South China Sea Strategies for other nations (Not China)

Brumby · Apr 17, 2016

I said I was giving you the last word but your conclusion has not only mischaracterised my position and arguments but conveniently ignored my rebuttal as a failure to address your points now warrants a summarised rebuttal of our discussions to-date.

Bltizo said:
This is an entirely tangential to the original point at hand, which is your claim that China's supposed deviation from the norm in its ADIZ is required to follow certain existing legal frameworks to be considered legitimate, when no such legal requirement exists in the world.

You are making a statement about how you believe something should be done, but you lack the means to argue that not doing so in that way is legally incorrect, because as I've repeatedly said, there are no legal requirements for it to be done in the way you believe.

The issues are :

(1) The source of legitimacy of ADIZ

(2) The deviation in practice by China in enforcing ADIZ in the ESC and the legal issue associated with it

Your argument on ADIZ is principally that there are no specific international laws as a source to determine how a ADIZ is meant to function. As such China is not bound by any limitation in administration of its own ADIZ.

My reply :

Brumby said:
there are no specific international laws governing ADIZ. Primarily international laws are not like domestic legislation but typically comes about through customary and state practices and occasionally like UNCLOS which is a comprehensive set of laws that the international community managed to agree upon. As I mentioned before, ADIZ is just an offshoot of the internationally recognised territorial 12 nm sea limit and adopting the principle of "as below so above" giving rise to the concept of the 12 nm national airspace. In effect, the administration of it is drawn primarily from the principles of UNCLOS and the Chicago Convention (Convention on International Civil Aviation).

The point is while ADIZ lack specific international laws, that in itself doesn’t mean it lacks sources of international laws in which it is grounded upon and where it needs to reference to. I have pointed out that the sources are UNCLOS and the Chicago Convention. Your rebuttal can only come in three forms. My argument is wrong either in law, fact or logic. You have offered none other than brute reasoning that it must be drawn from specific legislation. Such a position is not tenable because it is flawed in law (international practice) and in logic (exclusive reasoning).

The second issue is pertaining to this statement that you made and I quote ” You are making a statement about how you believe something should be done, but you lack the means to argue that not doing so in that way is legally incorrect, because as I've repeatedly said, there are no legal requirements for it to be done in the way you believe.” The problem with your argument is in its logic in warranting an answer tailored to your narrative. The source of the contention is associated with the deviation in practice by China as opposed to the rest of the international community (except maybe South Korea). The argument is not whether ADIZ needs to be enforced in a particular way but whether the deviation in practice by China conforms to international laws or whether it infringes international principles. Specifically my reply :

Brumby said:
The question to ask is outside of the 12 nm airspace, what laws govern international airspace and hence on what principles are administration of ADIZ drawn from. Whatever administrative actions that arise have to be based on some sound legal principles. By definition, international airspace are not bound by sovereignty conditions except to the extend that the international aviation authority had put together a set of rules that are primarily meant to ensure aviation safety.

and

Brumby said:
With regards to international airspace it is grounded on the principle of caelum liberam (freedom of the skies). As such any administration of ADIZ needs to reconcile to this overriding principle and any potential conflict has to be addressed qualitatively and not just brushed off as an inconvenience. Any infringement of movement especially if threats are imposed have to be grounded on some credible principle and not just as a matter of preference especially when it is an international issue.

and

Brumby said:
ADIZ has to reconcile to the principle of unhindered movement within international airspace. Procedurally it is generally accepted as a pre-condition to enter a country's national airspace just like you need a visa. That is in itself intuitive enough without having to go through the justification of why a visa is needed or the legal basis for it. If you don't intend to enter country X you don't have to get a visa just like when an aircraft is just transiting through international airspace. The problem is that you keep on arguing that there are no legal basis to prevent you from insisting that person needs to get a visa regardless and that includes exercising a threat because the person don't have a visa. In this case, such an imposition is unreasonable relative to the principle of freedom of movement in international airspace. If you wish to override such an important principle, you need to have a compelling legal justification.

in summary my argument is that the deviation of practice in ADIZ administration by China infringes the general principle of freedom of movement in international airspace. In my replies I have given you very specific reasoning. A proper rebuttal requires you to point out whether I have err in law, fact or logic. You have offered none other than mischaracterisation of the discussions and you have offered no compelling argument why China can unilaterally infringe freedom of movement in international airspace.

Bltizo said:
You originally said the inclusion of the use of force in the ECS ADIZ had no legal grounding.

My premises in response to this are simple:

1: there are no legal requirements for an ADIZ to have legal grounding.

2: thus technically, one can write their own ADIZ however they like and remain legally sound.

The problem with your argument is one of logic. You can’t simply premise your argument on the basis that your premise is correct to begin with i.e. premise 1 “there are no legal requirements for an ADIZ to have legal grounding”. That is circular reasoning.

Bltizo said:
No one's saying that conflict rules apply during peacetime, and I've never said that China's ADIZ procedures is one of conflict procedures.

I am merely saying that China's ADIZ procedure can be sensibly interpreted to account for all levels of tension including that of war time, and there is nothing about doing so which breaks any existing laws.

Your reply here defies the law of non contradiction. Either the rules are meant for conflict or it is not. You are trying very hard to bend the rules of logic in your reply but you can’t defy it. In war time, the rules as governing in peace time are suspended. It is either a or b. You are arguing a and b.

Blitzo · Apr 17, 2016

Brumby said:
I said I was giving you the last word but your conclusion has not only mischaracterised my position and arguments but conveniently ignored my rebuttal as a failure to address your points now warrants a summarised rebuttal of our discussions to-date.

The issues are :

(1) The source of legitimacy of ADIZ

(2) The deviation in practice by China in enforcing ADIZ in the ESC and the legal issue associated with it

Your argument on ADIZ is principally that there are no specific international laws as a source to determine how a ADIZ is meant to function. As such China is not bound by any limitation in administration of its own ADIZ.

No. I am saying that there are no specific international laws for how ADIZs must be conducted, including the fact that its procedures do not need to be established on the basis of any existing laws.

In my last post I did say this:

You can however argue that particular clauses of an ADIZ may infringe on other internationally accepted laws, but you are unable to criticize an ADIZ for lacking a legal grounding because there is no requirement for an ADIZ to have it.

Having looked at the rest of your reply, I think I finally understand where our differences lie. I'll elaborate on it further below.

My reply :

The point is while ADIZ lack specific international laws, that in itself doesn’t mean it lacks sources of international laws in which it is grounded upon and where it needs to reference to. I have pointed out that the sources are UNCLOS and the Chicago Convention. Your rebuttal can only come in three forms. My argument is wrong either in law, fact or logic. You have offered none other than brute reasoning that it must be drawn from specific legislation. Such a position is not tenable because it is flawed in law (international practice) and in logic (exclusive reasoning).

I have no qualms with your position that you believe ADIZs can rely on the basis of existing international law to draw its procedures from, whether it's the Chicago convention or what not.

My issue is your belief that all ADIZs have to rely on the basis of existing law, and that if it does not then it is illegitimate.

However, if you want to argue that if an ADIZ's clause crosses an existing law and therefore you believe a particular clause is illegitimate, I would be willing to engage the argument on those terms.

The difference between the two is subtle but that is the difference I have been spending the last few posts on about.

The second issue is pertaining to this statement that you made and I quote ” You are making a statement about how you believe something should be done, but you lack the means to argue that not doing so in that way is legally incorrect, because as I've repeatedly said, there are no legal requirements for it to be done in the way you believe.” The problem with your argument is in its logic in warranting an answer tailored to your narrative. The source of the contention is associated with the deviation in practice by China as opposed to the rest of the international community (except maybe South Korea). The argument is not whether ADIZ needs to be enforced in a particular way but whether the deviation in practice by China conforms to international laws or whether it infringes international principles. Specifically my reply :

and

and

in summary my argument is that the deviation of practice in ADIZ administration by China infringes the general principle of freedom of movement in international airspace. In my replies I have given you very specific reasoning. A proper rebuttal requires you to point out whether I have err in law, fact or logic. You have offered none other than mischaracterisation of the discussions and you have offered no compelling argument why China can unilaterally infringe freedom of movement in international airspace.

Okay, I think I understand your position now. You're saying a if particular clause of the ADIZ violates any existing laws then it is illegitimate. I am willing to engage your argument on those terms, so long as you are not arguing that any any ADIZ is legally illegitimate if the entire thing is not derived from existing legal groundings.

In this case, you are arguing that China's ADIZ procedures and its administration of its ADIZ infringes on the principle of freedom of movement in international airspace, and because of that it is illegitimate, am I correct?

Assuming that is your argument, then it becomes a question of whether China's ADIZ either in procedure if practice infringes on the principle of freedom of movement in international airspace.
I'm sure you can tell what my answer to that will be.

The problem with your argument is one of logic. You can’t simply premise your argument on the basis that your premise is correct to begin with i.e. premise 1 “there are no legal requirements for an ADIZ to have legal grounding”. That is circular reasoning.

I think you may have misunderstood what I meant by "legal requirements" and "legal grounding"

By "legal requirements" I mean internationally accepted regulations for how an ADIZ is meant to be conducted. "Legal grounding" would be one of the potential clauses in a hypothetical internationally accepted regulation for ADIZs.
Your original statement from all those posts before suggested that a potential SCS ADIZ would have no legal basis, whereupon I argued that there is no legal requirement for any ADIZ to be based on existing legal bases because there are no internationally binding legal procedures around ADIZs to begin with.

If you wish, you can interpret my premise 1 as "there are no legal requirements for ADIZs (of any kind, including the need to have legal grounding)".

Your reply here defies the law of non contradiction. Either the rules are meant for conflict or it is not. You are trying very hard to bend the rules of logic in your reply but you can’t defy it. In war time, the rules as governing in peace time are suspended. It is either a or b. You are arguing a and b.

Correct, I am arguing that the procedures can be comprehensive enough to include provisions for A and B.

Instead of having multiple separate statements describing the exact response in each level of tension and aircraft (such as: response to civilian aircraft during peacetime, response to civilian aircraft during wartime, response to military aircraft during peacetime, response to military aircraft during wartime, (and so on and so forth)), one single statement captures the entire spectrum of potential responses to different aircraft in different scenarios.
I see no legal issue with that.

joshuatree · Apr 17, 2016

confusion said:
List of build dates: 1993, 1994, 1994, 1995, 2000, 2009, 2009, 2012, 2013

Four of those lighthouse build dates are post Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the SCS (2002). Which makes singling out China for "violating the spirit of the declaration" nothing more than pure bias if Vietnam gets a pass.Can't be selective if one is objective.

Brumby · Apr 17, 2016

Bltizo said:
I have no qualms with your position that you believe ADIZs can rely on the basis of existing international law to draw its procedures from, whether it's the Chicago convention or what not.

My issue is your belief that all ADIZs have to rely on the basis of existing law, and that if it does not then it is illegitimate.

I am arguing that ADIZ has to be grounded on some international convention. Implicitly in that statement it is based on some recognised, established and accepted practice. You are saying it need not. This offers you the most freedom to justify such a statement. Please proceed.

Bltizo said:
However, if you want to argue that if an ADIZ's clause crosses an existing law and therefore you believe a particular clause is illegitimate, I would be willing to engage the argument on those terms.

Okay, I think I understand your position now. You're saying a if particular clause of the ADIZ violates any existing laws then it is illegitimate. I am willing to engage your argument on those terms, so long as you are not arguing that any any ADIZ is legally illegitimate if the entire thing is not derived from existing legal groundings.

In this case, you are arguing that China's ADIZ procedures and its administration of its ADIZ infringes on the principle of freedom of movement in international airspace, and because of that it is illegitimate, am I correct?

Assuming that is your argument, then it becomes a question of whether China's ADIZ either in procedure if practice infringes on the principle of freedom of movement in international airspace.
I'm sure you can tell what my answer to that will be.

Yes but so far your answer is logically unsound to begin with. You can't have a peace and conflict procedure being applicable at the same time. That is a logical impossibility. For example, you can't be white and black at the same time.

Bltizo said:
I think you may have misunderstood what I meant by "legal requirements" and "legal grounding"

By "legal requirements" I mean internationally accepted regulations for how an ADIZ is meant to be conducted. "Legal grounding" would be one of the potential clauses in a hypothetical internationally accepted regulation for ADIZs.
Your original statement from all those posts before suggested that a potential SCS ADIZ would have no legal basis, whereupon I argued that there is no legal requirement for any ADIZ to be based on existing legal bases because there are no internationally binding legal procedures around ADIZs to begin with.

There are two parts to the issue. The first part is that any ADIZ in the SCS is illegitimate because the islands are in dispute. The second part is your argument that ADIZ can be conducted in practice without actually calling it as such. Technically yes in terms of conduct but not as enforcement. I would then question the nature and purpose of such a program. Based on your previous explanation it would merely be a shadowing exercise.

Bltizo said:
Correct, I am arguing that the procedures can be comprehensive enough to include provisions for A and B.

Instead of having multiple separate statements describing the exact response in each level of tension and aircraft (such as: response to civilian aircraft during peacetime, response to civilian aircraft during wartime, response to military aircraft during peacetime, response to military aircraft during wartime, (and so on and so forth)), one single statement captures the entire spectrum of potential responses to different aircraft in different scenarios.
I see no legal issue with that.

I understand your argument except the construct of China's statement on ADIZ in the ESC does not correspond to such an interpretation. You can stretch the meaning but you are arguing a position that cannot even be reasonably construed. The following is the Chinese statement "The Chinese military will adopt emergency defensive measures in response to aircraft that refuse to follow the instructions". There are no exclusions, no exceptions, and no conditions attached to it except that is precisely what you are arguing.

Blitzo · Apr 17, 2016

Brumby said:
I am arguing that ADIZ has to be grounded on some international convention. Implicitly in that statement it is based on some recognised, established and accepted practice. You are saying it need not. This offers you the most freedom to justify such a statement. Please proceed.

I am arguing that ADIZs do not need to be grounded in any sort of international convention to be legally legitimate, however it can be argued that an ADIZ could be considered legally illegitimate if it infringes on other existing laws.

In practice I think we are saying the same thing, but it is the phrasing which is the point of disagreement.

Yes but so far your answer is logically unsound to begin with. You can't have a peace and conflict procedure being applicable at the same time. That is a logical impossibility. For example, you can't be white and black at the same time.

Are you replying to the correct part of my post here?
In the part of my post which you quote, I am not talking about the ADIZ "emergency defensive measures" matter, only the general basis on which we are making our arguments.

But I'll address your point anyway, ahem:
I am not saying that a peace and conflict procedure is applicable at the same time, but rather that there is a spectrum of procedures which can be applied depending on the situation which may differ over time.

There are two parts to the issue. The first part is that any ADIZ in the SCS is illegitimate because the islands are in dispute. The second part is your argument that ADIZ can be conducted in practice without actually calling it as such. Technically yes in terms of conduct but not as enforcement. I would then question the nature and purpose of such a program. Based on your previous explanation it would merely be a shadowing exercise.

I'm not sure how this is relevant to the part of my post which you quoted.

I was clarifying what I meant by "legal requirement" and "legal grounding," to state that my argument was not circular.

I think you're talking about the whole "ADIZ-like" operation I described a few posts back, and I'm not really sure how it's relevant...

I understand your argument except the construct of China's statement on ADIZ in the ESC does not correspond to such an interpretation. You can stretch the meaning but you are arguing a position that cannot even be reasonably construed. The following is the Chinese statement "The Chinese military will adopt emergency defensive measures in response to aircraft that refuse to follow the instructions". There are no exclusions, no exceptions, and no conditions attached to it except that is precisely what you are arguing.

On the contrary I think my interpretation of the statement about emergency defensive response is a very obvious interpretation that any legal or defense professional would be able to deduce the likely meaning of.

Furthermore, in my post 1324, I did say: "You can argue that the lack of clear differentiation of varying levels of "defensive responses" creates room for misunderstanding and tension, which I would agree with, but I also maintain my position that there is nothing about the wording of that ADIZ procedure which is inconsistent with international law."

And that is still the position I maintain.

Brumby · Apr 17, 2016

Bltizo said:
I am arguing that ADIZs do not need to be grounded in any sort of international convention to be legally legitimate, however it can be argued that an ADIZ could be considered legally illegitimate if it infringes on other existing laws.

In practice I think we are saying the same thing, but it is the phrasing which is the point of disagreement.

Are you replying to the correct part of my post here?
In the part of my post which you quote, I am not talking about the ADIZ "emergency defensive measures" matter, only the general basis on which we are making our arguments.

But I'll address your point anyway, ahem:
I am not saying that a peace and conflict procedure is applicable at the same time, but rather that there is a spectrum of procedures which can be applied depending on the situation which may differ over time.

I'm not sure how this is relevant to the part of my post which you quoted.

I was clarifying what I meant by "legal requirement" and "legal grounding," to state that my argument was not circular.

I think you're talking about the whole "ADIZ-like" operation I described a few posts back, and I'm not really sure how it's relevant...

On the contrary I think my interpretation of the statement about emergency defensive response is a very obvious interpretation that any legal or defense professional would be able to deduce the likely meaning of.

Furthermore, in my post 1324, I did say: "You can argue that the lack of clear differentiation of varying levels of "defensive responses" creates room for misunderstanding and tension, which I would agree with, but I also maintain my position that there is nothing about the wording of that ADIZ procedure which is inconsistent with international law."

And that is still the position I maintain.

Ok. I think we have made our respective positions known and reached an exhaustion point. I suggest we move on to other things.

Blitzo · Apr 17, 2016

Brumby said:
Ok. I think we have made our respective positions known and reached an exhaustion point. I suggest we move on to other things.

Very well.

confusion · Apr 18, 2016

This is much more cost-effective than traditional SSNs, a rationale that's not mentioned in the article, but it might just be the most important reason to make this move - seems like a no-brainer to do this.

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‘Unmanned undersea vehicles’ part of Pentagon plan to deter Beijing from seeking to dominate region

As it watches China build up its presence in the South China Sea, one reclaimed island at a time, the US military is betting on a new technology to help retain its edge — submarine drones.

During the past six months, the Pentagon has started to talk publicly about a once-secret programme to develop unmanned undersea vehicles, the term given the drone subs that are becoming part of its plan to deter
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.

Ashton Carter, US defence secretary, made special mention of drone subs in a speech about military strategy in Asia and hinted at their
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, which has large areas of shallower water.

The Pentagon’s investment in subs “includes new undersea drones in multiple sizes and diverse payloads that can, importantly, operate in shallow water, where manned submarines cannot”, said Mr Carter, who visited a US warship in the South China Sea on Friday.

By lifting the veil on new technologies such as drone subs, some of which it hopes will be operational by the end of the decade, the Pentagon is trying to deter potential rivals such as China and Russia by pointing to its continuing military superiority. The drones are part of a
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as it tries to keep one step ahead.

“The idea is that if we were ever to get into a bust-up in the South China Sea, the Chinese would not know for sure what sort of capabilities the US might have,” says Shawn Brimley, a former White House and Pentagon official now at the Center for a New American Security. “This might have some deterrent impact on the potential for provocative behaviour.”

Mr Carter’s trip to the USS Stennis on Friday was part of a visit to the Philippines aimed at expanding military co-operation between the two countries that is partly aimed at checking China’s growing influence. The Philippines, which will now host US fighter jets, is one of the countries that has contested claims with China for some of the land features and islands in the South China Sea.

“Countries across the Asia-Pacific are voicing concern with China’s land reclamation, which stands out in size and scope, as well as its militarisation in the South China Sea,” Mr Carter said in Manila on Thursday.

As military competition intensifies in the western Pacific between the US and China, submarines have become one of the key areas. China’s heavy investment in missiles has put at risk US land-based forces in the region and some of its surface vessels. As a result the US is investing $8bn next year in submarines to “ensure ours is the most lethal and most advanced undersea and anti-submarine force in the world”, as Mr Carter put it last week.

Small, remotely operated subs have been used for some time in search and rescue and the Navy has been using Remus drones to search for mines. The new investments are in more autonomous vessels that might eventually carry weapons.

Last autumn, the US Navy unveiled a 10-foot, semi-autonomous sub drone known as the
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, which is due to conduct its first test voyage in open seas in the summer. Officials hope that a squadron will be operating by 2020 if tests go well. As well as being able to operate for 30 days at a time, other distinguishing features of the submarine include being
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.

The initial function of sub drones is expected to be surveillance, however naval planners believe there are endless potential uses. One model is what one official calls a Russian doll approach — with a mother sub or surface vessel that can then release a series of much smaller drones that could be mines or used to track subs or even launch their own missiles.

Small sub drones would be much harder to monitor using sonar systems that are designed to find large objects in deep waters. It might be possible, for instance, for a vessel to enter an enemy harbour unobserved.

The Pentagon’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has been testing a programme it calls upward falling payloads — robot pods that would hide on the ocean floor for years and release sub drones or small surveillance aircraft once activated. Another reconnaissance drone under development is shaped and swims like a small fish.

“The use of undersea drones opens up a whole new area of capabilities,” said Mr Brimley.

The principal obstacles at the moment are providing enough power for the drones so that they can stay underwater for long periods and communicating with them.

Officials are also debating how much autonomy they will want to give sub drones — an issue that will become more difficult if and when they start to carry weapons.

As well as investing in undersea drones, the US is developing
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. Last week the Pentagon unveiled what it calls the Sea Hunter, the prototype of a sub hunter. Robert Work, deputy secretary of defence, said the vessels could be used in the western Pacific in the next five years.

AndrewS · Apr 18, 2016

It's a no brainer for the Chinese to use submarine drones as well.

In general, China started development later than the US, but the technology is easier to master because:

1. With unmanned drones, you can iterate and develop faster than if you had to worry about a hardware mistake or software glitch killing the crew.
2. Drones can rely on quantity rather than quality, so they can use large numbers of commercial grade hardware/technology.
3. Done technology in general is being led by the commercial world rather than the military, and the Chinese tech giants know this is the future.

Underwater drones hold the promise of neutralising the current US advantage in submarine warfare, which was why China identified this as part of its own strategy some years ago.

So whilst the US thinks this will intimidate China and demonstrate US military superiority to ASEAN - the end result is that China will simply continue in the SCS as before and also accelerate its own development efforts to build a bigger and better underwater drone army.

Again, China is the world's largest trading nation and the vast majority of that trade traverses the waters of the SCS next to mainland China, so I don't see how China would be content with US underwater superiority in the region.

Given how underwater drones would be small, stealthy and dirt cheap - along with technological/financial parity between China and the US - this means both China and the US could theoretically shut down all shipping in the Western Pacific.

But remember China is the same size as the continent spanning USA and shares numerous land borders with neighbouring countries, so China is inherently more self-sufficient against blockade than the smaller littoral island nations in the rest of the Western Pacific like Japan/Korea/Taiwan/Philippines.

They have a critical reliance on seaborne shipping for the commercial economy AND also for military resupply as the US is all the way on the other side of the Pacific Ocean.

SamuraiBlue · Apr 18, 2016

@AndrewS

Some questions about your drones.
How big are your imaginary drones and how deep does it dive?
You see communicating underwater is a difficult task in which at depth of 50m or below you'll need to transmit at ultra low frequency waves like the US using what's know as the Elephant cage and can only send about 5~10 bits or 5 to 10 letters a second.
Any shallower and it becomes much easier to detect with sonar since it is above the thermal layer.

At the moment most nations are not thinking about autonomous attack underwater drone due to the various difficulties and this goes with PLAN as well.

South China Sea Strategies for other nations (Not China)

Brumby

Major

Blitzo

Lieutenant General

joshuatree

Captain

Brumby

Major

Blitzo

Lieutenant General

Brumby

Major

Blitzo

Lieutenant General

confusion

Junior Member

AndrewS

Brigadier

SamuraiBlue

Captain