The broad general offensive seems crazy to me unless they somehow doubled their troops overnight.
Most likely is that they will focus their offensive in a few specific areas and try to breakthrough through them
The War in the Ukraine
- Thread starter SampanViking
- Start date
Most likely is that they will focus their offensive in a few specific areas and try to breakthrough through them
If Russia want to win the war by 'demilitarizing' Ukraine it is hard to see how they can do so without:
1. achieving grand strategic encirclements.
or
2. fighting a costly war of attrition.
or
3. use nuclear weapons.
If their troops are not sufficient enough to perform the Soviet 'Deep battle' and the grand encirclements there is only option
2. and 3.
I think however, that the annexed regions are within their military capability but it will be an attritional struggle going forward- whether it is the north/central Donbass approach or the southern approach.
I think that's what the General means by broad front. They just pour in reinforcements into the Donbass salient as soon as they are operationally ready, and just continue doing what they are doing.
1. achieving grand strategic encirclements.
or
2. fighting a costly war of attrition.
or
3. use nuclear weapons.
If their troops are not sufficient enough to perform the Soviet 'Deep battle' and the grand encirclements there is only option
2. and 3.
I think however, that the annexed regions are within their military capability but it will be an attritional struggle going forward- whether it is the north/central Donbass approach or the southern approach.
I think that's what the General means by broad front. They just pour in reinforcements into the Donbass salient as soon as they are operationally ready, and just continue doing what they are doing.
Ukrainian positions in and around Bakhmut seem be to increasingly untenable
The offensive in Balaklia should serve as a good, and modern, example of how to force the enemy to retreat by rapidly breaking through his lines and threatening an encirclement.
Russian inability to patch up their lines and push the enemy out is what led to the decision to withdraw from Khakriv entirely (a correct decision).
Another example is how Russia forced an Ukrainian withdrawal from Severodonietsk and Lysichansk (all the way to the Seversk-Bakhmut line) after the breakthrough in Popasna. Keep in mind though, that the entire Battle of Severodonietsk was incredibly grinding and artillery heavy, preferably not the kind of thing you want to re-create too much giving manpower shortages and artillery ammunition constraints (alleged).
But I'd like to point people to the Battle of Kherson. After Ukraine managed a minor breakthrough in Davydov Brod, despite having their pontoons regularly blown up, Russia was unable to cut off that grouping. Despite regularly destroying any units (reminiscent of a Hoi4 game( that would go over or attempt to expand their breakthrough, Russia was unable to cut that pocket off.
Is this an inability or a deliberate decision? I don't know, but I am skeptical of Russia's ability to carry out any major combined arms offensive, or even anything as simple as orchestrating an armored push through a weak point in the Ukrainian defensive line. They simple haven't demonstrated anything beyond their ability to grind down the enemy through massive artillery fire and extensive infantry assaults (some of which, admittedly, were carried out decently well).
Russian inability to patch up their lines and push the enemy out is what led to the decision to withdraw from Khakriv entirely (a correct decision).
Another example is how Russia forced an Ukrainian withdrawal from Severodonietsk and Lysichansk (all the way to the Seversk-Bakhmut line) after the breakthrough in Popasna. Keep in mind though, that the entire Battle of Severodonietsk was incredibly grinding and artillery heavy, preferably not the kind of thing you want to re-create too much giving manpower shortages and artillery ammunition constraints (alleged).
But I'd like to point people to the Battle of Kherson. After Ukraine managed a minor breakthrough in Davydov Brod, despite having their pontoons regularly blown up, Russia was unable to cut off that grouping. Despite regularly destroying any units (reminiscent of a Hoi4 game( that would go over or attempt to expand their breakthrough, Russia was unable to cut that pocket off.
Is this an inability or a deliberate decision? I don't know, but I am skeptical of Russia's ability to carry out any major combined arms offensive, or even anything as simple as orchestrating an armored push through a weak point in the Ukrainian defensive line. They simple haven't demonstrated anything beyond their ability to grind down the enemy through massive artillery fire and extensive infantry assaults (some of which, admittedly, were carried out decently well).
US confirms Ukraine will receive M1A2 version of M1 Abrams tanks
Citing U.S. Deputy Press Secretary Sabrina Singh, "We just don't have these tanks available in excess in our U.S. stocks, which is why it is going to take months to transfer these M1A2 Abrams to Ukraine. And I think that you have to remember, I mean, as you probably know, these tanks are going to require training, maintenance, sustainment that is going to take a very long time to also train the Ukrainians on. And so, because of that -- and we took that into account -- that's why we are using the USAI capability in order to procure these tanks for the Ukrainians."Russia threatens to use Marker combat UGV to burn Ukrainian Leopard 2 and Abrams tanks
The former Director General of Roscosmos and the Head of the special military advisory group known as “Tsar’s Wolves”, Dmitry Rogozin, told RIA Novosti a shock version of the Russian Marker UGV would be deployed in Ukraine in February to obliterate NATO-delivered tanks, Sakshi Tiwari reports. Rogozin explained the combat robot would be able to automatically recognize and attack Ukrainian equipment, including Abrams and Leopard tanks, owing to the computerized catalog of photographs, which means the use of AI (Artificial Intelligence): “The combat version of the Marker robot has an electronic catalog in the control system with images of targets both in the visible range and in the infrared. Accordingly, the robot can automatically determine the enemy’s equipment. For example, as soon as deliveries of the Abrams and Leopard tanks to the Ukrainian troops begin, Marker will receive an appropriateelectronic image and be able to detect and hit American and German tanks with ATGMs automatically,” Rogozin said
I never understood why people keep underlining this point. A tank is a tank... They're all fairly maintenance heavy, and Ukraine is having a logistics nightmare anyway. An additional SKU to keep track of isn't going to make or break this war, but having heavy tanks might definitely make a difference in specific scenarios.
I.E. Tanks > No Tanks
And I don't know why our generals keep trying to make out the M1 Tanks as some "special" machine. It's a tank.
Aim-120D entered service 8 years ago that's not anywhere near "barely."
I think the point is that AIM-120D stockpile can't be large enough to be handing out to Ukraine. The C7 variant is over two decades old, and it makes much more sense for us to give Ukraine the older variant of the missile, rather than the one we are explicitly trying to stockpile.
Ukrainian kamikaze drone hit Russian BMP-3.
I was able to find a bit of information by looking on google and twitter (as always, may not be 100% reliable). Current AIM-120 production maxes out at 1,200 missiles per year and operates at around 1/3 that capacity.
In September 2022, the DoD signed a contract worth ~ a billion dollars for AIM-120D3 and C7 production to be completed by 2025 (don't know rate of production - ~40% of this will go to FMS).
Current total production of AIM-120 missiles is around ~21,000 lifetime to date.
Just to give everybody an idea on what may be available to send to Ukraine.