South China Sea Strategies for other nations (Not China)

Brumby

Major
Heh I'm sure there are more than a few people who would say the ball is in the US courts...
The meaning of the ball being in which court is associated not just by actions but whether those actions lead to changes to the status quo and more importantly whether they are conducted within a rule based order or they are actions that lack legitimacy. Conducting FON within the provisions of UNCLOS are legitimate. China might not like some of those activities but China needs to respect there is an established system that governs behaviour. The conversation is not simply about actions but whether they are legitimate. If the view is that the US is acting out of norms then what is it and not just because China doesn't like it.

I think your understanding of ADIZs are only partly correct.
I don't agree. The contention is that you have a different interpretation of ADIZ and more importantly the basis from which it is derived.

First of all, there are no legal foundations for ADIZs in general. That is to say, there is no international consensus on what constitutes a "legal" or "standard ADIZ that I'm aware of.
I could not disagree more. Form follow substance and substance is derived from basic international laws that govern international boundaries. Each country has territorial sovereign space as defined by the 12nm out to sea. The reasoning then follows that the same distance in sovereign airspace applies as with the sea. When the US introduced ADIZ, the basis of it is foundered upon this principle and the Chicago convention basically affirms this practice as being consistent with international law. The ADIZ beyond the 12 nm is meant to identify aircraft as a pre-requirement to enter into the 12 nm sovereign airspace. Aircraft that do not wish to enter and are merely transiting through are not obliged to notify. This is how every country that has imposed ADIZ has gone about enforcement until China came along with the ADIZ in the ESC. The difference is that China requires notification within the ADIZ even if the aircraft is transiting through. There is no legal standing on this because outside of the 12nm it is international airspace and hence China has no jurisdiction to impose such a requirement and the reason why the US and Japan has simply ignore such a condition. The analogy is the same as getting a visa before entering a country. I am not obligated to get a visa from country B if I have no intention to enter country B.

Furthermore, an ADIZ most definitely does not have to be conducted over one's own airspace -- it can extend hundreds of km out beyond one's own coast and territorial waters/airspace and well beyond one's own EEZ as well into international waters and airspace.
As explained above, ADIZ outside the 12 nm is international airspace. China has no right to impose any condition except to those intending to enter its 12nm territorial airspace. The threat of consequences outside of the 12nm is clearly outside of international law. If you wish to argue that China has the right to conduct in a certain manner outside of that 12nm, please outline the basis for its actions in international law.

Of course, it is generally normal for an ADIZ to not include the territory of other nations, therefore the establishment of an ADIZ in the SCS is another way for China to establish its claim of sovereignty over the rock and island features included within the ADIZ boundaries.
I think you have got the logic the wrong way round. ADIZ is derived from sovereignty and not that imposing an ADIZ will reinforce a sovereignty claim. Sovereignty is established through title and title accords certain rights. If title is not established but disputed, then there is no source in legitimacy of imposing ADIZ. This is why any attempts to introduce ADIZ is so antagonistic. It is equivalent to thumbing its nose at the international community. This is besides the fact that ADIZ is notionally tolerated because of the recognition in flight time across 12 nm is short and hence countries need some form of allowance to prepare entry of an airplane into its airspace. In the SCS we are talking about rocks that are barely above water even in low tides. Imposing ADIZ is simply making a farce of international convention.

You are also right in saying that there are a few differences in the fine print of ADIZs such as the Chinese ECS ADIZ requiring aircraft to provide flight plans for entering the ADIZ even if they are not intending to enter Chinese airspace, but the lack of any sort of unified international ADIZ guideline makes it difficult to truly pin this down as a big issue, especially if one considers the fact that one's own ADIZ rules likely depends on the strategic air situation they are facing.
It is not an argument over fine print or it is dependent on some extenuating reason. Other countries don't make things up as they go about introducing ADIZ. It is grounded on some international principles and law that has standing. Every action has a basis and is not because of preference or feeling. That is what differentiates a rule based order versus what China is doing on many fronts.

Second of all, I think you make a mistake in assuming that China has to somehow enforce an ADIZ or else risk looking "impotent". That is not the way an ADIZ typically works -- they are essentially a non-binding statement of intent that aircraft which do not comply with its terms may face certain military measures (usually escort and visual identification), but those measures could mean anything. Aircraft may try to flout the ADIZ, such as the couple of B-52s which skirted the eastern edge of China's ADIZ back in late 2013 when it was first announced, and may well be able to go about their business without any sort of Chinese fighter escort, but that would not be a problem for the Chinese. An ADIZ is essentially an announcement to all aircraft that if they do not follow the ADIZ guidelines they might be scoped out by a fighter jet to confirm their intent.
Once an ADIZ is introduced the Pandora box is opened and events that may normally be benign will become inextricably unpredictable and complex.

Something else I'm interested in is how the Philippines election may influence this. Specifically, the current front runner (a fellow called Duterte) has made some statements that he may be willing to take a more compromising position with China in time.
So the Philipino election will be something to watch.
However if you note the qualifier is that sovereignty is not negotiable but merely cooperation over economic activities. We now know with certainty that China's main game plan is sovereignty and the economic resources was simply a secondary consideration.

One could also argue that the ball is in the US court... they could volunteer to pull out some of their forward deployed military assets from the SCS and reduce the frequency and intensity of surveillance operations off China's coast.
But of course that is also geopolitically infeasible, and not in the strategic interests of the US. Fair enough.
That is another topic but the difference is that the US is acting within the rules and China is not and that is the problem.
 
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Blitzo

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Envision a circle. That circle is the territory that the ROC govt presently administers, including Taiping island.

Then consider China's one China principle, which is that all the territories administered by the ROC govt are part of China.

We draw a larger circle completely around the first circle.
Therefore, China's principle is that territory administered by the ROC are also effectively China's own, and that is the basis of certain actions.
That is what PanAsian means.
 
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Blitzo

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The meaning of the ball being in which court is associated not just by actions but whether those actions lead to changes to the status quo and more importantly whether they are conducted within a rule based order or they are actions that lack legitimacy. Conducting FON within the provisions of UNCLOS are legitimate. China might not like some of those activities but China needs to respect there is an established system that governs behaviour. The conversation is not simply about actions but whether they are legitimate. If the view is that the US is acting out of norms then what is it and not just because China doesn't like it.

The way I interpret the ball in the court phrase is that of the two sides, one side has the option to either continue acting in the way they have been or can cease acting the way they have been with far lower if not non-significant existentialist danger to their homeland and or threat to their vital nuclear deterrence facilities, while the other side does not.



I don't agree. The contention is that you have a different interpretation of ADIZ and more importantly the basis from which it is derived.

Okay, let's see where the contention lies.



I could not disagree more. Form follow substance and substance is derived from basic international laws that govern international boundaries. Each country has territorial sovereign space as defined by the 12nm out to sea. The reasoning then follows that the same distance in sovereign airspace applies as with the sea. When the US introduced ADIZ, the basis of it is foundered upon this principle and the Chicago convention basically affirms this practice as being consistent with international law. The ADIZ beyond the 12 nm is meant to identify aircraft as a pre-requirement to enter into the 12 nm sovereign airspace. Aircraft that do not wish to enter and are merely transiting through are not obliged to notify. This is how every country that has imposed ADIZ has gone about enforcement until China came along with the ADIZ in the ESC. The difference is that China requires notification within the ADIZ even if the aircraft is transiting through. There is no legal standing on this because outside of the 12nm it is international airspace and hence China has no jurisdiction to impose such a requirement and the reason why the US and Japan has simply ignore such a condition. The analogy is the same as getting a visa before entering a country. I am not obligated to get a visa from country B if I have no intention to enter country B.

I'm not intimately familiar with the ADIZs of South Korea or Japan, or those of any other nations like India, Norway and the UK (and many other countries) and only mildly familiar with that of the US and Canada.

However assuming for the sake of argument that all of those nations do have ADIZs along the same lines as what you have described, there remains no accepted international legal conventions for ADIZs as far as I am aware of.

If there was a legal clause stating that a nation can only impose certain requirements to an aircraft in their ADIZ if said aircraft was intending on entering their 12nmi sovereign airspace then I would be open to read it.


Furthermore, China is not the only nation with an ADIZ that states aircraft transiting its ADIZ without entering its sovereign airspace must also file a flight plan.
South Korea does so as well.
adiz .jpg

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However, I am not seeking to make this a "race to the bottom" to see how many nations have ADIZ regulations similar to China's.
For the sake of argument you can assume that all nations have ADIZs which comply with your perceived sense of regularity.

My position is that no agreed upon laws about a nation's ADIZ exist, only norms, therefore you can argue that the Chinese ECS and potential SCS ADIZ would flout international norms but not international law.



As explained above, ADIZ outside the 12 nm is international airspace. China has no right to impose any condition except to those intending to enter its 12nm territorial airspace. The threat of consequences outside of the 12nm is clearly outside of international law. If you wish to argue that China has the right to conduct in a certain manner outside of that 12nm, please outline the basis for its actions in international law.

See above.


I think you have got the logic the wrong way round. ADIZ is derived from sovereignty and not that imposing an ADIZ will reinforce a sovereignty claim. Sovereignty is established through title and title accords certain rights. If title is not established but disputed, then there is no source in legitimacy of imposing ADIZ. This is why any attempts to introduce ADIZ is so antagonistic. It is equivalent to thumbing its nose at the international community. This is besides the fact that ADIZ is notionally tolerated because of the recognition in flight time across 12 nm is short and hence countries need some form of allowance to prepare entry of an airplane into its airspace. In the SCS we are talking about rocks that are barely above water even in low tides. Imposing ADIZ is simply making a farce of international convention.

Sigh. Of course I know that an ADIZ is not capable of reinforcing a sovereignty claim in any sort of legal sense.
However, in practice that is exactly what it will indirectly achieve.
Note, I use the word "reinforce" not in any legal sense, but rather in the sense that the ADIZ would indirectly normalize Chinese aircraft to operate over disputed islands and or features and by that method reinforces the sovereignty claim by physical presence in the air.

By the way, I am not necessarily I support an ADIZ that overlaps disputed features. Personally I think China can do what it needs to in the SCS without announcing an ADIZ at all. I'm merely stating what the intention and result of such an action will be.


It is not an argument over fine print or it is dependent on some extenuating reason. Other countries don't make things up as they go about introducing ADIZ. It is grounded on some international principles and law that has standing. Every action has a basis and is not because of preference or feeling. That is what differentiates a rule based order versus what China is doing on many fronts.

You are insistent that there is some kind of accepted legal regulations surrounding ADIZ procedures, but there are none. The ICAO standards and Chicago convention do not address ADIZs.
Some other nations may have voluntarily abode by limits that they have chosen themselves, but there are also nations whose ADIZs are more expansive in nature.

So in effect, each nation is indeed making it up for themselves without any sort of internationally accepted legal framework around ADIZs.



Once an ADIZ is introduced the Pandora box is opened and events that may normally be benign will become inextricably unpredictable and complex.

I can agree with that, however I would again like to repeat that China would have no obligation to enforce its ADIZ at every single non complying aircraft


However if you note the qualifier is that sovereignty is not negotiable but merely cooperation over economic activities. We now know with certainty that China's main game plan is sovereignty and the economic resources was simply a secondary consideration.

Potentially.

I think China may be willing to acquiesce to a degree, but it would depend on negotiating from a position of overwhelming strength and probably with some private prostration from the other side.



That is another topic but the difference is that the US is acting within the rules and China is not and that is the problem.

Some others see the problem as the US insisting on maintain an overwhelming degree of forward deployed military and surveillance capability and China having no choice to encourage them to reduce that capability and must thus resort to other means for its defense.
 
according to NavyTimes John McCain is done pussyfooting around with China
A powerful Senate hawk is warning that China may take aggressive moves in the South China Sea in the next few weeks ahead of an international court ruling — and he’s calling for the U.S. Navy to stop them.

China is undermining international law and picking on its neighbors, argues
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chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, in a recent editorial.

“Over the past several years, China has acted less like a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in the rules-based order in the Asia-Pacific region and more like a bully,” McCain wrote in an April 12 editorial in Financial Times.

The Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Netherlands is expected to rule in June on a case brought against China’s claims in the South China Sea by the Philippines. China may try to build new islands or declare part or all of the South China Sea an Air Defense Identification Zone, McCain warned.

An ADIZ is a zone of airspace controlled and enforced by a government. A 2013 ADIZ created by China over the Japanese-held Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea has been largely condemned and ignored by the U.S. and its allies in the region.

McCain, a retired Navy captain who
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for resisting his captors during the Vietnam war, is calling for a “freedom of the seas campaign” to counter China’s claims.

As part of the campaign, he is urging the U.S. to sail its carrier strike group by Scarborough Shoal. This reef about 140 miles from the Philippines capital of Manila is a flashpoint in the South China Sea. China seized it in 2012. If China opts to set up radars and missile batteries there, they could menace U.S. forces in the Philippines, strategists say.

“The administration should consider having its carrier strike group patrol the waters near Scarborough Shoal in a visible display of U.S. combat power,” McCain wrote.

Carrier John C. Stennis is operating in the South China Sea, and has been since the end of March, according to U.S. Pacific Fleet.

The campaign would also include stepped up freedom of navigation patrols around Chinese-claimed features and artificial islands, as well as increasing the number of patrol days in the hotly contested sea. The administration should also move more naval, air and ground forces into the region and reaffirm its commitment to the Philippines mutual defense pact, McCain said.

Defense Secretary Ash Carter announced Friday that troops and combat aircraft would be deploying to the Philippines as defense cooperation has been deepening between the two counties.
source:
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Brumby

Major
The way I interpret the ball in the court phrase is that of the two sides, one side has the option to either continue acting in the way they have been or can cease acting the way they have been with far lower if not non-significant existentialist danger to their homeland and or threat to their vital nuclear deterrence facilities, while the other side does not.
Not sure what you are saying. It seems to me the contention is about who is responsible for raising the tension. My view of the source is in which China is changing the status quo in highly questionable manner. The issue is not a rising China but the manner in which power is exercised and lacking legitimacy.

I'm not intimately familiar with the ADIZs of South Korea or Japan, or those of any other nations like India, Norway and the UK (and many other countries) and only mildly familiar with that of the US and Canada.

However assuming for the sake of argument that all of those nations do have ADIZs along the same lines as what you have described, there remains no accepted international legal conventions for ADIZs as far as I am aware of.

If there was a legal clause stating that a nation can only impose certain requirements to an aircraft in their ADIZ if said aircraft was intending on entering their 12nmi sovereign airspace then I would be open to read it.

Furthermore, China is not the only nation with an ADIZ that states aircraft transiting its ADIZ without entering its sovereign airspace must also file a flight plan.
South Korea does so as well.
View attachment 26776

[Source: Table 1
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However, I am not seeking to make this a "race to the bottom" to see how many nations have ADIZ regulations similar to China's.
For the sake of argument you can assume that all nations have ADIZs which comply with your perceived sense of regularity.

My position is that no agreed upon laws about a nation's ADIZ exist, only norms, therefore you can argue that the Chinese ECS and potential SCS ADIZ would flout international norms but not international law.
You are right that there are no specific international laws governing ADIZ. Primarily international laws are not like domestic legislation but typically comes about through customary and state practices and occasionally like UNCLOS which is a comprehensive set of laws that the international community managed to agree upon. As I mentioned before, ADIZ is just an offshoot of the internationally recognised territorial 12 nm sea limit and adopting the principle of "as below so above" giving rise to the concept of the 12 nm national airspace. In effect, the administration of it is drawn primarily from the principles of UNCLOS and the Chicago Convention (Convention on International Civil Aviation). The question to ask is outside of the 12 nm airspace, what laws govern international airspace and hence on what principles are administration of ADIZ drawn from. Whatever administrative actions that arise have to be based on some sound legal principles. By definition, international airspace are not bound by sovereignty conditions except to the extend that the international aviation authority had put together a set of rules that are primarily meant to ensure aviation safety. The Chicago Convention calls for state aircraft to operate with “due regard” for the safety of flight of other aircraft. In a recent and somewhat controversial addition that entered into force in 1998, the Convention prohibits state aircraft from using weapons against civil aircraft in flight or endangering the lives and safety of persons onboard during interception. The troubling statement when China introduced the ADIZ in ECS is the following "The Chinese military will adopt emergency defensive measures in response to aircraft that refuse to follow the instructions". There is clearly no legal basis to do so in international airspace. Rather than asking me what international laws apply to ADIZ, the better question is what international law provides for the ADIZ with Chinese characteristics.

Sigh. Of course I know that an ADIZ is not capable of reinforcing a sovereignty claim in any sort of legal sense. However, in practice that is exactly what it will indirectly achieve.
Note, I use the word "reinforce" not in any legal sense, but rather in the sense that the ADIZ would indirectly normalize Chinese aircraft to operate over disputed islands and or features and by that method reinforces the sovereignty claim by physical presence in the air.
Legitimacy of action comes from a legal source and not in spite of. It is not achieving a desired outcome regardless and damn the rules if they are an inconvenience.

By the way, I am not necessarily I support an ADIZ that overlaps disputed features. Personally I think China can do what it needs to in the SCS without announcing an ADIZ at all. I'm merely stating what the intention and result of such an action will be.
Such an action as I pointed out would be a source for potential conflict.

You are insistent that there is some kind of accepted legal regulations surrounding ADIZ procedures, but there are none. The ICAO standards and Chicago convention do not address ADIZs. Some other nations may have voluntarily abode by limits that they have chosen themselves, but there are also nations whose ADIZs are more expansive in nature.

So in effect, each nation is indeed making it up for themselves without any sort of internationally accepted legal framework around ADIZs.
That is not true as I had tried to explain. The manner of administration of ADIZ by the rest of the international community can be reconciled to known international laws. The manner in which China is going about it cannot. If you disagree please reconcile it to established international convention.
More importantly in this whole discussion which we are being distracted is not about the administration itself but that China lacks the legitimacy to introduce it in the SCS because sovereignty is disputed. Such an act will be highly antagonistic.

Some others see the problem as the US insisting on maintain an overwhelming degree of forward deployed military and surveillance capability and China having no choice to encourage them to reduce that capability and must thus resort to other means for its defense.
The issue is not about China taking action but the manner in which it is being done and that is flouting the rules and thumping the rest of the international community in the process.
 

Blitzo

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Not sure what you are saying. It seems to me the contention is about who is responsible for raising the tension. My view of the source is in which China is changing the status quo in highly questionable manner. The issue is not a rising China but the manner in which power is exercised and lacking legitimacy.

Okay.
My view is that the source of the tension is the US seeking to maintain its previous degree of military capability and surveillance in the western pacific with the pivot to the pacific, forcing China to respond with what few means it has available.



You are right that there are no specific international laws governing ADIZ. Primarily international laws are not like domestic legislation but typically comes about through customary and state practices and occasionally like UNCLOS which is a comprehensive set of laws that the international community managed to agree upon. As I mentioned before, ADIZ is just an offshoot of the internationally recognised territorial 12 nm sea limit and adopting the principle of "as below so above" giving rise to the concept of the 12 nm national airspace. In effect, the administration of it is drawn primarily from the principles of UNCLOS and the Chicago Convention (Convention on International Civil Aviation). The question to ask is outside of the 12 nm airspace, what laws govern international airspace and hence on what principles are administration of ADIZ drawn from. Whatever administrative actions that arise have to be based on some sound legal principles. By definition, international airspace are not bound by sovereignty conditions except to the extend that the international aviation authority had put together a set of rules that are primarily meant to ensure aviation safety. The Chicago Convention calls for state aircraft to operate with “due regard” for the safety of flight of other aircraft. In a recent and somewhat controversial addition that entered into force in 1998, the Convention prohibits state aircraft from using weapons against civil aircraft in flight or endangering the lives and safety of persons onboard during interception. The troubling statement when China introduced the ADIZ in ECS is the following "The Chinese military will adopt emergency defensive measures in response to aircraft that refuse to follow the instructions". There is clearly no legal basis to do so in international airspace. Rather than asking me what international laws apply to ADIZ, the better question is what international law provides for the ADIZ with Chinese characteristics.

Again, your argument would be well made if there were any sort of internationally accepted laws surrounding ADIZ procedures which existed, but there are none. The Chicago convention does not mention anything regarding ADIZs. Some nations may have built elements of their ADIZ procedures using certain principles from the Chicago convention but there is no legal requirement for all nations to do so.

So my position remains the same as before: you can argue that China is deviating from possible international norms in terms of its ADIZ procedure, but not international law.
[However, at least one other country has very similar ADIZ procedures to that of China regarding the area of contention: requiring all aircraft entering the ADIZ to file flight plans rather than merely aircraft intending to enter their airspace. So that makes it difficult to put a fully solid case that China is even flouting international norms with its ADIZ]

Regarding your concern around the statement of "The Chinese military will adopt emergency defensive measures in response to aircraft that refuse to follow the instructions" -- these emergency defensive measures could constitute anything from tracking them on radar, to having a fighter jet visually identify them, to outright shooting them down by using deadly force, depending on the severity of the threat. Obviously, shooting down an aircraft would be tantamount to either breaking international law against civilian aircraft, or if it is against a military aircraft it would be an act of war, so that's why deadly force would almost never be deployed even in highly extenuating circumstances in an ADIZ.
Therefore I am surprised as to why you would immediately assume that "emergency defensive measures" constitutes the use of weapons.
I hope you can appreciate why China may prefer to phrase its potential response to non complying aircraft in the broadest way possible, given the wide variety of differing types of aircraft not to mention differing potential threat levels depending on the security environment over time.

However, I can also appreciate why you may find the phrasing of the statement alarming and interpret it in the worst possible way. But I think any careful reading of the statement with a dash of critical thinking should elucidate what the "emergency defensive measures" really can mean.



Legitimacy of action comes from a legal source and not in spite of. It is not achieving a desired outcome regardless and damn the rules if they are an inconvenience.

I was merely stating the end result of what that particular action by China would result in.



Such an action as I pointed out would be a source for potential conflict.

And I don't think I have said anything contrary to that statement of yours.



That is not true as I had tried to explain. The manner of administration of ADIZ by the rest of the international community can be reconciled to known international laws. The manner in which China is going about it cannot. If you disagree please reconcile it to established international convention.
More importantly in this whole discussion which we are being distracted is not about the administration itself but that China lacks the legitimacy to introduce it in the SCS because sovereignty is disputed. Such an act will be highly antagonistic.

Okay, first of all, I want to re state that you cannot accuse China's ECS ADIZ of having no legal basis, because that suggests any ADIZ has a legal basis at all, which is not true because there are no accepted international legal requirements surrounding ADIZ procedures. Some nations may have ADIZs based on certain aspects of existing laws and regulations, but there is no sort of legal requirement for that to be compulsory for all nations seeking an ADIZ.

You can, however argue that China's ADIZ procedure is different to the ADIZs of some or many nations, though I would be interested in knowing the ADIZ procedures of all other nations to know how much similarity and differences there actually are. In my previous post I proved that at least one other country (South Korea) has ADIZ procedures which requires all aircraft entering its ADIZ (and not only aircraft entering its airspace) to file a flight plan, which was seemingly a major point of contention in your previous post.
However, for the sake of discussion let's just simplify the matter and agree that China's ECS ADIZ procedures are different to the ADIZ procedures of most other nations. I'm willing to let this one slide.

As for the prospect of an SCS ADIZ -- the entire reason for a SCS ADIZ is to use it as a political message.
China could quite easily conduct ADIZ-like operations in the SCS without announcing an ADIZ to anyone, as part of normal military aviation activities in international airspace.



The issue is not about China taking action but the manner in which it is being done and that is flouting the rules and thumping the rest of the international community in the process.

I'm not so sure about thumping (?) the rest of the international community, but it is definitely meant to be a well calibrated message to certain nations as part of a geopolitical power play.
How much the entire international community cares about it probably depends on how much they have invested into that particular piece of ocean...
 

Brumby

Major
Okay.
My view is that the source of the tension is the US seeking to maintain its previous degree of military capability and surveillance in the western pacific with the pivot to the pacific, forcing China to respond with what few means it has available.
The bottom line is whether the corresponding actions are within the rules or outside and this seems to be a point that is lost. The problem as I said previously is the manner of the actions.

Again, your argument would be well made if there were any sort of internationally accepted laws surrounding ADIZ procedures which existed, but there are none. The Chicago convention does not mention anything regarding ADIZs. Some nations may have built elements of their ADIZ procedures using certain principles from the Chicago convention but there is no legal requirement for all nations to do so.

So my position remains the same as before: you can argue that China is deviating from possible international norms in terms of its ADIZ procedure, but not international law.
The issue is the deviation lacks a credible legal source that makes it legitimate.

Regarding your concern around the statement of "The Chinese military will adopt emergency defensive measures in response to aircraft that refuse to follow the instructions" -- these emergency defensive measures could constitute anything from tracking them on radar, to having a fighter jet visually identify them, to outright shooting them down by using deadly force, depending on the severity of the threat. Obviously, shooting down an aircraft would be tantamount to either breaking international law against civilian aircraft, or if it is against a military aircraft it would be an act of war, so that's why deadly force would almost never be deployed even in highly extenuating circumstances in an ADIZ.
Therefore I am surprised as to why you would immediately assume that "emergency defensive measures" constitutes the use of weapons.
I hope you can appreciate why China may prefer to phrase its potential response to non complying aircraft in the broadest way possible, given the wide variety of differing types of aircraft not to mention differing potential threat levels depending on the security environment over time.
Whether the likelihood in the use of force is exercised or not is not the point but the language of choice that it is inclusive is in itself contentious especially in international airspace. That clearly has no legal grounding.

Okay, first of all, I want to re state that you cannot accuse China's ECS ADIZ of having no legal basis, because that suggests any ADIZ has a legal basis at all, which is not true because there are no accepted international legal requirements surrounding ADIZ procedures. Some nations may have ADIZs based on certain aspects of existing laws and regulations, but there is no sort of legal requirement for that to be compulsory for all nations seeking an ADIZ.
I did not say that the ECS ADIZ has no legal basis other than the deviation from norm lacks legal basis. That is a big difference.

As for the prospect of an SCS ADIZ -- the entire reason for a SCS ADIZ is to use it as a political message.
Your statement captures the essence of a lot of the disagreement between our views. I believe in a rule based order and that means it is the framework that determines the extend and by default constrain actions. In contrast your view is that the end objective reign supreme. This is an example of rule of law vs rule by law. The problem with the latter is that rules simply become a discriminatory instrument subject to the one wielding it.

China could quite easily conduct ADIZ-like operations in the SCS without announcing an ADIZ to anyone, as part of normal military aviation activities in international airspace.
Do you actually realise that what you are suggesting is highly problematic in international relations? The problem with that statement is reflective of the view that China believes the SCS is a China lake. The rest of the international community does not share that view.

I'm not so sure about thumping (?) the rest of the international community, but it is definitely meant to be a well calibrated message to certain nations as part of a geopolitical power play.
How much the entire international community cares about it probably depends on how much they have invested into that particular piece of ocean...
As I have said previously, the line that changes the dynamics is an ADIZ in the SCS and the Scarborough shoals. I might well be wrong.
 

Equation

Lieutenant General
Your statement captures the essence of a lot of the disagreement between our views. I believe in a rule based order and that means it is the framework that determines the extend and by default constrain actions. In contrast your view is that the end objective reign supreme. This is an example of rule of law vs rule by law. The problem with the latter is that rules simply become a discriminatory instrument subject to the one wielding it.
.

Aren't they both one in the same? Rule of law can be discriminatory as well especially those that wield power and influence to make the laws more into their favor. Nothing is simply black and white in life.
 

Blitzo

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The bottom line is whether the corresponding actions are within the rules or outside and this seems to be a point that is lost. The problem as I said previously is the manner of the actions.

I suppose I'll address this below when you mention the matter of rules.


The issue is the deviation lacks a credible legal source that makes it legitimate.

There is no legal requirement that an ADIZ requires procedures which are based on a "credible" legal source.


Whether the likelihood in the use of force is exercised or not is not the point but the language of choice that it is inclusive is in itself contentious especially in international airspace. That clearly has no legal grounding.

You can accuse them of being over-compensating in their wording.

But saying that their ADIZ procedure includes measures that may include the use of force and thus lacks legal grounding is irrelevant because ADIZs do not have to legally rely on any sort of firm legal basis to begin with.

Furthermore even if one wanted to look at it from a legal perspective, reserving the right to use force in international airspace should not be that contentious as it can merely be perceived as being viewed within the context of wartime or the onset of war. The fact that the ADIZ includes provisions for actions during wartime should not be a major concern, nor is it somehow legally outrageous.



I did not say that the ECS ADIZ has no legal basis other than the deviation from norm lacks legal basis. That is a big difference.

Very well, then: there is no legal requirement for a nation's ADIZ procedures to have any firm legal basis, and those procedures include any which may deviate from the norm.


Your statement captures the essence of a lot of the disagreement between our views. I believe in a rule based order and that means it is the framework that determines the extend and by default constrain actions. In contrast your view is that the end objective reign supreme. This is an example of rule of law vs rule by law. The problem with the latter is that rules simply become a discriminatory instrument subject to the one wielding it.

You're partly right -- however the disagreement is more rooted in our differing faith of rule based systems.

I would also like to believe in a rule based order, but I believe certain nations are able to flout international law when it suits them, and without substantial consequence. Furthermore, I believe the rule based order has been built on certain unequal foundations which causes certain rules to slant in a way which causes systematic inequalities in power in geopolitics, and the privileged nations in power have no motivation to change it given it greatly benefits them. Therefore certain nations will then inevitably seek to change those norms and laws more to their suiting, if they start to become more powerful.
The risk of course, is that it may lead to a risk of substantial conflict, and I can appreciate why the side who benefits from the rules may seek to preserve it but I can also appreciate why the side who would want to change the rules may seek it as well.


Do you actually realise that what you are suggesting is highly problematic in international relations? The problem with that statement is reflective of the view that China believes the SCS is a China lake. The rest of the international community does not share that view.

Of course it would be problematic in international relations, however it would also be quite legal. After all they would merely be conducting standard military aviation activities in international airspace.

That said, our definitions of "ADIZ-like" activities may differ. In my definition, "ADIZ-like" activities would essentially be conducting surveillance and occasional visual intercept missions in international airspace. They obviously would not require aircraft to file flight plans or place any requirements on any aircraft at all because there is no ADIZ procedures.

By the way, I've never understood what it meant in terms of the SCS, whether it meant territorial dominance, or military/surveillance dominance, or both. If China believes the SCS is a China lake in the sense of military/surveillance dominance, then what exactly is the legal problem if there is one at all?



As I have said previously, the line that changes the dynamics is an ADIZ in the SCS and the Scarborough shoals. I might well be wrong.

And as I said, how much of the international community really cares (beyond some of the regional powers) is an issue to watch.
 
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