If they really legit sending Bradleys to Ukraine, i doubt it would be use in the frontline.
Probably for reserve units entrusted in guarding Kiev or other backlines...
Probably for reserve units entrusted in guarding Kiev or other backlines...
The War in the Ukraine
- Thread starter SampanViking
- Start date
It’s just better than the old shit they would’ve had on bmp 1/2 is what I’m saying. The armour protection is also superior.
Not more than any other combat vehicle. I sense that discussion turns overwhelmingly negative when any western equipment is involved on this forum.
There is no consolidation of brigades into divisions resulting from the war.
This decision was made already in 2012 as part of reversing previous reforms, which reorganized the ground forces into army/brigade structure.
Russian Ground Forces in 2007 had 6 military district commands:
- Leningrad - 3x MRBg
- Moscow - 20 army (3x TBg, 4x MRBg)
- North Caucasus - 58 army (12x MRBg)
- Volga-Ural - 2 army (1x TBg, 4x MRBg)
- Siberian - 36 army (1x TBg, 4x MRBg), 41 army (4x MRBg)
- Far Eastern - 5 army (7x MRBg), 35 army (6x MRBg), 4x MRBg
Each army has an artillery brigade, rocket brigade, air defense brigade, logistical brigade etc etc but some can have as few as 1 or 2 motor rifle brigades while others have 2-3 divisions. Still the armies now are functional tactical formations that can perform tasks independently.
As for why divisions were chosen over brigades - it has to do with the platoon/company structure and the tactics that are being taught as well as the limitations that this imposes, partly because of the weakness of the NCO and lower officer corps.
Russian tank battalion:
Russian motor rifle battalion:
Currently the structure is different depending on the type of the unit. All brigades and regiments have three "maneuver" battalions and one "reinforcement" battalion that is used to augment battlegroups formed from maneuver battalions.
- motor rifle brigade/regiment - 3x motor rifle battalion (3 companies / 30 vehicles) + 1x tank battalion (4 companies / 40 vehicles)
- tank brigade/regiment - 3x tank battalion (3 companies / 30 vehicles) + 1 motor rifle battalion (4 companies / 40 vehicles)
The above structure has inherent weakness if the main tactical formation is a brigade because NATO brigades are structurally stronger. Each NATO platoon has four vehicles and that particularly matters for tank formations because a NATO tank platoon is capable of operating as an independent tactical formation with two pairs of tanks performing maneuver. Russian tank platoon has three vehicles and is incapable of using the same tactic which is then further complicated by the NCO/LO weakness as well as lack of personnel - NATO tanks have 4 crewmembers, Russian tanks have only 3. Finally NATO armies moved to professional cadres and tank crews in particular are composed of professional personnel
NATO tank company has 13 or 14 vehicles - 3 platoons of 4 vehicles and 1-2 vehicles in command platoon, typically professional.
Russian tank company has 10 vehicles - 3 platoons of 3 vehicles and 1 command tank, typically conscript. This structure is directly inherited from Soviet army where a tank company - rather than a platoon - was the smallest independent tactical unit.
Tactics is governed by law of proportions. Attacker has to have a minimum 2,5x of the defending force to succeed in pushing the defender out of position. 30 tanks with 3x3 structure is not 2,5x of 14 tanks of 3x2 structure. Ratios are:
- 30/14 = 2,14
- 9/6 = 1,5
As a result in tactical terms a NATO tank company is considered approximate equivalent of a Russian tank battalion, and a NATO tank platoon, is considered to be weaker equivalent of Russian tank company. Add to that technical advantage of NATO tanks before the modernization program was started and it becomes obvious why changes were necessary.
The return to army/division structure was an attempt to improve combat capabilities without having to reorganize the entire lower structure of platoons, companies and the cadres and training system involved in it, which would take up to two decades. Russian General Staff knew their ground forces were poor quality at the bottom and nothing could be done about it in the near term so they reinforced the top.
Also compare how Ukrainian army has been restructured following 2014 under NATO instruction - this is Ukrainian mechanized infantry batalion. Note inclusion of a tank company in the structure of the battalion.
Ukrainian tank battalions consist of 3 companies of 13 tanks (3 platoons x 4 tanks, 1 command tank) and 1 company of 11 IFVs (3 platoons of 3 IFVs, 2 command IFVs) Ukrainian mech battalions consist of 3 companies of 11 IFVs and 1 company of 13 tanks.
This was chosen because the ongoing war in Donbas as well as the extensive training program run by NATO allowed Ukraine to train its lowest ranks of NCOs and some of the lower officers o they could put together battalions structured nominally as tactical battlegroups and this is why you can see individual battalions being used on the front independently of the rest of the brigade, often separated by hundreds of kms from their brigade.
At the same time Russian forces use battalion tactical groups deployed from larger formations - brigades or regiments.
This is the consequence of the evolution of both forces. Ukraine built its army from the ground up after 2014 (Donbas). Russia built its army from the top downards after 2008 (Georgia). Each side used as foundation the thing which they had best - Ukraine had experienced lower ranks and NATO advisors higher up but weak higher cadres, Russia had strong post-Soviet institutions and doctrine but weak lower ranks.
Not true. Currently there is a single weakpoint that can collapse the entire Russian frontline - Tokmak/Melitopol.
Tokmak is the transport hub connecting railway lines from Crimea and Zaporozhia front. Melitopol is the urban centre that serves as a staging base and point of resistance.
Because Russia hasn't managed to restore the rail connection from Donbas to Zaporozhia - this is what the fights near Vuhledar and Volnovakha are about - the connection through Tokmak is the only rail connection supporting the forces in the entire southern front. It will therefore be heavily defended but it is a similar situation to that in Kherson before the collapse of the western bank. Ukraine can put constant pressure on that point until Russia makes a mistake which at this point seems like a question of when and not if.
The only counter that Russia has is further mobilization and an attempt at a large counter-offensive early next year. If they don't do it - and succeed in gaining ground, thus forcing Ukraine to redirect forces - they lost the war.
If Tokmak/Melitopol is lost Ukraine can push toward Crimea and that will cause chaos, panic and total collapse of morale. Ukraine doesn't have to capture either Donbas or even the occupied parts of Luhansk oblast (Starobilsk direction) because those are worthless tactically. They can even give up some of the ground captured in September/October as long as they push to border of Crimea.
Direct threat to Crimea is "check" considering the logistical importance. If Russia doesn't manage to "check" Kiyv at the same time - and nothing else will constitute an effective "check" - it's "checkmate" in a couple of moves. From the operational and strategic perspective the south is much more important to Russia than the east. Specifically the northern Luhansk oblast is the least valuable part of Ukraine. Here's a map with pre-invasion populations of the raions in the oblast.
All of the nearby regions are mostly evacuated. Kharkiv is the nearest large urban and industrial center and it will be next to impossible to capture considering size and preparations as well as the failure in February. Ukraine can sacrifice those areas and even parts of Donetsk oblast for a decisive push in the south toward Crimea that will force Russia to escalate beyond what it is capable of winning or to concede defeat. So it's this or mass mobilization for a decisive counter-offensive and mass mobilization means 1916-1917.
Game-changing here is actual Ukrainian ability to replenish its mechanized formations.
Ukraine tries combining pure infantry action with using MRAPs as sort of IFVs, but it mostly doesn't work.
M2s are also nice technically. Due to the unexplainable failure of Russian mic to produce just an adequate IFV since early 1980s, arguably gotta be the best IFV of this war.
Chasing wunderwaffen is a sin.
Appreciate the response. For the “conversion”, I got that news from this post:
Would the brigades mentioned in the bolded text be the leftover brigades that accidentally weren’t part of the reversal of the reforms in 2012? Or did the Russians purposely leave them like that given their expeditionary nature (assuming the motorized brigades were part expeditionary to begin with like the marines) or more professional nature, particularly in the marines’ case?
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Bradley are IFV, they are to send infantry to front line and fight on the front line with infantry.
M113 is to ferry troops to the front line and then run away, or ferry injured troops off the Frontline.
One should not be fighting with M113. That's not the intended purpose of m113.
Absolutely agree about the M113. Should not be anywhere near the front. Even 152mm airburst would not be good!
Mi-28 and Mi-35 attacked some Ukrainian positions. One vehicle appeared hit by the Mi-28, while another vehicle pops after a rocket barrage by the Mi-35. In exchange the Ukrainians fired a MANPADs on the Mi-35 which took the hit, but nonetheless returned. Back at the base, the pilot of the Mi-35 showed the patches on his helicopter where he took previous hits.
Which bring back us to the strategy of Russia.
They need to destroy the fortress network in Donbas, to secure Zaporozia .
Means Bakhmut is the most important for Ukraine, willing to sacrifice anything to keep it.