According to TSTO from Guancha, PLA is procuring lots of DF-17s
That doesn't address what I wrote.
If you agree with my position, a "fair enough" is fine.
According to TSTO from Guancha, PLA is procuring lots of DF-17s
I do agree. It will mean the start of an arm race the moment one side starts to procure lots of weapons and it is money wasted on weapons instead of developing the economy and invest in R & DThat doesn't address what I wrote.
If you agree with my position, a "fair enough" is fine.
The last part is key. If there are any competent short-range air defence or anti-drone systems remaining.
Remember that these air defences will have to reveal themselves when they engage.
And presumably the PLAAF will have something like air superiority over the skies of Taiwan and have SEAD assets in play.
If you have drones acting as $10K guided missiles, you don't mind if many get shot down because there are lots more available. If a single J-16 costs $80 Million, you could buy 8000 Mugin 5 drones for example which would be enough to overwhelm any air defence.
I've previously pointed out that the cost of commercial drones is really low and how it would be straightforward to repurpose them for military use.
This type of Mugen drone also has enough range to reach South Korea
And if you made a somewhat bigger drone, it could have a 1000km range which means Japan is now in reach.
Yes, they've actually replaced a few Bdes with DF-17s in the past few years; especially DF-11 and DF-15 Bdes. One of the prevalent thoughts is that they're semi-standardizing their BM fleet. There's a common medium range booster, a common intermediate range booster, and potentially air/naval-launched versions of each (potentially the basis of H-6N's ALBM and the """"YJ-21"""" we've seen). There are also conventional MaRV warheads for both (DF-16 and conventional DF-26), an HGV payload which we know as the DF-17, and an anti shipping payload (potentially CH-AS-X-13 warhead and the DF-26's anti-shipping warhead). This gives each Brigade a lot more versatility in the event of a conflict, and allows for much more rapid retasking of rocket force fires, as all the work to integrate the various warheads can (most likely) be conducted in the Technical Bn/Comprehensive Support Bn's mating facilities.
What would be nice on a Chinese cheap recon drone is optical telescope and camera, IR telescope and camera, laser designator and a coordinate finder kit (laser rangefinder, Beidou receiver, electronic compass and altimeter to establish 3D position, angle to target and range to target) in addition to a high efficiency rotary engine for long time on station.China needs a modified mass produced drone but with military grade communication link. Not this civilian fluff which can be jammed or intercepted easily. It would be as simple as software change to the software defined radio.
I would not say the DJI drone is 100% better than Orlan-10 because it lacks the laser target designator. Without the laser designator the accuracy in pointing a target will be a bit hit and miss. The main advantage is it is way cheaper and easier to recover. Likely also more portable. The control unit for Orlan-10 seems to be a laptop. The Russian Army needs to move to ruggedized tablets I think.
Orlan-10's combustion engine will mean it will have more range, but also noisier and likely easier to spot as a result.
In the software Tempest and I built with genuinely awesome folks from 6th Intelligence Squadron (and which we're - as part of that super secret big project - are going to be tidying up and releasing as a public tool/"game" ),
So... moral of the story: "in milshit, the answer is almost always 'it's complicated,' and single, public, consistent, and meaningful performance metrics are vanishingly rare."
Not as much as you may think. The need for supporting infrastructure, decent throughput + paved (if overland) + resilient sustainment vectors, radio, satcom, and datalink emissions, topographic challenges (can't launch an IRBM in trees, can't drive a ROGUE fires JLTV over swamplands, and can't improvise an airstrip in hills), and more all make DMO/EABO/ACE+ACO very anemic CONOPs.
I had a good talk with some folks from PACAF a few days ago while I was in DC where we discussed the sustainment requirements for even a single fighter squadron being all but unsupportable even in as ideal of a spot as Luzon. Getting the requisite materiel not only to whatever improvised port is offloading cargo, but doing so in the face of the PLA's anti-shipping complex, but then to transport it inland to dispersed, ostensibly """""concealed""""" forces is a huge logistical obstacle to sortie and fires generation.
The need to support personnel and operations is also a significant challenge. There's a reason PLARF Brigades require such extensive facilities after all. Munition inspection, transport, and mating; vehicle fueling, maintenance, and crewing; and all the other aspects of effectively employing standoff munitions via mobile TELs are the kinds of things that don't come cheap. Not in money, manning, or infrastructure. NMESIS is certainly making strides, but the reality of it is, a 100nm buffer around most landmasses isn't especially big; and the actual, in practice volume of fires that can be generated is not sufficient to seriously impede PLAN operations.
All of the aforementioned emissions are also a problem. ELINT/COMINT is sort of an area in which the PLA excels, and they have an amply large inventory of platforms capable of facilitating it. Command and control of these forces would necessitate them speaking over SATCOM or other very-much-NOT-LPI solution. The cueing process would require either manual programming of the munition with information provided over the C3 network, or the presence of a datalink, which - sadly - would most likely be LINK16; and LINK16 is about as far from LPI as you can get these days, as an omnidirectional not-at-all-inconspicuous xmission. The reason F-22s are only capable of receiving LINK16 data as of Update 6, but explicitly unable to Xmit, is because it would give away their location. Theoretically some more modern LPD waveforms can be integrated into the LINK16 architecture, and that sorta stuff is planned for the future, but we're a ways off.
All of this comes together to create a low-effectiveness, logistically unsustainable, vulnerable, semi-concealed force that can only really operate as a pest/deterrent rather than as a meaningful contributor to local combat power.
As much as I wish you were right, you're not.
The Philippines have explicitly banned US Bases as part of their new constitution, and we're only allowed to set foot on their soil due to the Visiting Forces Agreement. In the 2010s they began allowing the US to use Subic Bay to make port calls as long as we seek and obtain prior approval from the PH government, but that's all. The only notable time we've used it in support of operations has been to host transitory supplies and servicemen for a joint exercise in 2015 In total we have less than 200 servicemen in the Philippines (practically all of whom are there as advisors/trainers to support the PH's fight against ISIS), of which only 10 are from the Navy.
We do not have any major military presence in the PH, and this article (notably by Stripes lol) is just referencing a comment about the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. During a thinktank's discussion on that agreement, the ambassador to the US simply said they "plan" to move fairly quickly. However, that statement doesn't mean very much. The agreement was signed in 2014, and simply allows the US to build facilities for servicemen and supplies in 5 Philippine bases. That never ended up being done, and has been subject to pretty much constant political friction from/in the Philippines - especially lately due to the election.
All of this comes together to create a low-effectiveness, logistically unsustainable, vulnerable, semi-concealed force that can only really operate as a pest/deterrent rather than as a meaningful contributor to local combat power.
This would be funneled into procurement for standoff naval mines (Korea is, kinda humorously, super well positioned to launch large numbers of such systems into the Bohai Sea/East China Sea border with the aim of complicating naval operations), ground launch VLO cruise missile with sufficient range to target Northeastern Chinese critical infrastructure and C2 facilities, and for a production apparatus capable of generating a large inventory of these systems, which will be stored in dispersed locations throughout the country.
This would provide those types of nations with a significant retaliatory capability, ample longevity for it, and would not significantly impede conventional military operation. However, it's a half measure. The 70% of remaining aerial inventory, and the 75% of remaining land force systems are still going to be sitting around, doing next to nothing for the majority of - if not the entire - conflict. I'm sure you see what I'm getting at.
Not as much as you may think. CVNs operating at standoff distance from the PRC are able to generate pretty poor sortie volumes (I wouldn't put it much above 85-100 sorties per day per carrier at surge tempo), and with the majority of closer-in infrastructure destroyed or disabled, there is a very limited amount of basing available for air operations. At this rate, the US is essentially unable to operate in the WESTPAC anywhere near the first island chain. Regardless of initial circumstance, anything other than a ludicrously heavy forward presence, PLA bad luck and poor decision making, and god's blessing will result in the PLA thrashing 7FLT AOR forces, and essentially leaves Guam as the westernmost major military facility (i guess excluding Australia). Whether the US can muster forces and wear the PLA down is somewhat doubtful, but it's essentially the only chance we've got, since the "fast war" concept is a near total losing game.