Brumby
Major
The meaning of the ball being in which court is associated not just by actions but whether those actions lead to changes to the status quo and more importantly whether they are conducted within a rule based order or they are actions that lack legitimacy. Conducting FON within the provisions of UNCLOS are legitimate. China might not like some of those activities but China needs to respect there is an established system that governs behaviour. The conversation is not simply about actions but whether they are legitimate. If the view is that the US is acting out of norms then what is it and not just because China doesn't like it.Heh I'm sure there are more than a few people who would say the ball is in the US courts...
I don't agree. The contention is that you have a different interpretation of ADIZ and more importantly the basis from which it is derived.I think your understanding of ADIZs are only partly correct.
I could not disagree more. Form follow substance and substance is derived from basic international laws that govern international boundaries. Each country has territorial sovereign space as defined by the 12nm out to sea. The reasoning then follows that the same distance in sovereign airspace applies as with the sea. When the US introduced ADIZ, the basis of it is foundered upon this principle and the Chicago convention basically affirms this practice as being consistent with international law. The ADIZ beyond the 12 nm is meant to identify aircraft as a pre-requirement to enter into the 12 nm sovereign airspace. Aircraft that do not wish to enter and are merely transiting through are not obliged to notify. This is how every country that has imposed ADIZ has gone about enforcement until China came along with the ADIZ in the ESC. The difference is that China requires notification within the ADIZ even if the aircraft is transiting through. There is no legal standing on this because outside of the 12nm it is international airspace and hence China has no jurisdiction to impose such a requirement and the reason why the US and Japan has simply ignore such a condition. The analogy is the same as getting a visa before entering a country. I am not obligated to get a visa from country B if I have no intention to enter country B.First of all, there are no legal foundations for ADIZs in general. That is to say, there is no international consensus on what constitutes a "legal" or "standard ADIZ that I'm aware of.
As explained above, ADIZ outside the 12 nm is international airspace. China has no right to impose any condition except to those intending to enter its 12nm territorial airspace. The threat of consequences outside of the 12nm is clearly outside of international law. If you wish to argue that China has the right to conduct in a certain manner outside of that 12nm, please outline the basis for its actions in international law.Furthermore, an ADIZ most definitely does not have to be conducted over one's own airspace -- it can extend hundreds of km out beyond one's own coast and territorial waters/airspace and well beyond one's own EEZ as well into international waters and airspace.
I think you have got the logic the wrong way round. ADIZ is derived from sovereignty and not that imposing an ADIZ will reinforce a sovereignty claim. Sovereignty is established through title and title accords certain rights. If title is not established but disputed, then there is no source in legitimacy of imposing ADIZ. This is why any attempts to introduce ADIZ is so antagonistic. It is equivalent to thumbing its nose at the international community. This is besides the fact that ADIZ is notionally tolerated because of the recognition in flight time across 12 nm is short and hence countries need some form of allowance to prepare entry of an airplane into its airspace. In the SCS we are talking about rocks that are barely above water even in low tides. Imposing ADIZ is simply making a farce of international convention.Of course, it is generally normal for an ADIZ to not include the territory of other nations, therefore the establishment of an ADIZ in the SCS is another way for China to establish its claim of sovereignty over the rock and island features included within the ADIZ boundaries.
It is not an argument over fine print or it is dependent on some extenuating reason. Other countries don't make things up as they go about introducing ADIZ. It is grounded on some international principles and law that has standing. Every action has a basis and is not because of preference or feeling. That is what differentiates a rule based order versus what China is doing on many fronts.You are also right in saying that there are a few differences in the fine print of ADIZs such as the Chinese ECS ADIZ requiring aircraft to provide flight plans for entering the ADIZ even if they are not intending to enter Chinese airspace, but the lack of any sort of unified international ADIZ guideline makes it difficult to truly pin this down as a big issue, especially if one considers the fact that one's own ADIZ rules likely depends on the strategic air situation they are facing.
Once an ADIZ is introduced the Pandora box is opened and events that may normally be benign will become inextricably unpredictable and complex.Second of all, I think you make a mistake in assuming that China has to somehow enforce an ADIZ or else risk looking "impotent". That is not the way an ADIZ typically works -- they are essentially a non-binding statement of intent that aircraft which do not comply with its terms may face certain military measures (usually escort and visual identification), but those measures could mean anything. Aircraft may try to flout the ADIZ, such as the couple of B-52s which skirted the eastern edge of China's ADIZ back in late 2013 when it was first announced, and may well be able to go about their business without any sort of Chinese fighter escort, but that would not be a problem for the Chinese. An ADIZ is essentially an announcement to all aircraft that if they do not follow the ADIZ guidelines they might be scoped out by a fighter jet to confirm their intent.
However if you note the qualifier is that sovereignty is not negotiable but merely cooperation over economic activities. We now know with certainty that China's main game plan is sovereignty and the economic resources was simply a secondary consideration.Something else I'm interested in is how the Philippines election may influence this. Specifically, the current front runner (a fellow called Duterte) has made some statements that he may be willing to take a more compromising position with China in time.
So the Philipino election will be something to watch.
That is another topic but the difference is that the US is acting within the rules and China is not and that is the problem.One could also argue that the ball is in the US court... they could volunteer to pull out some of their forward deployed military assets from the SCS and reduce the frequency and intensity of surveillance operations off China's coast.
But of course that is also geopolitically infeasible, and not in the strategic interests of the US. Fair enough.
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