you do know china is on the 'MAINLAND' of east asia, and has far more bases and airfields than all the US and its east asia alliens combined.... also most of these countries by theirselves don't have the ability/weapon to reach china, but china does has a large arsanal to get them
really? I don't think so, you do remember China is a major nuclear power right? what makes you think if the time when China need to develop carriers to attack these countries or US military in these countries, US won't strike back with nuclear? US was even threating to go nukes to China on potential loss of a carrier.
and when US started a nuclear war, what makes you think china will chicken?
let me put this way, the scenario that China use carrier within 1st island chain does not even exist, even campion on Taiwan, China is most likely to place its carrier fleet on the EAST side of Taiwan and north to philipine, technically outside the 1st island chain
Having airbases on the mainland does not give you effective air and sea control 1000 miles out from China’s coast. But 1000 miles out from China’s coast is how the US plans to dictate its engagement scenarios. The 1st and 2nd island chains are key staging areas for US force projection. If you don’t effectively wrest area control from the US along at least the 1st island chain that means the US always has a place to recuperate any attrition it might incur during a conventional conflict with China. Furthermore, if the US chooses to impose a blockade against China (this is a very prominent scenario covered by Pentagon strategic planning), China has no way of contesting US forces at vital choke points that far out from its mainland if it does not have the ability to project air power out to at least the 1st island chain.
If being a nuclear power meant that China was safe from conventional military conflict scenarios and any attempt at countering a conventional scenario meant nuclear escalation on both sides why even bother developing the navy in the first place? Why even bother with A2AD? Why not just threaten to nuke the US if they choose to come anywhere close to the Chinese coast? The answer is because outside of direct invasion of either country’s main territory or existential war the nuclear option is not actually on the table. For one, it’s not even clear the extent to which the US’s nuclear umbrella is active with countries it has bases in outside of Japan and Korea. But more importantly China isn’t going to attack another country sheltering US bases unless those bases are used to attack China, creating a justified retaliation scenario. US controlled bases in other countries are themselves typically considered US soil, but bases owned by other countries that are not US controlled which provide operational support for the US essentially signal collaboration with the US, which under standard laws of engagement make them fair targets for limited strikes. Those kinds of situations are not sufficient triggers for a nuclear deterrence because they don’t involve the intent to take over or destroy a whole country. There are actual international laws and norms that create some scaffolding for the rules and norms for nuclear escalation, and nuclear powers follow them because they create paths for predictable conduct and behavior that help prevent nuclear countries from actually ending the world in a nuclear hellfire. China conventionally attacking a US base that’s being used to conventionally attack them does not qualify under nuclear escalation scenarios.
A war over Taiwan may not stay contained to Taiwan, especially if the US chooses to pursue the blockade scenario. But even if it does not, to prevent the USN from attacking Chinese assets engaged in an invasion of Taiwan China would have to prevent US entry into the theater via the southern face of the 1st island chain, which A2AD by itself doesn’t guarantee prevention of. Having forward projected carrier groups
to force an ingressing USN to deplete their fighting strength before they reach the Taiwan theater helps the likelihood for China’s ability to resist US involvement in a fight over an invasion of Taiwan significantly. So the idea that China should only have to worry about deploying carriers on Taiwan’s eastern coast is imo an overly simplistic and shortsighted way to understand all the different strategic contingencies China would need to cover even for an invasion for Taiwan.
