On impact of western fighters:
Before Russian retreat from Kherson I made a series of simple graphical analyses for personal use. They are far from being precise and comprehensive and may seem confusing at first but they effectively illustrate the main problems involved in aerial warfare in Ukraine. I suggest you give them some attention.
I focused on the southern front because I concluded that this is the most likely area where western fighters would be used to full extent including air-to-air. All other areas would only see limited use and defensive counter air over western and central Ukraine does not change the current dynamic.
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Russia has only few AEW aircraft and the modernized A-50U had only the processing units replaced and still use old radar antennas which - according to the RUSI report on aerial campaign - Ukraine found relatively easy to disrupt. Almost all of primary situational awareness in aerial combat comes from ground-based sensors like in the Soviet era. While Russia has radars capable of tracking low altitude targets they operate like 48Ya6 Podlet-K1 they are only now being introduced so the main low altitude detection method is using elevation for standard radars.
Below notional radar horizon for S-400 system radars mounted on 40V6 masts - top figure is altitude in km, bottom figure is horizon distance in km.
With radar in Dzhankoy airbase UA aircraft flying at altitudes of 0.5-1 km hide below the horizon all the way to Crimea. HARM has range sufficient for attacking such targets from near the horizon even if they're located further west. All that is required is a dynamic pop-up.
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The same diagram with added notional maximum ranges for S-400 missiles and approximate ranges of R-27/77 missiles with maximum range, effective range and no escape zone indicated by different shading. The maximum ranges for missiles are theoretical only and are calculated for low altitude targets and optimal (no maneuvering) trajectory. Effective range is approximately 75% of maximum range. The rangs shown is 9M96E (40km), 9M96E2 (120km) and 48N6 (200-250km). The largest circle extending beyond the image is 40N6 which is according to reports not in service in sufficient numbers to be used regularly. Also the range of ukrainian Su-27 is incorrect - it should be slightly greater than MiG's.
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An important factor for SEAD scenarios is the Kinburn peninsula which can be easily infiltrated by special forces to enable use of drones and other disruption methods. Also after retreat from Kherson a larger portion of the area between Dnepr and Crimea is in range of GMLRS.
Large situational diagrams (3000x2000 pixels) - click to enlarge:
Notional ranges of radars and missiles used by Russian fighters and potential western fighters. The key is in bottom left and top right.
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Notional ranges of radars and missiles with approximate range of NATO aerial ISR assets.
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Notional distances from airbases in Southern MD to targets along Kherson-Zaporozhe front.
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If air defenses in Crimea are made ineffective all of aviation will have to permanently relocate to Kuban (Rostov and Krasondar regions) even in the case of a Ukrainian offensive. It will have significant impact on VKS availability as only Flankers/Fullbacks will have sufficient range to deliver meaningful payload on target. Su-25 will be useless, even with drop tanks. Helicopters will be out of range.
SEAD against Crimean air defenses is not difficult. It only requires patience.
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Currently Ukraine uses SARH missiles which require the target to be continously illuminated with radar until impact or the missile loses contact with target. Illumination as all radar emission is subject to physical limitations and is not guaranteed to ensure a hit. It is however effectively impossible to maintain effective illumination while evading an ARH missile, let alone when the target is performing evasive maneuvers. This is the real reason why Ukraine likely wasn't able to score any kills in air to air although there are claims of shootdowns of attack aircraft which could be plausible but are not confirmed.
This situation will change fundamentally with delivery of any aircraft capable of using ARH missiles. Ukrainian fighters will be able to launch missiles and begin evasive maneuvers at half range after mid-course update. However when fighting within range of NATO ISR assets they can begin evasive maneuvers immediately because all targeting data can be sent indirectly by NATO AWACS. In the south - where NATO ISR has greatest access an F-16 equipped with a datalink can launch AMRAAM without using its own radar being guided entirely by AWACS.
Let's consider F-16 in BVR against VKS aircraft:
- Su-25 and Su-24 and all helicopters are effectively targets protected only by circumstances and their protection systems.
- Su-34 and Su-30 are comparable in performance having better radar but worse kinematics and RCS.
- Su-35 has advantage in radar and energy and can launch R-37M.
- MiG-31 has decisive advantage in all aspects.
F-16s with AMRAAM will force VKS to fly escort with strike missions and/or maintain CAP in the same manner as they did in autumn last year. Per RUSI report the frontline was divided into eight sectors and each sector had a persistent CAP by Su-35 or MiG-31. This however will result in quick loss of readiness as Russia lacks aerial refueling and spare tanks so the aircraft can only stay in the air for ~2h forcing them to take off and land more than is optimal. MiG-31 is also extremely maintenance-intensive so using it with high frequency will reduce readiness faster than for Su-35. This suggests that VKS will reduce strike missions to whenever they are capable of protecting their bombers with air superiority fighters. This, coupled with the institutional problems that VKS has with planning missions, exchanging information etc will have a measurable impact on effectiveness.
If Ukraine focuses on the southern front - which is logical considering that push toward Crimea is both feasible and provides the only decisive scenario in this conflict - it will cause a massive shift in dynamic of all of the fighting. Russia will be forced to eliminate the threat which will force it to expend valuable munitions and risk their own aircraft in the process.
Delivery of F-16s (or similar) is far from a decisive change but it will be a landslide change in favour of Ukraine.
Finally there's the factor of NATO involvement. As soon as Ukraine flies F-16s and uses AMRAAM it becomes impossible for Russia to separate NATO assets over Black Sea from Ukrainian assets. NATO may begin to fly F-35s regularly to deter any aggressive use of aviation near Crimea as there is very little Russia can do if their aircraft is "accidentally" shot down by a NATO plane. This will force VKS to maintain constant air patrols next to NATO assets which will further complicate issues for Russia.
Su-57 will not be a factor. Without a full operational unit and developed tactics it is a propaganda stunt. The "combat use" is really part of the practical tests and developing knowledge for proper use of a VLO aircraft.
