PLAN SCS Bases/Islands/Vessels (Not a Strategy Page)

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
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Customary and international law does not seek to differentiate between military and civilian vessels when it comes to the principle of freedom of navigation. There are specific references to military activities because of the sensitivity it presents to a State but the specifics are meant to clarify the rules rather than in imposing additional conditions. You are attempting to decouple them in your argument. If you wish to take such a track the onus is on you to make your case rather than simply stating my failure to see your logic.

Yes I am attempting to decouple them. Logically, for the purposes of this discussion at least, one must decouple them, otherwise it is materially misleading regarding China's actions and its intentions. I explain this at the end of the post.

The fact that international law does not differentiate them does not mean that we, as astute observers cannot point out illogical statements that seek to hide behind international law for misinformation.



There are States out there constantly attempting to subrogate established laws by imposing their will and changing the status quo. In International law acquiescence has far more implication than at face value which I will quote the following :”. Acquiescence is the tacit acceptance of a certain legal position as a result of a failure to make a reservation of rights at the appropriate juncture. For acquiescence to arise, a claim must have been made and accepted. The claim must be made in a manner, and in such circumstances, that the other State has been placed on notice of that claim. The conduct that allegedly constitutes acquiescence, or tacit acceptance of that claim, likewise must be clear and unequivocal. The failure to make a timely protest in circumstances when it reasonably could have been
expected to do so may constitute tacit acceptance of the claim (International Law Studies Volume 66 : Maintaining Freedom of the seas)”

In other words, in international law failure to challenge the imposed conditions can be construed as tacit agreement by failure to act. The FON issue as recorded by CNN is much more than some military exchange because it goes to the heart of the issue over non recognition of China’s sovereignty claim and FON restrictions. If China is able to establish the conditions of freedom of navigation, it is irrelevant whether it is concerning military or civilian vessels because it would established the conditions and imposing it in future is merely a decision and of timing of its choosing. Whether it will is irrelevant.

As to the issue of security or the threat of use of force, these are issues that are well covered by UNCLOS and the UN.

So therefore you are implicitly agreeing that China has not sought to establish conditions of freedom of navigation regarding civilian vessels... and you also agree that it is not in the US's interests for China to have the capability to do so if the necessity ever arose...

I don't disagree with any of this -- in fact if you look back at my posts on the matter, I have entirely stated that it is in the US's interest to prevent Chinese military presence in SCS, while it is in China's interest to have a greater military presence in SCS, and it all goes back to mahan 101 -- that control of sea lanes and shipping is power.

In other words, the ability to constrain the other side's shipping via one's own military power is... well, power.

But hey, we were never debating about the ability to constrain civilian, we were debating the evidence for China intending to limit civilian FON as justification for describing them as a threat to FON of all kinds of vessels. And for that, you have no leg to stand on, because China has never physically acted in such a way to restrict FON of civilian vessels and they have never stated any desire to do so, so unless you want to equate the ability to restrict civilian FON as the intention, well then I refer you back to this doctrine that you supposedly follow:
I am dealing with facts as it is presented and not what may happen in the future.

----


I am sorry that I do not see your logic about decoupling because other than your stated claim that it is logical you have not actually presented a case of why it is logical.

Because civilian ships and military ships are fundamentally different (do you need me to "present a case" for why they're different?)?
Because China has not sought to challenge any civilian vehicle's FON up to the present?
Because the suggestion that China would seek to challenge the FON of civilian vehicle's makes no sense for its economy given it is the largest trading nation on earth and the largest trading partner of virtually all its regional neighbours, and limiting FON would limit its own trade?
Because if one does imply that China is challenging the FON of all vehicles, and if one looks at the few challenges they have issued in the past and the types of vehicles they have issued it to, it is disingenuous if not outright lying to claim that China is a threat or a challenge to FON of all types of vehicles, when facts up to the present are only suggestive that a particular, obvious subset of vehicles (military) were challenged?
Because if one implies China is challenge FON of all vehicles (rather than only military vehicles in certain limited ways), then that would mislead other nations and observers into thinking it is more aggressive than it actually is?


(btw now that I go back to the P-8 incident, the name of the zone was actually a "military alert zone" not a "military exclusion zone". Given you were insistent on equating exclusion as restriction, what would you equate "alert" to?)
 
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Sweeper Monk

New Member
Registered Member
China isn't restricting freedom of navigation. It does however have an interesting interpretation of the rules of EEZ which the US spin as limiting FON.

Essentially under UNCLOS a nation can limit maritime surveys in its EEZ if it wants. China applies this to all vessels, civilian and military, the US excludes military vessels from this eg submarines. Thus if we take China's interpretation, US military vessels can pass through to China's EEZ to go from point A to point B, but they can't do maritime surveys, which limits their ability to spy since detecting other submarines could potentially fall under the "maritime survey" bit.

The US then goes, "ah, so China doesn't want our submarines to go through its EEZ" (after all, what will it do in its EEZ if it can't spy, hunt other military assets etc") and thus we get the old freedom of navigation spiel the US likes to use.

*************************************************************************************

The other example about the CNN reporting is stretching it. Those artificial islands which were reclaimed from rocks (ie above sea level at high tide) like the one they flew near are entitled to 12 nm territorial sea eg Scarborough shoal, Johnson reef , Cuarteron reef and Fiery Cross reef.
.
Those that are reclaimed from reefs (ie below sea level at high tide) are entitled to a 500 metre safety zone only, eg Mischief Reef, Kennan Reef /Hughes Reef , Gaven Reef and Subi Reef.

FON allows me to fly north to south skirting US airspace, but not entering it. I can even ignore the US ADIZ in the sense that I don't have to answer their requests for identification, but it might make them suspicious and send assets to trail me. I cannot however deliberately enter US airspace and go FON for the win. The same applies here. The US can skirt near the 12 nm limit of some of the islands (which media are now reporting they did) but not enter it. If they want to get from point A to point B, they can cross the SCS without skirting the airspace of these islands easy. So China warned them about entering Chinese airspace, and the US didn't. Since they supposedly flew very close, its quite possible both sides thought that the plane was inside / outside the 12 nm limit respectively.

The only way you could argue it was standing up for FON is if the Chinese believe they are entitled to more than the 12 nm limit, and there is no evidence for this. At best they believe the US military plane can pass through but not spy, ie cannot do maritime surveys.

FON is just an excuse the US politicians use to make themselves look tough on China.
 

Zetageist

Junior Member
South China Sea: Satellite Images Show Pace of China’s Subi Reef Reclamation
China is adding 8 acres a day, while other images corroborate Malaysia on South Luconia Shoals.

By Victor Robert Lee for The Diplomat
June 19, 2015

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Satellite imagery from June 5, 2015 shows China has expanded its land fill of Subi Reef by 74 percent in less than two months, adding an average of eight acres of surface per day on that reef alone. Mischief Reef, larger than Subi, is now more than half filled in, according to a June 9, 2015 NASA image.

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Subi’s expansion, to 3.87 square kilometers (955 acres*), has proceeded by extension along the reef as well as by widening.
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, a straight segment of land fill on Subi is long enough to accommodate an airstrip more than three kilometers long; terrain grading patterns on this segment resemble China’s preparations for a now-constructed airstrip at Fiery Cross Reef, making it highly likely that China will build an airstrip at Subi as well.

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The June 16 announcement by China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lu Kang that “the land reclamation project of China’s construction on some stationed islands and reefs of the Nansha (Spratly) Islands will be completed in the upcoming days” deserves to be treated with skepticism. Earlier obfuscation from Beijing defended its new installations as shelter for fishermen.

Subi, Mischief and Fiery Cross reefs are part of the disputed Spratly Islands, portions of which are claimed by Vietnam, the Philippines, China, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei. Subi lies 430 kilometers off the Philippines’ Palawan Island, and 930 kilometers from China’s nearest coastline at Hainan Island.

China’s land filling at four other Spratly Reefs – Gaven, Hughes, Cuarteron and Johnson South – has largely ceased, but intensive construction of facilities continues. On May 28, the U.S. government reported it had observed two mobile artillery units on one of China’s Spratly installations a month prior, but that they had subsequently been removed or concealed. (According to @Rajfortyseven and the South China Sea Research Forum, the artillery was positioned at Johnson South Reef, also called Chigua.) Each of Gaven, Hughes, Cuarteron, and Johnson South reefs now has a 5-meter by 40-meter concrete ramp leading to a 2nd/3rd story structure connected to a large new building. A ramp-and-“garage” arrangement of these dimensions could accommodate mobile artillery units and permit their concealment as well as provide sheltered elevation above storm surge in the event of a typhoon.

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While the Philippines, the country closest to China’s reef construction, has strenuously protested Beijing’s moves, Malaysia, which claims several islands and features further south and operates two
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, was largely silent on China’s actions until two weeks ago when
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reported that “China has been detected intruding on Malaysian waters at the Luconia Shoals,” and a Malaysian government minister, Shahidan Kassim, posted aerial photos of a 1,000-ton-class Chinese Coast Guard vessel that purportedly had been anchored in the area for two years, in violation of Malaysia’s territorial rights. (Thanks to Scott Bentley and Andrew Chubb for calling attention to the Luconia Shoals.)

Undisclosed by Malaysian authorities, and apparently reported here for the first time, is that a much larger Chinese Coast Guard ship, of the 4,000-ton “3401-class,” has also been operating close to the South Luconia Shoals. A satellite image from February 13, 2015 shows the Chinese vessel stationed 3.5 kilometers from an elevated coral sediment feature within a site called Luconia Breakers. Because the feature may qualify as above-water, it may be of special value to territorial claimants. Malaysia-controlled pipelines from marine natural gas fields also pass within 30 kilometers of Luconia Breakers.

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Chinese Coast Guard ships of the same “3401-class” have recently been used by Beijing to wrest control of the Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines, and to blockade the Second Thomas Shoal (also called Ayungin), where a unit of Filipino marines has been stationed.

In the February 13, 2015 satellite image, a smaller Malaysian Navy Kedah-class patrol vessel is seen anchored 2.7 kilometers northwest of the Chinese vessel. By not revealing this shadowing of the more threatening Chinese ship, Malaysia may wish to avoid a full-fledged stand-off like the one that resulted in the Philippines losing the Scarborough Shoal in 2012. The Malaysian leadership may also be weighing whether over time it can benefit from a counter-balance from the U.S. and its allies.

In an era in which the U.S. federal government lacks even the basic competency to protect millions of highly sensitive personnel files from Chinese government hacking, it is unsurprising that Malaysia would proceed cautiously as it assesses the help it might get from America to hold onto territory in the South China Sea.

Victor Robert Lee reports from the Asia-Pacific region and is the author of the espionage novel
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.

*Corrected from the original 395 acres.
 

Jeff Head

General
Registered Member
Guys (specifically Brumby and Bltizo), need I remind you that this thread is about the PLAN/PRC fleet and islands/reefs and bases themselves? This is for pictures and discussions of each of those and the vessels, structures, facilities, etc. there.

Your back and forth and dialog are excellent, but...

We have a SEPARATE THREAD for PRC Strategy in the SCS.

We have another SEPARATE THRED for other nation's strategy in the SCS.

Take discussions regarding that to those thread.

Thanks, let's get back on topic.

DO NOT RESPOND TO THIS MODERATION
 

delft

Brigadier
From
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The construction period was very rushed; specialists considered that only a 10–20-year period was sufficient for this massive project. Another cause for this rush was due to the uncertain future of the airport construction after the transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China. It was originally believed that Beijing preferred to keep everything basically intact and minimise financial commitments for big projects, therefore stopping all construction despite the need for the new airport. In practice, the airport did not finish in time for the handover. However, China gave an additional year's grace period to finish the project.
This project showed China how it was possible to make an island in a short time. Next an island was constructed for port and shipbuilding activities near Shanghai. I think that when planning and executing that last project time was saved by using more equipment than would earlier have been thought necessary with the idea to use that equipment in SCS. No doubt a wealth of articles appeared in China's technical press about all aspects of constructing islands but that was not recognized by US or SEA strategic thinkers. When the time came China had the equipment and the experience to think and act big.
By comparison after the inundation of a significant part of The Netherlands on February 1, 1953 the Dutch parliament decided to rebuild the defence against the sea and a lot of equipment and experience was developed that help Dutch companies do similar work all over the World, including contributing to the Hong Kong airport, but also at home extending the port of Rotterdam into the North Sea ( Europort and Europort2 ).
 
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