Here is an interesting article:
S.M. HALI
Expressing hope that the Light Combat Aircraft ‘Tejas’ being developed by the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), will be able to fulfill the requirements of Indian Armed Forces for achieving self-reliance in defence technology, Indian Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee failed to inform the Parliamentary Consultative Committee for the Ministry of Defence that the Indian Air Force, which was supposed to replace the aging MiG-21 and MiG-23 fleet with the LCA, is yet to place the order for a single aircraft. Small wonder because 23 years have passed since its inception in 1983 and the final product is nowhere in sight.
Defenders of the LCA will try and justify the chequered history of India’s second indigenous jet fighter blaming US sanctions for the delay although in August 1998, A.P.J. Abdul Kalam as Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister had announced in Bangalore that “the LCA, post-Pokhran sanctions by the United States notwithstanding, would be inducted into the IAF in 2003.†This has since been revised to 2010 and has every likelihood of being further delayed.
An update on the Tejas has been provided by Ravi Sharma, in his article ‘No take-off in sight’, December 17-30, 2005 of the Frontline magazine. The columnist discloses: “The relatively successful maiden flight of Prototype Vehicle-2 or PV-2, of the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas on December 1 (2005) is cause enough for celebration. Success in the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA)-driven, Rs 5,500-crore, 22-year-old programme has come at huge costs and infrequently. Since the LCA rolled out in 1995, the ADA has been able to fly just four aircraft – TD-1 (Technical Demonstrator-1), TD-2 (Technical Demonstrator-2) and PV-1 (Prototype Vehicle-1).
The full operationalisation of the fourth-generation combat aircraft, to replace the ageing MiG-21 fleet with the Indian Air Force (IAF), is not expected for another 10 years. But, even by the ADA’s revised schedules it has flown at least a year late. Its maiden flight was marred by a fuel problem, forcing the flight to be restricted to 20-25 minutes. The non-availability of the Engine Driven Pump (EDP) also forced the ADA to cannibalise PV-1 for this, making the latter unserviceable (read cannot fly). PV-2 is also not in a serviceable condition until the fuel problem is rectified.â€
The two most crucial components of a fighter aircraft are the engine and the radar, around which the weapons and avionic systems are integrated. Both components are nowhere in sight in the LCA project. Although currently General Electric’s (GE) 404 F2J3 engine powers the LCA, it is planned that the indigenously developed one, Kaveri, will eventually replace it.
But Kaveri, the ‘Achilles heel’ in the successful development of the LCA, has been slipping regularly. It has been under development since 1986 by the Bangalore-based Gas Turbine and Research Establishment (GTRE), and is still years away from completing the approximately 8,000 hours of testing required to complete the engine development phase. GTRE has finally admitted defeat in its efforts to go it alone and decided to bring in a foreign collaborator, for which Request for Proposals (RFPs) have been submitted by four combat aircraft engine developers – GE, Pratt and Whitney, Snecma Moteurs and NPO Saturn. It would still take GTRE four years along with its partner to develop a new engine.
The LCA’s Pulse Doppler Multi-Mode Radar (MMR), which will detect, track, terrain-map and deliver guided weapons even Beyond Visual Range (BVR), is also experiencing problems both in terms of time and cost overruns. With the MMR nowhere on the horizon, the ADA has had to make do with a weapon delivery pod, which is not a primary sensor, and hence critical weaponisation of the aircraft cannot be undertaken.
Quoting a retired IAF Air Marshal, Ravi Sharma further reveals, “Even 22 years later the programme hasn’t surmounted the IOC [Initial Operational Clearance] stage where the key components are weapon and stores integration. Following IOC, the aircraft will have to get the Final Operational Clearance [FOC], which will mean it is ready to go into combat.
But for the IOC, the aircraft will have to undertake around 1,200 sorties, many of which have to be pre-planned test flights, where requirements, objectives and parameters are clearly defined. This is nowhere near completion. Of the 470-odd sorties undertaken by the three LCA, hardly 5 percent can be counted towards IOC flying. The rest have been cash flying, data generation flying, or flying during displays before dignitaries or the public in air shows.â€
IAF, which has shown exasperation in the need to replenish its aging fleet, has already asked for an immediate induction of 126 fighter aircraft, for which various foreign manufacturers are competing. On the other hand, India is extremely keen for the success of the LCA project to uphold the credibility of its aeronautical industry. However, with delays and obsolescence setting in at a rapid pace, IAF would be reluctant to induct the LCA.
Unless there is a firm order, the cost per unit of LCA-Tejas would climb sky high. Indian defence planners would be imprudent to press on pumping big chunks of their defence capital budget over a weapon system; neither IAF nor any foreign buyer would be interested in.
