Russia has a "vanity" carrier because it has no strategic need for carriers and the problems which can be optionally solved by a carrier, can be solved by other means more efficiently. It maintains a carrier because it is an industrial special interest, much more than a political status symbol. If Russia loses its only carrier then an entire area of military production becomes theoretical, and in this market it means nonexistent. Without Kuznetsov there is no MiG-29K and without it there's no entry into Indian naval aviation and additional funding for Mikoyan etc.
The influence of Russian defense industry on procurement choices is greatly overlooked. Russian MIC is second only to American MIC in terms of its economic and political influence. The entire modernization of aviation in recent decade has been driven by special interest and economic policy and not by rational choices.
Nobody wants to see industrial contracts awarded for inferior or ill-suited equipment owing to corruption or as a form of make work, but we should acknowledge that industrial considerations have a legitimate role to play in questions of national security. Maintaining design and engineering expertise, facilities, a skilled and experienced workforce, these are all important things.
The question for me is: to what end? Industrial policy needs to be linked to a broader vision for the nation, and to the long-term realities of costs, budgets, and requirements/priorities. This is where I see the problem, in that Russia has not sufficiently adjusted to the reality of its diminished power in the world and scaled its ambitions accordingly. Hence, instead of fielding very credible and modern armed forces still considerably exceeding those of any other nation in Europe, we instead bear witness to the undignified end of
Moskva (indeed, the entire Ukraine conflict), the unedifying saga of
Admiral Kuznetsov, and any other number of less dramatic examples of a national ego writing cheques that it can't cash.
It seems to me that Russia's rapid economic growth throughout the 2000s bears much of the responsibility for this state of affairs, in that this period of economic growth allowed planners at all levels to dream of a return to a glorious pseudo-Soviet future. It follows from this vision that all manufacturing facilities, specialist capabilities and expertise should be maintained in anticipation of this glorious future, and that large numbers of older ships, aircraft, vehicles, etc. should be maintained because they would ultimately be replaced in equal or greater numbers. This was the era in which the Leader destroyers and PAK DA were first conceived. In the real world, Russia's economic performance has never returned to pre-GFC levels, and there is little reason to think the next decade will be any better than the last. Indeed, it stands a good chance of being worse. At a certain point, Russia's visions need to align with reality.
An important but forgotten factor is the political climate of the 1990s and the peace dividend that majority of political establishment in America supported. That was the context of that decision. Washington's reaction to 9/11 should have changed Russia's entire strategy but that would require pragmatic thinking, and that would require recognizing a permanent loss of status - something Moscow was (and is still) unwilling to accept with tragic consequences. Psychologically it's always easier to grow than to shrink.
Can you expand on this? Why should Washington's reaction to 9/11 (by which I assume you mean the GWOT and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq) have changed Russia's strategy?