The Taiwan army major traced his finger in a swooping arc across the map. “The extended distances that UAVs can now cover means that everything is now a target. How do we defend against this?” He then looked expectantly out at our delegation.
One of our delegation members stood up, with a smile that would have done credit to a shark. “A good question, but allow me to submit that first, your adversary can
already target you without the use of UAVs. Second, UAVs are an asymmetric weapon. Your adversary is coming to you — make
them worry about how to defend against
your UAVs.”
That stirred up an audible reaction. During the break afterwards, the major sought me out. “Is that person a fire-eater, or what?” — with a nod and a smile, inviting me to agree. “No, she’s being realistic,” I replied. “Things are getting to the point where
not being a ‘fire-eater’ is the risky option.” The major looked at me, bemused (and probably wondering if the entire U.S. delegation would be dining on flames for lunch).
However, the recently concluded Armenia-Azerbaijan War has been fairly conclusive proof about the advisability of my colleague’s recommendations. From the various after-action reports coming from the conflict, I identify three primary lessons for the Taiwan military.
Play the Game of Drones
In operational considerations of a Taiwan conflict, there is an overwhelming focus on air and sea control. Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept (ODC) emphasizes
,” while published writings from China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) reciprocate with a focus on the
use of massed missiles to destroy Taiwan airpower and paralyze defensive capability.
However, the first and most obvious lesson of the Armenia-Azerbaijan war is that through massed unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), it is possible for ground forces to cheaply replicate elements of a robust air force at a localized level.
As demonstration of this, the Azerbaijanis used
, and
, to devastating effect. Against an entrenched opponent, the strikes decimated the fixed command posts, logistics centers, and assembly areas, badly weakening Armenian defenses. Reinforcing heavy armor received the same treatment, only worse; caught out in the open, with predictable lines of advance,
. The destruction of Armenian armor and mechanized forces was crucial in allowing
, which effectively ended the war.
In the case of a successful landing of the PLA on Taiwan, Taiwan would be on the strategic defensive. Given expected PLA Air Force air superiority, small radar-evading UAS may mean the difference between the Taiwan army being forced to remain in an operationally defensive role or having the ability to take the offensive during a period of high vulnerability for the PLA. The PLA, like the Armenians, would be fixed in place while desperately bringing up enough logistical capability to go on the offensive – which would then be on predictable lines of advance to Taipei. This would actually be a worse scenario than having the initial invasion armada destroyed at sea, because a partial but inadequate landing force would not be able to easily retreat, would continue to be a massive resource sink for the PLA, and would essentially be a marooned hostage if the U.S. Air Force and Navy destroyed resupply capability.
Unleash the Decoy Ducks
One of the greatest advantages the PLA holds over the Taiwan military is the ability to conduct precision missile saturation. The
of accurate land-attack cruise missiles and
have made the PLA Rocket Force the
now
than ever.
Previously, the Second Artillery (now PLA Rocket Force, PLARF) development of short range ballistic missiles was meant as a counter to the expected qualitative advantage of Taiwan’s Republic of China Air Force (ROCAF) platforms and training;
, most analysts still predicted ROCAF air superiority over the PLAAF in an invasion scenario. However, in a demonstration of the rapid evolution and growth of PLA capabilities, the main focus of the PLARF is no longer on developing short-range missiles to counter Taiwan defense, but
to counter and deter U.S. intervention.
Herein lies another opportunity demonstrated by the Armenia-Azerbaijan War. Azerbaijan used a significant number of
to locate Armenian air defense and artillery. These decoys were quite low-tech: the pilots simply aimed at the cheap biplanes at Armenian lines, strapped the controls with belts to maintain course, and bailed out. Paired with strike UAS, this proved to be an extremely cost-effective method of revealing and then targeting an enemy air defense.
Similarly, the Taiwan military could massively expand a cheap decoy fleet, with a main mission of complicating adversary targeting calculus and forcing missile expenditure. This could be a mix of UAS, biplanes, even aging fighters: Taiwan is in the
, which could instead be repurposed as missile bait. In the hands of a more technically sophisticated power than Azerbaijan, unmanned decoys could spoof attacks not just against an invasion force, but against targets in China – thus forcing ever-increasing PLA expenditures on base-hardening, missile/UAS defense, and raising the specter among Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership that the consequences of a Taiwan war cannot be isolated.
