South China Sea Strategies for other nations (Not China)

Scarborough reclamation before Xmas? Hope not too many banana would go bad.


Chinese South China Sea Fleet holds exercise
CNTV, April 28, 2016

The Chinese Navy's South China Sea Fleet has conducted a landing drill. The drill has not only honed the fleet's landing combat capability, but also given valuable practice in coordination.

This is the target. The objective for the Chinese Navy's South China Sea Fleet: to capture the island. The drill involved a landing brigade, marine corps [kor], amphibious forces and navy helicopter units. The Red Side landing formation broke the enemy blockades and the fleet went into action.

Moving towards the pivoting station. Twisting, accelerating, and then, the assault on the target. The new fleet is characterized by superior speed and high assault breaching capacity. But the terrain proved much more challenging than in previous missions.

The experience of the commander was key.

"The mission is very complicated this time. There's no depth in the landing shore. So the fleet risks crashing to the shore if the speed is too high, and may be severely affected by the wind at a low speed. We have to continuously switch helm rudder and rotative speed difference to ensure a punctual landing," Yang Fei, commander of South China Sea Fleet, said.

Once within range, the marines quickly made landfall.

"We have greatly tested the combat capability of the fleet. This has laid a solid foundation for further enhancing the competitiveness of the entire troop," Chen Jianli with South China Sea Fleet, said.

The drill tested the coordination abilities of the different forces under real-fire conditions. The practice has improved multiple navy tactics.

Brumby said:

Frankly, what has China offered to its claim besides the rhetoric that its sovereignty is indisputable? Discovery and historical rights carry very little weight and that is why China to-date has been ambiguous and can only bang the table.

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I find that to be both an interesting question and perspective on the Chinese position Brumby.

You often take a very strict legal view on these events where I tend to take a more interests based strategic view (what I would consider to be more political realism) however, if Discovery and Historical Rights carry little weight, what is left to support a legal argument? I would suggest that leaves us with possession and control or de facto control. That saying of possession is 9/10 of the Law. Am I wrong?

So in a case where current possession/control is a primary factor in legal view of disputed territorial holdings, is it not in all parties interests to develop and work their holdings to the greatest extent they are able, in order to strengthen their claims? This seems to be what everyone is doing although because China is best able to execute (among other reasons) it is the one being called out.

But what recourse is there for any of the parties if Discovery and Historical Evidence carry little legal weight? Bilateral negotiation I would think, as with most international dealings. That's an option China has said it would prefer to pursue instead of internationalization and expansion of the disputes.

Zool said:

You often take a very strict legal view on these events

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That is because the arguments are grounded on something as opposed to mere rhetoric. Customary and international laws do not just pop up from no where but are actually developed from sound principles that try to be equitable and fair to all parties. For example, where there is an overlap in maritime delimitation, the arbitration tribunal normally apply the equidistance rule in terms of award. Laws also serve the function of a level playing field and to remove ambiguities. What China is doing is undermining a set of rules and adding confusion to the whole system.

Zool said:

where I tend to take a more interests based strategic view (what I would consider to be more political realism)

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Politics is amoral and discussions often degenerate into pissing contest on this forum. Frankly I don't think posters here generally have the maturity to conduct mature debates. I know you do your research and can handle a robust discussions but sadly few do.
Philosophically I don't have a problem with a rising China but I view how China is exercising its power as highly problematic. That to me is a philosophy that says the end justify the means and damn the rules if they are in the way. I would like to hear your view on how you would justify China's actions philosophically.

Zool said:

however, if Discovery and Historical Rights carry little weight, what is left to support a legal argument? I would suggest that leaves us with possession and control or de facto control. That saying of possession is 9/10 of the Law. Am I wrong?

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On your question regarding possession, it is technically subject to a critical date. Once a dispute is recognised whatever actions post that date becomes irrelevant. Acquisitive prescription is subject to a few conditions to have sound legal standing and that includes acquiescence. In short, whether possession is 9/10 is simply subject to the facts.

Zool said:

So in a case where current possession/control is a primary factor in legal view of disputed territorial holdings, is it not in all parties interests to develop and work their holdings to the greatest extent they are able, in order to strengthen their claims? This seems to be what everyone is doing although because China is best able to execute (among other reasons) it is the one being called out.

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Legally speaking no because of the critical date principle. However I don't think China is interested in any legal arguments but merely to create a form of legitimacy if possible. Otherwise it is simply brute reasoning. China attracts attention because of the scale and frankly is doing a poor job by insisting on the indisputable line.

Zool said:

But what recourse is there for any of the parties if Discovery and Historical Evidence carry little legal weight? Bilateral negotiation I would think, as with most international dealings. That's an option China has said it would prefer to pursue instead of internationalization and expansion of the disputes.

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I think it is obvious by now that China intends to treat the SCS as sovereign territory. That in my view is not negotiable. Any notion of bilateral negotiation is merely about economic cooperation. I guess Philippines concluded that after protracted negotiations and decided that the only option left is to internationalise the issue.

Some pictures of outposts controlled by Malaysia.


Ardasier reef dated March 21, 2016.


Mariveles Reef dated March 21, 2016.


Erica Reef dated March 21, 2016.

Brumby said:

That is because the arguments are grounded on something as opposed to mere rhetoric. Customary and international laws do not just pop up from no where but are actually developed from sound principles that try to be equitable and fair to all parties. For example, where there is an overlap in maritime delimitation, the arbitration tribunal normally apply the equidistance rule in terms of award. Laws also serve the function of a level playing field and to remove ambiguities. What China is doing is undermining a set of rules and adding confusion to the whole system.

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Which established rule specifically are you pointing to that China is violating? We've all acknowledged China's opt-out of particular UNCLOS clauses when ratifying that agreement, so I assume it is something else in particular that you specifically take issue with.

Brumby said:

Politics is amoral and discussions often degenerate into pissing contest on this forum. Frankly I don't think posters here generally have the maturity to conduct mature debates. I know you do your research and can handle a robust discussions but sadly few do.
Philosophically I don't have a problem with a rising China but I view how China is exercising its power as highly problematic. That to me is a philosophy that says the end justify the means and damn the rules if they are in the way. I would like to hear your view on how you would justify China's actions philosophically.

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I view the regional dynamic as wholly problematic and do not ascribe current state of affairs to the activities of any one player in isolation. Each action taken by a given party (Reclamation, Naval Patrol, Military Over-Flight etc) is bound to be internally considered an appropriate reactive response to a competitors preceding act. Its circular at this point and not surprising.

The parties are going to pursue their interests to maximum effect especially when the core of it deals with matters of National Security, Territorial Sovereignty & Resource Rights. Add to the list of regional players an extra-regional power with its own security interests, and the weight of leverage in negotiation is thrown further askew. The dynamic has become much more complicated with the direct involvement of the US. This benefits US interests and (possibly) the position of Philippians, Vietnam & Japan (Diaoyu/Senkaku) while weakening the Chinese position. Internationalization has made the disputes more dangerous and difficult to resolve in my opinion.

I was interested in your question and comment about the legal aspect of Chinese claims because if the supporting Discovery & Historical Rights side of it can be so easily dismissed and the rest termed rhetoric, it really leaves no recourse for China or anyone else to hope for a law based solution. Possession/Control appears to be paramount legally and those factors are changed either by Conflict or Negotiation. Historically Conflict is the preferred method...

So as you can see, I don't put nearly as much stock in an International Law based resolution as perhaps you might. The idealistic side of me wishes I could. But I see International Law as one tool that can be utilized, or put aside in Global Affairs -- something I have seen practiced by many nations -- and I see it as less than absolute in comparison to citizens subject to domestic law. Until we reach a state of Unified Global Governance, I don't see that changing.

As I said before, in my work I take a view that can best be described as political realism. I should have spelled that out clearer as it could have come across as condescending, suggesting my view is more rooted in realism than your legal perspective. That was not my intent;

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is a term for a specific point of view and best describes my outlook on all things Geopolitical.

Brumby said:

On your question regarding possession, it is technically subject to a critical date. Once a dispute is recognised whatever actions post that date becomes irrelevant. Acquisitive prescription is subject to a few conditions to have sound legal standing and that includes acquiescence. In short, whether possession is 9/10 is simply subject to the facts.

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Re: Critical Date in relation to international dispute, I found that there is no set criteria for what date is chosen as the critical point. It is decided upon by an arbiter of a dispute and generally chosen based on a critical point of contention between the two sides on the matter historically. So depending on historical evidence of title presented, its completely up in the air as to whether that feature of law would help or hinder a claim. But from what I've read, legally possession is paramount. Its why disputing parties protest so loudly at the changing of 'facts on the ground'.

Brumby said:

Legally speaking no because of the critical date principle. However I don't think China is interested in any legal arguments but merely to create a form of legitimacy if possible. Otherwise it is simply brute reasoning. China attracts attention because of the scale and frankly is doing a poor job by insisting on the indisputable line.

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I always chuckle at the chastisement of China, or anyone else for that matter, for stating that their claim is indisputable. All claims are indisputable from all sides, until they are resolved. No one in the history of the world made a claim and suggested it was on shaky grounds to begin with. You make an assertive claim, attach as much value to it as possible for the potential/inevitable bargaining table session and go from there, don't you think?

Brumby said:

I think it is obvious by now that China intends to treat the SCS as sovereign territory. That in my view is not negotiable. Any notion of bilateral negotiation is merely about economic cooperation. I guess Philippines concluded that after protracted negotiations and decided that the only option left is to internationalise the issue.

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I would agree with the assessment that China will seek to exert de facto control over the SCS & ECS in the coming years and maintain claim over disputed physical features until negotiation wins out or conflict breaks out. In an earlier conversation with you I talked about how this is likely viewed through the prism of the security environment for both China and the US. That is unlikely to change anytime soon and will guide events.

On Philippines, my own guess is that they saw an opportunity to gain greater leverage with the involvement of the US versus whatever arrangement China was offering a few years back, and decided to scuttle bilateral negotiation in hopes a better deal will be attainable in future. Or until it appears China is reaching a critical point of regional control and influence that some deal must be reached quickly.

Cheers

With justice and law on her side, China has nothing to fear in SCS, no matter what anti-China crowd say.




China to Join Exercises With Rival South China Sea Claimants

• By christopher bodeen, associated press

BEIJING — Apr 28, 2016, 6:28 AM ET

China said Thursday it will send a warship and special forces for a multinational exercise next month that is also expected to include troops from the and other rival claimants in the South China Sea.

The May 2-12 maritime security and counterterrorism exercise will feature the militaries of the 10 countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, along with those of the U.S., India and six other dialogue partners.

It will be held in and and in nearby waters of the South China Sea.

Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman Col. Wu Qian said that China would send the missile destroyer Lanzhou, staff officers and a dozen special forces troops.

The exercise will help the militaries to "learn from each other and deepen practical cooperation in the defense and security fields," Wu told reporters at a monthly news briefing.

China claims virtually the entirety of the strategically vital South China Sea and has attempted to shore up its control by building islands on coral reefs complete with airstrips, harbors and radar stations.

Despite that, China says it wants to resolve differences between the six rival claimants through dialogue and accuses the U.S. of raising tensions by challenging the Chinese actions with what are known as freedom of navigation patrols.

Asked about calls in the U.S. for stepped-up naval activity in the South China Sea, Wu summed up China's hard line on its sovereignty claim in a new formulation claim he called the "Three No's."

"No matter how many and how frequently U.S. ships come to the South China Sea, that would not change the fact that the islands and adjacent islands are China's inherent territory, it would not stop the pace of China's growth and development and even more it would not shake the will of the People's Liberation Army in resolutely safeguarding the sovereignty and security of China," Wu said.

I just heard that back then before the U.S. military use Scarborough Shoal as an target practice, it actually seeked permission from the Taiwanese government (then Republic of China, KMT). Does that mean back then the U.S. already acknowledge the shoal sovereignity to China? Anyone want to do some digging on that? Makes you wonder if that actually happened, why's Taiwan staying quiet about this.

A FONOP that didn't materialize in early April.

US navy prepares third provocation in South China Sea
By Peter Symonds
5 April 2016
An unnamed US official told Reuters last Friday the US was planning to carry out a third “freedom of navigation” operation in early April to challenge China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea.

While other American officials disputed that such an exercise was imminent, the leak emerged on the eve of the annual joint Balikatan military exercises in the Philippines. The war games, which run from April 4 to April 15, involve around 8,000 US and Philippine troops, as well as 80 Australian military personnel.

For the past year, Washington has waged an escalating war of words directed against China’s land reclamation activities and alleged “militarisation” in the South China Sea. Last October and again in January, the US Navy sent a destroyer within the 12-nautical-mile territorial limit around a Chinese-controlled islet, provoking angry warnings from Beijing.

Speaking at a Pentagon press conference in late February, Admiral Harry Harris, commander of the US Pacific Command, grossly inflated the “threat” posed by Chinese reclamation activities in the South China Sea, falsely claiming it had established “3,000 acres of military bases.” He called for more frequent “freedom of navigation” to China’s claims and urged “like-minded” nations to do the same.

A third naval challenge to Chinese claims in the midst of the Balikatan exercises involving other countries would be particularly provocative. During his meeting with US President Barack Obama last week on the sidelines of the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, Chinese President Xi Jinping warned that Beijing would not accept violations of its sovereignty in the name of “freedom of navigation.”

According to the Diplomat, the Balikatan exercises will include “a simulation of the retaking of an island seized by an unspecified country in the South China Sea, an amphibious landing and the implementation of a joint rapid reaction force.” The focus underscores the shifting role of the Philippine military from one primarily devoted to suppressing internal insurgencies to one aimed at waging a broader war.

This year, the US military has gained access to five Philippine military bases under the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) signed between the two countries in 2014. The Philippine Supreme Court declared EDCA constitutional in January. The bases include those on the islands of Luzon and Palawan, which are adjacent to the South China Sea.

The Balikatan war games will also include joint naval exercises, including maritime law enforcement, surveillance and interdiction exercises. The Philippines has very limited naval and coast guard capacities, most of which have been recently supplied by the US, Australia and Japan. In addition to US warships taking part in the exercises, the US aircraft carrier, the USS John C. Stennis, and its accompanying strike force, are currently in the South China Sea.

Last weekend, three Japanese naval vessels—a submarine and two destroyers—docked in the Philippines in preparation for a separate three-day “training exercise” off the Subic Bay base before heading to Vietnam. A senior Japanese Defence Ministry official told the Yomiuri Shimbun the exercise “is aimed at promoting friendly relations [with the Philippines], but it also includes a strong message to keep China in check.”

Significantly, Ashton Carter will be the first US defence secretary to directly observe the Balikatan exercises. He is due to arrive in the Philippines during the war games to watch several activities, including those by US warships at sea. According to the Diplomat, Carter will visit the Philippine military’s Western Command on Palawan, which is central to the US build-up in the Philippines.

As part of its “pivot to Asia” aimed against Beijing, the Obama administration has encouraged the Philippines to aggressively assert its territorial claims in the South China Sea. With Washington’s backing and support, Manila has mounted a legal challenge in the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague to China’s territorial claims. China has refused to recognise the court’s jurisdiction over its maritime claims.

China has hit out at the latest Balikatan exercises. A comment in the state-owned Xinhua news agency declared: “The upcoming US-Philippine military exercises cap Manila’s recent attempts to involve outsiders in [the] regional row. However, a provocation so fear-mongering and untimely as such is likely to boomerang on the initiators.” It called on the US to clarify “the targets of its pivot to Asia strategy” and condemned its “unscrupulous inconsistency between fear-mongering deeds and peace-loving words.”

Washington’s confrontation with Beijing over the South China Sea has set the stage for a further escalation of tensions when a third “freedom of navigation” operation proceeds. An ominous proposal by the Washington-based think tank, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), suggests a joint US-Philippine military operation in order to issue a particularly provocative challenge to the Chinese presence at the Scarborough Shoal.

The Scarborough Shoal, which is claimed by both China and the Philippines, effectively came under Chinese control in 2012 after a series of skirmishes involving fishing and coast guard vessels from the two countries. The CSIS, which has played a central role in Obama’s “pivot to Asia,” published its “Developing a Scarborough Contingency Plan” on March 30 outlining three steps to halt possible Chinese land reclamation at the disputed reef.

The first would involve intelligence sharing on Chinese activities. The second would be a definitive US declaration to militarily support the Philippines under their alliance “if Philippine troops or ships are attacked at Scarborough Shoal or other areas of the South China Sea.” The CSIS suggested that Carter’s visit to Manila would be an opportunity to make such a statement. The third step would be to send Philippine vessels to block the entrance to the shoal. “US Navy assets would need to remain in position over the horizon to signal that they would be prepared to intervene should China attack Philippine forces,” it stated.

No Chinese land reclamation activity has been identified in Scarborough Shoal, but undoubtedly other pretexts could be drummed up. The reckless character of US actions is highlighted by the CSIS’s calculation that its plan would not end in conflict because China has been “hesitant to risk a military clash, especially with the United States” in the past.

Washington is engaged in a dangerous game of brinkmanship. Whenever and wherever another US “freedom of navigation” operation in the South China Sea takes place, it risks a clash between nuclear-armed powers that could plunge the region and the world into war.

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US warplanes sent near disputed South China Sea reef
By Peter Symonds
27 April 2016
The US is continuing to escalate the confrontation with China over the South China Sea, with a military foray last week by six military aircraft near the Scarborough Shoal. The reef, which is claimed by both China and the Philippines, has effectively been under Chinese control since a tense standoff between the two countries in 2012.

In a statement released last Friday, the US Pacific Command announced that four A-10C Thunderbolt II warplanes and two Sikorsky HH-60 helicopters had flown in “international airspace” in the vicinity of the atoll. The use of American ground attack aircraft and special forces helicopters is a menacing threat designed to underscore Washington’s ability to mount operations against Chinese-claimed islets in the South China Sea.

The Pentagon justified its provocative operation, using what is now a catch-all pretext for its military build-up around the South China Sea: freedom of navigation and overflight. “Our job is to ensure air and sea domains remain open in accordance with international law... International economics depends on it—free trade depends on our ability to move goods,” Colonel Larry Card, the air contingent commander, said.

In reality, China has a vested interest in ensuring the sea lanes, on which it depends to import energy and raw materials from the Middle East and Africa, remain open. Washington, on the other hand, is determined to ensure its military dominance in the South China Sea as part of the Pentagon’s strategy for war against China, which includes a naval blockade to strangle the Chinese economy.

The Chinese defence ministry issued a blunt warning that its armed forces would “take all necessary measures to safeguard national sovereignty and security.” The statement added: “The US is pushing militarisation of the South China Sea in the name of ‘freedom of navigation’. China is concerned about and opposed to such actions which threaten the sovereignty and security of countries around the South China Sea.”

Foreign ministry spokesman Hua Chunying pointedly asked: “The United States has repeatedly questioned China’s intentions [in the South China Sea], but will the US explain its real motive in stoking tensions and increasing military presence in the area?”

The US has twice directly challenged China’s maritime claims by sending a destroyer within the 12-nautical-mile territorial limit of Chinese-controlled islets last October and again in January. It has escalated its military presence in the region, most recently sending the aircraft carrier, the USS John C Stennis and its strike group into the South China Sea as part of the annual joint Balikatan exercises with the Philippine military.

The Balikatan exercises, which ended on April 15, included a simulation exercise involving the retaking of an island in the South China Sea that had been seized by an unnamed country, as well as a practice amphibious landing.

The Pentagon also used the war games to quickly implement the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) signed with the Philippines in 2014 and declared constitutional in January. The US has gained access to five Philippine military bases, including two airfields directly adjacent to the South China Sea.

US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter visited the Philippines to observe the Balikatan exercises and strengthen military ties with Manila. The American war planes involved in last week’s operation near the Scarborough Shoal are part of the military force that remained in the Philippines after the war games, stationed at the Clark Air Field—not one of the five nominated bases under EDCA. The huge Clark air base was used heavily by the US Air Force during the Vietnam War for its criminal bombing campaigns.

As part of its “pivot to Asia” against China over the past five years, the Obama administration has encouraged the Philippines to more aggressively assert its territorial claims against China. Washington has been closely involved in backing and assisting Manila to mount a legal challenge to China under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). A ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague is due in coming weeks.

While demanding that China abide by the outcome, the US is contemptuous of international law. It has not ratified UNCLOS and has mounted its so-called freedom of navigation operations within Chinese-claimed waters before a judgment has been released. Washington will ratchet up its operations against Beijing in the South China Sea regardless of the court findings.

China has reacted to the “pivot” with its own military build-up and the whipping up of Chinese nationalism. This only serves to divide the international working class, the only social force capable of preventing the slide into war. Just days before Carter arrived in the Philippines, the right-wing Washington Free Beacon reported that China had test-fired a nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile able to hit any target in the United States. The Chinese military issued a brief statement neither confirming nor denying the test, but insisting on China’s right to carry out such a launch.

Beijing’s response to the US military build-up and provocations is reactionary and plays into Washington’s hands. The US, which is expanding its already huge military presence in Asia, cynically seizes on any incident as the pretext for accusing Beijing of “militarisation” and “expansionism” in the South China Sea. Last week, the US State Department criticised China’s use of a military transport aircraft to airlift injured workers from Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly island group.

As the tribunal ruling in The Hague looms, China, which has refused to recognise the court’s jurisdiction, is attempting to garner diplomatic support. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi announced a four-point consensus with Brunei, Cambodia and Laos on Saturday over the South China Sea, upholding Beijing’s stance that the maritime disputes should be resolved bilaterally and without outside interference.

For its part, Washington is mounting a propaganda campaign suggesting that China will declare an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) and extend its land reclamation activities to the Scarborough Shoal following the court ruling. All of this points to preparations for far more aggressive US provocations, for which last week’s air operation over the South China Sea could be a dress rehearsal.

I would agree Mike Green is a weeaboo hack.

CSIS report argues for strong US-Japan-Australia alliance against China
By Peter Symonds
9 April 2016
As the US ramps up its military provocations in the South China Sea against China, the Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) issued a major report this month entitled “Australia-Japan-US Maritime Cooperation.” It calls for greater military integration between the United States and its two chief allies in Asia.

The report argues for a “federated defence” in response to “the evolving threat environment in Asia and the Pacific, including increasing Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea and East China Sea.” In reality, “federated defence” is nothing but a system of military alliances in preparation for war with China—akin to the alliances that preceded the previous two world wars.

The report contains specific recommendations to enhance “inter-operability” on intelligence and surveillance, submarine and anti-submarine warfare, amphibious forces and logistics. It also outlines the extent to which the three imperialist powers already act together. The United States has longstanding alliances with Japan and Australia, which, with Washington’s encouragement, have developed closer military ties between themselves over the past decade.

The report’s author, Andrew Shearer, is a senior figure in the Australian foreign policy and military establishment, having served as national security adviser to two prime ministers, John Howard and Tony Abbott. Shearer is also very well connected in Washington. There, as the CSIS notes, he has been a senior diplomat who “worked at the coal-face of the Australia-US alliance to strengthen defence, security, and intelligence cooperation.” His presence at the CSIS, a think tank centrally involved in the US military build-up against China, is another indication of the close collaboration between Washington and Canberra.

The CSIS report dispenses with the usual attempts to dress up military collaboration as necessary to respond to natural disasters, piracy, terrorism and so on. It bluntly declares that while “these low intensity missions are necessary, they are no longer sufficient. Federated defence is more ambitious, recognising a new approach is also needed to the more traditional and fundamental ‘hard security’ objectives of deterring potential aggression and reassuring regional allies and partners.”

Shearer makes clear, in his detailed comparison of China’s military capabilities with those of the United States, Australia and Japan, that the main “hard security” objective is to prepare for war with China. He highlights “the most immediate concern of US defence planners” as being China’s development of so-called A2/AD weapons—Anti-Access, Area Denial—aimed at countering the US military in waters off the Chinese mainland in the event of conflict.

The Pentagon’s preoccupation with “freedom of navigation” and China’s A2/AD systems flows directly from its military strategy for war with China—Air Sea Battle. This is premised on being able to launch massive missile and air attacks on the Chinese mainland from warships and submarines in nearby waters, as well as from military bases in Japan and South Korea. Australia and Japan are central to Air Sea Battle and associated strategies, which include a naval blockade of China to strangle its economy.

“In the event of a conflict with China, the United States and its allies could adopt a range of strategies to counter its A2/AD capabilities,” the report explains. All are based on Air Sea Battle, which “relies on networked, integrated forces to take the offensive across air, maritime, land, space and cyberspace to disrupt, destroy and defeat an adversary’s A2/AD capabilities, allowing friendly forces maximum flexibility to defeat opposing forces.”

Japan would be central to such a blitzkrieg and “would also play an important role in executing less direct strategies based on maritime denial.” Such a naval blockade would destroy Chinese naval and commercial shipping within the first island chain [waters near China] to cripple China’s economy and hem its military forces into the near sea.”

The report identifies Australia’s role as akin that played during World War II—“as a vital logistics base and stronghold athwart key lines of communication between the Pacific and Indian Oceans.” It notes that Australia already has been engaged in discussions about Air Sea Battle with US defence officials “and could be expected to contribute a range of niche contributions in support of any such efforts… Australia’s submarines, in particular, could be called upon to operate around archipelagic chokepoints between South East Asia and the Indian Ocean in any maritime denial scenario.”

As a result, the report places a premium on developing military ties between Australia and Japan—described as the “northern and southern ‘anchors’ of the US alliance system in the Pacific.” These moves have accelerated since the signing of a joint declaration on security cooperation in 2007, and especially following the election of Japan’s right-wing Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. His government last year rammed through unconstitutional legislation enabling “collective self-defence.” The new law gives the green light for the Japanese military to directly participate in US-led wars of aggression, to forge quasi-alliances with other countries, such as Australia, and to sell arms abroad.

The Australian government is in the process of tendering for a new fleet of submarines that will cost at least $50 billion to build and another $100 billion to maintain. Acting as a mouthpiece for the Pentagon, Shearer co-authored an Australian article this month with CSIS senior vice-president for Asia, Michael Green, strongly arguing that the Japanese bid should be chosen over its German and French rivals on strategic grounds.

“Australia, the US and regional stability will benefit from a highly capable and interoperable Australian submarine force and from a more engaged Japan. From a strategic viewpoint, it’s hard to argue that Japan isn’t the best international submarine partner for Australia,” the article declared.

The CSIS report also calls for other allies and strategic partners, especially India, to be integrated into the framework of a trilateral US-Japan-Australia “federated defence” system.

A quadrilateral defence initiative or “quad” involving India was first mooted in 2007 by Abe, during his first term in office, but it was sunk by Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd in 2008. Australia’s unilateral withdrawal alienated the US and contributed to Rudd’s ouster in 2010 by Labor Party powerbrokers linked to Washington. While suggesting that a quadrilateral alliance should remain a long-term objective, the CSIS report concludes that “there is no time to lose,” so the main focus should be on strengthening naval ties between the US, Japan and Australia.

The sense of urgency that runs through the document, as well as its open discussion of scenarios for war with China—that is, one involving nuclear-armed powers—is a sharp warning that Washington is not preparing for conflict in the distant future. Indeed, one of the report’s reasons for closer trilateral collaboration is that US predominance is waning—“the US military is steadily losing the technological edge it has enjoyed for more than half a century.” This is an argument for waging war sooner, rather than later.