PLAN SCS Bases/Islands/Vessels (Not a Strategy Page)

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
Sorry mate you are conflating two distinct issues as if one is the cause of the other. FON is a long established principle that predates UNCLOS. The underlying problem in the SCS is because there are competing claims and unresolved questions of jurisdiction. China's nebulous claims and unilateral application of rules is adding confusion to the picture. The CNN overflight story was a window to the world as an example of China's attempt at restricting FON. It is no accident that the story was captured by CNN as one would easily conclude previous attempts of restriction was happening and CNN's presence was to showcase to the world what was in fact happening with FON.

It is a problem because China made it a problem and not because of FON.

The P-8 overflight using a military aircraft was warned via the use of a small military exclusion zone. Do you believe that warning is proportional to potential denial of FON for civilian vessels and aircraft over the entire SCS?
The CNN overflight was actually perfect in describing the Chinese approach where the civilian airline requesting clarification was reassured that the messages were not directed to them, showing the dichotomous Chinese approach between civilian versus military presence near its territories and claimed territories.
That is about a differing issue in interpreting a particular clause within UNCLOS relating to military assets and surveying (see the Impeccable incident), unrelated to

I agree that China's territorial claims as we understand it are not very clear, however at the same time have there been any instances where China has sought to restrict FON of civilian vessels or aircraft in a manner unrelated to territorial disputes?

So no, the problem is not about China seeking to restrict "FON", but about military power and the desire for different countries seeking the ability to project it or restrict it.

At the very least, throw me a bone and admit that issues where "FON" has been challenged were all relating to the navigation of military assets (USNS Impeccable, the Cowpens cruiser, the P-8 incident), not civilian, in other words, I will concede that China may potentially seek limited restrictions on the navigation of certain military vessels near its claimed territories in the SCS (but this is not without precedent that some other nations believe in -- re: the article the Shen posted regarding differing international interpretation of EEZ surveying and military presence).

However I will resolutely argue against the idea that China would seek (or has sought) unconditional restrictions on civilian freedom navigation in SCS (and challenge anyone to find evidence of such desires), and also argue against the blatant all encompassing phrasing of "challenging freedom of navigation"... when it should more accurately be described as "potentially challenging the ability for certain military assets to navigate within the scope of claimed territories".
 

Brumby

Major
The P-8 overflight using a military aircraft was warned via the use of a small military exclusion zone. Do you believe that warning is proportional to potential denial of FON for civilian vessels and aircraft over the entire SCS?

You yourself have used the word "exclusion" which has the same meaning as restricting. I am dealing with facts as it is presented and not what may happen in the future. What exactly is a military exclusion zone in accordance with international law?
 

Brumby

Major
So no, the problem is not about China seeking to restrict "FON", but about military power and the desire for different countries seeking the ability to project it or restrict it.

At the very least, throw me a bone and admit that issues where "FON" has been challenged were all relating to the navigation of military assets (USNS Impeccable, the Cowpens cruiser, the P-8 incident), not civilian, in other words, I will concede that China may potentially seek limited restrictions on the navigation of certain military vessels near its claimed territories in the SCS (but this is not without precedent that some other nations believe in -- re: the article the Shen posted regarding differing international interpretation of EEZ surveying and military presence).

However I will resolutely argue against the idea that China would seek (or has sought) unconditional restrictions on civilian freedom navigation in SCS (and challenge anyone to find evidence of such desires), and also argue against the blatant all encompassing phrasing of "challenging freedom of navigation"... when it should more accurately be described as "potentially challenging the ability for certain military assets to navigate within the scope of claimed territories".

I am happy to debate the issue of military activities outside the territory seas because I believe the case is strong in terms of the USN interpretation of UNCLOS, the wording and its history. I don't know what is Shen's article about but I am happy to address every specific issue you care to raise.
 

Blackstone

Brigadier
China's major efforts in reclamations are about the whole of the Spratlys. One question: Why is China reclaiming so many reefs if not for its own nationalistic and security interests? The South China Sea has always been a Free International Seaway, with about US$5 trillion worth of trade passing thru it annually for many years without being pried upon by any country. There has never been such controls or claims (historically or otherwise) in other international waters: Examples - India for the Indian Ocean or the Mediterranean Sea by European Countries or US. China should realise the reasons why majority of countries in the region (though some are silent about it) are very unhappy and wary about PLA-N expansion and presence in these waters. Time to be transparent and negotiate peacefully under the auspices of the UN to help deescalate growing tension in the region.
There are many inaccuracies in your post, and I'd like to highlight some of them;
  1. You imply China is against commercial freedom of navigation (the bit about $5 trillion trade passage), when the reality is just the opposite. If SCS maritime trade is disrupted, it would harm China's economy (in raw dollars) more than anyone else. That's why China hasn't done so, to date
  2. You implied China claims SCS waters outside what its land features normally get, and that's wrong. Facts are, PRC hasn't claimed SCS waters outside its land features, with the caveat of waters around artificial islands. If you have evidence to the contrary, by all means show them
  3. What do you mean by "time to be transparent?" China has been painfully transparent about taking control of the SCS. Nothing could be more transparent than building artificial islands!
  4. As for "negotiate peacefully," China's salami tactics, while infuriating to the other claimants, is peaceful and has been relatively non-violent. The chasing and sinking of a Vietnamese boat was outrageous, but it was also the exception that proved the rule
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
I am happy to debate the issue of military activities outside the territory seas because I believe the case is strong in terms of the USN interpretation of UNCLOS, the wording and its history. I don't know what is Shen's article about but I am happy to address every specific issue you care to raise.

That issue has been discussed at great length already.
I bring up the issue of UNCLOS, EEZ, and military vessels + surveying those waters, in relation to the fact that "challenging FON" isn't about overall FON but rather military FON. I will expand on this directly below.

You yourself have used the word "exclusion" which has the same meaning as restricting. I am dealing with facts as it is presented and not what may happen in the future.

Okay, let's deal with the facts:
1: does the phrase "challenging freedom of navigation", suggest challenging the navigation of all types of assets, military and civilian? I would say yes.
2: has China ever demonstrated the desire or any actions to challenge the navigation of innocent civilian vessels or aircraft? (that is to say, not involved in territorial disputes or unidentified aircraft which may need to be identified for sake of security). No, I cannot recall any recent memory of this, nor has there been any hints at all of discussion by China in relation to challenging innocent FON of civilian vessels or shipping.
3: is it reasonable to say China in the SCS is seeking to challenge "freedom of navigation" in an overall sense of both civilian and military vehicles? I would say no
4: has China in the SCS or elsewhere sought to restrict the movement of military vehicles near its territories or sensitive military assets? Yes.
5: does 4, equate to the phrase "China is seeking to challenge FON" in a logical and rational way? Refer back to 1. No, it doesn't equate.


What exactly is a military exclusion zone in accordance with international law?

A lot of it depends on the exact nature of the zone.
For instance, during the tanker war both Iran and Iraq declared similar zones, and both Argentina and the UK did during the Falkland's war, and in all situations, the terms of encroachment were severe with the justification of using military force.
The legality of such zones varies in nature depending on the justifications of different nations, and different nations in history have announced zones of differing severity and also during different moments of conflict or peace.
I'm not sure where China's would lie on the spectrum, and it's difficult to judge without knowing the physical size of such a zone (and thus where it sits within the scope of chinese interpretations of EEZ as well as its claimed territory in relation to Taiping island), as well as what rules of engagement they have to enforce it (if at all), and how it relates to civilian vessels (if at all).
Such zones are generally declared on the basis of heightened perception of threat to oneself, as well as to protect civilian vehicles from getting entangled in danger.

However I should note that I wasn't discussing the legality of an MEZ, but rather whether there is evidence to suggest that China has sought to challenge FON in a general sense (i.e.: including civilian vessels not involved in territorial disputes and/or those which may present a security threat), versus whether China has only sought to challenge military FON in certain limited ways.

Whether it is legal or not for China to seek and challenge military FON in the ways that it has, is another matter which I am not interested in broaching (at least not today)
 
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Brumby

Major
Okay, let's deal with the facts:
1: does the phrase "challenging freedom of navigation", suggest challenging the navigation of all types of assets, military and civilian? I would say yes.
I believe FON applies to all vessels navigating the high seas. There is no notion of decoupling between military and civilian.

2: has China ever demonstrated the desire or any actions to challenge the navigation of innocent civilian vessels or aircraft? (that is to say, not involved in territorial disputes or unidentified aircraft which may need to be identified for sake of security). No, I cannot recall any recent memory of this, nor has there been any hints at all of discussion by China in relation to challenging innocent FON of civilian vessels or shipping.
You are attempting to decouple between military and civilian vessels and as per 1 above it is irrelevant. We have the CNN report on the overflight as an example of attempted restriction of FON in the SCS. This restriction is probably not the first attempt except it is being publicly disclosed. So let's deal with the facts as publicly available and not some kind of conjecture.
You are attempting to frame a conversation about a future event that is impossible to prove for obvious reason.

3: is it reasonable to say China in the SCS is seeking to challenge "freedom of navigation" in an overall sense of both civilian and military vehicles? I would say no
A thousand mile journey begins with the first step. What the future holds no one knows. Let's stick with what we know.

4: has China in the SCS or elsewhere sought to restrict the movement of military vehicles near its territories or sensitive military assets? Yes.
5: does 4, equate to the phrase "China is seeking to challenge FON" in a logical and rational way? Refer back to 1. No, it doesn't equate.
You are attempting to connect 2 dots with a straight line when it is not there because there are many dots to the problem. Given that there are so many dots or should I say rocks that are disputed out there in the SCS it would be a good step in the right direction if China actually clarify what exactly it is claiming and on what basis rather than just declaring its sovereignty as indisputable. I thought imperial decree went out the window in China long time ago.

A lot of it depends on the exact nature of the zone.
For instance, during the tanker war both Iran and Iraq declared similar zones, and both Argentina and the UK did during the Falkland's war, and in all situations, the terms of encroachment were severe with the justification of using military force.
The legality of such zones varies in nature depending on the justifications of different nations, and different nations in history have announced zones of differing severity and also during different moments of conflict or peace.
Those examples you mentioned are adjoining land mass unlike rocks some where out there in the SCS.

I'm not sure where China's would lie on the spectrum, and it's difficult to judge without knowing the physical size of such a zone (and thus where it sits within the scope of chinese interpretations of EEZ as well as its claimed territory in relation to Taiping island), as well as what rules of engagement they have to enforce it (if at all), and how it relates to civilian vessels (if at all).
The ambiguity of the Chinese actions is the source of the problem.

Such zones are generally declared on the basis of heightened perception of threat to oneself, as well as to protect civilian vehicles from getting entangled in danger.
I think you are spinning on this one
 

delft

Brigadier
The presence of large Chinese islands, even a small number, makes cooperation with China in winning oil and gas in the area more attractive than doing so against Chinese opposition. As China already offered to share with the other claimants China wouldn't win anything if it drove out the outposts of the other countries.
So China is winning all it wants by just going on as it is doing and eventually reaching agreements with these countries. US is only delaying these agreements.
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
I believe FON applies to all vessels navigating the high seas. There is no notion of decoupling between military and civilian.

You are attempting to decouple between military and civilian vessels and as per 1 above it is irrelevant. We have the CNN report on the overflight as an example of attempted restriction of FON in the SCS. This restriction is probably not the first attempt except it is being publicly disclosed. So let's deal with the facts as publicly available and not some kind of conjecture.
You are attempting to frame a conversation about a future event that is impossible to prove for obvious reason.

On the contrary, you are trying to frame a conversation about a future event by not even admitting that there is a difference between challenging FON for military and civilian vehicles.
Logically I cannot understand how you do not see the difference in FON for military versus civilian vehicles, especially when it applies to accusations. If one is accusing China of limiting FON generally speaking, then one there are certain implications of the kind of impact it has.
If one is only limiting FON of military vehicles, it sounds far less ominous than limiting the FON of all vehicles. The latter reeks of over-reach and threatens trade and innocent vessels of all kinds, while the former is more limited and suggests there are security and defence reasons against only specific kinds of vehicles that could prove to be lethal threats.

I can give any number of analogies or examples of how the treatment of civilian and military individuals, aircraft, or personnel are differingly portrayed and described, but I'm sure you can think of them yourself.

For the purposes of accusing China of challenging FON, if one does not decouple military versus civilian vehicles then not only is it a failure of logic, but it is deliberately mis-portraying one's current and past actions. At best that is an attempt to slander one's actions, at worst, the tension and misunderstanding generated by such statements could which could lead to unnecessary conflict.

If you do not agree to this fundamental, then I have nothing else to say on the matter.


A thousand mile journey begins with the first step. What the future holds no one knows. Let's stick with what we know.

If you are attempting to connect 2 straight line when it is not there because there are many dots to the problem. Given that there are so many dots or should I say rocks that are disputed out there in the SCS it would be a good step in the right direction if China actually clarify what exactly it is claiming and on what basis rather than just declaring its sovereignty as indisputable. I thought imperial decree went out the window in China long time ago.

I never said that China shouldn't clarify its stance.
In fact I have said that China should clarify its stance before.

What I am disputing is whether China's present and past actions, and announcements (even in context of the ambiguity of its territorial claims) means one can claim China is a challenge to FON.

There is no need to answer if you're not willing to change your position on the difference between military and civilian FON.


Those examples you mentioned are adjoining land mass unlike rocks some where out there in the SCS.

Look, you asked for some examples, I gave you some.
If you really want to describe the differences that makes those specific MEZs or NFZs or TEZs within the scope of international law while China's MEZ (whose characteristics we don't even know, making comparisons more or less moot) in the SCS are the devil incarnate, then go ahead.

But like I said, I'm not interested in debating the legality of MEZs in this particular strand of discussion. It was always about whether one can use China's present and past actions to logically accuse it of challenging FON, knowing that such an accusation implies that it challenges FON of all vessel types.


The ambiguity of the Chinese actions is the source of the problem.

Which is different to accusing China of challenging freedom of navigation for all vehicles. Of course you believe challenging freedom of navigation for military aircraft nearing a high security island under a time of tension is equal to challenging freedom of navigation for all vehicles... so go figure.


I think you are spinning on this one

I wasn't saying that China's MEZ in this case was due to those reasons exactly.

That said, declaring an MEZ does generally dissuade civilian aircraft from entering those areas so as to not endanger themselves -- again I'm not saying this is the case for the MEZ around fiery cross reef, rather in a general sense for MEZs, TEZs or NFZs imposed by various nations in recent years. You can do a search of MEZs, TEZs, and NFZs if you wish (Falklands, Tanker War, Libya, Iraq ar all prime examples).
 

Brumby

Major
On the contrary, you are trying to frame a conversation about a future event by not even admitting that there is a difference between challenging FON for military and civilian vehicles. Logically I cannot understand how you do not see the difference in FON for military versus civilian vehicles, especially when it applies to accusations. If one is accusing China of limiting FON generally speaking, then one there are certain implications of the kind of impact it has.

Customary and international law does not seek to differentiate between military and civilian vessels when it comes to the principle of freedom of navigation. There are specific references to military activities because of the sensitivity it presents to a State but the specifics are meant to clarify the rules rather than in imposing additional conditions. You are attempting to decouple them in your argument. If you wish to take such a track the onus is on you to make your case rather than simply stating my failure to see your logic.

If one is only limiting FON of military vehicles, it sounds far less ominous than limiting the FON of all vehicles. The latter reeks of over-reach and threatens trade and innocent vessels of all kinds, while the former is more limited and suggests there are security and defence reasons against only specific kinds of vehicles that could prove to be lethal threats.

I can give any number of analogies or examples of how the treatment of civilian and military individuals, aircraft, or personnel are differingly portrayed and described, but I'm sure you can think of them yourself.

There are States out there constantly attempting to subrogate established laws by imposing their will and changing the status quo. In International law acquiescence has far more implication than at face value which I will quote the following :”. Acquiescence is the tacit acceptance of a certain legal position as a result of a failure to make a reservation of rights at the appropriate juncture. For acquiescence to arise, a claim must have been made and accepted. The claim must be made in a manner, and in such circumstances, that the other State has been placed on notice of that claim. The conduct that allegedly constitutes acquiescence, or tacit acceptance of that claim, likewise must be clear and unequivocal. The failure to make a timely protest in circumstances when it reasonably could have been
expected to do so may constitute tacit acceptance of the claim (International Law Studies Volume 66 : Maintaining Freedom of the seas)”

In other words, in international law failure to challenge the imposed conditions can be construed as tacit agreement by failure to act. The FON issue as recorded by CNN is much more than some military exchange because it goes to the heart of the issue over non recognition of China’s sovereignty claim and FON restrictions. If China is able to establish the conditions of freedom of navigation, it is irrelevant whether it is concerning military or civilian vessels because it would established the conditions and imposing it in future is merely a decision and of timing of its choosing. Whether it will is irrelevant.

As to the issue of security or the threat of use of force, these are issues that are well covered by UNCLOS and the UN.

For the purposes of accusing China of challenging FON, if one does not decouple military versus civilian vehicles then not only is it a failure of logic, but it is deliberately mis-portraying one's current and past actions. At best that is an attempt to slander one's actions, at worst, the tension and misunderstanding generated by such statements could which could lead to unnecessary conflict.

If you do not agree to this fundamental, then I have nothing else to say on the matter.

I am sorry that I do not see your logic about decoupling because other than your stated claim that it is logical you have not actually presented a case of why it is logical.
 

Franklin

Captain
Surprisingly from The Diplomat.

Who Is the Biggest Aggressor in the South China Sea?

In the past 20 years, Vietnam has doubled its holdings in the South China Sea.

In 1996, Vietnam occupied 24 features in the Spratly Islands (source). At that time, according to the same source, China occupied nine. By 2015, according to the United States government, Vietnam occupied 48 features, and China occupied eight.

On May 13, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense, David Shear, said this to the Senate Foreign relations Committee: “Vietnam has 48 outposts; the Philippines, 8; China, 8; Malaysia, 5, and Taiwan, 1.”

In the past 20 years, according to the United States, China has not physically occupied additional features. By contrast, Vietnam has doubled its holdings, and much of that activity has occurred recently. The Vietnamese occupations appear to have increased from 30 to 48 in the last six years.

Shear also pointed out that as of his speech, China did not have an airfield as other claimants did. He said:

All of these same claimants have also engaged in construction activity of differing scope and degree. The types of outpost upgrades vary across claimants but broadly are comprised of land reclamation, building construction and extension, and defense emplacements. Between 2009 and 2014, Vietnam was the most active claimant in terms of both outpost upgrades and land reclamation, reclaiming approximately 60 acres. All territorial claimants, with the exception of China and Brunei, have also already built airstrips of varying sizes and functionality on disputed features in the Spratlys.

It appears China has now built an airfield and that this was already visible in April 2015, when the Daily Mail reported that “images showed a paved section of runway 505m by 53m on the northeastern side” of Fiery Cross Reef. Now media pundits are engaged in a debate about how many acres China has reclaimed, suggesting that China has been more aggressive than Vietnam because it has reclaimed more acres.

The statement by Shear in May puts additional critical light on the suggestion of some in the United States that China is not only making “preposterous” claims but is being the most aggressive actor in the territorial disputes (see: “Intelligence Check: Just How ‘Preposterous’ Are China’s South China Sea Activities?”). Shear specifically said that between 2009 and 2014, Vietnam had been the most active. This helps us understand what Chinese military leaders mean when they say China has shown “great restraint.”

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