While the defender may have thousands of SAMs in stock - the REAL question is how many does he have that are ready to fire - at one time. Increasing that stock, with more firing platforms, would greatly increase the overall cost of the air defense system - perhaps prohibitively so.
Actually, I bothered to calculate how much equipment it would cost to replace carriers air defence, and strike capability for sustained time and I don't think the costs would be excessive. It's my last post on the issue how carriers are obsolete, as I recognise my own writings are starting to resemble each other.
Equipment losses are considered in neither scenario, as they're hard to model.
First, let's make a scenario: All-round China vs. USA over Taiwan slugfest, nuclear weapons excluded. US has use of Guam, but not Japan and South Korean bases due to political considerations. The mission for US forces is to defend Taiwan against air strikes and to conduct strikes against Chinese forces. Length of the operation is 30 days. For calculation purchases, the strike point in China is Hangchuan, in Fujian, China, situated some 400nm's from potential carrier deployment area. For calculation purchases, carriers are deployed at point 24.30 N, 122.25 E
Now, a carrier force available includes 5 carrier strike groups with Nimitz-class carriers. Each has pimped up air wing of 32 F/A-18E/F and 32 JSF + assorted AEW etc. aircraft. A total of 160 Super Hornets and 160 JSF's. What carriers have for escort is not relevant, as these elements can be also used with alternate force displayed below.
For the course of 30 days of action let's presume each carrier can operate 5 days continuosly, after which one day is reserved for resupply. Total carrier operating days are thus 125. Each carrier can fly 140 sorties a day, of which perhaps 20 should be reserved for AEW and housekeeping duties. So let's make it a total of 15 000 operational sorties, or some 1/3rd more effective sortie rates than historically during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Keeping in line with historical data from OIF, some 1/3 of the sorties will be tanker sorties. That leaves some 10 000 sorties to go, divided equally between 30 days of operations some 333 sorties per day.
Considering China's powerful air force and air defence let's presume 1/3 will be anti-air sorties, 1/3 SEAD sorties and 1/3 strike sorties. Of strike sorties, half are JDAM and other half are SDB sorties. Of SEAD sorties a half are HARM sorties, other half JDAM equivalent sorties. Every anti-air sortie lifts up 4 AMRAAM's to air.
Total ordnance delivered per day: 444 AMRAAM's in the air, 222 HARM's, 444 JDAM's, 888 SDB's.
Maximum Alpha Strike delivered by CVW (meaning full armament load on every strike fighter): 640 JDAM's.
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Now, let's make a replacement force, capable of delivering and sustaining a similar punch. Used elements are Ticonderoga's, SSGN's, B-2's, E-3's and KC-10's, although better elements would be available if pressed. Particularly, Arsenal Ships or Ticos might be used instead of SSGN's, which would make the whole replacement effort a lot cheaper. Additionally, if non-carrier option was really sought, a technique of practical underway replenishment for VLS launchers would be developed. But even with these calculations the non-carrier option would not seem enormously expensive.
How many B-2's would be needed? 16. How many SSGN's? 10. How many E-3's? 15. How many KC-10's? 30. How many Ticonderoga's? 40. (12 kept continuosly on station)
Naval crew requirements: 1530 for SSGN's, 14 400 for Tico's.
Air force personnel requirements: Roughly 5000.
Total of: 21 000 (contra 28500 of carriers)
Personnel put in harms way on daily basis: About 4500 (contra 28500 of carriers)
Maximum Alpha Strike effort delivered by non-carrier force: 1280 JDAM's, 1410 Tomahawks.
And here's the case if 500 VLS Arsenal Ships were used to replace SSGN's and 4 of the 12 Tico's continuosly on station. Tico's needed: 8 Arsenal ships needed: 12. Naval crew requirement 3480. Total personnel required: 8480 (contra 28500 of carriers. 50 person crew of Arsenal Ship assumed).
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How this is calculated, the boring part is below.
First, let's replace strike elements: For house rules, we may presume that SEAD sorties can be replaced with cruise missiles and strike sorties with bomber sorties. Cruise missiles needed daily: 444. SSGN's needed daily: 3,15.
B-2 sorties needed daily to deliver 222 JDAM's and 888 SDB: 6,5. Total sorties needed: 195
To deliver the needed number of B-2 sorties let's base them in Northern Australia and Hawai instead, farther from combat area but more convenient for our purposes, as during Operation Iraqi Freedom B-2's flew half of their sorties from Diego Garcia and half from Whiteman AFB, Missouri, about similar distance from Iraq. Four B-2's used flew a total of 49 sorties during OIF. To use this as a yardstick, 16 B-2's would be needed. As sorties from Hawai would require one aerial refuelling, let's allocate 20 KC-10's for the task.
SSGN's could launch their missiles 1350 miles away from impact point, some 400nm's from Guam. Transit at leisurely 20kts would require 20h's to both directions. Assuming they don't need any other repairs than Tomahawk fill-up during this 30 day period, the fill-up might be made in few hours. To get carriers some headway, let's say it takes a day. So, between every SSGN launch extravaganza 64 hours is required. Just to aid carriers, let's make it simpler and say a SSGN is available every fourth day. So, a total of 9,6 or 10 SSGN's.
Now, for next, let's consider AEW coverage. Each carrier can hold an E2C up in the air continuosly, so that makes 5 E2's. Let's replace them with E-3's on one-on-one basis, although E-3 is more capable aircraft. Let's fly them from Guam, some 1500nm away. Transit flight of 3h's each way, or total of 6h's for transit. With maximum of 24h missions that means 18h of time at station. Using lavish maintenance time, some 15 E-3's might hold that tempo leisurely for 30 days.
This of course, would require tankers. For air refuelling needs, I'd calculate the need is 2 refuellings for every 24h sorties. A KC-10 holds enough fuel for 2 E-3 refills, so 7 KC-10 sorties would be needed daily. Make it 10 KC-10's to keep the sortie rate down.
Finally, the air part. 111 sorties, so 444 AMRAAM's in the air, daily. This is controversial, as it's unlikely that 444 AMRAAM's would be used any given day. On the other hand, a surge day for China would mean all sorties might be air-to-air sorties. So, let's replace this with demand that for all times there must be 1332 SAM's ready, but still, 444 are used every day. How big a Tico fleet would this require?
To maintain 1332 SAM's on station the requirement is out for 11 Tico's. For convenience, let's round it up to 12. If 4 Tico's load is expended every day, transit to Guam is at 20kts and reloading takes 24h's, the round trip takes some 170 hours, or that it takes 7 days to make that round trip. So, a total requirement would be 40 Ticonderogas. The amount of SAM's required is in excess of any realistic consumption, but to give carriers some headway I decided to keep it that way.