The War in the Ukraine

Temstar said:

13/13 drones shot down, two buildings hit

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sheogorath said:

The buildings crashed into the remains of the drones, obviously.

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The problem with the Shaheds (and many other cruise missiles) is that:
1) The Russians target civilian infrastructure/buildings with them.
2) The Ukrainians tend to shoot them down (or not) over cities, so they inevitably fall on something civilian anyway.
Result being that Ukraine can claim they shot it down even if they didn't and Russia can claim it hit the target even if it didn't.

Regardless, Ukraine has an energy crisis today, and they didn't before the drone strikes.

Estonia's Spy in Chief has made some comments about Russia's ability to replenish weapons

He estimates that Russia still has 9000 tanks in various levels reserve and using basic calculations of employing 3 tanks to put 1 serviceable together, gives Russia the potential to reactivate 3000 tanks.

He also mentions that the destroyed 500 SPG's only represent a loss of the 10% of Russia's pre-war fleet including reserves.

Regarding artillery rounds, they estimated Russia had 17 million rounds before the war, having using 10 millions by now in part to the increased rate of use 20.000 to 60.000 rounds per day during the summer. Prior to the war Russia could manufacture 1.7 million rounds per year, or around 141.000 rounds per month but that amount has been increased as factories have implemented more shifts and personnel.

Based on those numbers without the increase, they estimate Russia has 10 million rounds left to use but estimate Russia can/has increased the production levels to 3.4 million rounds per year.

On the precision munition front, while Russia has depleted a big part of their stocks, they estimate Russia still have enough left for the next 9 months.

sheogorath said:

Estonia's Spy in Chief has made some comments about Russia's ability to replenish weapons

He estimates that Russia still has 9000 tanks in various levels reserve and using basic calculations of employing 3 tanks to put 1 serviceable together, gives Russia the potential to reactivate 3000 tanks.

He also mentions that the destroyed 500 SPG's only represent a loss of the 10% of Russia's pre-war fleet including reserves.

Regarding artillery rounds, they estimated Russia had 17 million rounds before the war, having using 10 millions by now in part to the increased rate of use 20.000 to 60.000 rounds per day during the summer. Prior to the war Russia could manufacture 1.7 million rounds per year, or around 141.000 rounds per month but that amount has been increased as factories have implemented more shifts and personnel.

Based on those numbers without the increase, they estimate Russia has 10 million rounds left to use but estimate Russia can/has increased the production levels to 3.4 million rounds per year.

On the precision munition front, while Russia has depleted a big part of their stocks, they estimate Russia still have enough left for the next 9 months.

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It's almost believable to me, if every other thing they said to date wasn't proven wrong by time itself.

Propaganda only works for so long, then it just becomes noise that most people just begin to ignore

How effective is strategic strikes against infrastructure in the long run?
Opponents adapt, if the ukraine figures are to be believed the effectiveness of the shahed drones seems to have diminished as the Ukrainians have adapted and brought in more NATO supplied air defence assets.

No one has succeeded in breaking the will of an opponent by bombing them into submission*
*with the exception of the US nuking Japan

I have not seen one getting killed or seen one make a kill however. If a weapon system isn't getting killed then it's being pampered and not being pushed to the most risky and intense battles.


Two separate Lancet strikes at M777s combined into one video.


Lancet takes out a BRM.


Shahid taken out by ATGM, possibly an airborne one like LMUR. I'm more likely to think it's another Lancet victim with these target reticles on the video.


Beobachtungpanzer doing it's thing, recovering a broken vehicle.

Biscuits said:

It would depend on how heavily upgraded the L-7 types are.

China's experience with L-7 is mixed, on one hand, they quickly upsized the guns to 125mm on almost every major tank, on the other hand, the Type 15 still uses something of the same caliber but far far more modernized. Even then, the Type 15 gun is considered insufficient to penetrate the most heavily armored tanks from the front.

I doubt those Eastern European countries have anywhere near the expertise to upgrade a L-7 that much. But on the other hand, Russia will also mostly not be fighting with T-90M.

The biggest problems with the T-55 is how shit it is in every aspect, but at the end of the day it has a gun that can destroy APCs and T-72 if it hits in the rear and maybe the sides.

Given that Russians have overkill in terms of firepower, you'd rather want something with high mobility than something modern and heavily armored unless you can back it up properly.

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I think in this conflict so far, ATGMs have killed more tanks than tank on tanks gun battles ever could so discussing the merits of whether one could penetrate the other is academic at best, since most tank kills, we've seen on footage wasn't even aware that they were being targeted by an ATGM crew. Once you are spotted it basically doesn't matter what tank you are in unless it's the latest iteration of the T-90 a single ATGM can cripple you with the same ease they do to an APC.

There's nothing wrong with using old equipment as long as it serves the doctrine that your troops were trained for, since often times it is the only equipment in the numbers you need for a war of this size. Conversely the equipment needs to match the doctrine, at the start of the war Russia was trying to fight in a way that was completely anthesis to their equipment, the results speak for themselves, they're not the only ones who are affected by this however, we can also see that in Ukranian artillery usage case that they're using them like they were soviet designs, causing excessive wear on maintenance heavy western gear, it also does not help that they are sourcing weapons from many many different sources which has caused compatibility issues.

Temstar said:

Unless your war goal is the extermination of the other side all wars end with some sort of negotiated settlement

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Except you said Survikin's new strategy is destroying of Ukraine as a viable state and not forcing Ukraine to the negotiation table.

Temstar said:

Around when Surovikin was promoted Russia's strategy changed. Rather than trying to forcing Kiev to the negotiation table by taking ground the strategy changed to win by destroying Ukraine as a viable state.

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Either Surovikin is:

1. not forcing negotiations and seeking the destruction of Ukrainian state viability,
2. OR
3. Russia is not seeking extermination of state and all negotiations are inevitable anyways

Which is it? Does unconditional surrender include regime change?

Temstar said:

even if the negotiation term was once famously "either sign here on the instrument of unconditional surrender or we bath more of your cities in the light of our atom bomb".

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Japan's unconditional surrender lead to regime change, with "Divine Emperor" deposed and replaced with US-imposed Constitution.

Lavrov and Peskov have said Russia is not seeking regime change, so Japanese example is not really comparable

Temstar said:

What it says to me is Russia does not aim to incorporate all (or even majority) of Ukraine into Russia and that a country called Ukraine will exist after the war in some form.

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Agreed 100%

Temstar said:

but as with the transition from Imperial Japanese Empire to Japan the nature of the country is not guaranteed to be the same before and after.

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Japan's unconditional surrender ended with regime change, so you don't see the contradiction with Russia's position of "no regime change" with the Japanese example? Also, if Russia occupies Ukraine, they are never going to leave like US left and repeat Soviet's mistake.

Phead128 said:

Except you said Survikin's new strategy is destroying of Ukraine as a viable state and not forcing Ukraine to the negotiation table.

Either Surovikin is:

1. not forcing negotiations and seeking the destruction of Ukrainian state viability,
2. OR
3. Russia is not seeking extermination of state and all negotiations are inevitable anyways

Which is it? Does unconditional surrender include regime change?

Japan's unconditional surrender lead to regime change, with "Divine Emperor" deposed and replaced with US-imposed Constitution.

Lavrov and Peskov have said Russia is not seeking regime change, so Japanese example is not really comparable

Agreed 100%

It was literally a regime change with Japanese unconditional surrender...the Japanese gov't is fundamentally reformed and re-written Constitution by occupation authorities. Lavrov and Peskov said Russia is not seeking regime change, so why would Japan be an appropriate example?

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I wouldn't say Japanese government pre and post WW2 are completely different. Their emperor still exists and a lot of the ruling class people are even the same. Abe family for example. For completely different we would have to look at say, Iraq's government pre and post 2nd Gulf War. Such things are not binary and more a continuum.

I can't really say weather or not Russia intends to regime change Ukraine's government by collapsing their society, but I do see for sample if the war drags out and casualty reaches a point that Ukraine could physically no longer continue fighting, a coup could occur to topple the current Kiev government and then lead to a frozen war.

Temstar said:

I wouldn't say Japanese government pre and post WW2 are completely different. Their emperor still exists and a lot of the ruling class people are even the same. Abe family for example. For completely different we would have to look at say, Iraq's government pre and post 2nd Gulf War. Such things are not binary and more a continuum.

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US actually left Japan and Iraq after installing puppet regimes (still counts as regime change btw), but Russia is most likely going to permanent stay in Ukraine if it gains unconditional surrender, likely annex it all. Putin would never repeat Soviet mistake of allowing an independent Ukraine, with or without puppet regime installed, because that risks another Western coup in Ukraine in future, and repeated problems.

Temstar said:

I can't really say weather or not Russia intends to regime change Ukraine's government by collapsing their society, but I do see for sample if the war drags out and casualty reaches a point that Ukraine could physically no longer continue fighting, a coup could occur to topple the current Kiev government and then lead to a frozen war.

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Fair points. Maybe Ukraine will get internally couped as you have suggested, we will have to see.

jvodan said:

How effective is strategic strikes against infrastructure in the long run?
Opponents adapt, if the ukraine figures are to be believed the effectiveness of the shahed drones seems to have diminished as the Ukrainians have adapted and brought in more NATO supplied air defence assets.

No one has succeeded in breaking the will of an opponent by bombing them into submission*
*with the exception of the US nuking Japan

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Not true, Serbia in the Kosovo war.

Are there any examples of a country not surrendering after facing complete one sided bombing?

This myth originates from a Churchill speech during the Blitz, but German strategic bombing was stopped because they lost the battle of Britain, not because the bombings were ineffective.