The War in the Ukraine

Overbom

Brigadier
Registered Member
It is a stalemate in terms of ground captured but not in terms of casualties.
Again. Strategy matters not casualties

For Ukraine, its most important task is territorial defence. This means that ground is the most important thing for them. Manpower is irrelevant

They probably have millions and millions of men which they can draft. As long as the West funds Ukraine's economy, Ukraine can afford to allocate a big number of working-age men to its military

So no. Casualties don't matter to Ukraine as much as Russia thinks. The one thing that Ukraine cares though is how much equipment is lost. I would bet that Ukraine's high command is more worried about losing 10 tanks than losing 100 men



Trading lives for ground is regarded as the lowest form of tactics
Nobody cares about how it is regarded. Everything is allowable in war. There are plenty of times when the defender when trading lives for ground (basically playing for time) has won against the attacker.

To be honest, I consider all sorts of moral criticisms towards war tactics employed, idiotic. Everything is fair in war. Simply stated, if you don't want these "dirty" tactics to be used against you, then just don't start a war. Simples
 

sheogorath

Major
Registered Member
Sounds like you’re just making assumptions.

We have seen articles of how the M777 start to malfunction after a few hundred shots in rapid succesion and how they require nitrogen for the dampeners and the titanium starts to warp after a few days of heavy use which they don't have a way to repair them in the field, there was an article on how the Pzh2000 can't fire more than a few hundred rounds at max cadence before the onboard computer starts failing. Another recent articles mentioned how Italian Howitzers were also failing after a few rounds.

Meanwhile the main complain the Ukranians had with their soviets pieces were the lack of accuracy, which can be caused by a number of factors and not just the guns themselves, not their durability.

And it makes sense as soviet doctrine relied on artillery, so durability and fire volume probably took priority over accuracy; meanwhile NATO shifted to an air power doctrine, then there is their focus in the last 30 years on colonial policing and bombing poor people, where accuracy was more important than volumne. You don't need to fire 1.000 rounds in 30 minutes to supress a bunch of goat herders; double tap with JDAMs and maybe 20 to 40 rounds in an hour is enough to disperse a group of jihadis.

More T-90M and T-72B3M on the way in Rostov
 

MarKoz81

Junior Member
Registered Member
If Ukraine is destroying Russia with 40 or less HIMAR. What about the over 100 long range MLRS Russians have? They just sit and look pretty?

"When amateurs discuss tactics professional discuss logistics."

Ukraine stopped "destroying Russia" with HIMARS around the time it conducted the offensive in September-October. Russia moved its assets outside of HIMARS range and that was one of the main reasons why the offensive succeeded.

The actual effect of HIMARS has relatively little to do with the system itself and more with the circumstances in which it was being used, specifically the manner in which Russian ground forces sustain combat operations and maintain frontline stability.

During the second phase of the invasion (after 8 April) Russia entered Ukraine with most of its field armies and army corps, each having an artillery brigade or regiment with two battalions of tube artillery and one battalion of eight BM-30 launchers. While not all assets were deployed to the front it gave Russia at least 12 MLRS brigades (96 BM-30) from armies which could support combat operations at any time.

Ukraine had only two brigades of BM-30 directly subordinate to the main command and while they nominally consisted of eight battalions total, it is difficult to tell how many BM-30 were operational, and how much ammunition was available. We know that Ukrainian-made GPS-guided 300mm Vilkha system had about 50 rockets available. We don't know how many BM-30 rockets were used during the chaotic first phase of Russian invasion (24 February - 7 April).

However both Russia and Ukraine had two units of tube (RU: 2x 152mm, UA: 1x 152mm, 1x 122mm) artillery and an unit of 18 BM-21 in each mechanized brigade. Ukraine had much larger stores of ammunition for those systems and they could also be supported by Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and Finland which still used these systems extensively and manufactured ammunition. None of those countries however had or manufactured BM-27 or BM-30. BM-27 has comparable range to BM-21 so it doesn't play a tactical role

This created a fire boundary along the front where there would be relative equilibrium between 122mm rocket artillery and 152mm tube artillery and a Russian advantage in 300mm. That advantage gave Russia an effective firing range of 90km without counter-battery risk while Ukraine had only 30-40km with counter-battery risk.

That fire boundary was mostly stable throughout the entire period of 8 April - 27 May and it also corresponded with the most intense fighting in the war including largest volume of artillery fire. That required logistical support which was laid out in a manner that exploited Ukraine's inability to reach certain distances and volumes of fire with artillery.

8 April
1000px_front 2022.04.08.jpg

27 May
_front 2022.05.27.jpg
6 September
_front 2022.09.06.jpg

First confirmed use of HIMARS is on 24 June. Because Russia air defense failed to intercept GMLRS - which is logical considering the divergent physical parameters of GMLRS and Russian air defenses which were not designed to counter such threat - and Russian air force failed to destroy HIMARS - which is logical as well Russian command made the decision to reorganize support and logistics extending distances etc. That process would greatly hamper Russia's ability to sustain frontlines and was responsible for the collapse of Kherson and Kharkiv fronts - where Russia couldn't sustain sufficient forces, it withdrew them creating weakpoints.

This process lasted for most of August but perhaps began already in July. While Russia was withdrawing gradually Ukraine was building up forces which resulted in the two successful counter-offensives. Ukraine pushed as far as it could before the lengthening of its own logistical lines and shortening of newly established Russian logistical lines began to influence results at the front.

A particular weakpoint was the Kherson front where for political reasons Russia maintained control of the west bank exposing its forces in the process. I'm of the opinion that the transfer of so many VDV units to the front in August was deliberate to use them as screening forces for the withdrawal of heavier ground force units. Witout the VDV Ukraine could exploit Russia's bad position and destroy units trapped at the west bank. VDV being better trained and properly staffed with personnel could hold off attack more effectively than skeleton ground force units. The way the Kherson front collapsed in early October suggests just that but I won't go into the details of it.

After the logistics was reorganized HIMARS no longer has the same effect because the targets are no longer within reach and in the open as they were in June - August/September. It's gone down to the point where the media don't even bother pushing their narratives because there's no point anymore.

I'm also of the opinion that the delivery of HIMARS was delayed on purpose to lead Russia into false sense of security. There was no reason why HIMARS couldn't be given in early May like M777 but the way media kept talking about HIMARS without decision from the WH suggested that there's political reluctance. Much like it's been done with ATACMS which was not given not because it would change too much but because it would change nothing - its cost/effect ratio is very high and there are not enough missiles to make an effect.

As always: There is no thing such as a Wunderwaffe just propaganda and marketing lies about them.

However propaganda and lies are highly emotional and mentally ill people who constitute 90% of online activity in this field latch on to those highly emotional narratives because of their emotional disorders. They talk about war because it allows them to manage their aggressive mental state, not because they have anything useful to say about war. (This is for example why football hooliganism and gang activity overlap so much - it's seeking for substitutes to manage aggression) That, and kids who have no business talking with adults onlie. Both groups parasitize the discourse about conflicts and turn it into their own personal delusion and unfortunately social media made it almost inescapable to the point where you can't have a meaningful discussion with others who share interest in military matters because keyboard warriors take over everything like an infection. The more excited they are the more they interact, the more they interact the more excited they are. Positive feedback loop for them, negative feedback loop for everyone else.
 

baykalov

Senior Member
Registered Member
Aftermaths for the AFU of the Bakhmut (Artemovsk) "meat grinder". The Ukrainian in the video says:

"This is 3rd batch this morning. 3rd trip moving corpses. Orcs are fucking us non stop. This, Pan Zaluzhniy, is what's left of the men who followed your orders and didn't leave their positions. The rest of us will be lucky to make it out alive".

Another video with foreign mercenaries in Bakhmut:

Arestovich admitted that after 2023, the United States might “abandon” Ukraine:
 

Anlsvrthng

Captain
Registered Member
Again. Strategy matters not casualties

For Ukraine, its most important task is territorial defence. This means that ground is the most important thing for them. Manpower is irrelevant

They probably have millions and millions of men which they can draft. As long as the West funds Ukraine's economy, Ukraine can afford to allocate a big number of working-age men to its military

Nobody cares about how it is regarded. Everything is allowable in war. There are plenty of times when the defender when trading lives for ground (basically playing for time) has won against the attacker.

To be honest, I consider all sorts of moral criticisms towards war tactics employed, idiotic. Everything is fair in war. Simply stated, if you don't want these "dirty" tactics to be used against you, then just don't start a war. Simples
Could you explain HOW ground can win war?

I mean, it is obivousy the strategy of the NATO and Ukraine, but I still has no clue how it can affect the outcome of the war.


I mean, just by simple logic, if they don't need land and economy to survive, then by creating the biggest possible force by giving up land and grining of the Russian forces should be superior strategy.


So, why leting russia to grind of the Ukrainan units gives an edge for Ukraine ?
 

FairAndUnbiased

Brigadier
Registered Member
Again. Strategy matters not casualties

For Ukraine, its most important task is territorial defence. This means that ground is the most important thing for them. Manpower is irrelevant

They probably have millions and millions of men which they can draft. As long as the West funds Ukraine's economy, Ukraine can afford to allocate a big number of working-age men to its military

So no. Casualties don't matter to Ukraine as much as Russia thinks. The one thing that Ukraine cares though is how much equipment is lost. I would bet that Ukraine's high command is more worried about losing 10 tanks than losing 100 men




Nobody cares about how it is regarded. Everything is allowable in war. There are plenty of times when the defender when trading lives for ground (basically playing for time) has won against the attacker.

To be honest, I consider all sorts of moral criticisms towards war tactics employed, idiotic. Everything is fair in war. Simply stated, if you don't want these "dirty" tactics to be used against you, then just don't start a war. Simples
It's regarded as a low tactic because it doesn't actually work, as Mao himself noted when Chiang bragged about capturing the CPC capital of Yan'an and fleeing to Taiwan in the end. It's proven time and time again that attrition is what matters, such as Hitler losing due to the no retreat order, Chiang losing due to overextension, Imperial Japan losing due to their no surrender no evacuation orders in Southeast Asia.

Meanwhile I don't know of a single time that a hold at all cost strategy succeeded.

If Ukrainians are playing for time, what's the end timer? A meteor hits Russia or something? How does a prolonged war benefit Ukraine when every month that passes Ukraine's GDP and population falls while Russia's doesn't? Russia even gains net population from Ukrainian refugees and occupied residents fleeing to Russia, but nobody is moving to Ukraine.

Losing men means destruction of the national economy and demoralization of the remaining soldiers. The more disproportionate casualties Russia inflicts on Ukraine, the more likely their civilian economy and morale is to collapse, while the more time Russians have to mobilize more troops.
 

emblem21

Major
Registered Member
It's regarded as a low tactic because it doesn't actually work, as Mao himself noted when Chiang bragged about capturing the CPC capital of Yan'an and fleeing to Taiwan in the end. It's proven time and time again that attrition is what matters, such as Hitler losing due to the no retreat order, Chiang losing due to overextension, Imperial Japan losing due to their no surrender no evacuation orders in Southeast Asia.

Meanwhile I don't know of a single time that a hold at all cost strategy succeeded.

If Ukrainians are playing for time, what's the end timer? A meteor hits Russia or something? How does a prolonged war benefit Ukraine when every month that passes Ukraine's GDP and population falls while Russia's doesn't? Russia even gains net population from Ukrainian refugees and occupied residents fleeing to Russia, but nobody is moving to Ukraine.

Losing men means destruction of the national economy and demoralization of the remaining soldiers. The more disproportionate casualties Russia inflicts on Ukraine, the more likely their civilian economy and morale is to collapse, while the more time Russians have to mobilize more troops.
Simple conclusion is, land can be taken back, lives cannot. If all the fights in Ukraine end up with majority of Ukrainian soldiers dead (for the horde), the USA and Europe sends their soldiers in as mercenaries, ok simply kill them too and they will lose soldiers and equipment to meaning that Ukraine and the EU and to some small level the USA will lose troops and weapons as well so in the long run, Russia is only going to be gaining with a Ukraine no longer capable of fighting and an EU and USA with depleted man power and resources. And those that are lost will not be coming back any time soon, particular when the EU and USA doesn’t quite have the resources to produce the required soldiers and weapons in bulk that they need to beat Russia without escalating into nuclear war.
The world doesn’t follow 4d chess and assume that by losing lots of troops means that there will be some kind of moral Victory for the side that lost the most soldiers, no, if the Ukrainians lose all their soldiers, the nation is reduced to rubble and the EU and USA are left screaming human rights, no other nation is going to give a crap because at the end only one lesson can come from this, you don’t screw with Russia and expect to get away with it without a fight and the USA is a weasel that will sell you out the moment they lose
 
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FriedButter

Colonel
Registered Member
It's regarded as a low tactic because it doesn't actually work, as Mao himself noted when Chiang bragged about capturing the CPC capital of Yan'an and fleeing to Taiwan in the end. It's proven time and time again that attrition is what matters, such as Hitler losing due to the no retreat order, Chiang losing due to overextension, Imperial Japan losing due to their no surrender no evacuation orders in Southeast Asia.

Meanwhile I don't know of a single time that a hold at all cost strategy succeeded.

I am probably looking at it the wrong way but wouldn’t Stalingrad fall under the “hold at all cost?” Tho attrition at the end of the day was still the ending factor.
 

generalmeng

New Member
Registered Member
It's regarded as a low tactic because it doesn't actually work, as Mao himself noted when Chiang bragged about capturing the CPC capital of Yan'an and fleeing to Taiwan in the end. It's proven time and time again that attrition is what matters, such as Hitler losing due to the no retreat order, Chiang losing due to overextension, Imperial Japan losing due to their no surrender no evacuation orders in Southeast Asia.

Meanwhile I don't know of a single time that a hold at all cost strategy succeeded.

If Ukrainians are playing for time, what's the end timer? A meteor hits Russia or something? How does a prolonged war benefit Ukraine when every month that passes Ukraine's GDP and population falls while Russia's doesn't? Russia even gains net population from Ukrainian refugees and occupied residents fleeing to Russia, but nobody is moving to Ukraine.

Losing men means destruction of the national economy and demoralization of the remaining soldiers. The more disproportionate casualties Russia inflicts on Ukraine, the more likely their civilian economy and morale is to collapse, while the more time Russians have to mobilize more troops.
This question should have been asked from the start. Not like 11 months after the war started. The bottom line question for the Zelensky regime is, what do they actually want to achieve? I am of the opinion, Ukraine is a lost cause, and their goal is to kill as many Russians as possible. The USA already achieved one of their objective, which was to severe economic ties between Russia and Europe. Remember, NATO was "to keep the Soviet Union (now Russia) out, the Americans in, and the Germans down,"(
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).

I mean, if you look at NATO, it actually has no purpose (if this war never starts). I don't see France and Germany going to war again. If the Europeans develop a closer tie with Russia, there is even less incentive for war. Russia supplied Europe with the energy they needed, for their manufacturing, and then sales to the USA. It's a pretty symbiotic relationship.

The Russian's aims are clear, they want to denazify and demilitarize Ukraine, and autonomy for the Russian ethnic regions. I think initially the Russian's didn't think the Americans would be so involved, so they did not start wrecking Ukraine's electrical infrastructure. Russians hoped for a fast war. Now it has been clear the Americans are somewhat committed, its a war of attrition. I believe the attack on the power plant started in September. From a grand strategy perspective, the power plant should have been bombed in the first month. One can argue, the Russians showed Ukraine mercy for 7 months.
 

Overbom

Brigadier
Registered Member
It's regarded as a low tactic because it doesn't actually work
Meanwhile I don't know of a single time that a hold at all cost strategy succeeded.
What?? Did you just miss Soviet Union's defence against the Germans??

Soviet Union threw untold number of troops to defend vital key locations in order to buy time for its industry and military to regroup.

What Ukraine is now buying time for, is obviously neither for its industry or its military to suddenly turn it around. It is waiting for Western MIC to ramp up. The more it can survive, the more weapons and equipment will flood in.
 
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