Russian Military News, Reports, Data, etc.

New RVV MD2 missiles for Russian Su-57 aircraft. For the Russian Su-57 fighters, fifth-generation short-range missiles RVV-MD2 were created, which are ahead of world developments by five, ten years, there is no image of the rocket yet. Briefly about air-to-air missiles. In the RVV-MD2 missile, for the first time among short-range missiles, an inertial missile control system was installed. The missile is equipped with a radio correction line, which allows you to specify the coordinates of the target from the aircraft, increasing the probability of hitting the target. A multi-element dual-band infrared homing head with increased noise immunity is also installed. The missile is capable of hitting targets in the rear hemisphere of the aircraft. That is, when launched forward, the rocket turns in the air and strikes a flying aircraft from behind.

Possible launch of the first GLONASS-K2 on 7 August. Apparently a delay of a decade, obviously sanctions played a role. My understanding is that these satellites have much improved performance including CDMA.

I bring bad news for everyone who still thinks that war in Ukraine hasn't massively affected Russian potential both in short and long term. News comes from the blog of experienced and reliable Russian naval enthusiast and blogger Alexander Shishkin at navy-korabel.livejournal.com

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condition of the fleet as of 01/07/2023


There are discrepancies between this list and that on russianships.info (RS.I) but I will focus on Shishkin's list as it tends to be more reliable.
Long-term condition and availability can be seen conjunction with the previous listings on 01.01.22 and 01.01.23.

submarines - active / total


surface ships - active / total


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naval procurement as of 01/07/2023


I compared the dates on the recent table with dates on tables published in January of 2022 and 2023. Red denotes delays between previous and current table. Yellow denotes no delay. Black dots denote number of calendar years of delay. Vessels which have been ordered in 2023 are not marked because no meaningful estimation of delay can be given.

The second column lists project number. The fourth column lists fleet (TOф - Pacific, Cф - Northern, Бф - Baltic, Чф - Black Sea)

закладка - laying down of the keel
спуск - launching of the hull
флаг - commissioning of the vessel



In April 2022 when Russian strategic blunder was made evident and long war became inevitable I predicted - based on years of observation of Russian naval procurement - that every vessel which wasn't laid down before February 2022 would have been delayed in entirety, including laying down of the keel. I made two exceptions for nuclear submarines from Sevmash and conventional submarines from Admiralty. This is caused by diversion of funding from new construction to other areas, the urgent need to maintain old warships in ongoing operation and higher priority welding and mechanical work in plants producing other weapons where shipyard workers can be redirected. If the war continues for another year - which it will in all likelihood - all red positions will add another black dot.

In April I referred to that as an event worse than Tsushima and "Putin sinking his fleet in the shipyards before it even set out to sea". According to Shishkin's notes I was wrong only in the case of two 20385 corvettes built in Amurskaya. All other predictions hold and based on the tables published every several months the trend hold as well so there is no reason to expect any change in it until the war stops, and even then the delays and neglect will take its toll on fleet modernization which was already struggling after the decision to de-prioritize the navy in the revision of State Armaments Plan in 2018.

The reason for greater efforts to procure ships in the east at the expense of procurement elsewhere is obvious: the alliance between Russia and China is one of temporary expediency and it covers a fundamental long-term rivalry for influence in the region. Russia is not building weapons where it allegedly has enemies but where it allegedly has friends. Pay no mind to words and mind the actions alone.

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state of Laika SSGN program as of 7/2022


Laika is a 5gen design class intended as replacement for 4gen Yasen SSGN.

Технические предложения и проработки, полученные в результате аванпроекта, показали высокие риски реализации проекта, не позволяющие перейти к созданию корабля нового поколения в установленные сроки, поэтому принято решение о переносе начала технического проектирования на следующий программный период" (ссылка 7, с. 8).

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Which translates to:

Technical proposals and studies received as a result of the preliminary project , showed high risks of the project implementation, which did not allow moving on to the creation of a new generation ship on time, so a decision was made to postpone the start of technical design to the next program period (reference 7, p. 8).

The "next program period" refers to State Armaments Program (государственная программа вооружения - ГПВ) which is determined every 10 years with a nominal revision date in the 5th year. The previous SAP covered the period of 2011-2020 but was revised only in 2018 instead of 2016, due to the unpredictability of situation following the 2014 Ukrainian conflict. The current SAP therefore covers 2018-2027 with the nominal revision due this year, but again unpredictability of situation following the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine will delay the revision indefinitely until the resolution of the war. This means that the earliest possible date for revision of current SAP is 2025-2026. If Laika was to be approved it would enter its development phase in 2026 at the earliest which would likely put the start of construction of the first submarine in 2031-32 but no earlier than 2030.

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summary

SSBN
6 Borei in service and 6 more under construction with tentative final delivery dates of 2030-31 for boats #11 and #12. They will replace all Delta IVs. According to preliminary indications they will be split 6/6 between Northern and Pacific fleets.10 SSBNs is seen as minimum deterrent matching USN posture.

SSGN + SSN
3 Yasen in service and 7 more under construction with tentative final delivery dates of 2030-31 for boats #9 and #10. They will replace all Oscar IIs. They also are split 5/5 but it is likely that at least 2 more boats will be added. 13 SSN in service with no replacements in construction. By 2030 most will be over 35 years and all except one (Gepard, 971.1) will be below Improved Los Angeles level. This is likely to cause either further orders of Yasen and likely reduction to submarine fleet which currently struggles to maintain very limited activity. Combined with new Khabarovsk class it likely will set the fleet at 12 SSBNs, 12-16 SSGNs and 3 Belgorod/Khabarovsk.

SSK
The likely target is 24 SSKs (2 squadrons per fleet) at which point production will likely cease unless Lada (677) will finally receive a working AIP which the vessels under construction do not have. The important factor is return of submarines to the Baltic by 2030 - no activity since 2010.

CV & CG
Everything indicates that Kuznetsov will not come back into active service although it may be retained nominally. Only one Kirov in service and both Slavas will stay as nominal flagships until Gorshkovs take over.

DDG & FFG
The current upgrades to Udaloys extend life by 10 years with retirement ~2031-34 at 45 years. By then they should all be replaced 1:1 by Gorshkovs.

FFC
Pacific fleet will receive 6 20385 and 6 20380. Black Sea Fleet will only receive 2 20380 and Baltic fleet will likely expand from 4 to 6 20380 after 2030 when 1154 retire. Per current plan Northern fleet will receive 2 20385 and 2 20380 and likely up to 6 and 6 but construction likely won't start before 2030.

LHD
23900 are built at Zaliv Shipyard in Kerch (Crimea) with delivery by 2028-29 which poses a risk in a prolonged conflict.

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projection of Russian navy in 2030-35 / 2023

By 2030-35 Russia will receive a reduced fleet that was projected to enter service 2025-2030 under SAP 2018-2027. Pacific and Northern fleets will equal in strength and Baltic will be weakest. Reduction in large vessels will be permanent and the main fighting force will be corvettes which will relegate the fleets to defensive and coastal roles with limited blue water potential outside of nuclear submarines.

The technological level of the fleet will be that of current state (2010s) so with few exceptions by the time it enters service it will be in need of MLU.

MarKoz81 said:

he reason for greater efforts to procure ships in the east at the expense of procurement elsewhere is obvious: the alliance between Russia and China is one of temporary expediency and it covers a fundamental long-term rivalry for influence in the region. Russia is not building weapons where it allegedly has enemies but where it allegedly has friends. Pay no mind to words and mind the actions alone.

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You say this as if we haven't had months of news and actions of NATO wanting to expand into the Pacific with Japan wanting to get zesty with regards to the Kurils. Then there is the fact the war that the US and its "allies" are pushing for against China will involve Russia one way or the other, so might as well modernize the largely neglected Pacific Fleet.

This thing about "temporary alliances for expediency" is a projection from Euros and Anglos. Can't fathom a relationship were the involved parties aren't equal but one has to dominate the other.

Russia to announce 2S43 Malva deployment in Ukraine at Army-2023​

The Army Forum is scheduled to take place at Patriot Park in Kubinka, near Moscow, from August 14 to 20. Organized under the Russian Defense Ministry's auspices, this event aims to provide insights into the advancements in Russia's military technology. "Malva has already passed state tests. Now its serial production has been launched. The first samples will be delivered to the troops in the coming months," Artyakov stated, shedding light on the imminent operationalization of the .

The 2S43 Malva's firepower includes the capability to launch projectiles weighing around 43 kilograms to a maximum firing range of 24,500 meters. Its firing rate is estimated at 7-8 rounds per minute, surpassing similar artillery systems. The 2S43 has a crew of five, and measures 13 m in length, 2.75 m in width, and 3.1 m in height.

Russia's New Phlox 120mm Self-Propelled Mortar Deployed in Ukraine​

According to information released by Russian media on August 10, 2023, images of the first serially produced 120-mm self-propelled artillery system, known as "" or 2S40, have surfaced on social networks. Deliveries to the Russian army are anticipated shortly, with rapid deployment expected on the Ukrainian battlefield.

From a global perspective, showcasing new weaponry can act as a powerful strategic signal, underscoring a nation's military prowess, which can act as a deterrent to adversaries. Economically, the success of these systems on the battlefield could bolster export opportunities, as many countries prefer battle-proven equipment. Conversely, real-world deployments can highlight potential weaknesses in equipment, which is invaluable for subsequent iterations and refinements. For the soldiers on the ground, having advanced and efficient tools can elevate morale, knowing they possess a potential edge in the field. Finally, the exigencies of war often spur faster innovation, driving rapid responses to emergent challenges.

The is a newly-developed Russian wheeled self-propelled artillery system. It's built on a truck chassis and is equipped with a 120mm mortar. Designed to operate close to the frontline, this artillery system features an armored crew cab that provides protection against small arms fire and artillery shell splinters.


The 2S40 Phlox has the capability to fire a diverse range of ammunition, including High-Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT), High-Explosive Fragmentation (HE-FRAG), and smoke. Its maximum firing range with these types of ammunition reaches up to 13 km. Additionally, it can launch any 120mm mortar shells, boasting a maximum range of 7.5 km. For precision strikes against armored targets, the Phlox employs the Kitolov-2M precision-guided munitions with a range extending up to 10 km. The vehicle carries a total of 80 rounds, with 28 of them ready to use.


Equipped with a state-of-the-art fire control system, the 2S40 offers a high degree of accuracy. It can share firing data with an associated command post vehicle and also has the capability to select targets and operate autonomously. Operated by a four-man crew, the Phlox can be prepared for firing in just a few minutes. Furthermore, it can swiftly redeploy to evade counter-battery fire.

MarKoz81 said:

I bring bad news for everyone who still thinks that war in Ukraine hasn't massively affected Russian potential both in short and long term.

Click to expand...

Thanks for this information. Looks much like USN Fleet condition and future.

I don't agree with rationale for eastern shipbuilding emphasis -- China will engage Russia on its own terms and they won't be kinetic.

MarKoz81 said:

bring bad news for everyone who still thinks that war in Ukraine hasn't massively affected Russian potential both in short and long term. News comes from the blog of experienced and reliable Russian naval enthusiast and blogger Alexander Shishkin at navy-korabel.livejournal.com

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first you should understand what happens practically in Ukraine. this is largest demonstration of cruise missile launches and most are from bombers. and those are old missiles based on 90s tech and Tu-160 practically not participate in it due to modernization project.
Tu-160M has significant increase in range which gives capability of both loitering and airbase flexibility near Arctic.
Su-57 second stage engine is part of current contracts. interview is all about Airpower.

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Vladimir Artyakov: "We clearly understand that we are working to win"​

- How is the work on increasing the serial production of Su-57 fighters going? When is it planned to install the so-called second stage engine on this aircraft?

- We fully fulfill our obligations to the Ministry of Defense. Now the aircraft is undergoing trial operation in the Russian Aerospace Forces. This year, our cooperation, headed by UAC, plans to significantly increase the rate of production of these aircraft in accordance with the state contract. At the same time, the Su-57 platform is evolving. Its combat capabilities are being increased, the most modern technologies are being introduced into the machine. That is, its effectiveness continues to grow. As for the power plants, the Su-57 aircraft is adapted for the use of the engine of both the first and second stages. Even with the engine of the first stage, the fighter meets the basic requirements for a fifth-generation aircraft. Aircraft with the engine of the second stage are now undergoing flight tests. Already under the current serial contract, it is planned to supply the Su-57 with a new engine - UEC and UAC are working on this.
When is it planned to complete the tests of the upgraded Tu-22M3M long-range bombers ? How many samples are now connected to the tests? Were weapons tested on them? Have the existing Tu-22M3M prototypes been tested by using weapons against Ukrainian military facilities as part of the NWO?

- Tests of the upgraded Tu-22M3M long-range bombers will be completed in accordance with the plan of the Russian Defense Ministry. Approbation of new weapons within the framework of the SVO is the prerogative of the military department. We are ready for this.
- Su-25 attack aircraft have proven themselves well in the NVO zone. Is the possibility of their modernization taking into account combat experience being considered? What might this upgrade be?

- According to the results of combat use, the Su-25SM3 variant shows itself to be the most effective. To date, such modernization is being carried out at one of the aircraft repair plants. During the modernization, the aircraft is equipped with new sighting and navigation equipment, a new optical-laser thermal-television sighting system, a new satellite navigation system, as well as an electronic warfare complex and other systems.

How are the works on launching Tu-160M missile carriers into mass production? Did you manage to fully establish the technological chain for the production of all components for them?

- Let me remind you that the mass production of the Tu-160 was discontinued in the 90s. Now we are resuming the construction of these missile carriers in a new look - the Tu-160M. Yes, we managed to completely restore the technological chain of production of all components. Corresponding cooperation of enterprises has been re-formed. As a result, in 2022 we witnessed the first flight of the Tu-160M built from scratch. The combat capabilities of the upgraded aircraft have been significantly increased. The range of armament has been expanded, on-board equipment has been modernized. The aircraft received new engines - NK-32 of the second series, thanks to which the range of its combat use was significantly increased.

- The PAK DA project has been suspended due to sanctions and NWO, or is it continuing in a benign mode? When can the first flight model of the newest bomber be created?

- Works under the PAK DA project are carried out in the mode established by the approved schedule.

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sheogorath said:

This thing about "temporary alliances for expediency" is a projection from Euros and Anglos. Can't fathom a relationship were the involved parties aren't equal but one has to dominate the other.

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Partnership will last as long as both parties face the same external threats and continue to have a high level of economic dependency on one another. This state of affairs may last several decades, but will not last one day longer once the previous two conditions are no longer fulfilled.

There exists no degree of historical friendship or common cultural or ideological ties between Russia and China. Russia will always put Russian interests first. The two nations are natural geopolitical rivals and Russia is one of the three countries that inflicted the most harm on China during the 19th/20th centuries after all.

RobertC said:

Thanks for this information. Looks much like USN Fleet condition and future.

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USN is going to follow the British model of gradual decline where inefficiencies will slowly accumulate under the strain of insufficient funding.

Russia has suffered several tectonic shifts that affected the fleet in structural terms - the largest after 1991, after 1998 and after 2014 and now it's the fourth tectonic shift except it isn't as distinct because the fleets have already atrophied to a level that is almost sustainable. While the US has shipyards that slowly lose capability Russia has shipyards that have no capability and those that retain it like Sevmash or Severenaya are struggling more than American counterparts - both with limited capability and excessive orders. Amurskaya was expanded not just as regional investment but mostly as expansion of industrial capacity in a geographically distant region that was lacking post 1991.

USN is struggling to maintainin and grow an existing extensive potential in contest vs the world's top shipbuilding industry. Russia is struggling to maintain a sustained rate of moderate modernization so as not to atrophy beyond a point of no return. Those are not comparable scenarios no matter how critical you want to be toward US naval procurement.

To expand on the previous post:

The "new" fleet in 2035 will be mostly between 0 and 20 years old. Right now the fleet is mostly between 20 and 40 years old. In net terms it's a gain but it's a loss in terms of initial plan which attempted to modernize even more rapidly before the idiotic strategic decisions in 2014 and 2022 killed it.

The problem really lies in the permanent shift in balance of forces that Russia wanted to address:


Considering that all countries in the region are modernizing and/or expanding their fleets Russian navy in its improved state will still end up last and outclassed by an order of magnitude with only the nuclear submarines as a factor. In cooperation with PLAN it may be in the same position as RN is to USN but it will not be capable of offensive operations without PLAN support and that relegates Russia permanently to security client status in the region unless it wants to abandon offensive posture at all and focus on defense of territory. Both will have political consequences.

The same situation occurs in terms of air power - Russia struggles to modernize its own air force and the projected number and late delivery of Su-57 will cause Russia to fall into the fourth spot in this area as well behind China, Japan and Korea. Russia won't be able to direct more than 24-36 Su-57s to Eastern Military District because in the west NATO is developing a fleet of over 200 F-35s only counting traditionally "hostile" countries:

• Norway - 52
• Finland - 64
• Denmark - 27
• Poland - 32
• Czechia - 32

If Romania manages to acquire F-35s (plan for 32) that establishes infrastructure for USAF (48-96 F-35s in Europe) and other NATO 5gens (210 total) all over Russia's western flank and that forces Russia to prioritize additional Su-57s in western MDs compared to the planned 36 because Su-35s and Su-30SM2s alone won't be enough.

36 to 60 Su-57 vs 450 to 500 F-35 is Desert Storm asymmetry and will produce Desert Storm results.




And the more Russia shifts toward relying on nuclear weapons as solution to all threats the more it becomes effectively defenseless against low level/sub-threshold activity which will only increase in the coming years because preparations are made for it currently.

All of Caucasus republics are potential separatist regions with ethnically distinct majorities and with 58th Army (now in Tokmak) serving as pacifying force and 49th Army (now in Kherson) protecting the northern flank in Krasondar and Stavropol krais. The only "Russian" region at Caspian coast is Astrakhan oblast and if the Caucasus ethnic republics break away Russia loses connection to former Soviet republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. And that opens up a corridor through Caucasus for hostile influence and power projection.


Ethnic Russians per federal subject - note the Tatar republics east of Moscow, and north of Kazakhstan.



Nukes are a ceiling of escalation. Not a floor. If all you have is nukes then you have nothing.

In the east Russia will be squeezed by three (plus US) competitors of which it will be the weakest without any ability to shift additional forces east because of the sheer disproportion in the west. But west has the core of the state and just east of Urals lies the largest energy basin:




With that Russia can attempt to survive but it will inevitably have to shed eastern Siberia to conserve and focus resources.

RobertC said:

I don't agree with rationale for eastern shipbuilding emphasis -- China will engage Russia on its own terms and they won't be kinetic.

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It's not about Russia engaging China but Russia being able to provide security which legitimizes Moscow's power. The problem Russia faces is entirely internal.

If Russia can't provide security then China will and then it's no longer sovereign Russian territory but Chinese protectorate in Russia which will be the first step in deconstruction of Russian Federation.

Russia exists in its current form only because the outward pressure generated by its military strength was greater than inward pressure generated by both military and non-military power projection from other states like China, US and Japan. Russia lacks soft power so hard power is everything.

Think about the border regions in China and Russia that are affected by Eastern Military District and the Pacific Fleet.

China

Russia

Reduce the GDP by 1/3 (minimum) due to change in exchange rate RBY/USD and only oil and gas rich Sakhalin and Magadan are above Chinese provinces in nominal terms in a region populated by approx. 6 million people. Russia has already struggled to increase investment in those regions and now it will be even harder.

In those conditions Russia simply can't afford to not provide security or at worst provide it in cooperation with China as an equal partner. Democracies have both inertia and flexibility to handle such situations. They're plastic. Authoritarians systems are hard and brittle. Press to hard and they shatter.

I'll link to posts adjacent to the problem from WestPac thread for reference. They provide additional information:


Ok, that's enough.

MarKoz81 said:

USN is going to follow the British model of gradual decline where inefficiencies will slowly accumulate under the strain of insufficient funding.

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Thanks. I was referring to the USN condition and future, not the path taken. Your path is most likely.

WRT to the remainder of your comprehensive analysis, for which I again thank you, Russia's sovereignty is, as you described, challenged by several factors only one of which is geographic. And for that 4,000km factor, recently successfully (mostly) demarcated with Russia, China will not allow the West to intrude any more than the North Korean border with South Korea as you described in another thread

Russia is also the absolute priority for China because of geography.

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China is addressing Russia's northern seas vulnerability as a "near-Arctic" observer to the Arctic Council; joint exercises with Russian soldiers manning Chinese equipment under Chinese overall command and control; Arctic-oriented shipbuilding and undersea sensor deployment; etc. China's SCS (and ECS) solution is complete. As you have said, the gaps are in the Indian Ocean (eg, AUKUS) and Russia's Arctic.

You concluded

The "decolonization of Russia" is therefore historically inevitable and it will be likely the pivotal conflict of this century that will also involve China as the only power capable of introducing structure and stability primarily due to economic power and expanding infrastructure, less so due to military power. In fact it is a historical necessity because the regime in Moscow has demonstrated its inability to rule competently and responsibly. And that is not a security gain for China but a security cost because of the nuclear potential that should not exist in a client state. Ever.

This scenario should really have a thread of its own.

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I'm looking forward to your introducing such a thread.