PLA Strike Strategies in Westpac HIC

ZeEa5KPul

Brigadier
Registered Member
Cause its extremely dangerous as your enemy cannot distinguish whether it is a nuke or conventional warhead until it impacts. All they see is an projectile with icbm trajectory.

Politicians then only have a few minutes to decide in their response which could lead to a misunderstanding and into nuclear escalation.

All that potential fallout for a measly few hundred kg of explosive warhead isnt worth it.
That argument doesn't make sense. Americans can't distinguish whether a hypersonic cruise missile fired by an H-20 or a Type 09-V is conventional or nuclear armed either. The reason intercontinental missiles aren't used is because they're a very inefficient way to deliver a relatively small amount of conventional explosive.
 

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
In your scenario (the one you were recommending the ICBM for, to be exact), you are talking about a limited strike on the contiguous United States, using an ICBM with a conventional warhead.

The United States of America has a Launch On Warning nuclear capability. Their current communicated doctrine says they don't have a LOW posture, but there is enough ambiguity left in. On purpose.

This means, if you launch an ICBM @ the US, you are getting nuked in retaliation, most probably before the missile even lands. They have no way of recognizing what type of warhead your missile uses.

Historically speaking, nuclear countries have thought about this in the past. My reference to PGS was exactly that, as an example.

Hope that helps. ;)

That doesn't make sense.

A single incoming ICBM (even if it is nuclear) does not justify the US launching an full-scale nuclear attack.
Such an action will trigger a full-scale Chinese nuclear retaliation against the US.

Remember that there are over 300 Minuteman silos plus the SSBN warheads.
The US could just wait for that single incoming ICBM to detonate, then decide to launch everything
 

lych470

Junior Member
Registered Member
That doesn't make sense.

A single incoming ICBM (even if it is nuclear) does not justify the US launching an full-scale nuclear attack.
Such an action will trigger a full-scale Chinese nuclear retaliation against the US.

Remember that there are over 300 Minuteman silos plus the SSBN warheads.
The US could just wait for that single incoming ICBM to detonate, then decide to launch everything

No one is ever willing to make that gamble, because the fallout (no pun intended) if you gambled wrong is unacceptable.
 

Jilternj

Just Hatched
Registered Member
This isn't that bizarre. The US military has always argued for massively attacking China proper whenever there has been a threat of conflict between the two:
  1. Korean War (MacArthur and other hawks wanted to use nuclear weapons on targets in Manchuria)
  2. Second Taiwan Strait Crisis (JCS informed Eisenhower that if it came to war, there would be no way to defeat China without using nuclear weapons on the mainland)
  3. Vietnam War (When considering a potential invasion of North Vietnam, planners believed that if China intervened to defend Vietnam, there would be no way to defeat the intervention without using nuclear weapons)
They are just repeating the same trope, but with conventional weapons, because they are unable to make the mental adjustment needed to realize China no longer has a Soviet-style AD network based on HQ-2s.

They are still right though. Attempting to defend Taiwan without attacking bases on the mainland would akin to Germany invading the USSR without attacking industry east of the Urals. But the US just isn't taking the challenge of striking the mainland seriously.

I don't think it would come to nuclear war because there is no way the CPC and PLA regard strikes on the mainland as something "forbidden" or "unacceptable." The entire point of expanding the PLARF's conventional strike capability was to destroy the bases in the 2IC necessary to launch those kinds of attacks; they know the US is likely to do that kind of thing. Tomahawks or JASSMs appearing over Shanghai isn't going to generate the same effect a Trident II heading for Moscow would.
there will be bombs in LA , Seatle etc if a single bomb is dropped in Shanghai , i'm pretty sure about that. Not sure if NY will get one, but no later than 30s, NY will also be bombed, with conventional bomb, there will be no possiblity that US could bomb China without sequence, not any more , not any longer, and indeed, I hope that will happen . Or , there is no reason to attack US. Any bomb on China main land will have its consequnces, will turn the whole country into what you wont' hope to recognize.
 

MC530

New Member
Registered Member
No one is ever willing to make that gamble, because the fallout (no pun intended) if you gambled wrong is unacceptable.
War and international politics are inherently games; gambling is a pattern. Was Kennedy gambling in 1962? The world waited with bated breath for the outcome.

This time, Mr. Trump has chosen to gamble with the entire world, with losers paying. The only country willing to raise the stakes to 145% is China, and the consequences aren't that unacceptable.

There's no need to play by someone else's rules. As long as we have sufficient strength, any rules can be negotiated—after all, strength represents the true "unacceptable consequences."

China can now negotiate with the United States: The open-air launch towers deployed in the desert west of Lanzhou will not have any liquid-fueled rockets equipped with nuclear warheads. This is the new rule of the game.

Essentially, this is a bunch of B2s. Everyone knows they can carry nuclear warheads and were originally designed for strategic strikes. But now, no one "wants to believe" the B2 is capable of carrying nuclear warheads. This is because after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, no one launched nuclear retaliation against B2 attacks. This is the American rule, and it could also be the Chinese rule.
 
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Wrought

Senior Member
Registered Member
A report on the need for a new force structure for USAF in the face of a peer-level contested battlespace. I quite like it. Distilled down to first principles, it argues that instead of relying on pure airpower->air control for everything, what USAF really needs is lots of GBAD, lots of standoff strikes, and a smaller fleet of air superiority fighters which only fights when conditions are appropriate. Such a force structure is far better optimized for protracted high-intensity conflict, at the cost of conceding theatre-level control of the air in favor of temporary and contested windows of opportunity.

It's a fundamentally solid argument which recognizes that you can't just bulldoze your way through peer-level opposition by virtue of superior everything. Otherwise the opposition wouldn't be peers, now would they? More importantly, and ironically, it's the exact force structure long employed by the PLA. It's why PLAGF/PLAAF operate so many air defense units. It's why PLARF exists. It's why PLAAF is weighted so heavily on air superiority platforms over strike. It's the right way to conceptualize and fight a genuine peer.

That being said, if you choose to fight a equal opponent on highly unequal terrain—like say, his front yard—then you will lose. Because then it's no longer a contest of equals.

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tamsen_ikard

Senior Member
Registered Member
A report on the need for a new force structure for USAF in the face of a peer-level contested battlespace. I quite like it. Distilled down to first principles, it argues that instead of relying on pure airpower->air control for everything, what USAF really needs is lots of GBAD, lots of standoff strikes, and a smaller fleet of air superiority fighters which only fights when conditions are appropriate. Such a force structure is far better optimized for protracted high-intensity conflict, at the cost of conceding theatre-level control of the air in favor of temporary and contested windows of opportunity.

It's a fundamentally solid argument which recognizes that you can't just bulldoze your way through peer-level opposition by virtue of superior everything. Otherwise the opposition wouldn't be peers, now would they? More importantly, and ironically, it's the exact force structure long employed by the PLA. It's why PLAGF/PLAAF operate so many air defense units. It's why PLARF exists. It's why PLAAF is weighted so heavily on air superiority platforms over strike. It's the right way to conceptualize and fight a genuine peer.

That being said, if you choose to fight a equal opponent on highly unequal terrain—like say, his front yard—then you will lose. Because then it's no longer a contest of equals.

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So in order to fight the PLA, USAF wants to become the PLA.

Here is the problem though, USAF already has just 1200 fighters with most of it old. They can't reduce that down even more.

The only thing they can do then to free up resources is to give up on the tankers and transporters. If they get rid of those to free up manpower and money, they can buy more air defense with it.

So, that says goodbye to their so called global expedition capability.

How can they fight in westpac without the tankers and the transporters. How can they bring in supplies.

Are they willing to give up on the tankers and transporters?
 

gelgoog

Lieutenant General
Registered Member
It is a big mistake. The strategy of using fighters and airpower is fine for a country like the US with its vast holdings. But for it to work they need to maintain the numeric and qualitative edge over all possible opponents. Which the US MIC has failed to deliver in terms of platforms since the Cold War ended. They cannot produce anything that is cost effective.
 

drowingfish

Senior Member
Registered Member
A report on the need for a new force structure for USAF in the face of a peer-level contested battlespace. I quite like it. Distilled down to first principles, it argues that instead of relying on pure airpower->air control for everything, what USAF really needs is lots of GBAD, lots of standoff strikes, and a smaller fleet of air superiority fighters which only fights when conditions are appropriate. Such a force structure is far better optimized for protracted high-intensity conflict, at the cost of conceding theatre-level control of the air in favor of temporary and contested windows of opportunity.

It's a fundamentally solid argument which recognizes that you can't just bulldoze your way through peer-level opposition by virtue of superior everything. Otherwise the opposition wouldn't be peers, now would they? More importantly, and ironically, it's the exact force structure long employed by the PLA. It's why PLAGF/PLAAF operate so many air defense units. It's why PLARF exists. It's why PLAAF is weighted so heavily on air superiority platforms over strike. It's the right way to conceptualize and fight a genuine peer.

That being said, if you choose to fight a equal opponent on highly unequal terrain—like say, his front yard—then you will lose. Because then it's no longer a contest of equals.

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This wont work:

1. doing so will deplete their ability to enforce their rule over other regions, it essentially turns into a China do nothing - win scenario again everywhere. Goes back to a recurring theme of the US losing their grip elsewhere trying to contain China, only to get pulled away from China because they are losing grip.

2. China is too large and too well fortified for this long range strike capability to work. long range strike pre-supposes that your enemy has some vulnerabilities for you to strike at. Barring nukes, how would the US employ this supposed strike capability against China?

3. Even assume that it all works, it is a very expensive undertaking. very difficult to make that transition.
 

Jason_

Junior Member
Registered Member
A report on the need for a new force structure for USAF in the face of a peer-level contested battlespace. I quite like it. Distilled down to first principles, it argues that instead of relying on pure airpower->air control for everything, what USAF really needs is lots of GBAD, lots of standoff strikes, and a smaller fleet of air superiority fighters which only fights when conditions are appropriate. Such a force structure is far better optimized for protracted high-intensity conflict, at the cost of conceding theatre-level control of the air in favor of temporary and contested windows of opportunity.

It's a fundamentally solid argument which recognizes that you can't just bulldoze your way through peer-level opposition by virtue of superior everything. Otherwise the opposition wouldn't be peers, now would they? More importantly, and ironically, it's the exact force structure long employed by the PLA. It's why PLAGF/PLAAF operate so many air defense units. It's why PLARF exists. It's why PLAAF is weighted so heavily on air superiority platforms over strike. It's the right way to conceptualize and fight a genuine peer.

That being said, if you choose to fight a equal opponent on highly unequal terrain—like say, his front yard—then you will lose. Because then it's no longer a contest of equals.

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I read this garbage and no where did the author explain in detail what actual, realistic, physically-possible systems the "edge" force is supposed to be made of. And like all stupid tank analysis, they completely ignored technological growth on the PLA side.
 
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