plawolf
Lieutenant General
I would be amazed if any of that make it onto a "mainstream" media piece about the topic.
Its amazing how co-ordinated the "independent" western "free" media can be isn't it.
Customary and international law does not seek to differentiate between military and civilian vessels when it comes to the principle of freedom of navigation. There are specific references to military activities because of the sensitivity it presents to a State but the specifics are meant to clarify the rules rather than in imposing additional conditions. You are attempting to decouple them in your argument. If you wish to take such a track the onus is on you to make your case rather than simply stating my failure to see your logic.
There are States out there constantly attempting to subrogate established laws by imposing their will and changing the status quo. In International law acquiescence has far more implication than at face value which I will quote the following :”. Acquiescence is the tacit acceptance of a certain legal position as a result of a failure to make a reservation of rights at the appropriate juncture. For acquiescence to arise, a claim must have been made and accepted. The claim must be made in a manner, and in such circumstances, that the other State has been placed on notice of that claim. The conduct that allegedly constitutes acquiescence, or tacit acceptance of that claim, likewise must be clear and unequivocal. The failure to make a timely protest in circumstances when it reasonably could have been
expected to do so may constitute tacit acceptance of the claim (International Law Studies Volume 66 : Maintaining Freedom of the seas)”
In other words, in international law failure to challenge the imposed conditions can be construed as tacit agreement by failure to act. The FON issue as recorded by CNN is much more than some military exchange because it goes to the heart of the issue over non recognition of China’s sovereignty claim and FON restrictions. If China is able to establish the conditions of freedom of navigation, it is irrelevant whether it is concerning military or civilian vessels because it would established the conditions and imposing it in future is merely a decision and of timing of its choosing. Whether it will is irrelevant.
As to the issue of security or the threat of use of force, these are issues that are well covered by UNCLOS and the UN.
I am dealing with facts as it is presented and not what may happen in the future.
I am sorry that I do not see your logic about decoupling because other than your stated claim that it is logical you have not actually presented a case of why it is logical.
McKennan Reef (West Gate in Chinese) is directly west of Hughes Reef (East Gate in Chinese)Where exactly is Keenan Reef? Or is that their name for Hughes?
Satellite imagery from June 5, 2015 shows China has expanded its land fill of Subi Reef by 74 percent in less than two months, adding an average of eight acres of surface per day on that reef alone. Mischief Reef, larger than Subi, is now more than half filled in, according to a June 9, 2015 NASA image.
Subi’s expansion, to 3.87 square kilometers (955 acres*), has proceeded by extension along the reef as well as by widening. , a straight segment of land fill on Subi is long enough to accommodate an airstrip more than three kilometers long; terrain grading patterns on this segment resemble China’s preparations for a now-constructed airstrip at Fiery Cross Reef, making it highly likely that China will build an airstrip at Subi as well.
The June 16 announcement by China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lu Kang that “the land reclamation project of China’s construction on some stationed islands and reefs of the Nansha (Spratly) Islands will be completed in the upcoming days” deserves to be treated with skepticism. Earlier obfuscation from Beijing defended its new installations as shelter for fishermen.
Subi, Mischief and Fiery Cross reefs are part of the disputed Spratly Islands, portions of which are claimed by Vietnam, the Philippines, China, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei. Subi lies 430 kilometers off the Philippines’ Palawan Island, and 930 kilometers from China’s nearest coastline at Hainan Island.
China’s land filling at four other Spratly Reefs – Gaven, Hughes, Cuarteron and Johnson South – has largely ceased, but intensive construction of facilities continues. On May 28, the U.S. government reported it had observed two mobile artillery units on one of China’s Spratly installations a month prior, but that they had subsequently been removed or concealed. (According to @Rajfortyseven and the South China Sea Research Forum, the artillery was positioned at Johnson South Reef, also called Chigua.) Each of Gaven, Hughes, Cuarteron, and Johnson South reefs now has a 5-meter by 40-meter concrete ramp leading to a 2nd/3rd story structure connected to a large new building. A ramp-and-“garage” arrangement of these dimensions could accommodate mobile artillery units and permit their concealment as well as provide sheltered elevation above storm surge in the event of a typhoon.
While the Philippines, the country closest to China’s reef construction, has strenuously protested Beijing’s moves, Malaysia, which claims several islands and features further south and operates two , was largely silent on China’s actions until two weeks ago when reported that “China has been detected intruding on Malaysian waters at the Luconia Shoals,” and a Malaysian government minister, Shahidan Kassim, posted aerial photos of a 1,000-ton-class Chinese Coast Guard vessel that purportedly had been anchored in the area for two years, in violation of Malaysia’s territorial rights. (Thanks to Scott Bentley and Andrew Chubb for calling attention to the Luconia Shoals.)
Undisclosed by Malaysian authorities, and apparently reported here for the first time, is that a much larger Chinese Coast Guard ship, of the 4,000-ton “3401-class,” has also been operating close to the South Luconia Shoals. A satellite image from February 13, 2015 shows the Chinese vessel stationed 3.5 kilometers from an elevated coral sediment feature within a site called Luconia Breakers. Because the feature may qualify as above-water, it may be of special value to territorial claimants. Malaysia-controlled pipelines from marine natural gas fields also pass within 30 kilometers of Luconia Breakers.
Chinese Coast Guard ships of the same “3401-class” have recently been used by Beijing to wrest control of the Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines, and to blockade the Second Thomas Shoal (also called Ayungin), where a unit of Filipino marines has been stationed.
In the February 13, 2015 satellite image, a smaller Malaysian Navy Kedah-class patrol vessel is seen anchored 2.7 kilometers northwest of the Chinese vessel. By not revealing this shadowing of the more threatening Chinese ship, Malaysia may wish to avoid a full-fledged stand-off like the one that resulted in the Philippines losing the Scarborough Shoal in 2012. The Malaysian leadership may also be weighing whether over time it can benefit from a counter-balance from the U.S. and its allies.
In an era in which the U.S. federal government lacks even the basic competency to protect millions of highly sensitive personnel files from Chinese government hacking, it is unsurprising that Malaysia would proceed cautiously as it assesses the help it might get from America to hold onto territory in the South China Sea.
Victor Robert Lee reports from the Asia-Pacific region and is the author of the espionage novel .
*Corrected from the original 395 acres.
This project showed China how it was possible to make an island in a short time. Next an island was constructed for port and shipbuilding activities near Shanghai. I think that when planning and executing that last project time was saved by using more equipment than would earlier have been thought necessary with the idea to use that equipment in SCS. No doubt a wealth of articles appeared in China's technical press about all aspects of constructing islands but that was not recognized by US or SEA strategic thinkers. When the time came China had the equipment and the experience to think and act big.The construction period was very rushed; specialists considered that only a 10–20-year period was sufficient for this massive project. Another cause for this rush was due to the uncertain future of the airport construction after the transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China. It was originally believed that Beijing preferred to keep everything basically intact and minimise financial commitments for big projects, therefore stopping all construction despite the need for the new airport. In practice, the airport did not finish in time for the handover. However, China gave an additional year's grace period to finish the project.