Jura The idiot
General
says
... he's arrived:
Defense secretary visits aircraft carrier in South China Sea
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South China Sea Strategies for other nations (Not China)
- Thread starter PanAsian
- Start date
Defense secretary visits aircraft carrier in South China Sea
Brumby
Major
In South China Sea Visit, U.S. Defense Chief Flexes Military Muscle
It is obvious the carrier visit and statements from it are meant to be show and tell but what is unconvincing is Obama's resolve when push comes to shove. His historical performance to-date don't exactly demonstrate he has the spine for it. Having said that I also see a strengthening of US resolve and a limit to its patience in the face of the salami tactics, a line which China I believe had been trying to determine with its incremental actions. I see two potential developments in which the US may have drawn a line and privately conveyed to the Chinese. A potential ADIZ in the SCS and the reclamation of Scarborough shoal. That in my view may well be the tipping point.
The article states "generally signaled that the Obama administration had decided to lean more on military power to counter ’s territorial ambitions in the region."
It is obvious the carrier visit and statements from it are meant to be show and tell but what is unconvincing is Obama's resolve when push comes to shove. His historical performance to-date don't exactly demonstrate he has the spine for it. Having said that I also see a strengthening of US resolve and a limit to its patience in the face of the salami tactics, a line which China I believe had been trying to determine with its incremental actions. I see two potential developments in which the US may have drawn a line and privately conveyed to the Chinese. A potential ADIZ in the SCS and the reclamation of Scarborough shoal. That in my view may well be the tipping point.
I agree, but I'm not very sure as to what the US may respond with, in the hypothetical situation of China either establishing an ADIZ in the SCS, or reclaiming Scarborough.
I can't see the US conducting using direct military force and to be the party to fire the first shot... but I imagine they may be willing to conduct large scale exercises in the SCS for a sustained duration, possibly with a period of high frequency and intensity FONOPs as well.
But I can't really see what the medium and long term actions after the hypothetical initiation of either an SCS ADIZ or Scarborough reclamation would be. I suppose the US would try to further establish more permanent and stronger military alliances in the region, but that's sort of a given, and may continue with high frequency FONOPs and military exercises in westpac.
But there will be no way to physically prevent China from having an ADIZ in the SCS, or to evict China from its reclaimed islands or to physically stop China from reclaiming Scarborough without starting a shooting war. They would have to rely on political and economic methods instead.
I also wonder if the Chinese have privately conveyed to the US what the potential consequences of continued high intensity US military presence in the SCS would be, such as whether continued persistent US surveillance missions around Hainan would result in the eventual establishment of an ADIZ, or whether continued US naval exercises in the SCS would result in deployment of actual AShMs on the reclaimed islands beyond only Yongxing island.
Ultimately it seems like both sides are trying to use the threat of militarization (but not military action) as a way of trying to deter the risk of militarization by the other side:
-the US conducting high profile military exercises seems to be a message that they are willing to raise the stakes and conduct potential punitive actions if China continues increasing its potential military presence in the SCS
-China is similarly using the threat of placing military assets on its reclaimed islands in response to perceived US provocations as a way of conducting punitive actions if the US continues its high military presence in the SCS
It almost makes sense, if one doesn't think too hard about it.
China in the end wants to normalize its long term paramilitary presence in the SCS and potential for deploying military capability there, as well as its surveillance capability in the SCS overall. Naturally the US isn't too enthused about that, as it would prefer to have the upper hand in surveillance and military capabilities in the SCS.
Whoever comes out on top will probably be the one more willing to risk more to achieve their end goal.
Brumby
Major
Neither do I as we are not in a position to project US likely actions especially with Obama still in the WH. The problem in my view is that both these potential events if crystallised will more likely than not set into motion an escalatory path leading to unintended conflicts which neither party want to see happen. The ball therefore is in the Chinese court and history can only be the judge thereafter.
Let's deal with each of the cases from a legal and military standpoint. IMO, there is no legal foundation for a ADIZ in the SCS. ADIZ is simply an extension of a 12 nm territorial zone in airspace just as with the sea. As such, international convention provides that flights intending to enter into territorial air space be subject to notification requirements just like getting a visa before intending to enter another country. China is the only country that flouts such a convention with its ADIZ in the ECS by requiring notification regardless of destination. In the SCS, there is no land mass to be had and any that has territorial air space are actually in dispute. Imposing any ADIZ will lack legal basis and clearly be escalatory in nature. It is more than likely that most western nations will not observe such an imposition. Such a step will surely infuriate the ASEAN countries and not win any friends. If China resort to such a step it will have to enforce it and that raises the scale of everything by several notches. Failure to enforce will just project impotence on China's part once it goes down that pathway. It means China will have to fully deploy military air assets onto the Spratly islands and that essentially is full scale militarisation. The US will then ramp up deployment of air assets in the Philippines to protect both its civilian and military air assets. What happens after that is anybody's guess.
Regarding the Scarborough shoals, China has a very weak hand on the legal basis. The findings from the arbitral proceedings due soon will more likely than not affirm this situation. This will provide the Phillipines with the legal cover and international standing on its position and the unreasonableness of the Chinese in island grabbing. The Philiipines will overtly resist any Chinese attempts to conduct land reclamation in the Scarborough shoals with whatever limited assets it has. The US will place military assets in the vicinity and invoke its treaty obligations with the Philippines. what then?????
The assumption is that neither China nor the US wants to go to war, but the lines in my view are starting to form. The ball is clearly in China's court with both the ADIZ and Scarborough shoals and the US I believe has been sounding out signals on where the lines are.
The Western media loves to use international law to bash China with, but somehow they never comment on violations by other claimants. Technically, the Indonesian boat that stopped the Chinese fishing vessel had no right to stop the Chinese fishing boat, and violated international law (the fishing boat should have had the right of FON) by stopping the Chinese fishing vessel. FON rights only applies to the US Navy and its allies, apparently.
Brumby
Major
That argument is simply procedural rather than substantive. Legally, Indonesia has economic jurisdiction within its EEZ and UNCLOS defines that as its sovereign rights. Whether it is registered is a domestic issue which doesn't remove its right to enforce. On the other hand, China doesn't have any legal rights to operate its CG within someone else EEZ.
Heh I'm sure there are more than a few people who would say the ball is in the US courts...
I think your understanding of ADIZs are only partly correct.
First of all, there are no legal foundations for ADIZs in general. That is to say, there is no international consensus on what constitutes a "legal" or "standard ADIZ that I'm aware of. Furthermore, an ADIZ most definitely does not have to be conducted over one's own airspace -- it can extend hundreds of km out beyond one's own coast and territorial waters/airspace and well beyond one's own EEZ as well into international waters and airspace. Of course, it is generally normal for an ADIZ to not include the territory of other nations, therefore the establishment of an ADIZ in the SCS is another way for China to establish its claim of sovereignty over the rock and island features included within the ADIZ boundaries.
You are also right in saying that there are a few differences in the fine print of ADIZs such as the Chinese ECS ADIZ requiring aircraft to provide flight plans for entering the ADIZ even if they are not intending to enter Chinese airspace, but the lack of any sort of unified international ADIZ guideline makes it difficult to truly pin this down as a big issue, especially if one considers the fact that one's own ADIZ rules likely depends on the strategic air situation they are facing. Furthermore, aircraft who will fly through the ADIZ without entering Chinese airspace can simply choose not to file the flight plans, and the most China will do is maybe send a fighter to visually ID the aircraft if the aircraft appeared suspicious on radar.
[Though it goes without saying that establishing an SCS ADIZ will elicit some alarm there, I have no disagreement with that]
Second of all, I think you make a mistake in assuming that China has to somehow enforce an ADIZ or else risk looking "impotent". That is not the way an ADIZ typically works -- they are essentially a non-binding statement of intent that aircraft which do not comply with its terms may face certain military measures (usually escort and visual identification), but those measures could mean anything. Aircraft may try to flout the ADIZ, such as the couple of B-52s which skirted the eastern edge of China's ADIZ back in late 2013 when it was first announced, and may well be able to go about their business without any sort of Chinese fighter escort, but that would not be a problem for the Chinese. An ADIZ is essentially an announcement to all aircraft that if they do not follow the ADIZ guidelines they might be scoped out by a fighter jet to confirm their intent.
However, I do agree that any SCS ADIZ will likely include deployment of at least some fighter aircraft and possibly surveillance aircraft to the reclaimed islands on a rotational basis, and that would likely be a cause of significant friction, as well as the fact that the ADIZ will likely include various disputed features in the SCS.
What then indeed...
Something else I'm interested in is how the Philippines election may influence this. Specifically, the current front runner (a fellow called Duterte) has made some statements that he may be willing to take a more compromising position with China in time.
So the Philipino election will be something to watch.
One could also argue that the ball is in the US court... they could volunteer to pull out some of their forward deployed military assets from the SCS and reduce the frequency and intensity of surveillance operations off China's coast.
But of course that is also geopolitically infeasible, and not in the strategic interests of the US. Fair enough.
In many ways his thoughts about possible deals between the Philippines and China are similar to the fishing deal between Taiwan and Japan in the seas around Diaoyutai/Senkakus.
A major point of contention in the Philippines' UN case is that it claims that Taiping island does not qualify as an "island" while the facts prove that it does. Taiping island is also located within the disputed claimed areas of the Philippines, Vietnam, China, and Taiwan so it is certainly relevant to the disputes. As China considers Taiwan part of one China it also considers Taiping island part of one China.
Neither China nor the US want a real conflict. The Chinese want to increase their actual control over the islands, features, and waters around the SCS. The US wants to strengthen its alliances in the Pacific and to establish bases around the SCS. Both countries will meet their objectives, to the detriment of the other claimant states in the SCS.
One of the US's main goals is to establish a permanent military presence at Cam Ranh Bay. This is going to happen, and China won't be able to stop the US, just as the US will not be able to stop Chinese reclamation at Scarborough Shoals.
To rephrase this in another way, Chinese reclamation at Scarborough Shoals will not result in direct military confrontation with the US. Instead, it will hasten the arrival of a US military presence at Cam Ranh Bay. That's the trade-off to be weighed here.
The US would be stupid to actually get sucked into a real conflict over the Scarborough Shoals, and they won't be sucked into one.