PLA strike strategies in westpac HIC

Biscuits

Major
Registered Member
I don't think they care about historic parallels. Historic parallel would only matter if US out industry muscles China like how they did with Imperial Japan, because it might galvanise US into mobilising their industry. Whereas in China's situation, they don't care if US mobilises their whole industry because China will also do the same.

Besides, China has no known offensive plans as of now. So a strike on Pearl would only be an answer on initial US aggression, it would not be a sucker punch, rather it's just hooking America in the face after US sucker punched first.

I think China would employ any method such as using containerized cruise missiles and drones to hit US home targets if US actually committed to a war. The situation would be desparate enough to warrant any and all methods being used to hold off the enemy, it's not like China has such overwhelming force that they can afford to treat a conflict with America as a "brotherly war" where they purposefully hold back.
 

plawolf

Lieutenant General
Hitting Pearl is an objective for the PLAN for the same reason that hitting Chinese ports is an objective for the USN. It's not a "sucker punch" if you delete the opposition's assets in port, it's the opposition's job to protect their own ports.

With that said, hitting deployed fleets/assets is also (obviously) a critical objective. No one is saying you over-index on one and ignore the other.

My point is hitting enemy assets at base really should only be considered as a nice bonus rather than forming the cornerstone of your entire battle plan.

The alpha strike against US forward bases should be aimed primarily to knock those bases out and remove them from the equation. You would not expect to be able to catch enemy principle fleet strengths as sitting ducks on port once hostilities have commenced unless you were planning a Pearl Harbour 2.0 surprise alpha strike, which would be stupid.

For such a war, China really needs to be planning for the worst case scenario, which is that every USN principle surface combatant is out at sea by the time the call is given for the alpha strike.

As such, the proper use of 093Bs should be to help detect and interdict enemy fleet strengths at sea, rather than hope on catching them helpless at port.

That’s not saying multi-vector time-on-target attacks are not worth investing in, it’s just 093Bs would be the wrong asset to tailor for such a role.

That kind of mission would be ideal for a submarine drone arsenal ship. One that can have greater endurance than any SSN due to the lack of a crew; something you can stuff to the gills with VLS and cruise missiles for maximum effect; and also something that is ultimately expendable.
 

ACuriousPLAFan

Brigadier
Registered Member
Slightly deviating from the discussion here, but there is something that I would like to talk about one of the IRBMs of the PLARF, i.e. DF-26.

The DF-26 IRBM has been widely known as the "Guam Express" or "Guam Killer" - Mainly because Guam and US warships sailing around the same distances from China are meant to be covered within the firing range of the DF-26.

The publically available values on the range of the DF-26 is around 4500-5000 kilometers. However, the distance between Guam and Shanghai is only around 3000 kilometers.

Of course, you would have around 1500-2000 kilometers of buffer zone that the PLARF could use, for instance, to station DF-26 TEL launchers deep inside China's interior and better shield them against American and Japanese strikes coming from the seas to the east - Which is a very good thing. However, allocating so much buffer distances for the DF-26 just doesn't seem right if the IRBM is indeed only meant for targets as far out as Guam.

Therefore, I took some look around the Westpac, and this one - Wake Island - caught my attention. As seen with the bird-eye-view of the island, there is a sizeable USAF military base on Wake.
Wake_Island_air.jpeg

Wake Island is located around 3/5th the way from Hawaii to Guam, and is around 4700 kilometers away from Shanghai. That would mean if we take the maximum range of DF-26 and project it all the way to Wake, that would leave around 300 kilometers of buffer zone from the Chinese coast.

Of course, I would like to stress that the 5000 kilometers-range may very well be achievable only if the DF-26 has a lighter payload, and that having heavier payload would restrict the DF-26's range to just Guam. There is also the point where 4700 kilometers is basically nearing the edge of the 5000-kilometer-range effective coverage of the DF-26.

However, even if the above assumptions are indeed true, I couldn't find the justification that even if the DF-26 is really meant for targets as far out as Guam - Would require such long range of coverage.

There is also the actions taken by the US military to expand operations and reinforce the defences on Wake:
NED-1905-Wake-Island-Fortification-map_3JXGJWskq8.jpg

We know that the US military has been working to disperse and strengthen their assets across the WestPac in face of the ever-growing threats by the PLARF and PLAAF against key US military installations along the First and Second Island Chains.

Have a look at this map illustration.
IslandChainProgression.jpg
Blue dot refer to Hawaii; Red dot refer to Wake; Green dot refer to Guam; and Purple dots refer to Yokosuka+Yokota, Kadena and Tindal, respectively.

You can note that Guam is essentially a key node for US military forces to move about in the Westpac. Meanwhile, Wake is a stepping stone between Guam and Hawaii. Also noted is the stage-by-stage east-to-west deployment of US power projection across the Pacific.

In this context, Wake could become very useful as a standby frontline military command and operation basing location. To put it simply, in case everything within the First and Second Island Chain are rendered inoperable by PLA strikes, the command and operation basing centers on Guam can be evacuated to the secondary location on Wake. In essence, Wake can be considered as an extension of the Second Island Chain.

Therefore, if the US military base on Wake could also be knocked out of commission with the DF-26, the remaining choice left for the US military would be to have their command and operation basing center retreated back to Hawaii.

This makes me think that the designers and engineers for the DF-26 could very well have took the capability of striking Wake Island into serious account when setting parameters for the missile. Perhaps the DF-26 shouldn't be called "Guam Killer", but instead "Guam Killer-but-don't-ever-think-that-Wake-is-safe-from-PLARF".

But even if the DF-26 currently in service with the PLARF does not have sufficient range to reach Wake, or the cost-to-payload ratio of the DF-26 may not be feasible enough to justify such strike missions - Perhaps future/WIP variants of the DF-26 (e.g. DF-26A/B) with longer ranges and larger payload capacity certainly could allow Wake to be targeted more easily.

I know that there are other DF missiles which are definitely more comfortable with covering Wake i.e. DF-31, DF-41 and the upcoming DF-27. However, this post is just touching more on the DF-26's potential capabilities in long-range WestPac strike missions on my own initative.
 
Last edited:

Mohsin77

Senior Member
Registered Member
My point is hitting enemy assets at base really should only be considered as a nice bonus rather than forming the cornerstone of your entire battle plan.

It's neither a cornerstone, nor a 'bonus'. It's an important objective, along with hitting deployed assets.

For such a war, China really needs to be planning for the worst case scenario, which is that every USN principle surface combatant is out at sea by the time the call is given for the alpha strike.

It needs to plan for all scenarios; however steer the opening towards those scenarios which have the highest probability of a win. The farther down the worse-scenario-list the opening is, the less the chances of victory in the late-game.
 

Michaelsinodef

Senior Member
Registered Member
The fact that the US is investing so much in facilities beyond 1IC such as Tindall, Wake, Palau and Guam suggests that they don't expect the facilities on the 1IC to last very long in a shooting war.
Just from Patch's posts, it's pretty clear the US can see how the PLA can basically generate 'overwhelming fires' (basically attacks with a variety of missiles) against targets within the 1 IC.

So yea, pretty unrealistic that they can survive the onset of hostilities.
 

Pacific

New Member
Registered Member
Slightly deviating from the discussion here, but there is something that I would like to talk about one of the IRBMs of the PLARF, i.e. DF-26.

The DF-26 IRBM has been widely known as the "Guam Express" or "Guam Killer" - Mainly because Guam and US warships sailing around the same distances from China are meant to be covered within the firing range of the DF-26.

The publically available values on the range of the DF-26 is around 4500-5000 kilometers. However, the distance between Guam and Shanghai is only around 3000 kilometers.

Of course, you would have around 1500-2000 kilometers of buffer zone that the PLARF could use, for instance, to station DF-26 TEL launchers deep inside China's interior and better shield them against American and Japanese strikes coming from the seas to the east - Which is a very good thing. However, allocating so much buffer distances for the DF-26 just doesn't seem right if the IRBM is indeed only meant for targets as far out as Guam.

Therefore, I took some look around the Westpac, and this one - Wake Island - caught my attention. As seen with the bird-eye-view of the island, there is a sizeable USAF military base on Wake.
View attachment 104648

Wake Island is located around 3/5th the way from Hawaii to Guam, and is around 4700 kilometers away from Shanghai. That would mean if we take the maximum range of DF-26 and project it all the way to Wake, that would leave around 300 kilometers of buffer zone from the Chinese coast.

Of course, I would like to stress that the 5000 kilometers-range may very well be achievable only if the DF-26 has a lighter payload, and that having heavier payload would restrict the DF-26's range to just Guam. There is also the point where 4700 kilometers is basically nearing the edge of the 5000-kilometer-range effective coverage of the DF-26.

However, even if the above assumptions are indeed true, I couldn't find the justification that even if the DF-26 is really meant for targets as far out as Guam - Would require such long range of coverage.

There is also the actions taken by the US military to expand operations and reinforce the defences on Wake:
View attachment 104650

We know that the US military has been working to disperse and strengthen their assets across the WestPac in face of the ever-growing threats by the PLARF and PLAAF against key US military installations along the First and Second Island Chains.

Have a look at this map illustration.
View attachment 104652
Blue dot refer to Hawaii; Red dot refer to Wake; Green dot refer to Guam; and Purple dots refer to Yokosuka+Yokota, Kadena and Tindal, respectively.

You can note that Guam is essentially a key node for US military forces to move about in the Westpac. Meanwhile, Wake is a stepping stone between Guam and Hawaii. Also noted is the stage-by-stage east-to-west deployment of US power projection across the Pacific.

In this context, Wake could become very useful as a standby frontline military command and operation basing location. To put it simply, in case everything within the First and Second Island Chain are rendered inoperable by PLA strikes, the command and operation basing centers on Guam can be evacuated to the secondary location on Wake. In essence, Wake can be considered as an extension of the Second Island Chain.

Therefore, if the US military base on Wake could also be knocked out of commission with the DF-26, the remaining choice left for the US military would be to have their command and operation basing center retreated back to Hawaii.

This makes me think that the designers and engineers for the DF-26 could very well have took the capability of striking Wake Island into serious account when setting parameters for the missile. Perhaps the DF-26 shouldn't be called "Guam Killer", but instead "Guam Killer-but-don't-ever-think-that-Wake-is-safe-from-PLARF".

But even if the DF-26 currently in service with the PLARF does not have sufficient range to reach Wake, or the cost-to-payload ratio of the DF-26 may not be feasible enough to justify such strike missions - Perhaps future/WIP variants of the DF-26 (e.g. DF-26A/B) with longer ranges and larger payload capacity certainly could allow Wake to be targeted more easily.

I know that there are other DF missiles which are definitely more comfortable with covering Wake i.e. DF-31, DF-41 and the upcoming DF-27. However, this post is just touching more on the DF-26's potential capabilities in long-range WestPac strike missions on my own initative.
There are other locations around the 2IC other than the 4 islands in Guam/the Marianas as well.

Minamitorishima (Marcus Island)Existing Military Airport~3200km from Shanghai
Iwo JimaExisting Military Airport~2000km
Ogasawara/HahajimaUnsuitable for Airport construction without large scale engineering work~2000km
Colonia (Micronesia)Small Civilian Airport (Suitable for Expansion)~3000km
PalauSmall Civilian Airport (Suitable for Expansion)~3000km
Pohnpei (Micronesia)Small Civilian Airport (Suitable for Expansion with some engineering work))~4600km

And don't forget Okinotorishima. ~1900km

Which is why its funny to see Japan complain about China in the SCS when they claim this "island" exerts a EEZ.

I expect to see the US pressure Japan to improve military infrastructures at these locations.

I expect the US to pressure Palau and Micronesia to allow the US to upgrade and station forces at those locations as well.
 

tphuang

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
VIP Professional
Registered Member
It's amazing, we have people here that don't want to hit easy targets in the port or docks before they are ready to sale out. You guys might want to look at how old some of these ships are, how hard is navy ride them on the long missions and how much time they need to spend in docks for repairs afterwards. You also might want to look up how long it takes ships to leave their ports and how long it takes to get fleet ready for combat.

Oh and also, plan will definitely pick a time to start conflict that's most advantageous for itself. That means more of its force is available and less of us military is available to fight.
Also having ports on an island doesn't make them suitable locations to operate. These places are not setup for sustainment. They also don't have enough people around that can fix up the facilities after they get hit. These things are not that straight forward.
 

plawolf

Lieutenant General


It's amazing, we have people here that don't want to hit easy targets in the port or docks before they are ready to sale out.

No, it’s a matter of priorities. Such targets would be a nice bonus, but your entire strategy should not depend on being able to hit the enemy fleet like that.


You guys might want to look at how old some of these ships are, how hard is navy ride them on the long missions and how much time they need to spend in docks for repairs afterwards. You also might want to look up how long it takes ships to leave their ports and how long it takes to get fleet ready for combat.

So, you want the PLAN to use some of their newest, most capable and most important naval assets to hit ships that are essentially out of commission and unlikely to play any role in the war?

Given the vast number and variety of other strike options the PLA have for such sitting duck targets, why do you need to task 093Bs for this? Just to overkill them 4 times instead of 3?

Oh and also, plan will definitely pick a time to start conflict that's most advantageous for itself. That means more of its force is available and less of us military is available to fight.

And I’m sure the USN would be most accommodating and place itself at a position of maximum vulnerability at the best time for China to attack. You don’t do planning like that!

Besides, the odds are that it will be America who would initiate the fight, because time is on China’s side and Chinese leaders have more patience than American ones. If China was to pick and chose the time for the fight, it would do so at a point where it’s basically guaranteed America would not dare to get directly involved as the odds would be so overwhelmingly against them.

If America gets to pick and choose when to start the fight, of course they are not going to do it with a bunch of its fleet out of commission and placed nearly within range of Chinese missiles at port!
 

bebops

Junior Member
Registered Member
How do you win a war against a big adversary like USA? A lot of swarms, unmanned partners or machines and "super low cost long range fast" missile to deplete your adversary high cost defense missiles or system. An example would be 20k dollar iran drone vs 1 missile dollar defense missile. Everyone knows there's a limited amount of missile one can produce and store. The more expensive a missile cost, the less it produce.

Deplete all your enemy missile on the cheap then you have big winning chance
 
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