The_Zergling
Junior Member
CSIST is known to have manufacutured the TC-2A with new seeker head and guidance package. Although this is an ARM version, it does indicate that CSIST's TC-2 production is not limited to Raytheon-supplied 200 seeker head kits. If they wanted to make more, I think they can always get the parts from somewhere.
Also, if a war breaks out and US decides to aid the ROCAF, I don't think it'd take too much effort to update the software code on IDF's to carry AIM-7's and AIM-120's. The GD-53 is basically AN/AGP-67 anyway.
I think the AIDC IDF gets a lot of bad press because people think it's neutered from birth. But we have to keep in mind that it was built only because the US refused to sell F-20 and F-16's, so Taiwan had to make do with what scraps the US was willing to sell. After the US agreed to export F-16's, the IDF suddenly doesn't get much love anymore.
I agree that the F-CK-1 is actually a capable fighter for the role it's designed for. Actually I don't really have a problem with Taiwan's current inventory and amount of fighters, because despite the huge numbers disparity, the geographical situation limits the amount of fighters that can be airborne in the Taiwan strait at a time and still be tactically effective. I believe the limit is around 100 at a time (got this from my Uncle, not sure how valid this is) considering problems such as avoiding collisions and friendly fire and what not so China would actually have a harder time using its superior numbers for anything besides a war of attrition.
In other words, in my opinion the number crunching that exchanges 1.5 Su-27s for 1 Mirage 2000 should be taken with a grain of salt. In such a small block of space in the air it would be an airborne environment more volatile than any seen before, and anything could happen. I don't think even the USAF would be able to function effectively there, nobody's been in this kind of frenzied guided missile war before.
As I said before, my main beef with the ROCAF is the lack of missiles, especially since one of the better anti-air defenses that Taiwan can put it would be something like this (Note : Very simplified and general, general idea from a Taiwanese military forum)
To take advantage of Taiwan's geographical location you'd have to use it like a minefield against an approaching superior force, in other words forcing the enemy to cross it (which in this case is possible, at least until China gets the Varyag operational, which would change the scenario drastically) and disorientating them by forcing them to evade your missiles before they can launch their first wave of missiles against your ground assets.
In regards to a Chinese air armada, this is how it would go down : Fire the first salvo of long range SAMs at maximum range. If incoming armada continues undeterred, a second larger salvo is launched.
Once the second wave of missiles has been fired, ground SAM radar stations are turned off and decoys (radio wave emitters of similiar or same frequency) are turned on to attract anti-radiation missiles. At this stage the E-2Ts would be the only aircraft with active radars on (not sure if this is feasible) although they would be linked up with ground-based control bunkers and defence command.
Afterwards you have two layers of fighters for defense, arguably divided into two main categories, the first being the high speed advanced models, Mirage 2000s and F-16s, second layer being the not as capable ones that would function as basically flying missile trucks, F-CK-1s and remaining F-5s.
First layer jumps the enemy armada that has by now at the very least been distracted or reduced in number using indirect targeting information from the E-2Ts and promptly turns tail and runs away. It isn't hard to see how very important a healthy amount of AMRAAMs (which are pitifully few as I type this, one of the biggest question marks) and Micas (which thankfully are more than abundant) will be.
Second layer launches another wave of missiles based on same E-2T targeting information. Rinse and repeat between alternating flights of first and second layers. Again, the same problem with the AMRAAMs occur with the TC-2s. the ROCAF is highly dependent on AR missiles if it wants to survive, unfortunately the military budget is very screwed up. But I digress.
By now you've fired quite a few effective salvos at the incoming force and enemy effectiveness would be greatly hampered by having to evade wave after wave of guided missiles.
This is probably one of the best tactics that Taiwan would use to defend against an airborne armada, a sort of hit and run warfare if you will, because in a straight-on dogfight the advantages return to the numerically superior PLAAF, and it will be harder for SAMs to pick out which fighters are hostile and which are friendly, whereas it will be easier if you don't mix it up and just keep firing and running from long range. Ground-based SAMs wouldn't have to worry about IFF for a while as long as friendly fighters stay over Taiwan. It's not a good idea to fight the PLAAF over the strait, it's just confusing your own SAM operators.
The problem with this plan is that Taiwan does not have enough AR missiles, which are the cornerstone of this plan.
If you feel offended by the Taiwanese POV from the above scenario, that's your problem, because I'm a lazy bastard and it's easier to type as if I'm a commander in charge of defense.