to handle flooded terrain in general like in wild parts of Russia.
From practical use in WP armies we know that the amphibious capabilities of "floating" vehicles are not that useful. For example there's quite a lot of preparatory work that needs to be done before such vehicles can cross a water obstacle. PTS can fall into the water. If a BMP does that it will sink immediately. It has to slowly drive into is from low angle banks and climb out at a similarly low bank. The current can't be too strong because it is propelled by tracks so it doesn't have good mobility in water and can easily overshoot the intended exit point. Etc etc. In general you only do it if you have no other options and only with extreme care.
There are no "mechanized infantry brigades" in the Russian army. There are motor rifle battalions that focus on "mechanized" tactics and battalions that focus on "motorized" tactics.
There are no "support fire weapons" in Russian doctrine either. Tanks perform fire support mission and Russia uses tanks and every tank battalion uses the same tactics regardless of whether it's part of a tank regiment or a motor rifle brigade, whether it is an old T-72B or modern T-90M. There really isn't a tactical framework that Russians can employ to put T-62s to use differently than other tanks simply because to use a "fire support vehicle" you need infantry capable of offensive maneuver with greater aggression and firepower which is something that Russia doesn't have. That's because they have a lot of tanks that they use for that purpose. "Fire support vehicles" are for units that can't afford tanks - either due to cost or logistics. Fire support vehicle is "limited use tank substitute".
T-62s will be used as tanks just with more caution due to weaker armour. But if they're equipped with thermals then they will be capable of more aggressive tactics using distance than say T-72B without thermals which in theory can get closer to the enemy because they're better protected.
Leopard 1 is significantly better than T-62. It has much better mobility, reliability and ergonomics and those things play a much bigger role on the battlefield compared to slightly better RHA armour or slightly larger gun. Both tanks are insufficiently protected for contemporary battlefield but I'd much rather be sitting in a Leo1 than a T-62 but only if I have necessary training for maneuver warfare. If I'm just a mobilized reservist/conscript with basic training who was put inside a tank it doesn't really matter because I'm useless anyway.
AMX-10RC is a very good wheeled recce/fire support vehicle that will fit with some of the wheeled units of the Air Assault forces. It will be very good in built up terrain provided that crews will receive proper training and will use it as intended. It's a specialized tool and needs to be used as such. If I could choose between AMX-10RC and T-62 and was able to also choose tactics I would choose AMX-10RC.
Russia invaded with 50% of TOE. All of its ground force units were severely under-strength. VDV was the only formation with full complement going into battle. This made it impossible to execute basic tactics and was the reason for low combat effectiveness and high losses. Because the authorities refused to mobilize initial casualties were filled by volunteers and other contract personnel which only prolonged the losses.
When mobilization was started in September it meant that first re-trained reservists arrived at the front in November. By which time 300k was necessary to simply match the required number of personnel. The expansion only happened with the continued mobilization in December but even then it takes time.
There's no additional army coming in. The mobilization only turned the Russian army into what it was theoretically supposed to be in terms of numbers in February 2022. Additional personnel will also fill up posts in units from all over Russia which were moved to Ukraine. Technically if you look at how Russian doctrine is supposed to handle such a full-scale conflict the military is still under-strength. The mobilization is insufficient but Moscow doesn't want to risk further instability.
Zelensky warns of ‘open road’ through Ukraine’s east if Russia captures Bakhmut, as he resists calls to retreat
Russian troops will have “open road” to capture key cities in eastern Ukraine if they seize control of Bakhmut, President Volodymyr Zelensky warned in an interview with CNN, as he defended his decision to keep Ukrainian forces in the besieged city.
“This is tactical for us,” Zelensky said, insisting that Kyiv’s military brass is united in prolonging its defense of the city after weeks of Russian attacks left it on the cusp of falling to Moscow’s troops.
“We understand that after Bakhmut they could go further. They could go to Kramatorsk, they could go to Sloviansk, it would be open road for the Russians after Bakhmut to other towns in Ukraine, in the Donetsk direction,” he told CNN’s Wolf Blitzer in an exclusive interview from Kyiv. “That’s why our guys are standing there.”
Russian troops will have “open road” to capture key cities in eastern Ukraine if they seize control of Bakhmut, President Volodymyr Zelensky warned in an interview with CNN, as he defended his decision to keep Ukrainian forces in the besieged city.
“This is tactical for us,” Zelensky said, insisting that Kyiv’s military brass is united in prolonging its defense of the city after weeks of Russian attacks left it on the cusp of falling to Moscow’s troops.
“We understand that after Bakhmut they could go further. They could go to Kramatorsk, they could go to Sloviansk, it would be open road for the Russians after Bakhmut to other towns in Ukraine, in the Donetsk direction,” he told CNN’s Wolf Blitzer in an exclusive interview from Kyiv. “That’s why our guys are standing there.”
"New intelligence reviewed by U.S. officials suggests that a pro-Ukrainian group carried out the attack on the Nord Stream pipelines last year, a step toward determining responsibility for an act of sabotage that has confounded investigators on both sides of the Atlantic for months."
It was pretty obvious that the out of operation, billion-dollar project funded by Moscow would not in fact be high on the list for Russia to destroy. Glad to see the Ukrainian narrative is getting debunked.
That road through Ukraine east will open sooner or later, the big question is what will remain of Ukrainian forces when it will happen. Controlling what goes out of Bakhmut while maintaining that encirclement is the best way for the Russian to cull forces if Ukraine continue to pour them in.
Its hard to know the real situation on the grinding side but if the other encirclements at Novomykhailivka, Marinka and Avdiivka are able to continue closing, it look like Russian forces have the upper hand and are not losing that much troops in Bakhmut. We will see if they can salvage the situation face in Vuhledar tho.
So what happens if the situation gets really bad for Ukraine? Like say for some reason or another, Russia makes large gains. Could there be a threat of NATO intervention on Ukraine behalf? A lot of money and political will has been put into this conflict on both sides, with seemingly little room for compromise. I worry it might get out of control if people can't find a solution for piece no matter how unpalatable it may seem.
So, article-5 againt Ukraine ? Like it's a direct attack on NATO country owned infrastructure, despite being built in cooperation with Russia.
So does the narrative of possible US attacks on it. Including that one written by that senior US journalist.
I feel the congnitive disonance from your posts : D
Russia invaded with insufficient force, without prior preparation, and started to preaper later after the invasion... Why? no one knows.... at least if wants to keep his job in any NATO military : D
Anyway, do you know the Russian forces at march/this year jan numerically ?
I haven't find anything reagards of this topics.